Pearl Harbor counterattack ?

So, let me get this right.
The reasons why a Japanese battleship force cannot get within range of Pearl harbor is because the Japanese ships did not have the fuel capacity needed to get there and the Japanese did not have a refueling capability at sea.
Is that correct?
 
So, let me get this right.
The reasons why a Japanese battleship force cannot get within range of Pearl harbor is because the Japanese ships did not have the fuel capacity needed to get there and the Japanese did not have a refueling capability at sea.
Is that correct?

They had the capability, but it barely sufficed to get them over the Pacific to Pearl in the first place. The capability was tactical, not strategic. If they'd had the oil to do that then they would not have gone to war with the USA in the first place.
 
MUC, fuel was such an issue that some of the IJN destroyers had to be carry drums of fuel so that they would have a reasonable prospect of getting home.


Japan's ship building capacity leaves no chance of building new oil tankers between the decision to attack Pearl Harbor and the actual strike while I am unaware that the IJN had a capacity to refuel at sea.

It did this to get the Kido Butai to Pearl Harbor, but it was the only time this happened during the war, and this was a logistical one-time-only feat for Japan. The general and deliberate neglect of logistics on the part of Japan was one reason why this happened all of once. Too, if Japan has the oil and the capacity to build more tankers it would not strike Pearl as fear of an oil collapse is what motivated the attack in the first place.
 
I think you guys don't really get my point. I am not talking about invading Hawaii. This is not doable. I was merely proposing that 4 Japanese battleships don't take part in the S. East Asia campaign and are rather sent together with the 2 battleships screening the Kido Butai to bombard Pearl harbor. These battleships would need a screen of their own, perhaps 4-6 destroyers.

The additional fuel needed this kind of operation would need is the sum of the fuel burned to get:
a) the 2 battleships from the Kido Butai to Pearl harbor and back
b) the 4 battleships from Japan to Pearl Harbor and back minus the fuel they spent when they got to S. East Asia and back in OTL.

Since the Kido Butai used something like 6 merchants for refuelling purposes in OTL, I presume that the Japanese would need about another 6 merchants for this kind of operation.
Eliminating some of the S. East Asia landings (or actually postponing them) could free up some resources for that.

As far as fuel reserves are concerned, it's not like Japan did not have ANY fuel at all left. They were simply using their strategic reserves at the time of the Pearl harbor attack.

Is this kind of operation really not possible?

I am speaking from the pure logistical point of view, not about the IJN not getting detected or the attack failing. Just from the purely logistical point of view and only after the IJN and IJA decide to cut back on other operations if necessary.
 
Really it is not, because the need OILERS, Japan had only one class of those and only a limited amount, I don't think they sent any oilers to assist with Southeast Asia but I could be wrong

Slowing down South East Asia was a bad idea, that was the main event and what they needed to do
 
Singapore was the proverbial near run thing OTL.

Japan could not have known in advance but a delay of less than a week likely means a military disaster for Japan and a rather substantial Japanese army shattered.




As for Pearl Harbor, that's four additional battleships plus a further screen of destroyers, more than a third of the IJN's total, putting at risk half the IJN battle line as part of an operation whose whole point was a rapid air strike and fast departure. Making the effort strongly implies that the concept of the carrier strike is in error before it is even attempted yet the IJN officers involved do not let this detail change their plans.
 
MUC said:
Keeping the battleships undetected and getting eithin striking distance of Pearl harbor is.
True. Sending them makes the chances of exposing the whole operation, or of having weather screw it up, greater. Why? BBs are slower...too slow to operate in company with CVs. You might end up with the BBs arriving a day or so earlier than the CVs, shelling crap out of things, & leaving Short & Kimmel alerted, enough to slaughter the inbound airstrike. (You also risk having Kimmel sortie after the CVs & having his ass handed to him::eek::eek::eek: all the BBs sunk, plus both CVs.:eek::eek: Of course, to even do this, you need a wayback POD to get a change in IJN doctrine so it believes shelling islands is a good idea.:rolleyes:)

If this mission does go off as planned, you've butterflied away some other op somewhere, because the fuel just doesn't exist. Japan's supplies weren't limitless, & a mission like this would burn thousands of tons at a crack. Enough to force cancellation of MO? (A net benefit for Japan, actually, if it means Midway has 6 CVs instead of 4.:eek:) Or is the crisis not felt til later? Earlier curtailment of the Tokyo Express, & earlier pullout from Guadalcanal? No Yamato death ride? No Battle of Leyte Gulf? No Shinano sortie? (Joe Enright will be a very sad guy...:(:()

The idea of Japan placing a blockship is a really good one.:cool: Anybody know why they never did it?
 
A block ship would risk the advantage of surprise, which guarantees an increase in IJN losses and ironically the only ships it might have been able to block would have been the battleships and carriers, whose destruction was the point of the IJN coming to Hawaii in the first place.

Incidentally any chance of sealing off just the naval base would require not one but many block ships, which further endangers the entire operation.

Otherwise anything smaller than a light cruiser would still be able to enter or exit the naval base while Honolulu and other potential anchorages would remain available...
 
Grimm Reaper said:
A block ship would risk the advantage of surprise, which guarantees an increase in IJN losses and ironically the only ships it might have been able to block would have been the battleships and carriers, whose destruction was the point of the IJN coming to Hawaii in the first place.

Incidentally any chance of sealing off just the naval base would require not one but many block ships, which further endangers the entire operation.

