Plausibility Check: Broader Habsburg Compromise in 1867?

An expansion on my thread on alternatives to Bismark, I wanted to take a look at the results of a longer Austro-Prussian War; specifically, how it would exacerbate the financial hardships and domestic chaos Vienna experienced following the conflict that threatened to tear the Empire apart. I've been reading through The Habsburg Empire, A New History and it seems there was quite a bit of liberal protests from many quarters; not just the small Magyar elite pressing for independence, and that Austria's foreign creditors were making it clear that, to quote the Rothschilds "No Constitution, No Credit". Now, in our timeline Vienna managed to only have to strike a decentralization compromise with Hungary, giving them very broad autonomy from Austria in what was essentially a tight alliance/personal union, but in the event of even further damage to the regime would additional concessions have to be made to other Crownlands in order to maintain their loyalty? (Or, at the very least, if credit was unavailable to offload some of the central government's expenses onto the provinces and their local nobility/power brokers).

From what I read in the above mentioned book, the Diets of Bohemia and Moravia were both pushing for more liberal, pro-Czech legislation (Though Moravia wanted to maintain their traditional autonomy from Prague), which could make the lands of St. Wenceslaus a possibility as a third crown for Franz Joseph's head. Venetia too could be an option if for some reason it were to be kept out of Italy's hands for one reason or another (Perhaps with the new Maggior Consiglio being crafted as a laboratory to test a more liberal-representative model by the Empire, since it could be done without disrupting the established local elite unlike in the other provinces), while Gallicia is probably the longest shot.

Personally, I'm of the opinion that this is a real possibility if Vienna comes out of the conflict without a strong army to re-establish order, or ends up having to lean more heavily on locally raised troops/extra governmental volunteers to bail the country out of total defeat in the event somebody less willing to offer generous terms or stand up to the King in Prussia than Bismark pressed the war further, especially considering the Great Powers might consider the restoration of centeralization attempts an unessicery risk to the stability of A-H and, therefore, the security of the Balkans and Eastern Europe (Given how near-run a thing it was that Hungary stood down from a second shot at independence). Especially if the pot was sweetened by reform being tied to guarantees of territorial integrity and/or access to credit to rebuild the national infastructure (both physical and governmental). However, I'm somewhat biased given I have a certain desired result in mind, and so wanted to get some input from the community.
 
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An expansion on my thread on alternatives to Bismark, I wanted to take a look at the results of a longer Austro-Prussian War; specifically, how it would exacerbate the financial hardships and domestic chaos Vienna experienced following the conflict that threatened to tear the Empire apart. I've been reading through The Habsburg Empire, A New History and it seems there was quite a bit of liberal protests from many quarters; not just the small Magyar elite pressing for independence, and that Austria's foreign creditors were making it clear that, to quote the Rothschilds "No Constitution, No Credit". Now, in our timeline Vienna managed to only have to strike a decentralization compromise with Hungary, giving them very broad autonomy from Austria in what was essentially a tight alliance/personal union, but in the event of even further damage to the regime would additional concessions have to be made to other Crownlands in order to maintain their loyalty? (Or, at the very least, if credit was unavailable to offload some of the central government's expenses onto the provinces and their local nobility/power brokers).

From what I read in the above mentioned book, the Diets of Bohemia and Moravia were both pushing for more liberal, pro-Czech legislation (Though Moravia wanted to maintain their traditional autonomy from Prague), which could make the lands of St. Wenceslaus a possibility as a third crown for Franz Joseph's head. Venetia too could be an option if for some reason it were to be kept out of Italy's hands for one reason or another (Perhaps with the new Maggior Consiglio being crafted as a laboratory to test a more liberal-representative model by the Empire, since it could be done without disrupting the established local elite unlike in the other provinces), while Gallicia is probably the longest shot.

