BlairWitch749
Banned
Define "major". But I think British & French will want to have a word with you (while Israelis and Turks will just scream obscenities from some distance awaywhile Pakistanis will just mutter something to themselves)
Also don't forget that lasttime US did opposed amphibious landing was Inchon and there were very few of them after that done by any military. Yet USMC is still around, still big and other militaries have similar, though smaller, forces.
Still makes one wonder how many of those remained after three guttings....
But you didn't answer my question. Why would US go on crash course to rebuild 2 AB divisions in 2 months after Normandy (one of them for third time in a year!) when they had other fresh, uncommited divisions just kicking their heels? Makes no sense to me but I hope you can explain this
And even that took a few months. US did it in 2 months! With 2 divisions!
I define major as more than one division
amphibious capability is also different and evolved... the marines have tanks and apc's now as part of their organic kit... they are no longer an elite assault force used only to break any enemy coast, but instead are a defacto ground army (sorry calbear but thats how it is)
certain platoons in the 101st had only 3 or 4 "originals" by the time of operation plunder, the infantry company in which audey murphy served had every single man killed or wounded in the north african campaign and italy except murphy and a clerk
the american though (british as well) was that it was superior to feed replacements into divisions that had experienced troops; hitler had the opposite vision... they thought they would get better results this way; there is no deeper reason other than strait doctrine
the german tactic (not necessarily better mind you) was to keep their divisions on the line without giving them replacements, until they where mroe or less destroyed (especially the infantry divisions)... then the command staffs and the few survivors would be pulled off the line and they would be completely rebuild OR they would be withdrawn, broken up and used to feed new divisions
the us strategy in rapid replacement was somewhat dubious because the fellows they inserted usually (unless they were returning wounded) didn't have anything like the quality of training that the "originals" had and where quite likely to be killed in their first engagement (comrade calbear or macauley could provide us with more in depth thoughts on the us replacement system)