Otherwise anything smaller than a light cruiser would still be able to enter or exit the naval base while Honolulu and other potential anchorages would remain available...
I'm presuming the blockship doesn't precede the air (or other) attack. You make a good point, tho.
 

sharlin

Banned
Just a quick question, how are you going to hide the arrival of a squadron of battleships and their escorts unless you plan it for basically a state visit?
 
I like e discussion so far and I see your points. Hiding the battleships is not easy indeed.

Now, let me think this over: What if Japan did not want to hide the battleships. What if they recognized earlier on, that aircraft carriers were the most important ships in the war to come and that hitting the fleet at anchor in Pearl harbor would not destroy whatever US ships were found there, but allow them to be salvaged?
What if the Japanese decided for the "decisive battle" to happen immediately at the beginning of the war, when the USN was less prepared?

So, instead of going after Pearl harbor with the Kido Butai, the Japanese split their forces. One force of 6 battleships, a couple of light cruisers and a dozen destroyers goes straight for Hawaii, aiming to tempt Kimmel in sending his battleline out and commit his CVs. Soryu and Hiryu are escorting this force, carrying mostly Zeros.
This force is the bait and it is used to shell Wake island on the 5th of December. Enterprise is on its way to Wake island, but steams away towards Pearl, having little to offer alone.
The Lexington mission is also scrapped and she's being loaded with her normal complement of planes. The Japanese start moving towards Hawaii on the 6th if December, US subs are sent towards the task force and PBYs try to locate the task force, only to be shot down by Zeros. A B17 strike achieves little from high altitude, but the Japanese lose 4 Zeros, realising that the B17 is a tougn nut to crack with machine guns only.
The decisive battle takes place at the 7 of December around 300 miles off Hawaii. The US battleline is there, together with Enterprise and Lexington. Both armadas clash, the USN having clearly superiority in numbers, aided as well by the USAAF operating out of Hawaii.
Suddenly over 300 IJN aircraft appear coming from the North, launched by the so far undetected Kido Butai. The USN radars on the carriers pick them up (did both of them have one?) but it's too late to divert sufficient fighters against them. At the end of the day, the IJN bait force has lost 4 of the 6 battleships, both small carriers, both light cruisers and half a dozen destroyers. The Kido Butai has only one carrier damaged from a USN sub attack.
The USN has lost 5 battleships, both Enterprise and Lexington, a dozen destroyers and half a dozen cruisers.
Strategically pre-placed IJN subs played a major role in the operation, hitting 2 battleships as they left Pearl harbor.

So, what do you think?
 

Flubber

Banned
So, what do you think?


I think you still have no real understanding of the situation.

Refueling issues meant that the IJN could barely get the OTL task force to it's launch point north of Pearl and those refueling issues have been explained to you repeatedly in the thread. Despite people repeatedly informing you of the refueling problems, you're now proposing that the IJN take even more ships even more closer to Hawaii.

It's as if you've ignored nearly everything the other posters have kindly been trying to explain to you.

Here are three threads courtesy of the search function. Hopefully they'll be able to make you understand the issues involved. Happy reading.

https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=96687

https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=94523

https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=97671
 

sharlin

Banned
Also if I recall reading somewhere, a naval bombardment isnt actually that effective against ground targets, great for morale but less so against specific points.


And god reading that 3rd link gave me a headache...
 
Oh dear...Japan's fixation on the great decisive battle returns to the board.:(



MUC, the problem, as Japan found out the hard way several times, is that there is not going to be a decisive battle unless the US agrees to such a state of affairs. Given that the USN is fully aware of what ships the IJN has there is no reason to imagine the USN accepting battle with a strong enemy force, least of all while the location of the rest of the IJN is unknown.

The historical record of IJN subs OTL was surprisingly consistent. For them to play any kind of useful role, let alone suddenly harm multiple battleships...



On a larger scale this is a disaster for Japan as all hope of surprising the US has been thrown out while the British have just been handed another week or two to prepare for combat. If anything Japan's position is going to be much worse in short order.
 
Ok, I understand.

I just gave it a shot, cuz I thought it would be cool to have Japan have its decisive battle after all.
 
That was an IJN problem, the obsession with a decisive battle which could never be achieved unless their opponent cooperated wholeheartedly with the IJN planning.

Of course, the most likely reason any given foe would consider such a thing would be that the foe felt that they had a serious edge over the IJN...:D

Even at Midway it came as a terrible shock to learn that the remaining USN carriers were turning east instead of preparing to charge an IJN fleet which still outgunned them to a massive degree.
 
Ok, I understand.

I just gave it a shot, cuz I thought it would be cool to have Japan have its decisive battle after all.
Japan did have its decisive battle but it happened in an unexpected manner. It was called Midway. The Japanese did not expect the decisive battle to occur between carriers and not involve the battle line.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
Ok, I understand.

I just gave it a shot, cuz I thought it would be cool to have Japan have its decisive battle after all.

It did have its decisive battle at Pearl Harbor.

They lost the war that day.
 

amphibulous

Banned
Since most of the newer surface ships of the US Navy were deployed at sea at the time of the attack, the question i would like to pose is: Would the Navy risk those units in defending against a likely invasion/raid?

There is no such thing as a likely invasion of Pearl.
 

amphibulous

Banned
Japan did have its decisive battle but it happened in an unexpected manner. It was called Midway. The Japanese did not expect the decisive battle to occur between carriers and not involve the battle line.

Well, yes and no. The Japanese were idiots - they never asked themselves how a battle could decisively knock the US out of the war. Midway ended the Japanese capacity for major offensives at sea, but it didn't have even the potential for knocking the US out. (As I'm sure you already know.)
 
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