Personally, I'm of the opinion that this is a real possibility if Vienna comes out of the conflict without a strong army to re-establish order, or ends up having to lean more heavily on locally raised troops/extra governmental volunteers to bail the country out of total defeat in the event somebody less willing to offer generous terms or stand up to the King in Prussia than Bismark pressed the war further, especially considering the Great Powers might consider the restoration of centeralization attempts an unessicery risk to the stability of A-H and, therefore, the security of the Balkans and Eastern Europe (Given how near-run a thing it was that Hungary stood down from a second shot at independence). Especially if the pot was sweetened by reform being tied to guarantees of territorial integrity and/or access to credit to rebuild the national infastructure (both physical and governmental). However, I'm somewhat biased given I have a certain desired result in mind, and so wanted to get some input from the community.

I want to point out 2 things in regards of the Ausgleich and Hungary:

1. The Ausgleich is usually thought of as between Austria and Hungary. But strictly speaking this was not the case. This was basically an agreement concerning three parties, the third being the habsburg family/imperial government, and the deal was in reality made between the imperial government and Hungary. Austria was only asked to ratify it later. Hungary on his part - or better Deák and his circle - refused to have anything to do with Austria. They wanted to deal with the dynasty - legally their point is understandable.

2. Hungary was not on the verge of revolt and the number of politicans who would support such a course were mostly the emigration of 1848-49. When one of them returned home (he was pardoned) he wrote to Kossuth on regards of the positions of the politicans in Hungary that the question was only the price* they wanted for the deal they would strike with the Habsburgs but basically everyone wanted to strike a deal at that point.

*by price he meant the level of freedom/autonomy Hungary would have under the new system. Deák was the leader of the more moderate group. The opposition wanted much more freedom for Hungary than received in the Ausgleich. This remained the central question of hungarian politics till the end of WWI.
 
One issue that comes to mind is that of Galicia-Lodomeria and Bukovina. To which crowd do those territories belong?

If they remain Austria, then Austria has to handle non-contiguous territory. Otherwise, I suppose they could be given to Bohemia or Hungary and organized in a similar fashion as Croatia-Slavonia within Hungary.
 
One issue that comes to mind is that of Galicia-Lodomeria and Bukovina. To which crowd do those territories belong?

If they remain Austria, then Austria has to handle non-contiguous territory. Otherwise, I suppose they could be given to Bohemia or Hungary and organized in a similar fashion as Croatia-Slavonia within Hungary.

Galicia is also an oppritunity for its own Crown (A Polish one; itd fit within the Austrian strategy of using the retention of traditional rights/privlages and borders), perhaps even prior to a Bohemian one at least for domestic motivations. The reason I think it'd be less likely though is the negative perception such a move would have from Russia, who have a very... poor opinion of Polish autonomy/nationalism. If that was the case, Hungary probably ends up governing Bukovina if it remains in the Habsburg Empire. There's also the possability that a more extended A-P war would result in The United Romanian Principalities stepping in to try to seize the province... though would they be allowed to keep it?

I want to point out 2 things in regards of the Ausgleich and Hungary:

1. The Ausgleich is usually thought of as between Austria and Hungary. But strictly speaking this was not the case. This was basically an agreement concerning three parties, the third being the habsburg family/imperial government, and the deal was in reality made between the imperial government and Hungary. Austria was only asked to ratify it later. Hungary on his part - or better Deák and his circle - refused to have anything to do with Austria. They wanted to deal with the dynasty - legally their point is understandable.

2. Hungary was not on the verge of revolt and the number of politicans who would support such a course were mostly the emigration of 1848-49. When one of them returned home (he was pardoned) he wrote to Kossuth on regards of the positions of the politicans in Hungary that the question was only the price* they wanted for the deal they would strike with the Habsburgs but basically everyone wanted to strike a deal at that point.

*by price he meant the level of freedom/autonomy Hungary would have under the new system. Deák was the leader of the more moderate group. The opposition wanted much more freedom for Hungary than received in the Ausgleich. This remained the central question of hungarian politics till the end of WWI.

