Peasants, enrich yourselves! A right opposition USSR TL.

You will see once we start getting into the mid-late 30s

That is good to hear.

Maybe we will see a smaller amount of weapons, vehicles and equipment, at least compared to OTL, but perhaps smaller numbers are both better designed, maintained and more reliable then IOTL. Less ordering straight off the design board, with finished product much more capable, and less teething issues that plagued a lot of more advanced Soviet Arms and Equipment during the Early period of WW2.

Doctrine wise, Soviets are likely to end up with Deep Battle Doctrine, they seem to heading that way from the mid-late 20ies, although, they are likely to be better prepared equipment wise to perform it ITTL, and perhaps a bit less reliant on Lend-Lease, at least Equipment wise.

Just how different Soviet arms may end up, is up for debate, but perhaps things like Yak-1 Fighters (and numerous other "next generation" items) are availlable in greater numbers and with some of its initial kinks at least partially ironed out, greater amount of motorized transport is availlable, more artillery pieces are towed by motor vehicles instead of horses, tanks more reliable and with greater amounts of spare parts around... Things like SVT-40 may end up seeing a much wider employment and production then IOTL, T-34M/T-43 design might end up in production early enough...

All in all very interesting developments, hope to see more soon.
 
Just how different Soviet arms may end up, is up for debate, but perhaps things like Yak-1 Fighters (and numerous other "next generation" items) are availlable in greater numbers and with some of its initial kinks at least partially ironed out, greater amount of motorized transport is availlable, more artillery pieces are towed by motor vehicles instead of horses, tanks more reliable and with greater amounts of spare parts around... Things like SVT-40 may end up seeing a much wider employment and production then IOTL, T-34M/T-43 design might end up in production early enough...
With more emphasis on consumer goods, less emphasis on having the worlds largest airforce and tanks.

Without the Purges, Tsyganov is still the lead designer for the BT tanks, and that line would continue

Here is the BT-SV,
bt_sv_1-650.jpg
for sloped armor testing and having a four man crew

and 45mm armed the BT-20
A-20-650.png
with 25mm armor.
Still very good for the era in 1939, to fix deficiencies discovered in Spain, but still could run trackless, from the Christie heritage.

Same goes for the airforce. Without the purge, Tupolev stays in control, not needing to bump up Arkhangelskii to that role that he proved ill suited to lead.
So fewer SB Bo,bers, but are developed along the same path to what the Ar-2 became
 
World Snapshot: 1933

RousseauX

Donor
A quick snapshot of the World in January 1933:

Mao Zedong is sitting in Yan'an, busy fighting Chiang Kai Shek 's Nationalist warlords from the outside, and busy purging the supporters of the Moscow trained "28-Bolsheviks" within the party. Despite some superficial similarities between the land redistribution policies of the CPC in Yan'an and Moscow's agricultural policies, he has being secretly reading a translation of the works of Leon Trotsky. However, he cannot quite be so open about this until he finds some way to purge Soviet "agricultural adviser" and Comintern agent Nikolai Yezhov [1], whom Mao suspects was sent by Moscow to keep an eye on him.

Walter Ulbricht is in Paris, having fled under an assumed name after the recent Nazi victory led by Adolf Hitler, in battle for Germany. Despite a half-hearted alliance with the Social Democrats [2], the Steel Helmets and the Red Front couldn't keep the Nazis at bay. Oh well....he will soon be heading to Hotel Lux in Moscow to wait another shot at the revolution. While at a Parisian Cafe, he had a very interesting chat with an idealistic young Briton named Kim Philby.

Franklin Roosevelt has defeated incumbent Republican Herbert Hoover, and is preparing for his inauguration and a "New Deal" for America...

Heinz Guderian is giving a lecture on logistics at the Frunze academy in Moscow [3], which is attended by deputy defense Comissar Mikhail Tukhachevsky, at the reception the two agreed that the new German government is likely to recall German military missions in the Soviet Union. And bid each other farewell with some regret.

[1] Funnily enough, Yezhov was deputy commissar for agriculture in the late 20s otl. In atl, he lost some power struggle in the post-Stalin era and has being sent on what is effectively an exile to China.

[2] The Comintern doesn't take the "Social Fascist" line ttl, but the KPD itself was pretty dubious about cooperating with the SDP

[3] German officers did do this during the Interbellum due to the Rapello Pact

Overall, the world has not changed too much from OTL. The butterflies thus far have being contained to the USSR and the global Communist parties.
 
