Persia Enters WWI on the Side of the Entente

CaliGuy

Banned
I read that there once was a point so tense in Ottoman-Persian relations (I think in late 1914) that Persia seriously considered going to war with the Ottoman Empire. Thus, here is my question:

What if Persia would have entered WWI on the side of the Entente?
 
Perhaps Britain launches an amphibious attack against Alexandretta instead of the Dardanelles? With a Turko-Persian conflict, Mesopotamia will be a significant theater of conflict earlier than IOTL, so the benefit of cutting Turkey off from the region will be larger. All depends on the timing though.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Perhaps Britain launches an amphibious attack against Alexandretta instead of the Dardanelles? With a Turko-Persian conflict, Mesopotamia will be a significant theater of conflict earlier than IOTL, so the benefit of cutting Turkey off from the region will be larger. All depends on the timing though.
What about if the timing is late 1914?
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
What if Persia would have entered WWI on the side of the Entente?

Probably Persia does not have any military success against the Ottomans until reinforced by British or Russian troops. And if those troops are sent, their home countries are more likely to retain control of territories conquered from the Ottomans than the Persians. Persia would probably make minor gains, like control over of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, but they don't get to annex Iraq/Mesopotamia.
 
Not even Basra?

Too close to Kuwait, forget it. Anyways, Persia was seriously divided at this time, and not just between British and Russian spheres of influence, so I don't know that a decision made in Tehran to go to war with the Turks would mean so much on their frontier.
 
Didn't Iran face a humanitarian crisis druing WWI which was greater then the actual combatants?

Caused by British negligence, yes. Possibly worse than the Holodomor, going by the high end estimates. Another reason I'm a little skeptical of this - the Persians were already under Anglo-Russian occupation and resented it, so it's hard to see them coming to hate the Turks more.
 
Definitely not Basra. IOTL, Basra fell to the British before the end of 1914, and the Shatt al Arab was under British control by December 1914. Mesopotamia and Basra especially are also important enough that Britain will not want to give them to Persia. And Persia can't take them on their own-their forces are too weak and too slow to get there before Britain.

With regard to the timing question posed earlier, if Persia entered the war in late 1914 it wouldn't make much difference, at least not immediately. The Ottomans were already planning to invade northern Persia before the Caucasus Campaign kicked off in November. Russian troops were present in the region pre-war, and that gave them a strategic position on the Ottoman flank. So Persia entering the war at the same time would really only legitimize the Russian presence, and strengthen their forces in the Caucasus with Persian auxiliaries.

However, it's important to remember that Persia at the time had an extremely weak central state. Most of their military was composed of tribal units and forces delivered by the regional authorities. Further, their central forces were small and foreign officered. So I think Russian and British forces would move in to an even greater extent than IOTL to secure the important positions, and ensure the Persian government retained control of the provinces. The difference would be the occupation would be legitimized by being done under the auspices of an alliance and in support of the Shah, rather than in defiance of Persian neutrality. So I think we could expect more units like the South Persian Rifles being raised and used more widely, possibly with some under nominal Persian control. In practice they would British units through and through.

Otherwise, I think the biggest military implication would be how the Ottomans choose to respond to the Persian declaration of war. Specifically, what they decide to commit in terms of additional resources. For example, if Turkey decides that the Persian threat means the Caucasian force needs x number of additional troops, those troops have to come from somewhere, and operations are delayed until those troops are in position. It might not change the campaign, but then again it might.

For example, I think it reasonable the Ottomans would strengthen their forces in the Caucasus and in Mesopotamia. As I've mentioned above, Persian belligerency gives the Russians more options, and it raises the possibility of an attack from Persia toward Baghdad or Basra or Mosul. That means Turkey needs more troops to garrison Mesopotamia and more for the 3rd army in the Caucasus (I don't think I've ever used that word so much in one day before...). Plus, it means the Turks will be even less likely to react decisively toward the early British operations in the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia. IOTL the reaction was very muted and here they have to worry about guarding against a Persian attack too. There's also the matter of where they pull troops from. As I see it, they can either draw down the forces in Thrace/western Anatolia or eliminate the Suez Raid force and use it elsewhere. I think that is the most likely option, personally. But non matter what, you now have an awful lot of Turkey's military dependent on an awfully vulnerable logistic umbilical cord in the railway passing through Alexandretta. The British considered landing there as an alternative to Gallipoli IOTL and TTL only makes the reward for such an operation greater.

As an aside, can you elaborate more on the incident you allude to in the OP? It would help figure out a concrete scenario and I wasn't able to find much with some quick googling.
 