Given how autocratic/court-centeric the centeralized Austrian state following the rescinding of the October Diploma, I suppose I didn't really draw the distinction during those few years between the Dynasty and the Austrian government. But you're right; it is an important disitinction if we're talking about the reorganization of the Empire. However, I doubt that Austria is really going to be disagreeing with the Dynasty on any realistic set of compromises. Or do you think that may be a possability? I suppose you could run into issues by Austrians in the event of Bohemia demanding too much autonomy, given the security issues they'd have and the status of the German language (oppritunities for advancement in government to German-speakers, specifically, in the event Czech becomes a required language of law and education)
 
I've been reading through The Habsburg Empire, A New History
I've also been reading that book. It's rather good, isn't it?
Anyway, if you can get the Moravian and Silesian diets to agree to it, maybe though some kind of federal model, and the three diets present a united front to the dynasty and the demands aren't too great, I don't think Vienna would have much of a choice. As to Galicia-Bukovina, I don't think continguity would be that big a problem. Just based on geography, it'd be pretty hard to get to Galicia from Bohemia without passing through Hungary anyway, and the railways, when they were built, didn't bother avoiding Hungarian territory. Dalmatia was also part of Austria, and mostly wasn't accessable by land from Austria.
 
I've also been reading that book. It's rather good, isn't it?
Anyway, if you can get the Moravian and Silesian diets to agree to it, maybe though some kind of federal model, and the three diets present a united front to the dynasty and the demands aren't too great, I don't think Vienna would have much of a choice. As to Galicia-Bukovina, I don't think continguity would be that big a problem. Just based on geography, it'd be pretty hard to get to Galicia from Bohemia without passing through Hungary anyway, and the railways, when they were built, didn't bother avoiding Hungarian territory. Dalmatia was also part of Austria, and mostly wasn't accessable by land from Austria.

Indeed it is.

And this is specific to the circumstances of the scenario I have in my head, but in what I was thinking the Silesian diet is irrelevant as the remainder of Habsburg Silesia would be lost to Prussia at the top of the list of any possible direct annexations. Strictly speaking, I suppose that breaks territorial integrity with Galicia anyways with the traditional borders of the Crown of St. Stephen taken into account, which probably only strengthens the case of the Polish gentry for equivalent autonomy (Probably becoming a second party in the conservative, ethno-assimiliationist bloc of Kingdoms under the Viennese Crown alongside Hungary in that case). Moravia would certainly be harder to spin though... unless perhaps it reached a Croatia-like compromise with the Bohemian half of the Crownland. The structure of the Empire could end up very complicated, very fast.

Though, nobody seems to be looking at the question I raised about the possability of Venetia being given autonomous status rather than being seceded. I suppose that depends alot on how the campaign against Italy goes, but given how nascent Italian national identity is at this point (politically, culturally, and linguistically) I wonder if such a state coulden't be made viable.
 
Hmm, if the general policy of educating citizens in their own language is applied with a definition of Venetian and Friulian as seperate languages to Italian, it might be possible to form a sense of identity within the Veneto. Maybe a revival of some of the symbols of the Venetian republic as well, calling the first minister of Veneto the Doge and naming the diet after the Venetian Great Council, etc. It might work.
 
Hmm, if the general policy of educating citizens in their own language is applied with a definition of Venetian and Friulian as seperate languages to Italian, it might be possible to form a sense of identity within the Veneto. Maybe a revival of some of the symbols of the Venetian republic as well, calling the first minister of Veneto the Doge and naming the diet after the Venetian Great Council, etc. It might work.

That could work, especially considering how the "language question" became so tied to regional educational-governing policy within the Empire. Let's remember that "Italian" at the time could really be better classified as Tuscan; I'm not sure it was even mutually intelligible with some of the Southern dialects and was really only a language of the elite. If Veneto is never integrated into a Kingdom of Italy educational system, and its own public schooling is conducted in Venetian as a matter of course and commerce directed towards Austria Proper/German-speaking regions, I doubt the vast majority of the population would even learn to speak Tuscan-Italian much less consider it their "mother tounge". This could also have some interesting knock-on effects in Italy, though; do the regional power brokers use the example to push harder for the retention of their own dialects, or does the 'threat" of not being able to create a unified language cause Italy to double-down on enforcing a single-dialect standard?
 
