PC: William H. Crawford in 1816? [3 Scenarios]

Despite the widespread popularity of President James Madison, Secretary Monroe, and the feeling of victory that followed the end of the War of 1812, not all was so perfect. Virginia had her men occupy the Presidency 24 out of 28 years by the time the 1816 was rolling around. Even without formally declaring his candidacy, William Crawford, who was Madison's French Ambassador during the war and twice a cabinet member after it, polled 54 congressional caucus votes to Monroe's 65. He would just need 6 defections and he could end up as the Republican nominee.

What I want to ask is not one, but a few questions:

1.) If the nomination were closer, say 61 for the Georgian and 60 for the Virginian, or vice-versa, could we get a split Republican field going into 1816? An earlier party split based on Monroenian and Crafordian (sic?) beliefs?

2.) If Monroe is chosen, and Crawford supporters feel the nomination was stolen or some such, could we seem another Republican take up the Federalist mantle for President? DeWitt Clinton's candidacy did fairly well only 4 years ago, and the Federalists had no real other options by that point, most didn't even bother to show up and nominate Rufus King that year!

3.) If Crawford were chosen, and Monroe doesn't contest it, how would his two terms end up? I say two because the Federalists were a basketcase and the prospect of a Presidential challenger seems unlikely.
 
If there is a party split, & one side supports DeWitt Clinton, it won't be called the Federalists - they're dead in the water after the Hartford Convention, I think. Rather, they might runa nd get 1-2 states if that.

I'm not totally sure, but I suspect the handling of the Panic of 1819 would be drastically altered if Crawford were President. monroe actually oposed Madison back in 1808, and my guess is that since he did nothing to ease the suffering he believed in a much less active federal government than Crawford did. (And that Madison did in 1808.) I could be wrong about that, though.

His VP is still probably Daniel Tompkins, which balances the ticket. Supposing Crawford still recovers from his stroke in 1823, it will still provoke interesting discussion regarding how to handle an incpacitated President. And, it's possible he could die from it, too, though the Presidency wasn't that stressful in those days,and he lived around a decade longer OTl, so it likely wouldn't be severe enough to kill him.
 
I have him as President in 1813 in my "Crime Across Time" timeline. Madison gets sick and dies. Having no VP at the time Crawford takes over.

At lunch at the moment will respond to your questions ASAP
 
I am really frustrated here, because I did a long post for soc.history.what-if on "President William H. Crawford" which now seems to be lost forever (thanks, Google!). However, as I recall, Crawford's showing (the result of anti-Virginia-dynasty feeling) was pretty good when you consider that he said he wasn't interested in the presidency! If he really wanted the presidency in 1816 he might have been able to get it. But he figured that it was unnecessary to divide the Republican caucus that way, since he would likely get the nomination in 1824...

I also discussed Crawford's policy views. Although he had the support of the "Old Republicans" in 1824 and is often considered a "strict constructionist", he was a strong supporter of rechartering the Bank of the United States.

I still hope I can find that post somewhere in my files...
 
I think Crawford was more the wheeler and dealer and Monroe the hands off lead by example type. I had read that they had once almost came to fisticuffs in the Whitehouse when Crawford asked Monroe to approve some of his friends as political appointees. It seems that Monroe to umbrage at being asked to get his hands dirty in such base matters and Crawford got pissed that Monroe wouldn't play ball.

1. I can't see the Republicans breaking up in any significant manner. Could they get a Monroe/Crawford compromise ticket?

2. While I think Crawford the more likely of the two to jump parties I think DTF is right that he would play good soldier with hopes of getting the 1824 nomination.

3. A Crawford/Monroe ticket? As for the Crawford Presidency I wonder how he would get along with JQA. Would there be a "Crawford Doctrine"?

What are some good websites or books to get more info on Crawford?

David T send me a link if you find your Crawford postings, thanks.
 
I think Crawford was more the wheeler and dealer and Monroe the hands off lead by example type. I had read that they had once almost came to fisticuffs in the Whitehouse when Crawford asked Monroe to approve some of his friends as political appointees. It seems that Monroe to umbrage at being asked to get his hands dirty in such base matters and Crawford got pissed that Monroe wouldn't play ball.

1. I can't see the Republicans breaking up in any significant manner. Could they get a Monroe/Crawford compromise ticket?

I don't think this is very likely because the vice-presidency in those days was not the typical route to the White House (the Secretary of State was far more likely to become president) and because it was taken for granted that the Virginia-dynasty president must be balanced with a northern vice-president--but a "safe" one, one who was not a plausible candidate for president himself. This decline in the prestige of the vice-presidency is exactly what the Federalists warned the Twelfth Amendment would bring about. (George Clinton may have harbored presidential ambitions, but was widely regarded as too old; and nobody thought of Gerry or Tompkins as likely presidents.)
 
Elbridge Gerry's death in 1814 may hinder his attempts at being re-nominated in 1816 let alone any future Presidential ambitions.
 
Another thought, wasn't Crawford originally from Virginia? Would this mollify the people who want to keep the "Virginia Dynasty" going?
 