The persian military barely reached 40 000 men with little modern armament (russian or british since the country was split into 2 spheres of influence). The elite unit of the Persian unit was a cossack brigade (roughly 2000 men) commanded by russian officers which become a full division during WW1 (perhaps up to 8000 men but not sure). There also the persian "gendarmerie" (6000 men) formed, trained and commanded by swedish officers (and Sweden was more pro-German than pro-Entente), a relatively capable force able to wage war against turkish small units but not a full army. So on a military point of view, Persia is not a huge asset for the Entente. And the Ottomans have around 600000 men.
There is also the tribes, de facto independant and armed by the british to defend the oil exploitations (vital for the Royal Navy since 1912) in Southwestern Persia: at least a few thousand men (probably fare more), this time well armed and pro-british (since England assured their autonomy and were giving them huge sums of money.
You have to know that in spite of Turkish expansion plans in case of a victory ( all the Kurdish Persia in the West would have been annexed), the persian population was pro-German and Ottoman since they were humiliated by Russia and Great Britain for decades (capitulations, foreigners controlling the customs like the Belgian Naus who was hugely unpopular btw and I could go on for hours). So rallying the Entente could create popular discontend within Persia.
And if the Russians and the British decide to unite all the persians having a rifle into a single national army (which, again, was against their doctrine of "divide and rule" and "enjoying the weakness of a state to do some business"): armed tribes, gendarmerie, official army, volunteers etc. You could create a relatively well trained army with modern equipment of 100 000 men for 1916 but not before. If Iran declares war in 1915, the country won't resist against a Ottoman invasion. In 1916, a 100 000 army if led by competent officers (probably coming from the Indian Army) could potentially save the English around Bagdad. The Persian-british army in Iraq would be a immense threat for the Ottomans and war could end earlier in the Middle East (since they are waging an exhausting four-front war, Djemal Pacha would perhaps be forced to send divisions in Iraq, thus weakening his own 4th army in Palestine and Arabia with predictible results): perhaps in december 1917 after the fall of Jerusalem. For the English, that means a huge army of hardened veterans ready to be sent in France (at least 450 000 men since 200 000 men would remain in the Middle East to keep order. The German Spring Offensive will probably be stopped earlier.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
As an aside, can you elaborate more on the incident you allude to in the OP? It would help figure out a concrete scenario and I wasn't able to find much with some quick googling.
Gladly :):

https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/soc.history.what-if/cpT0eH2MRyg/7W0tDUP7Ky4J

(Direct quoting here below.)

On Persia and Central Powers jihadism:

"The notion of global Islamic solidarity behind the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph was
a fantasy, particularly in the Shia world. Rauf Bey's incursion across the
border had reignited centuries-old hostility between Sunni Turks and Shia
Persians, very nearly pushing Persia into war--against the Ottoman
Empire. As Count Georg Kanitz, the German military attaché, reported from
Baghdad (en route for Tehran) in July 1915, Persians and Germans alike were
aghast at the 'wretched tragedy of plunder, arson, the defilement of women,
and senseless bloodbaths' which had come in the wake of the Turkish invasion.
Reports were filtering in from Karbala and Najaf that the Shia clerics,
horrified by Turkish misdeeds against their co-religionists in Persia, were
reconsidering their endorsment of the holy war, and preparing to make their
peace with the British invaders. All in all, Kanitz concluded, 'it was a
miralce that Persia had not long since decalred war on Turkey.' With this in
mind, simply keeping Tehran *out* of the war (as in securing the recall of
Rauf Bey) must count as something of an achievment for the Germans, even if a
hollow one." Sean McMeekin, *The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire
and Germany's Bid for World Power*, (Harvard UP 2010), pp. 283-284
https://books.google.com/books?id=6k5HzkboGvcC&pg=PA283

"Furthermore, holy war propaganda had mobilized only a handful of Arabs and
Kurds along the Turkish-Persian border, along with some south Persian tribes.
Elsewhere, the call for jihad had produced little response, falling victim to
Persian fears of the Turks and to the Shite-Sunni schism..." Donald M.
McKale, *War by Revolution: Germany and Great Britain in the Middle East in
the Era of World War I* (Kent State UP 1998), p. 134
https://books.google.com/books?id=j6-bKj5eaqcC&pg=PA134

Nevertheless, national-minded Persians hated the British and Russian
domination of their country (although they didn't want to trade it for
Turkish domination). Persia did not want to fight the Central Powers. The
point is that it might be forced to if the Germans did not restrain their
Turkish allies. In the end, they did: "Rauf Bey spent the summer in Persia;
but in September, due to mounting German pressure, the Ottoman High Command
ordered him to return to Khanaqin..."
http://www.turkeyswar.com/campaigns/persia.html
 
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