Standard Italian began to emerge in the middle ages as a lingua franca within Italy, and was the administrative language of the Venetian republic for centuries. It is closest to Tuscan, but they are still quite distinct. What is more likely is that after the majority of Venetians are educated in Venetian, any future Italian state that includes Veneto could well be forced to grant it significant autonomy. The Venetian elites and middle classes are still likely to learn Italian because it's useful, not just in Italy but also in the cities of Dalmatia and the Austrian Littoral, and it has much greater cultural prestige.
Thag said, Slovene was far less prestigious, and had never been an administrative language, and the Habsburg state was still perfectly happy to use it as a medium of education and preside over a flourishing of literary culture.
 
Thanks so much for that insight. As for Viennese policy on the issue... Austria was usually willing to play more fast and loose with allowing local tounges to flourish in its domain, since it very early on "farmed out" its educational responsabilities to the local authorities in order to save money. A Veneto operating with its own government, however, would have to establish a new, independent educational policy, so there's the question if they choose to prioritize standard Italian or the Venetian dialect. In the medium term, the state would probably have to juggle things very carefully in order to maintain its autonimous identity seperate from both Italy and Austria, but in the long run I'm starting to lean towards the viability of the region as a seperate domain under the Habsburg Imperial structure so long as said structure remains intact, and having a much more robust particularist identity if/when it does break down and it is incorperated into Italy proper. Particularly if the predominant political culture between them and their neighboring Italian regions deviate over the decades.
 
It certainly wouldn't be out of the ordinary for Vienna to set up Venetian-language schools deliberately. They made a point of setting up Ukrainian language schools over the objections of the Polish nationalist dominated Galician diet. Were there significan differences between Galician Polish and standard Polish, I imagine the Habsburgs would have defined it as a seperate language to try and dampen identification with the old Commonwealth.
Also, you have like 60 years between Austria's acquisition of Veneto and the Ausgleich.
 
Given how autocratic/court-centeric the centeralized Austrian state following the rescinding of the October Diploma, I suppose I didn't really draw the distinction during those few years between the Dynasty and the Austrian government. But you're right; it is an important disitinction if we're talking about the reorganization of the Empire. However, I doubt that Austria is really going to be disagreeing with the Dynasty on any realistic set of compromises. Or do you think that may be a possability? I suppose you could run into issues by Austrians in the event of Bohemia demanding too much autonomy, given the security issues they'd have and the status of the German language (oppritunities for advancement in government to German-speakers, specifically, in the event Czech becomes a required language of law and education)

If you look at the austrian constitution and especially the election system its evident that the original supporters of the Ausgleich in Austria were german liberals who created the election system in a way that heavily favoured them - as it turned out it was still not enough. Your proposal of adding other parties might be enough for them to not accept this compromise. However im seriously not well versed enough in the home affairs of Austria at the time to judge this but i think its a possibility. However czech and german nationalistic claims clashing was the biggest problem of austrian pairlaiment/politics for the decades to come and it was not resolved till the fall of the Empire, so yes, I cant imagine it wont become a problem in someway whatever way you try to resolve it initially.

And on a higher, imperial level there is the problem of Hungary. You say a Bohemian, Venetian, Galician crown could be added. What would be their relationship with Hungary? The Ausgleich OTL put Hungary theoretically on equal footing with Austria and this was acceptable to the hungarians. However what would imperial government look like in your vision. Would all this crowns created from OTL Austria be together the equal of Hungary? Or would they be separatly the equal to hungary? In the latter case Hungary is likely to refuse the compromise and in the first case the Empire will end up even more Hungary dominated than OTL: if hungary wants something it should only get the support of one of the other crowns to get it. Add to that the traditional polish-hungarian friendship and that both Galicia and Hungary were mainly agrarian countries which means that the interests of their elites align on an imperial level... My guess is that an Empire like that would be dominated by a hungarian-galician block.

