Plausibility check: a Franco-German Cold War

Recently I got this idea of a cold war in the mid to late 20th century (like the original cold war) for a cold war between France-led block and a German-led block. So I decided how possible this idea is and if it isn't possible, how can I change it to make it possible.

The POD is in the early 19th century. My idea was that Wallonia (and perhaps Luxemburg) ended up French (and Flanders Dutch), thus increasing both the French population and the French industrial power. During the 19th and early 20th century Germany (or at least Prussia) and France fought a couple of wars. In these wars the borders shift somewhat and contested parts (like Luxemburg, Alsace-Lorraine, the Saarland) could change hands a couple of times, but in the end neither wins a complete victory. So there will be no situation like 1870, in which France loses horribly (or the oposite, a war in which Germany loses completely). The wars could also be colonial in nature. The end result is that when the atomic bomb is invented both countries realy dislike each other, but fearing the destructive powers of modern warfare, like the atomic bomb, both sides end up not wanting to go to war anymore. So a Cold War like situation arises.

Both sides have their own allies, like the USA and the USSR have. France is the head of an alliance that consists of southern Europe and Northern Africa, including Spain, Portugal, Italy (which I would love to split into a Northern Italy and Sicily), Greece, Morocco, maybe Algeria somehow (you probably need a very different 19th century colonialism and 20th century decolonisation), possibly extending to the eastern mediterranean so maybe including Egypt and Turkey (I must think of what to do with the Ottoman Empire.
Germany heads an alliance consisting of Eastern Europe, thus including Poland (with or without Posen, probably without, I don't see Germany losing it), Austria (not unified with Germany if possible and including Czechia) and Hungary, possibly including Denmark and Sweden.

I like to have some neutral countries at the border like the Netherlands and Switserland, kind of like how Austria, Yugoslavia, Finland and Sweden were neutral.

So, how possible is this? Mind you, I am willing to rewrite a large part of the 19th century history for it. For example different colonialisation. Different Italian unification, so that the Italian-French relationship doesn't sour, etc.
 
Those alliance blocs... I'm assuming a neutral Britain...

I wonder how well that would play out over time.
 
Napoleon catching a bullet or a tropical disease in Egypt would be a good starting point. By this point France's eastern border is the Rhine, it's got a good cushion of sister republics, and without Napoleon's megalomania will probably settle down and lick its wounds. This doesn't preclude further anti-republican wars, but these will be nothing like the scale of the Napoleonic wars, which would benefit both France and the German states in demographic terms if nothing else.
 
Recently I got this idea of a cold war in the mid to late 20th century (like the original cold war) for a cold war between France-led block and a German-led block. So I decided how possible this idea is and if it isn't possible, how can I change it to make it possible.

The POD is in the early 19th century. My idea was that Wallonia (and perhaps Luxemburg) ended up French (and Flanders Dutch), thus increasing both the French population and the French industrial power. During the 19th and early 20th century Germany (or at least Prussia) and France fought a couple of wars. In these wars the borders shift somewhat and contested parts (like Luxemburg, Alsace-Lorraine, the Saarland) could change hands a couple of times, but in the end neither wins a complete victory. So there will be no situation like 1870, in which France loses horribly (or the oposite, a war in which Germany loses completely). The wars could also be colonial in nature. The end result is that when the atomic bomb is invented both countries realy dislike each other, but fearing the destructive powers of modern warfare, like the atomic bomb, both sides end up not wanting to go to war anymore. So a Cold War like situation arises.

Both sides have their own allies, like the USA and the USSR have. France is the head of an alliance that consists of southern Europe and Northern Africa, including Spain, Portugal, Italy (which I would love to split into a Northern Italy and Sicily), Greece, Morocco, maybe Algeria somehow (you probably need a very different 19th century colonialism and 20th century decolonisation), possibly extending to the eastern mediterranean so maybe including Egypt and Turkey (I must think of what to do with the Ottoman Empire.
Germany heads an alliance consisting of Eastern Europe, thus including Poland (with or without Posen, probably without, I don't see Germany losing it), Austria (not unified with Germany if possible and including Czechia) and Hungary, possibly including Denmark and Sweden.

