Plausibility Check- US pursues highly selective containment in Cold War

The US plausibly could have had Cold War containment without land wars in Asia?

  • Yes, this is plausible

    Votes: 3 50.0%
  • Yes, but only under the right set of domestic political circumstances

    Votes: 1 16.7%
  • Yes, but only under the right set of international diplomatic circumstances

    Votes: 1 16.7%
  • No, the logic of containment anywhere, and extended deterrence, compelled containment everywhere

    Votes: 1 16.7%

  • Total voters
    6

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
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In George Kennan's original conception of containment, and in the first 5 years years of the Truman Presidency, neither thought that an unlimited commitment to resisting Communist expansion wherever it threatened was viable.

Both stressed Europe and Japan over, for example, China and the rest of the Asian mainland.

With NSC 68 and the outbreak of the Korean War, these limits came off containment, and the US had a policy until the end of the Vietnam War of opposing Communism in any place in the world where Communist and noncommunist forces contended, no matter how economically important or unimportant the area was. This commitment extended to a string of regional defense pacts (CENTO and SEATO in addition to NATO and the US treaties with South Korea and Chinese Taipei in addition to the treaty with Japan) and two land wars in Asia.

With a PoD after September 1945, and without reduction in the ambitions of Communist Parties around the world or the ambitions of the Soviet Union, Communist China or North Korea, could America plausibly have kept its pre-1950 containment policy limited to a set of predefined vital areas, and reluctantly accepted Communist gains in non-vital areas without committing to wars to stop those gains?

The most practical expression of this is the U.S. is unwilling to fight or make binding alliances or major in Korea, Southeast Asia (bar the Phillippines) or South Asia (ie, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India).

Is this plausible? Why or why not?

Anticipating questions on what this means, here is a quick review from an old post of mine of what Kennan (and to a great extent, the Truman Administration) considered "vital" and "not vital" to American interests, from an old post of mine:

According to John Lewis Gaddis's "Strategies of Containtment", George
Kennan originally proposed that it was a vital US interest to keep the
following centers of industrial production outside of Soviet control:
North America, Western Europe, Britain and Japan. Because so much
industry and skilled manpower was there, they ranked head and
shoulders above the rest of the world in terms of strategic
importance.

Gaddis, representing the historiographical tendency of
"post-revisionism", agreed that this was correct, and tended to
interpret US actions in the industrial core areas of Europe and Japan
as necessary and moral, while US policy towards the periphery was more
often foolish, unnecessary or immoral. Steven Van Evera was also part
of this school.

According to Gaddis's book, Kennan listed some non-industrial areas
that were also vital for western defense because of their location or
petroleum resources. All together, he though the following parts of
the world "mattered":

1. North America
2. Britain
3. Western Europe
4. The Soviet Union
5. Japan
6. the Middle East, from Iran to Morrocco
7. The West Coast of Africa
8. the eastern and northern coasts of South America
9. Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean
10. The Philippines
11. Australia and New Zealand

The rest, according to his thinking, could go hang.1
Notable among these "leftovers" are:
China (including Taiwan), Korea, the Indian subcontinent to include
Afghanistan and Southeast Asia (except for the Philippines)

It wasn't worth fighting over, and would not be easy for any outside
power to control in Kennan's view.

Ironically the Cold War's Hot Wars were fought in the non-vital
regions of Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan.

So, here the challenge, create a *plausible* scenario for the US to
adopt a firm, selective strategy of containment for the vital regions,
while keeping as low a profile for the US as possible in the
peripheral regions.
 
Well, I dont think one POD does it. It's not the blockade of Berlin, the fall of China, Korean War, or the Soviets get the bomb, but rather all of the above. While in hindsight the threat of communism looks less pronounced as Stalin's caution is now known, at the time he looked aggressive. And with the string of advances, to say nothing of events in Eastern Europe, it's hard to argue with the perception. Finally, politicians still suffer from "appeasement syndrome" so it's hard to fault anyone of the time from doing so given WWII was so fresh in their minds.

All that said, I think if you spread out the the Soviets getting the bomb, fall of China, and Korean War this might be doable. Too much too quickly otherwise.
 
One indication that containment could not be limited so neatly is that Kennan himself supported Truman's decision to use force in Korea in 1950:

"In 1950, Kennan's principles were sorely tested by the invasion of South Korea from the North. Initially, he supported a limited war in Korea. He believed that the attack gave U.S. military planners an opportunity to evaluate the Soviet Union as a hostile force in international relations. America's involvement in Korea was important because the future security and stability of Japan, within our containment strategy aimed at the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia, was at stake.4

"Also, a forceful response was necessary to protect America's commitment to stand by its allies, no matter how dubious the importance to our overall national security.5 Kennan believed that America's involvement extended only to restoring the status quo upon the Korean peninsula. He 'saw in the North Korean attack adequate reason for us to undertake military operations for this limited purpose. (He) did not see in it justification for involving ourselves in another world war.'"

https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1421&context=gvr
 
there's the question of just what will be considered as 'unimportant'. Vietnam and most of SE Asia certainly qualifies, but Thailand may not. The Middle East won't. Anywhere in the New World will not. Korea will not either, being so close to Japan. Seems like the 'go hang' places will be limited to SE Asia and parts of Africa...
 
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