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I think industrial production, in the long run, would be less effected than people might think. People have a real incentive, outside not getting shot, to produce things and do it right. A lot of the industrial production under Stalin was garbage. Terrified about being shot if they don't meet production quotas there was a tendency to slap it together quickly so you can meet the quota. People were terrified of taking real risks as if they made a mistake they could be accused of being "wreckers". This hampers industrial research and trying to come up with new ideas to do things more efficiently.

The peasants deliberately wrecked Soviet agriculture under Stalin and it never really recovered. Without Stalin, they are far more likely to proceed to increase production using new methods. Eventually, there should be a surplus of grain. Move the less productive farmers into factories and sell the most productive farmers cheap tractors and other farm equipment. Allow them to lease the land that the less productive farmers abandoned from the state.
 
Doctrine wise, Soviets are likely to end up with Deep Battle Doctrine, they seem to heading that way from the mid-late 20ies, although, they are likely to be better prepared equipment wise to perform it ITTL, and perhaps a bit less reliant on Lend-Lease, at least Equipment wise.

The big difference in doctrinal development compared to OTL between 1937 and 1941 is liable to be in defensive doctrine. Historically, the Deep Battle crowd was just getting around to accepting that defensive operations should be paid attention too and incorporated into Soviet doctrine when Stalin had them dragged out and shot, leaving much of the nuts-and-bolts on how to apply Deep Battle defensively left only partly finished.

However, the single biggest difference from the lack of a Great Purge on the Red Army is liable to be in the training regimen. The purges, quite aside from any direct loss of experienced senior leadership, left the senior ranks too terrified to be nearly as focused on capacity building among their subordinates when they were at risk of being denounced and shot. Since part of those subordinates jobs were then in turn usually training their own subordinates, this had a ripple effect that led to many Soviet divisions being too poor in skills to conduct extended road marches or peacetime unit level maneuvers, let alone formation-level combined arms warfare. Continuity of the training regimen, with the progression of training from individual skills to sub-unit drills to unit and formation level maneuvers over the intervening years would be crucial in having divisions that can actually fight as divisions.
 
The big difference in doctrinal development compared to OTL between 1937 and 1941 is liable to be in defensive doctrine. Historically, the Deep Battle crowd was just getting around to accepting that defensive operations should be paid attention too and incorporated into Soviet doctrine when Stalin had them dragged out and shot, leaving much of the nuts-and-bolts on how to apply Deep Battle defensively left only partly finished.

However, the single biggest difference from the lack of a Great Purge on the Red Army is liable to be in the training regimen. The purges, quite aside from any direct loss of experienced senior leadership, left the senior ranks too terrified to be nearly as focused on capacity building among their subordinates when they were at risk of being denounced and shot. Since part of those subordinates jobs were then in turn usually training their own subordinates, this had a ripple effect that led to many Soviet divisions being too poor in skills to conduct extended road marches or peacetime unit level maneuvers, let alone formation-level combined arms warfare. Continuity of the training regimen, with the progression of training from individual skills to sub-unit drills to unit and formation level maneuvers over the intervening years would be crucial in having divisions that can actually fight as divisions.

Same thing in industry. Having your people terrified isn't the best way to get the best efficiency in anything. It will start a bit behind OTL but catch up IMO. I think the production would be higher, not lower by 1940 at the latest. The less concentration of manpower more than made up by higher efficiency.
 
Interesting timeline so far! Got some thoughts that if I'm not busy I'll type up at some point but overall looking forward to where you take it. If you haven't already I would recommend reading Robert Allen's Farm to Factory.

Same thing in industry. Having your people terrified isn't the best way to get the best efficiency in anything. It will start a bit behind OTL but catch up IMO. I think the production would be higher, not lower by 1940 at the latest. The less concentration of manpower more than made up by higher efficiency.
During this period in OTL the Soviet Union was the fastest growing economy in the world except for Japan which had its own form of planned primitive accumulation to fuel industrial growth. There's arguments both ways that replicating such growth without great ruptures in the rural population would be possible or impossible - one argument suggests that it was a side effect of forced collectivisation that truly fuelled the growth of industry, namely the dislocation of many peasants into the urban areas as they fled unfavourable conditions ending up increasing consumption and providing the new factory workforce. Then again, the purges and internal conflict Stalinism inflicted were undoubtedly negative in and of itself. Either way, I feel that some of your posts have been underplaying the vast and unprecedented growth that the five year plans were responsible for, even if you rightly recognise the accompanying cost in human lives.
 