I like to have some neutral countries at the border like the Netherlands and Switserland, kind of like how Austria, Yugoslavia, Finland and Sweden were neutral.

So, how possible is this? Mind you, I am willing to rewrite a large part of the 19th century history for it. For example different colonialisation. Different Italian unification, so that the Italian-French relationship doesn't sour, etc.

France and Germany seem too small be superpowers for long, especially with bigger, richer countries around (Britain, Russia, and eventually the US and China). In a Cold War situation, it's more likely that France and Germany will either be part of a bigger country's bloc or be one of 5-6 blocs in a multipolar world.

Either way, Franco-German animosity in your scenario seems plausible.
 

Sabot Cat

Banned
France and Germany seem too small be superpowers for long, especially with bigger, richer countries around (Britain, Russia, and eventually the US and China). In a Cold War situation, it's more likely that France and Germany will either be part of a bigger country's bloc or be one of 5-6 blocs in a multipolar world.

Either way, Franco-German animosity in your scenario seems plausible.

I have a feeling they'd each take sides, perhaps the UK backing France and Russia backing Germany, while the United States and China remain altogether not involved.
 
I have a feeling they'd each take sides, perhaps the UK backing France and Russia backing Germany, while the United States and China remain altogether not involved.

Right, but my point was that it's more likely to be an Anglo-Russian Cold War, with France and Germany part of one bloc or another, rather than a Franco-German Cold War. It's like calling the OTL Cold War a rivalry between the UK and the PRC.
 
Recently I got this idea of a cold war in the mid to late 20th century (like the original cold war) for a cold war between France-led block and a German-led block. So I decided how possible this idea is and if it isn't possible, how can I change it to make it possible.

The POD is in the early 19th century. My idea was that Wallonia (and perhaps Luxemburg) ended up French (and Flanders Dutch), thus increasing both the French population and the French industrial power. During the 19th and early 20th century Germany (or at least Prussia) and France fought a couple of wars. In these wars the borders shift somewhat and contested parts (like Luxemburg, Alsace-Lorraine, the Saarland) could change hands a couple of times, but in the end neither wins a complete victory. So there will be no situation like 1870, in which France loses horribly (or the oposite, a war in which Germany loses completely). The wars could also be colonial in nature. The end result is that when the atomic bomb is invented both countries realy dislike each other, but fearing the destructive powers of modern warfare, like the atomic bomb, both sides end up not wanting to go to war anymore. So a Cold War like situation arises.

Both sides have their own allies, like the USA and the USSR have. France is the head of an alliance that consists of southern Europe and Northern Africa, including Spain, Portugal, Italy (which I would love to split into a Northern Italy and Sicily), Greece, Morocco, maybe Algeria somehow (you probably need a very different 19th century colonialism and 20th century decolonisation), possibly extending to the eastern Mediterranean so maybe including Egypt and Turkey (I must think of what to do with the Ottoman Empire.
Germany heads an alliance consisting of Eastern Europe, thus including Poland (with or without Posen, probably without, I don't see Germany losing it), Austria (not unified with Germany if possible and including Czechia) and Hungary, possibly including Denmark and Sweden.

I like to have some neutral countries at the border like the Netherlands and Switserland, kind of like how Austria, Yugoslavia, Finland and Sweden were neutral.

So, how possible is this? Mind you, I am willing to rewrite a large part of the 19th century history for it. For example different colonialisation. Different Italian unification, so that the Italian-French relationship doesn't sour, etc.

