Plausibility check: A "good" treaty of Versailles

[Hörnla]

TOV impact was really unimportant. Hindenburg long life was order of magnitude more significant. And yes, i know what i'm saying is basically a heresy

Not a bad idea. Hindenburg dieing in late 1928 would have been ideal. Best chances to get a moderate Reichspräsident with a tenure until 1935, long enough to ride out the storm.

I recently thought about ideas to prevent Hindenburg's re-election in 1932 (while not letting Hitler win) and didn't get a convincing idea. Killing him would be the easy way.

Considering the heresy, I don't mind it as long as the argumentation is good.

 

[Mikestone8]

Not a bad idea. Hindenburg dieing in late 1928 would have been ideal. Best chances to get a moderate Reichspräsident with a tenure until 1935, long enough to ride out the storm.

I recently thought about ideas to prevent Hindenburg's re-election in 1932 (while not letting Hitler win) and didn't get a convincing idea. Killing him would be the easy way.

Considering the heresy, I don't mind it as long as the argumentation is good.

Even 1930 would probably do.

The Nazis gained ground that year, but not enough to have any chance in a Presidential contest. At best, Hitler would have been fighting the Communist candidate for third place. Assuming the new President is physically fit and doesn't get assassinated, there isn't another race until 1937.

FTM, if the President elected in 1930 is one who can live with the existing Reichstag, the Nazis could be stuck with just a dozen or so seats for some years. When would the next Reichstag election have to be? 1935?

 

[Hörnla]

Even 1930 would probably do. The Nazis gained ground that year, but not enough to have any chance in a Presidential contest. At best, Hitler would have been fighting the Communist candidate for third place. Assuming the new President is physically fit and doesn't get assassinated, there isn't another race until 1937.

Absolutely right, I agree. Even 1931 might be a possibility.

1928 was a safe bet. At that point, we might even manage a second SPDler after Ebert, maybe Otto Braun.

The problem in 1930/31 would still not be Hitler, but what kind of candidate the rest of the right-wing might bring up à la Hindenburg, though I cannot think immediately of someone with that huge appeal to the public.

FTM, if the President elected in 1930 is one who can live with the existing Reichstag, the Nazis could be stuck with just a dozen or so seats for some years. When would the next Reichstag election have to be? 1935?

Depends on the date in 1930. Already in March, the Grand Coalition failed and the first "presidential cabinet" came into existence under Brüning. From then on, new elections were unavoidable. The elections of September 1930 saw the rise of the NSDAP from 12 to 107 seats (18.2%).

With a democratic president, the elections of 1932/33 should have been avoided, if he acts wisely. The next regular Reichtstags-elections would have been in late 1934. This might be late enough to prevent a NSDAP of above 30% in the Reichstag.

If the Reichstag of 1928 wouldn't have been dissolved, there would have been elections in 1932. Of course, one could argue that the NSDAP would have to rise from 12 seats - BUT Germany always has a string of elections to the Parliaments of the Länder (there were 17 Länder in the late Weimar Republic). The NSDAP started its meteoric rise during these regional elections from 1929 on - thus their result an alternate 1932 election would probably not reach the desastrous 37%. But they would come close and most probably be the largest party.

I have once pondered on a POD for the election of 1932, i.e. the democratic parties risking a four-way-race Thälmann, Hitler, Hindenburg and "X". As only a simple majority is needed in the section tier, the danger of Hitler becoming Reichspräsident would have been really too large, though- even against Hindenburg he reached 36.7%. The tough question would be, how would the Hindenburg electorate split up in such a scenario.

 

[Mikestone8]

Absolutely right, I agree. Even 1931 might be a possibility.

1928 was a safe bet. At that point, we might even manage a second SPDler after Ebert, maybe Otto Braun.

The problem in 1930/31 would still not be Hitler, but what kind of candidate the rest of the right-wing might bring up à la Hindenburg, though I cannot think immediately of someone with that huge appeal to the public.

Lettow-Vorbeck's name occasionally gets mentioned in this conection, but even if he were willing to run, I don't think his popular appeal was att he Hindenburg level

 

[Hörnla]

Lettow-Vorbeck's name occasionally gets mentioned in this conection, but even if he were willing to run, I don't think his popular appeal was att he Hindenburg level

Not a bad idea. Lettow-Vorbeck had a political career and was member of the Reichstag from 1928-1930. He chose to leave the DNVP as it turned more right-wing and became member of a more moderate, but absolutely unsuccessful party.
He was a popular figure, but his electability as president stands to debate. Same was the case with Hindenburg in 1925, though.