So far the historians cited are so focused on the macro economics or nomenklatura that they're unlikely to deal with the suffering of the workers or peasants. Andrle hasn't been cited as a historian yet. Conquest and Pipes haven't been cited yet here.
 
Interesting timeline so far! Got some thoughts that if I'm not busy I'll type up at some point but overall looking forward to where you take it. If you haven't already I would recommend reading Robert Allen's Farm to Factory.


During this period in OTL the Soviet Union was the fastest growing economy in the world except for Japan which had its own form of planned primitive accumulation to fuel industrial growth. There's arguments both ways that replicating such growth without great ruptures in the rural population would be possible or impossible - one argument suggests that it was a side effect of forced collectivisation that truly fuelled the growth of industry, namely the dislocation of many peasants into the urban areas as they fled unfavourable conditions ending up increasing consumption and providing the new factory workforce. Then again, the purges and internal conflict Stalinism inflicted were undoubtedly negative in and of itself. Either way, I feel that some of your posts have been underplaying the vast and unprecedented growth that the five year plans were responsible for, even if you rightly recognise the accompanying cost in human lives.

It wasn't unprecedented. There was a similar or better growth rate in the US in the 1880s-1900s and again in ww2. It was was similar or better in Meiji Japan and again in 1960s-1980s Japan. Russia itself had a higher growth rate just prior to ww1. China right now has similar or better and has since the 90's.

Also, a lot of that growth was complete crap. You aren't ahead when your steel is inferior, your cars tend to break down, your chairs are poorly made and rickety and the shoes are clunky and fall apart than when you make smaller quantities of higher grade steel, your cars actually work, your chairs are well made and your shoes comfortable and last a decent number of years. You are ahead of the game if you make decent yet smaller numbers of moderate quality goods than larger numbers of goods that fall apart right away. Sheer numbers aren't everything. Some smaller numbers of things built adequately are better than larger numbers of things slapped together.
 
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its own form of planned primitive accumulation to fuel industrial growth. There's arguments both ways that replicating such growth without great ruptures in the rural population would be possible or impossible - one argument suggests that it was a side effect of forced collectivisation that truly fuelled the growth of industry, namely the dislocation of many peasants into the urban areas as they fled unfavourable conditions ending up increasing consumption and providing the new factory workforce.
That is a very dubious argument when you look at the UK 1940 - 1960 when the agricultural workforce halved and over 3 million jobs in domestic service disappeared or Northern Ireland where 230,000 land holdings in 1923 had consolidated to 38,000 by 1963 (there was certainly violence here but after the end of this process rather than during it). Farming involves lots of back-breaking work with relatively low rates of return. A peasant farmer does have a certain independence a factory worker does not, but factory work is generally easier and pays better. As the song goes "I spends me life workin' this dirty old ground/ For a few pints of porter and the smell of a pound". Nowhere but Russia were bayonets involved in leaving the farm for the factory.
 
That is a very dubious argument when you look at the UK 1940 - 1960 when the agricultural workforce halved and over 3 million jobs in domestic service disappeared or Northern Ireland where 230,000 land holdings in 1923 had consolidated to 38,000 by 1963 (there was certainly violence here but after the end of this process rather than during it). Farming involves lots of back-breaking work with relatively low rates of return. A peasant farmer does have a certain independence a factory worker does not, but factory work is generally easier and pays better. As the song goes "I spends me life workin' this dirty old ground/ For a few pints of porter and the smell of a pound". Nowhere but Russia were bayonets involved in leaving the farm for the factory.

Yeah, the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan among many others somehow managed to industrialize without the scale of violence of Stalinist Russia.
 
That is a very dubious argument when you look at the UK 1940 - 1960 when the agricultural workforce halved and over 3 million jobs in domestic service disappeared or Northern Ireland where 230,000 land holdings in 1923 had consolidated to 38,000 by 1963 (there was certainly violence here but after the end of this process rather than during it). Farming involves lots of back-breaking work with relatively low rates of return. A peasant farmer does have a certain independence a factory worker does not, but factory work is generally easier and pays better. As the song goes "I spends me life workin' this dirty old ground/ For a few pints of porter and the smell of a pound". Nowhere but Russia were bayonets involved in leaving the farm for the factory.
The origins of British capitalism were found in the late 1600's and 1700's when the British state enforced enclosure. The idea that factory work is easier or pays better is not historically accurate, there is much research about the degraded conditions of workers in factories. In "The Origins of Capitalism" Ellen Wood sums up the process of enclosure:

The first major wave of socially disruptive enclosure occurred in the sixteenth century, when larger landowners sought to drive commoners off lands that could be profitably put to use as pasture for increasingly lucrative sheep farming. Contemporary commentators held enclosure, more than any other single factor, responsible for the growing plague of vagabonds, those dispossessed ‘masterless men’ who wandered the countryside and threatened social order. The most famous of these commentators, Thomas More, though himself an encloser, described the practice as ‘sheep devouring men’. These social critics, like many historians after them, may have overestimated the effects of enclosure at the expense of other factors leading to the transformation of English property relations. But it remains the most vivid expression of the relentless process that was changing not only the English countryside but also the world: the birth of capitalism.