A good start for the Wallonia-Flanders issue might be a successful Talleyrand plan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talleyrand_partition_plan_for_Belgium) in 1830: it would give France the industrial basis to become significantly stronger although it would not (and could not at the time at least) include Luxembourg. It then depends how the Orleans manage their stint at being king of France which would go to Prussia. IOTL the French economy grew pretty fast over the period 1830-1860 and the addition of Wallonia and its industries would certainly help a lot: potentially France might become even closer to Great Britain and a true industrial powerhouse. There are two potential problems here: a significant split (even more significant than OTL) between the industrialized north and the agricultural south and west and more pressure by the raising entrepreneurial class for a greater slice of the power pie (as well as an earlier start of "organized labor"). Not an easy situation to ride which makes me think that an equivalent of 1848 will come anyway. My true hope is that it will end up better than IOTL (no Louis Napoleon coup, even better no Louis Napoleon at all: there are a lot of possibilities to butterfly him away). I also believe that if you are looking to a future confrontation between the French and the Prussian blocks a line of political demarcation should be required: liberals in the south and the west and conservatives in the north and the east would give you that.

There are a few more bumps on the road:
  • What to do with Russia: on paper Russia should be more sympathetic to the conservative alliance, but an independent Poland can be only established by Prussian support to one of the many Polish insurrections and this would be an obvious slap in the face to Russia. Another thing that would make them quite unhappy would be a Prussian-led alliance controlling the straits of the Baltic sea (as it would happen if both Sweden and Denmark are in the alliance). I am not saying that it would be necessarily impossible but it would be very hard to achieve and might end up with the Prussian alliance sandwiched between hostiles.
  • Italian alternate unification: again not impossible but certainly hard. The division between north and south is certainly achievable (and most likely would also feature a rump Papal state in Latium). To have both the north and the south in the same alliance might be somehow tricky though. Probably the best way is to instigate early reforms (starting in 1830 with the crowning of Ferdinand) in the south: this might make the trick but keep in mind Austrian (and Russian) hostility to liberal reforms in Europe. The key to good relations between Italy (or better Italies) and France would necessarily be predicated on France not regarding them as protectorates but rather as partners (again not easy).
  • I've already spoken of the Denmark/Sweden potential problem (and Great Britain too would be quite unhappy is someone locks up the Baltic). IMHO Sweden should be the best partner if Prussia has to choose since it would be bringing large mineral deposits (which would be even more important ITTL since it is quite unlikely that Krupp will end up owning the iron mines of Northern Spain).
  • Iberian peninsula: Spain is feasible if a liberal revolution prevails. This would be very good for Spain and a welcome addition to the French alliance. An earlier industrialization in northern Spain is also feasible. I'm more sceptical about Portugal: I think they will keep their traditional ties with GB due to fears of being subsumed in a greater Spain.
  • Austria: a partition of Austria into a Cisleithanian portion and a Transleithanian one is possible at the same time they are kicked out of nothern Italy (the 1848 equivalent). Again Russia might be not completely happy (but then Greater Hungary might become a Russian ally while Greater Austria gravitates toward the Prussian alliance)
  • North Africa: a French Algeria is still very well in the cards. ITTL it might be joined by a Spanish Morocco and a Tunisia "colonised" by the kingdom of Two Sicilies (I'd guess that both Morocco and Tunisia would be protectorates rather than real colonies).

Than there is Great Britain: it would take a significant paradigm shift to make GB completely aloof from continental changes, in particular changes of this magnitude. There are things about which they would certainly react (a closure of Baltic for example or Russian penetration into the OE to a degree to threaten the Straits) but then it is also possible that they might accept the idea of the two confronting blocks and play their game with them provided that their imperial interests are not put at significant risk (in particular if the Russian bear - rebuffed in Central Europe - is more proactive in Central Asia and Far East (OTL there was a significant scare of Russian expansionism in the Pacific).

China and the USA are out of the radar for the time being, but China might become a contention bone in the late 19th century.
 
