In George Kennan's original conception of containment, and in the first 5 years years of the Truman Presidency, neither thought that an unlimited commitment to resisting Communist expansion wherever it threatened was viable.
Both stressed Europe and Japan over, for example, China and the rest of the Asian mainland.
With NSC 68 and the outbreak of the Korean War, these limits came off containment, and the US had a policy until the end of the Vietnam War of opposing Communism in any place in the world where Communist and noncommunist forces contended, no matter how economically important or unimportant the area was. This commitment extended to a string of regional defense pacts (CENTO and SEATO in addition to NATO and the US treaties with South Korea and Chinese Taipei in addition to the treaty with Japan) and two land wars in Asia.
With a PoD after September 1945, and without reduction in the ambitions of Communist Parties around the world or the ambitions of the Soviet Union, Communist China or North Korea, could America plausibly have kept its pre-1950 containment policy limited to a set of predefined vital areas, and reluctantly accepted Communist gains in non-vital areas without committing to wars to stop those gains?
The most practical expression of this is the U.S. is unwilling to fight or make binding alliances or major in Korea, Southeast Asia (bar the Phillippines) or South Asia (ie, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India).
Is this plausible? Why or why not?
Anticipating questions on what this means, here is a quick review from an old post of mine of what Kennan (and to a great extent, the Truman Administration) considered "vital" and "not vital" to American interests, from an old post of mine:
Both stressed Europe and Japan over, for example, China and the rest of the Asian mainland.
With NSC 68 and the outbreak of the Korean War, these limits came off containment, and the US had a policy until the end of the Vietnam War of opposing Communism in any place in the world where Communist and noncommunist forces contended, no matter how economically important or unimportant the area was. This commitment extended to a string of regional defense pacts (CENTO and SEATO in addition to NATO and the US treaties with South Korea and Chinese Taipei in addition to the treaty with Japan) and two land wars in Asia.
With a PoD after September 1945, and without reduction in the ambitions of Communist Parties around the world or the ambitions of the Soviet Union, Communist China or North Korea, could America plausibly have kept its pre-1950 containment policy limited to a set of predefined vital areas, and reluctantly accepted Communist gains in non-vital areas without committing to wars to stop those gains?
The most practical expression of this is the U.S. is unwilling to fight or make binding alliances or major in Korea, Southeast Asia (bar the Phillippines) or South Asia (ie, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India).
Is this plausible? Why or why not?
Anticipating questions on what this means, here is a quick review from an old post of mine of what Kennan (and to a great extent, the Truman Administration) considered "vital" and "not vital" to American interests, from an old post of mine:
According to John Lewis Gaddis's "Strategies of Containtment", George
Kennan originally proposed that it was a vital US interest to keep the
following centers of industrial production outside of Soviet control:
North America, Western Europe, Britain and Japan. Because so much
industry and skilled manpower was there, they ranked head and
shoulders above the rest of the world in terms of strategic
importance.
Gaddis, representing the historiographical tendency of
"post-revisionism", agreed that this was correct, and tended to
interpret US actions in the industrial core areas of Europe and Japan
as necessary and moral, while US policy towards the periphery was more
often foolish, unnecessary or immoral. Steven Van Evera was also part
of this school.
According to Gaddis's book, Kennan listed some non-industrial areas
that were also vital for western defense because of their location or
petroleum resources. All together, he though the following parts of
the world "mattered":
1. North America
2. Britain
3. Western Europe
4. The Soviet Union
5. Japan
6. the Middle East, from Iran to Morrocco
7. The West Coast of Africa
8. the eastern and northern coasts of South America
9. Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean
10. The Philippines
11. Australia and New Zealand
The rest, according to his thinking, could go hang.1
Notable among these "leftovers" are:
China (including Taiwan), Korea, the Indian subcontinent to include
Afghanistan and Southeast Asia (except for the Philippines)
It wasn't worth fighting over, and would not be easy for any outside
power to control in Kennan's view.
Ironically the Cold War's Hot Wars were fought in the non-vital
regions of Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan.
So, here the challenge, create a *plausible* scenario for the US to
adopt a firm, selective strategy of containment for the vital regions,
while keeping as low a profile for the US as possible in the
peripheral regions.
Kennan originally proposed that it was a vital US interest to keep the
following centers of industrial production outside of Soviet control:
North America, Western Europe, Britain and Japan. Because so much
industry and skilled manpower was there, they ranked head and
shoulders above the rest of the world in terms of strategic
importance.
Gaddis, representing the historiographical tendency of
"post-revisionism", agreed that this was correct, and tended to
interpret US actions in the industrial core areas of Europe and Japan
as necessary and moral, while US policy towards the periphery was more
often foolish, unnecessary or immoral. Steven Van Evera was also part
of this school.
According to Gaddis's book, Kennan listed some non-industrial areas
that were also vital for western defense because of their location or
petroleum resources. All together, he though the following parts of
the world "mattered":
1. North America
2. Britain
3. Western Europe
4. The Soviet Union
5. Japan
6. the Middle East, from Iran to Morrocco
7. The West Coast of Africa
8. the eastern and northern coasts of South America
9. Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean
10. The Philippines
11. Australia and New Zealand
The rest, according to his thinking, could go hang.1
Notable among these "leftovers" are:
China (including Taiwan), Korea, the Indian subcontinent to include
Afghanistan and Southeast Asia (except for the Philippines)
It wasn't worth fighting over, and would not be easy for any outside
power to control in Kennan's view.
Ironically the Cold War's Hot Wars were fought in the non-vital
regions of Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan.
So, here the challenge, create a *plausible* scenario for the US to
adopt a firm, selective strategy of containment for the vital regions,
while keeping as low a profile for the US as possible in the
peripheral regions.