Plausibility check: Total Polish victory against the Soviets?

In the Polish-Soviet War following right on the heels of WWI, Pilsudski's Poland attempted to establish the "Intermarium", an federation envisioned by Pilsudski as including Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, and a host of othet Central-Eastern European states. While the Poles ostensibly won, keeping gains in West Ukraine and Belarus and pushing the Reds out of Poland, Ukraine was partitioned by the two, while Lithuania remained cold to Poland.

I argue, however, that if the Poles had successfully fought off Red Army counterattacks in the Kiev Offensive, a Poland-dominated Ukraine and a kleinIntermarium, if you will, could have been established between Poland, Ukraine, Latvia, and possibly Lithuania (most unlikely).

Is this possible, in the forum's opinion? If so, what do you guys foresee as the effects on the Polish-led East, the USSR, and Europe as a whole?

Might make a TL if there's interest.
 
Didn't Lenin want to hand over a lot more of Ukraine and Belarus after Warsaw IOTL, only for the Endeks to turn him down to keep the non-Poles out of Poland?
 
Didn't Lenin want to hand over a lot more of Ukraine and Belarus after Warsaw IOTL, only for the Endeks to turn him down to keep the non-Poles out of Poland?
Essentially, Pilsudki's political opponents didn't want to weaken their electoral prowess within the country, nor did they wish to integrate regions into the country they thought difficult to "polonize". The Soviets themselves however seem to have been willing to essentially establish a border with Poland very much as it existed after the First Partition of the Commonwealth, more or less along the Daugava and Dnieper rivers. Assuming that is the case, what does that mean for Poland? Well:
  • The Ukrainian's in signing their military alliance with the Poles gave up any claim to what was Austrian Galicia or then the West Ukrainian People's Republic, in return for aid in establishing their own country. That does not exactly specify however what the total western border would be, only a small portion of it unless I'm mistaken as to the length of the Zubrach River, and I'm fairly certain there would remain a number of disputes between Poland and the Ukraine about the remainder (which Poland would likely win out given the Ukraine's need for Poland). I have no idea if Kiev was included in the negotiations (the Ukrainians certainly would have pushed for it had they been present), but it might be necessary in order to allow the Ukrainian People's Republic to be more than an odd appendage to Poland (never mind though that the Ukrainian military and economy was going to be bound to Poland by treaty after the war).
  • There wasn't any cooperation between the Belarussians and the Polish that I can find, least not at the level that existed between the Poles and the Ukrainians, but I feel it safe to assume that a similar deal ultimately will be worked out with the Belarussian government in exile as was worked out with the Ukrainian People's Republic; a guarantee of independence and protection in return for territorial adjustments favorable to Poland, as well as treaties significantly entwining Belarus's military and economy to the Polish Republic.
The problem from here though is, again, those associated with the National Democracy movement who concentrated upon a homogeneous Polish State, or the Popular National Union as their political arm was called. The only solution I can think of, but can offer not spark as to how best start it, is for groups like the Polish Socialist Party (which were more favorable to Pilsudki's foreign policy goals) to perform better in the 1919 Sejm elections, and so lessen the level of influence the Popular National Union has there, least enough to get the Treaty passed.

That said, this is all from an OTL perspective; if we are talking about the Poles managing to hold the line and not being driven back to Warsaw, it will probably be easier to get these terms as the political fallout that came with the near extinction of the Polish State won't stain Pilsudki's reputation among the National Democrats (though that may not have really mattered to most). Kiev would almost certainly be on the table for the Ukrainian's, with the potential of pushing the border to the Dnieper in totality (though that could be a stretch still).

In either case though, I think it would be safe to say that Poland's grip on Belarus and Ukraine would be fragile, as many would be opposed to the kind of economic and military domination that Pilsudki sought to impose upon them, even if the intention was for the benefit of those involved as a whole, and that includes as well those in Poland who want nothing to do with the "Border Wall" States. In time you might well see a renegotiation of the treaties involved that morphs into some combination of the European Union and NATO, where there is a lot of cooperation between these three States but none of them have direct powers over the others (at least de jure).
 
This is more or less what I mean in terms of borders, roughly. The Polish border with Belarus and Ukraine would likely not be the OTL Polish-Soviet border, a sizable portion of the eastern bank of the Dnieper would probably be ceded to the Ukraine as well if only to serve as a buffer zone in case of conflict, and it can be argued that the southern portion allotted to the Ukraine here would remain Soviet.

PADjbE6.png
 
my scenario is always Poland holds what they captured, possibly adding the rest of the territory west of Dnieper?

PBW_June_1920.png

and/or Romania joins in (opportunistically or defensively fearing Soviet advance west) then they reach the Black Sea whether any further territory west of Dnieper captured or not.

(not a stable long term situation, almost guaranteed to produce German-Soviet collaboration)
 
Some sort of federation or regional alliance would be needed for them to truly win. Just getting more territory would only mean they start running low on Poles. Having that republic they set up around Vilnus keep around might help, as would them putting the non-Polish parts of Galicia into its own state. Both would mean many Poles outside of Poland though, and the non-Polish Galicians had been seeing themselves more as Ukrainian back then. Sure, the Poles could try to push for memories or Ruthenia... But then that involves reminding them how badly they were treated.
 
Top