A good start for the Wallonia-Flanders issue might be a successful Talleyrand plan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talleyrand_partition_plan_for_Belgium) in 1830: it would give France the industrial basis to become significantly stronger although it would not (and could not at the time at least) include Luxembourg. It then depends how the Orleans manage their stint at being king of France which would go to Prussia.
I have said before (actualy most recently today in a reaction of you in another thread) that I doubt that the Dutch would accept the Tallyrand plan. But we can use a slightly modified plan (the plan would probably be renegotiated anyway), in which the Netherlands keep Limburg and Zeelandic Flanders, while we move the French borders somewhat east, so it get a larger part of Liege and Namur province, while Prussia mainly gets Luxemburg and the eastern part of Liege. The city probaly needs to be French as the citizens of Liege where the biggest proponents of joining France during the Belgian revolt.
IOTL the French economy grew pretty fast over the period 1830-1860 and the addition of Wallonia and its industries would certainly help a lot: potentially France might become even closer to Great Britain and a true industrial powerhouse. There are two potential problems here: a significant split (even more significant than OTL) between the industrialized north and the agricultural south and west and more pressure by the raising entrepreneurial class for a greater slice of the power pie (as well as an earlier start of "organized labor"). Not an easy situation to ride which makes me think that an equivalent of 1848 will come anyway. My true hope is that it will end up better than IOTL (no Louis Napoleon coup, even better no Louis Napoleon at all: there are a lot of possibilities to butterfly him away). I also believe that if you are looking to a future confrontation between the French and the Prussian blocks a line of political demarcation should be required: liberals in the south and the west and conservatives in the north and the east would give you that.

Interesting ideas.
There are a few more bumps on the road:
  • What to do with Russia: on paper Russia should be more sympathetic to the conservative alliance, but an independent Poland can be only established by Prussian support to one of the many Polish insurrections and this would be an obvious slap in the face to Russia. Another thing that would make them quite unhappy would be a Prussian-led alliance controlling the straits of the Baltic sea (as it would happen if both Sweden and Denmark are in the alliance). I am not saying that it would be necessarily impossible but it would be very hard to achieve and might end up with the Prussian alliance sandwiched between hostiles.

  • Italian alternate unification: again not impossible but certainly hard. The division between north and south is certainly achievable (and most likely would also feature a rump Papal state in Latium). To have both the north and the south in the same alliance might be somehow tricky though. Probably the best way is to instigate early reforms (starting in 1830 with the crowning of Ferdinand) in the south: this might make the trick but keep in mind Austrian (and Russian) hostility to liberal reforms in Europe. The key to good relations between Italy (or better Italies) and France would necessarily be predicated on France not regarding them as protectorates but rather as partners (again not easy).
  • I've already spoken of the Denmark/Sweden potential problem (and Great Britain too would be quite unhappy is someone locks up the Baltic). IMHO Sweden should be the best partner if Prussia has to choose since it would be bringing large mineral deposits (which would be even more important ITTL since it is quite unlikely that Krupp will end up owning the iron mines of Northern Spain).
  • Iberian peninsula: Spain is feasible if a liberal revolution prevails. This would be very good for Spain and a welcome addition to the French alliance. An earlier industrialization in northern Spain is also feasible. I'm more sceptical about Portugal: I think they will keep their traditional ties with GB due to fears of being subsumed in a greater Spain.
  • Austria: a partition of Austria into a Cisleithanian portion and a Transleithanian one is possible at the same time they are kicked out of nothern Italy (the 1848 equivalent). Again Russia might be not completely happy (but then Greater Hungary might become a Russian ally while Greater Austria gravitates toward the Prussian alliance)
  • North Africa: a French Algeria is still very well in the cards. ITTL it might be joined by a Spanish Morocco and a Tunisia "colonised" by the kingdom of Two Sicilies (I'd guess that both Morocco and Tunisia would be protectorates rather than real colonies).

Than there is Great Britain: it would take a significant paradigm shift to make GB completely aloof from continental changes, in particular changes of this magnitude. There are things about which they would certainly react (a closure of Baltic for example or Russian penetration into the OE to a degree to threaten the Straits) but then it is also possible that they might accept the idea of the two confronting blocks and play their game with them provided that their imperial interests are not put at significant risk (in particular if the Russian bear - rebuffed in Central Europe - is more proactive in Central Asia and Far East (OTL there was a significant scare of Russian expansionism in the Pacific).

China and the USA are out of the radar for the time being, but China might become a contention bone in the late 19th century.
Ok, lets change the following. To avoid closing up the baltic we make Sweden/Norway a neutral country like Switserland and the Netherlands.