Enclosure continued to be a major source of conflict in early modern England, whether for sheep or increasingly profitable arable farming. Enclosure riots punctuated the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and enclosure surfaced as a major grievance in the English Civil War. In its earlier phases, the practice was to some degree resisted by the monarchical state, if only because of the threat to public order. But once the landed classes had succeeded in shaping the state to their own changing requirements – a success more or less finally consolidated in 1688, in the so-called ‘Glorious Revolution’ – there was no further state interference, and a new kind of enclosure movement emerged in the eighteenth century, the so-called ‘Parliamentary enclosures’. In this kind of enclosure, the extinction of troublesome property rights that interfered with some landlord’s powers of accumulation took place by acts of Parliament. Nothing more neatly testifies to the triumph of agrarian capitalism.
You also see the forced destruction of communal agricultural property in India when the British forced Indian farmers to farm cash crops. Across Africa similarly the peasant classes were forced out of their communal subsistence existences into agricultural capitalism or into resource extraction through their conquest as colonies. The UK had already undergone its agricultural revolution long before 1940 so the comparison with collectivisation in the USSR is hardly apt. The USSR's forced collectivisation was effectively the Russian method of enclosure (the Communists such as Preobrazhensky even referred to British enclosure as something they should be emulating) but that it was undertaken on a scale unseen before hand doesn't negate the fact that pretty much every corner of the globe went through a similar internal upheaval of varying scales often with the private land owners being supported by the bayonets of the state.

Since the author of this piece uses Sheila Fitzpatrick as a real life writer giving fictional observations of this timeline, perhaps we can look at what she has to say about the population upheaval in USSR from her OTL work "The Russian Revolution": "In the period 1928–32, urban population in the Soviet Union increased by almost twelve million, and at least ten million persons left peasant agriculture and became wage-earners. These were enormous figures, a demographic upheaval unprecedented in Russia’s experience and, it has been claimed, in that of any other country over so short a period. Young and able-bodied peasants were disproportionately represented in the migration, and this surely contributed to the subsequent weakness of collectivized agriculture and demoralization of the peasantry. But, by the same token, the migration was part of the dynamics of Russia’s industrialization. For every three peasants joining collective farms during the First Five-Year Plan, one peasant left the village to become a blue- or white-collar wage-earner elsewhere. The departures were as much a part of Stalin’s revolution in the countryside as collectivization itself."

The migration of peasants from the village to the city was what allowed the newly built factories to actually have a workforce. Over the process of the Civil War, the cities depopulated at an unprecedented scale and they only trickled back in peace. That is why many observers and writers exploring the era make allusions to the idea that, almost as a side effect of the horrific nature of forced collectivisation, the displacement of peasants almost helped ensure industrialisation could be a success even if it was most certainly not the goal. Do I assert that the only way to have the expansive industrialisation of the USSR in this period would have been from forced collectivisation? Not at all. It wasn't even that successful as a method of developing agricultural output as for many years after its implementation most output remained the same and there was the negative side effect of lots of livestock being butchered by peasants wanted to quickly make some money before they were appropriated.

I mentioned Robert Allen because his work has an important conclusion that I feel fits the themes and ideas of a Right Oppositionist controlled USSR, as shown in his essay "A Reassessment of the Soviet Industrial Revolution" which is a supplement to the book of his that I recommended: "First, the New Economic Policy, which involved the preservation of peasant farming and a market relationship between town and country, was a conducive framework for rapid industrialization. Collectivization made little additional contribution to this system of organization. Second, the autarchic development of the producer goods sector was a viable source of new capital equipment. Exporting wheat and importing machinery--i.e. following comparative advantage--was not necessary for rapid growth. Third, the central planning of firm output in conjunction with the soft budget constraint was effective in mobilizing otherwise unemployed labour. This additional employment made a significant contribution to output as well as distributing consumption widely". Whilst being critical of collectivisation, rightly, he also recognises the impressive industrial growth of this period that, although some like to do their best, can't be ignored.
 
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