He might prove to be a better and especially fitter president than Hindenburg. He would, though, also probably pursue an authoritarian or monarchical strategy.

 

[Maur]

Not a bad idea. Hindenburg dieing in late 1928 would have been ideal. Best chances to get a moderate Reichspräsident with a tenure until 1935, long enough to ride out the storm.

I recently thought about ideas to prevent Hindenburg's re-election in 1932 (while not letting Hitler win) and didn't get a convincing idea. Killing him would be the easy way.

Considering the heresy, I don't mind it as long as the argumentation is good.

Well, IIRC, he was already basically a zombie, so...

It's interesting, because the time was working against Nazis (and other radicals), both short term - depression recovery, and long-term - cultural changes. I'm curious if Germany could wither the storm, and if Nazis would try another violent attempt at seizing power and how would that turn out.

 

[Hörnla]

I remember "Hitler's Thirty Days to Power" by Henry Turner, who quoted a lot of sources from early January '33 who actually expected that the tide had turned against the Nazis and the Depression would have passed its nadir at this point of time. They expected Germany economy and political landscape to recover during the coming year.

And that was OTL, with Hindenburg in office...

Interesting challenge would be: what is the latest probable POD to save the Weimar Republic?

 

[Maur]

So much for "inevitable" Second World War, twenty years armistices, duh.

I don't know, but then again, i'm mostly interested in grand scale divergences, not specivics PODs.

 

[Malice]

I would suggest that the better solution would've been to order the withdrawl of all German and Austro-Hungarian troops to the positions they held as of June 1st, 1914, as a condition of the Armistice on November 11th, 1918, so that when they did finally hit the negotiation tables the war hype would've subsided a bit.

The following steps could've been done:

1. Restoration of the independence of the various states that formed the German Empire in 1871 and the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France. A total ban on political union would be introduced for the German states.

2. Poland to be granted an enclave in and around Danzig so they have access to the sea and a road and rail corridor created that is under Polish control so they have access from Poland proper to the Danzig enclave.

3. German colonies to remain in the hands of the countries that occupied them in lieu of reparations.

4. Allies agree to ratify Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Russia and, in return, assurances of unconditional withdrawal of all Allied soldiers from Russia and the introduction of a policy of strict non-intervention in Russia's internal affairs would be given.

 

[Eurofed]

1. Restoration of the independence of the various states that formed the German Empire in 1871 and the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France. A total ban on political union would be introduced for the German states.

Malice, forceful division of the German nation was not feasible or sustainable without extreme levels of cohercion (i.e. long-term heavy military occupation) on the Entente's part. The Entente nations were terribly war-weary and near-bankrupt in 1919, they absolutely did not have the money or the political consensus to keep hundred of thousands British, French, Italian soldiers in Germany to occupy it for decades. If the Entente had got that kind of resources, they would have used them to crush Lenin and Ataturk. As for trying to keep Germany divided in several states, we all saw how well that worked after 1815 and after 1945.

 

[I Blame Communism]

Furthering on what Eurofed says in response to point one...

4. Allies agree to ratify Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Russia and, in return, assurances of unconditional withdrawal of all Allied soldiers from Russia and the introduction of a policy of strict non-intervention in Russia's internal affairs would be given.

This is:

A) Not a good thing for Entente interests. British and especialy French sympathy lay firstly with the Poles, secondly with any "white" or "green" regime that could get itself back into power in Petrograd and Moscow, and thirdly with anyone who was fighting Lenin. B-L was basically a fighting truce between the Germans and Lenin, that is, between Public Enemy #1 and Public Enemy #2. Which. as of 1919, is which? Take your pick.

B) Not something that can realistically happen: if you enforce "non intervention", several of the governments created or co-opted by the Germans after B-L implode. In Ukraine, you have two groups (militant Bolsheviks and militant Denikinites) who have at least as much military potential to call on as the nationalist-leaning middle-classes represented by the Directorate and aren't in the least bit afraid to use it.

 

[Eurofed]

A) Not a good thing for Entente interests. British and especialy French sympathy lay firstly with the Poles, secondly with any "white" or "green" regime that could get itself back into power in Petrograd and Moscow, and thirdly with anyone who was fighting Lenin. B-L was basically a fighting truce between the Germans and Lenin, that is, between Public Enemy #1 and Public Enemy #2.

B) Not something that can realistically happen: if you enforce "non intervention", several of the governments created or co-opted by the Germans after B-L implode. In Ukraine, you have two groups (militant Bolsheviks and militant Denikinites) who have at least as much military potential to call on as the nationalist-leaning middle-classes represented by the Directorate and aren't in the least bit afraid to use it.

Agreed with these points as well.