How could we get an isolationionist Britain? I think Britain could significantly shift the balance of power in such a situation and I want both sides to be relatively evenly matched. Basicly have Britain focus in the 20th century on their crumbling empire and try not to get involved in continental politics. Their main consern would be to avoid one country dominating Europe (with two equal blocks competing that wouldn't happen) and as long as the Netherlands and Flanders remain independent, Britain might still be satisfied with the status quo.

I could easily see the USA not getting involved in European problems. OTL they prefered to stay out of it until WWII after all.

Russia realy is the biggest problem I have. Would adding Russia to any camp switch the balance of power? What would make Russia decide not to get involved in this situation? A complete (economic?) collapse of Russia perhaps?
 
I have said before (actualy most recently today in a reaction of you in another thread) that I doubt that the Dutch would accept the Tallyrand plan. But we can use a slightly modified plan (the plan would probably be renegotiated anyway), in which the Netherlands keep Limburg and Zeelandic Flanders, while we move the French borders somewhat east, so it get a larger part of Liege and Namur province, while Prussia mainly gets Luxemburg and the eastern part of Liege. The city probaly needs to be French as the citizens of Liege where the biggest proponents of joining France during the Belgian revolt.
Could work. I would suggest that France gets also a chunk of Luxembourg (maybe not as much as it was taken from the Grand Duchy in 1839) and that the king of Netherlands receives a monetary compensation from France and Prussia for the lost territories. The access of Wallonia to the see is guaranteed as it was IOTL by a neutralization of the Schelde. The only question is what's in this for Great Britain? They would certainly get the Dutch alliance (maybe a complete neutralization of the Netherlands, but I would rather see a defense treaty between GB and them). Maybe France cedes to GB some (minor) colonial possessions.

Interesting ideas.
Economy is always the strongest engine for changes, the more so in the 19th century given the sharp growth of wealth caused by the industrial revolution. The main problem with economic PODs (like this one: a wealthier France which benefits from the already established Wallonian industries and has access to larger coal reserves) is that they can bring fast and sharp changes which may go on and surprise everyone.

Ok, lets change the following. To avoid closing up the baltic we make Sweden/Norway a neutral country like Switserland and the Netherlands.

How could we get an isolationionist Britain? I think Britain could significantly shift the balance of power in such a situation and I want both sides to be relatively evenly matched. Basicly have Britain focus in the 20th century on their crumbling empire and try not to get involved in continental politics. Their main consern would be to avoid one country dominating Europe (with two equal blocks competing that wouldn't happen) and as long as the Netherlands and Flanders remain independent, Britain might still be satisfied with the status quo.

I could easily see the USA not getting involved in European problems. OTL they prefered to stay out of it until WWII after all.

Russia realy is the biggest problem I have. Would adding Russia to any camp switch the balance of power? What would make Russia decide not to get involved in this situation? A complete (economic?) collapse of Russia perhaps?