I also want to point out one more of hungarian anxieties of the time. The whole delegation system with its rigid rules and owerly complicated method of doing things was not a blunder. It was created in a big part this way because the hungarian side wanted to avoid even the seems of the existence of an imperial pairlaiment. And later political development in Hungary shows no support for a closer union with Austria - on the opposite. Meaning that if you want to come up with an alternate solution and want Hungary to accept it you should grant it at least the same level of freedom as OTL and forget any solution with an imperial pairlaiment. Otherwise hungary will refuse and dont participate.

I feel that I have to add to defend the hungarians a bit that what they wanted was as much freedom for their country as they could get and participating in the Austria project - especially the pairlaiment - was to give it up. To them Hungary was a completly separate country - the reason why they refused to deal with Austria during the Ausgleich negotiations. They had nothing to do with Austria - they were only legally bound to the dynasty and not the other countries of the dynasty (at least this was their logic). Also 1848-1849 and the reprisals afterward didnt do much to endear the Empire to them either.
 
@Tibi088

I always appreciate a thoughtful discussion to help sharpen the realism of ideas, so thanks for bringing intra_Imperial relations to the forefront. As I said, the Czech-German debate is liabel to be a major domestic issue in a theoretical Bohemian Crown with it's historic borders (which at least initially don't have a prayer of being redrawn if the idea is like in Hungary, of restoring an ancient country to its rightful existence). I suppose the initial acceptability to the German liberals in Austria would depend a great deal on the Empire's broader state in the immediate aftermath of the war. From what I can gather, most weren't nessicerily opposed to a more federalized model in the structural sense; more that they felt such structures should be filled with high-culture German speakers like themselves with national interests in mind, as opposed to provincial nobility and clergy with local and Conservative interests at heart. However, if presented with the choice of keeping an intact Empire with at the least the legal framework they can co-opt over time to build their ideal state, or likely watching it fracture as they're unable to beat the revolutionaries like they did in 48 with a broken army, empty treasurey, and either enemies or cold neutrals on it's borders, I don't think it's unrealistic they'd concede to the former.

Naturally, in that case I imagine it will change their policy focus somewhat: likely efforts to Foster closer Imperial unity by striking a bargain with the Church and setting up private organizations to help limit the appeal of public schools to the upper and middle classes by providing high quality education and connections (,Instruction in such courses would be, of course, in German) and pushing hard for electoral reform where they can to empower the merchantile-urban class to challenge the domination of landowners (especially early on, in an era where the cities are proportionately far more German than they would later be) an utalizing "machine politics"

As for Hungary, I'll touch on them in a little bit when I have time, but suffice to say I didn't think they'd get any less autonomy, merely that it's not be a uniquely greater level than the other potential states
 
It certainly wouldn't be out of the ordinary for Vienna to set up Venetian-language schools deliberately. They made a point of setting up Ukrainian language schools over the objections of the Polish nationalist dominated Galician diet. Were there significan differences between Galician Polish and standard Polish, I imagine the Habsburgs would have defined it as a seperate language to try and dampen identification with the old Commonwealth.
Also, you have like 60 years between Austria's acquisition of Veneto and the Ausgleich.

You do, but given the timeframe of the discussion it seems disingenuous to play those decades out too differently from OTL and still assume a similar war breaking out in 66 and identical internal politics in the realm. And, post-altCompronise, Vienna wouldent have direct control of Venetian educational policy if it's rewarded the same standing as Hungary.

That being said, I could see a great deal of effort being made to favor politicians of a pro-Venetian bent, making the dialect more prestigious and useful for commerce within Austria over standard Italian, selectively shifting university grants, ect. And given the local powers that be know their continued privlaged position is based on keeping pecularism dominant under the protective wing of the Habsburg eagle there's also an incentive naturally to take the pro-Imperial route. Which seems to be a common conclusion on the potential Kingdoms within a broader Augsburg Personal Union/Imperial Confedration; in order for the plurality ethnicity to dominate their local regions they need the commercial prosperity and security gurantee of unity, lest they fall victim to their own liberal agitators or populist tendencies among the hard to assimilate rural poor that can be exploited by nationalists. As @Tibi088 pointed out, it creates a natural alliance betweem the Polish and Hungarians to maintain the status who (and, thus, with the Austrian conservatives), which Veneto could also be added to.
 
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