alternatehistory.com

Peter Goes East
A Russian Timeline



“Where the Russian flag has once been hoisted, it must never be lowered.”
(Tsar Nicholas I)

“For a mad dog, seven versts is not a long journey.”
(Russian Proverb)​

Chapter 1


An excerpt from “Petrus: The Tsar Of The East” (1939, St. Petersburg-on-the-Ob University Press)

Our God is a sarcastic god and loves to play practical jokes on unsuspecting mortals below. A facet of this is history’s tendency to turn on the smallest and most unimportant things one could imagine—a certain unpopular man being killed in a backwoods town, or perhaps an unmeant smirk at a funeral. One would think such things would demean the good, honest profession of historian. No, indeed, they make it the truest and most pious expression of the Lord’s will known to me(1).

Perhaps the greatest of these small pivots was the heroic action of Boyar(2) Boris Petrovich Sheremetev at the Battle of Zelenaya Dolina on 15 May, 1689. For four months, the grand Russian army assembled by the great statesman Vasily Vasilyevich Galitzine had marched through the Wild Fields(3), bound for the Crimean fastness of Perekop, where Galitzine hoped to cripple the power of the Sublime Ottoman State in the Black Sea and aid Russia’s allies in their holy war against the heathens. However, unbeknownst to Galitzine, a horde of nearly 20,000(4) Tatars had left the Crimea and were ranging the Ukraine, hunting for the Russians themselves. On May 10, a Tatar scout spotted the Russians only a few miles from the town of Zelenaya Dolina. And so, five days later, the massive barbarian army launched a surprise assault on the rear of Galitzine’s army, aiming to capture the Russian baggage train. The rearguard almost immediately began to crumble under the assault, as they were weak and hungry after months of travel.

The army’s destruction would have come about were it not for the Achillean(5) Sheremetev, who, upon a great black steed, rallied the troops, calling on “Mary, Joseph, and the Lord himself!” to grant the Russians courage and lead to victory over the heathen. The troops, heartened, turned and fought the Crimeans, forcing them back temporarily: this momentary retreat was long enough, however, for the Russian artillery to ready for a second assault. Only minutes later, this second assault came, a renewed wave of Tatars rushing towards Sheremetev’s force—only to be met with cannon, musket, and the ring of steel-on-steel(6), forcing them back once again with heavy losses. By this time, Galitzine had realized what was happening, and rallied his own cavalry to inflict a stunning defeat on the Tatars, utterly dispersing them.
This victory proved the turning point in Russia’s campaign against the Crimeans.

Encouraged by his own military prowess, Galitzine and his army reached Perekop on May 18(7), catching the Tatars off guard. The Mohammedans had attempted to dig a great ditch across the isthmus, so as to keep artillery from being drawn up to the fastness—however, the ditch was not more than half-finished, and was quite shallow in width in its greatest portions, allowing Galitzine to bombard the fortifications with impunity. The Tatars had not had time to burn off the grass in the area, while drinkable water was provided by a small lake nearby(8). Thus, in a position of extreme advantage and with superior numbers and weaponry, the Russians were able to bombard the Tatars into surrender by June 6(9), allowing Galitzine entrance into the Crimea itself. However, Galitzine, ever the statesman, decided to negotiate from a position of strength rather than enter into a war with the strong opponent the Crimeans were.

And so, on June 22, 1689, Vasily Vasilyevich Galitzine and his Crimean counterpart, Selim I Giray, Crimean Kan(10), signed the Treaty of Perekop, by which the Crimean Kanate left the war against the Grand Alliance and became a vassal state of Russia: Russia also took possession of Perekop itself, allowing the Russians control of the access to the peninsula. His campaign accomplished, Galitzine returned to Moscow.

***

On July 12, the day after Galitzine had reached Moscow, the victor and his army were treated to a massive victory parade through the streets of the ancient city, delighting the populace and enveloping them in nationalistic fervor. Behind this façade of victory, Galitzine was troubled: yes, Russia had won a great victory and gained the respect of her allies, but in the distant east, the Manchurians(11) threatened the Russian colonies on the Pacific shore while the Ottomans remained a threat to the southeast.

Perhaps it was divine inspiration(12). Perhaps it was confidence in his own abilities gained by his victories(13). Whatever, the case, on July 17, Galitzine and his lover the Tsarevna Sophia came up with what is generally acknowledged to be one of the most brilliant political gambits in Russian history. Deciding to deal with both problems at once, Galitzine sent a long and apologetic letter to the Manchurian envoys, apologizing for not being able to treat with them at the moment, for he had to deal with the Ottomans. At the same time, Sophia dispatched two regiments of streltsy(14) to reinforce the Russian garrison in the Amur River valley, so as to give the Russians a position of advantage in the region. Here, however, was where the unexpected intervened.

Hearing of the streltsy leaving Moscow, the young co-tsar Peter made a rare visit to his sister and her lover to question them. Galitzine, seeing an opportunity to get rid of the strong young tsar, told him of his plan, and wondered out loud where he could get more troops to reinforce the Amur garrison. Peter, eager to fight, at once offered his two self-trained regiments of Imperial Guardsmen stationed at the small towns of Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky, along with his foreign advisors, and, of course, himself. When Galitzine feebly protested, Peter insisted on it—seemingly reluctantly, Galitzine accepted.

And so, on August 1, 1689, Peter Alexeyvich Romanov left Moscow with a cohort of 20,000 men, bound for the Amur River Valley, changing history forever.

Notes

(1) You should already be able to tell that Russia and the world are extremely different in this TL. Also, I want to warn you beforehand that this author is extremely biased towards Russia, so we will be seeing some mistakes and some more outright fabrications.
(2) In OTL, he’s known as the first Russian count. Here, he’s just another boyar.
(3) Polish-Lithuanian and Russian term for the Ukraine.
(4) More like 12,000.
(5) “Like Achilles”. It’s a word now.
(6) Our good narrator neglects to mention the terrible losses suffered by the Russians in this countercharge.
(7) Two days before OTL, meaning that the Tatars are much less prepared than OTL. IOTL, they had just barely finished preparing their defenses (a 7km ditch which drained that lake mentioned later).
(8) Unlike OTL.
(9) Again, neglecting to mention the significant Russian losses and difficulties taking the fort.
(10) TTL’s spelling of “Khan”.
(11) TTL’s word for the Manchu Empire.
(12) It wasn’t.
(13) It was.
(14) The streltsy were the elite guard units established by Ivan the Terrible, intended to form a professional core for Russia’s army. In reality, they became corrupt and lazy, and often revolted, causing significant problems for the Tsars. Our narrator fails to mention that the two regiments sent are some of the most troublesome.

* * *

I like Russia. Do you like Russia? If you like Russia, you might like this. Do comment and criticize, etc.
Top