You are right: Russia is the big issue even more so than Great Britain. The problem is also that you want an independent Poland (which can only be the outcome of a defeated Russia). The key must be Nicholas I. Let's say that there is a stronger (stronger than OTL where it was already quite significant) reaction to the Decembrist upraising: the Slavophile doctrine ("Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality" turns Russia more sharply from the West, deemed decadent and ungodly. There is another significant twixt: more and more of the Slavophiles claim that the destiny of Russia is in Asia. Fast forward to 1848: a richer and more liberally-oriented France sends the last Orleans packing and the 2nd Republic is proclaimed. ITTL the republican France sends arms, supplies and volunteers to Northern Italy and this (together with a better performance of a stronger and more liberal kingdom of Two Sicilies) succeeds in expelling the Austrians for good. What happens after this is much more complex and it might go different ways. Let's assume anyway that there will be no Italian unification and a sort of federal state will be established. It will be a good subject for future discussions. The collapse of the Italian possessions sends more waves of panic to Linz where the imperial government sits after having fled from Vienna (both Vienna and Prague are in the hands of insurgents as it was IOTL). To complicate the matter Franz Joseph refuses to meet the ban of Croatia (ironic since he was the best prop for the Habsburgs but panic is not a good counselor). Hungary is also rising in rebellion and a compromise with the insurgents is reached: the empire of Austria is split into two entities (Cisleithania under Franz Joseph and Transleithania under his brother Maximilian - the latter under a regency council since Maximilian is still a minor). Russia's offer to intervene is declined much to the chagrin of Nicholas I (but also strengthening his belief that Russia does not want to become entangled with the decadent west). Once again let's leave aside for the time being what is exactly included in Cisleithania and what is included in Transleithania as well as how these lands are governed (I would go for personal unions on both sides, but while this might work in Cisleithania it would possibly be more hard to swallow for the Hungarians). It is also quite possible that Russia takes the opportunity to occupy Galicia (to restore order :rolleyes:). Surprisingly enough the liberal revolution does not achieve the same results in Germany (mainly due to Prussia being steadfast on the conservative side): when the dust settles there is still a German Confederation (which includes also Cisleithania) but ITTL it is more dominated by Prussia. An interesting development might result out of the more successful 1848: Alexander Cuza is more successful in his liberal insurrection in Moldavia and ITTL he is not arrested by Austrians. The situation in Spain is slightly more complex since in 1847-49 the 2nd Carlist war is fought. I'd say that anyway the presence of a more liberal France on the northern border will produce slower but surer liberalization effects in Spain too (in particular since French entrepreneurs will be participating in the Spanish economic boom of the early 1850s).

The very unhappy Nicholas will certainly try to find glory and access to the Mediterranean by attacking the OE: it will end up in some kind of Crimea-equivalent (GB+France+*Federal Italy troops landing on the southern coast of the Black sea). IOTL after the fall of Sevastopol and the sudden death of Nicholas Alexander II sued for peace. Say that ITTL Nicholas does not die in 1855 (pneumonia - possibly aggravated by depression - is not too difficult to avoid) and there is no peace treaty. To break the Russian obduracy there is the obvious Baltic option: potential allies for the coalition are Sweden and Prussia (plus maybe Transleithania aiming to recover Galicia). Top this with a Polish insurrection (not too much out of the possibilities with the war going very badly for Russia). This Polish development might also induce Prussia to be in the war to have some kind of control on the outcome. Russia is brought to the peace table and the bill is higher: independence for the kingdom of Poland under a catholic German prince and maybe even a chunk of the Baltic duchies going to Prussia (or being set up as a semi-independent German puppet state). Now the destiny of Russia is clearly to the east: as soon as the new czar is crowned the first business is the modernization of the fleet and the army (would be good for the second son of Nicholas, Konstantin, who was involved mainly with the navy modernization with decent success. Russian penetration into Central Asia and Far East is much stronger and this will bring them once again in a clash with Great Britain. Incidentally I don't think Alaska will be sold ITTL.
Can some kind of real tie be arranged with the USA? I'm not talking of a military alliance but rather of more interest in the expansion to the west and the construction of the transcontinental railways which would strike a chord for Russia a could propose a model for the development of Siberia as well as better connection to the Far East.

Now you have also a good reason for Great Britain's aloofness from the politics of Continental Europe: the lodestone of the imperial policy is certainly the protection of India, but the worries for the Chinese situation comes a close second. In either case the enemy is the same: the Russian bear. If you want to distract GB even more there is always the possibility of a more successful mutiny in India: the rebellion will be suppressed in the end, but it will take more time and leave a deeper scar on the British imperial consciousness.
 
One major difference between a US-Sovjet cold war and a French-German one is the fact that the first two countries aren't neighbours. I think the chances of escalation in your setting will drastically increase because there really is no response time.
In our own cold war there was "plenty" of time to react to an all out missile strike. In this case it would be all too easy for one of the parties to think that a pre-emptive strike is the best case solution to prevent the other party from doing so first. No need for ballistic missiles when you can reach the others capital with nuclear artillery which hits in less then five minutes.
A point against this argument of course is that the same thing can be said for India/Pakistan. So it depends on if there's not only a geopolitical fear for the other but also an ideological one in which case the paranoia about the other party would be much higher.
 
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