Reading Lynn W. Turner's chapter on "The Elections of 1816 and 1820" in Arthur M. Schelsinger, Jr., Fred L. Israel, and William P. Hansen (eds.), *History of American Presidential Elections 1789-1968* (1971) it really does appear that Crawford could have had the nomination if he had wanted it.

p. 305: "The threat represented by William H. Crawford was serious. It served to remind citizens of another blemish in Monroe's record--namely, that he had listened for some time in 1808 to the siren song of revolt as piped by John Randolph and the other 'Quidites' against the dynastic succession of Madison. He could therefore hardly complain now that dissident Republicans in New York and the South were rallying behind the vigorous and younger Georgian. Sentiment for Crawford was so strong in the winter that those who yearned for harmony in the Republican ranks expressed alarm at 'the measures resorted to, to divide the friends of the late war.' One of Monroe's correspondents voiced the hope 'that you and William Crawford will be both so truly great, as not to suffer your friendships to be impaired thereby.'

"Perhaps there did exist such an element of true greatness in Crawford's composition, although more cynical observers were convinced that he was induced to withdraw from the race in 1816 by the promise of support for the succession in 1824. A Monroe supporter, Senator Abner Lacock of Pennsylvania, later admitted to a newspaper publisher that he had voluntarily called upon the Secretary of War in early March and asked him to renounce his candidacy. Lacock had argued for party loyalty but had also pointed out that Crawford was a young man with plenty of time for a later turn at the Presidency. The Georgian, Lacock reported, had replied that his own feelings would not permit him to oppose Monroe for office. Before the second caucus met on March 16, Senators Charles Tait and William Bibb of Georgia, friends of Crawford, spread the word that the Secretary of War could not run against so venerable a figure as the Secretary of State. This statement was a little condescending, perhaps, but capable of translation into a spirit of loyal and noble forbearance. Unfortunately, the friends of Crawford bungled the rest of the job. They were supposed to have attended the caucus, made a formal statement of Crawford's renunciation, voted for Monroe, and explained the whole heroic procedure in the Government press. Instead, they absented themselves from the caucus, which proceeded to nominate Monroe by 65 votes, a narrow majority of 11 over the 54 cast by stubborn Crawford partisans from New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, Georgia, and Kentucky. Had all of the Georgian's supporters from among the twenty-two Republicans been present and voted, James Monroe might never have become President of the United States."

(You may note that Turner writes about the March 16 caucus as the "second caucus." On March 10, an unknown person posted an invitation to Republican members of Congress to meet on March 12 to make the necessary nominations. At the appointed time, only 58 of the 142 Republican members appeared. This was obviously too small a number to give approval to even a pre-determined choice, so Jeremiah Morrow of Ohio, chairman of the rump session, was persuaded to issue a more official call for a Republican caucus on March 16. Turner thinks the low attendance on March 12, while perhaps partly motivated by growing opposition to the whole caucus system, was primarily a matter of Monroe-ites failing to attend because they thought the caucus might nominate Crawford. "It would have been logical enough..for Monroe's adherents to have tried to avoid a showdown, and for Crawford's friends to take the lead by making the anonymous call for a caucus on March 12. Monroe's followers would have ignored the call, thus accounting for the poor attendance, but since their hands had been forced they would have attempted to rally all their strength for the second caucus. Its outcome confirms the reliability of this hypothesis. This is also the way the newspapers interpreted events." p. 303)
 
Been ~3 months, time to bring ye backe from thee dead.

I commented further on Crawford and the kind of president he would have been at https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/3Se75U753uU/HMZb20eXfE8J

***

Crawford as Secretary of the Treasury wanted more economical government;
this involved clashes with the then-nationalist Calhoun, who as Secretary
of War feared that toom much retrenchment might hurt the national defense.
However, curiously for someone with the reputation as a states-rights-
southerner (who had the backing of the "Old Republicans" in 1824), Crawford
was a staunch defender of the consitutionality and expedience of the Bank
of the United States. Even on issues like internal improvements and the
tariff, he does not seem to have been very negative, according to Chase C.
Mooney, *Wiliam H. Crawford: 1772-1834*:

p. 167: "Crawford's annual and special reports as secretary of treasury.
his recommendations, and his letters, indicate that he did not look with
disfavor on the tariff as a means of revenue--though he and many others
recognized the uncertainty of the source and the consequent difficulty of
making reasonably accurate estimates of the return from such duties. Nor
did he object to a degree of protection incidental or otherwise, which
would permit and promote the growth of domestic manufacturing. On several
occasions he recommended a change in the duties both for revenue and
protection purposes. He was later vigorously opposed to protection for its
own sake, but while he was in the national government he would classify as
an economic nationalist."
https://books.google.com/books?id=juceBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA167

On internal improvements, Mooney writes (p. 170) that "Crawford may not
have been an advocate of internal improvements, but nothing indicates he
was opposed to using federal funds for the building of roads and canals. He
would throw all the initiative for such projects on Congress; he saw the
signifcant political implications of the problem; he recognized the
economic value of the roads; he expected a system of internal imrpovments
to come; and he was well attuned to Monroe's sensitivities on the subject--
and at time he may have attuned Monroe to his position."
https://books.google.com/books?id=juceBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA170 Anyway, Crawford
as Secretary of the Treasury did not deal much with internal improvments
after 1819; and the government already had too many financial problems.
"Whether an abundance of funds would have led Crawford to increasingly
stronger support for internal improvements can only be conjectured, but at
no time did he actively oppose the federal governent's participation in
this area. He never raised--in this period--the question of
constitutionality; he accepted the congressional sentiment on the issue and
felt certain that a national system would be instituted. After he left
Washington he felt the Constitution should be amended, either to deny the
power or to expressly grant it. He did not wish powers to be usurped, for
there was no limit to usurped powers."
https://books.google.com/books?id=juceBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA171

Interestingly, some years after he returned to Georgia, Crawford denounced
nullification:

"I have observed with some mortification that the Legislature of South
Carolina has adjourned without passing a resolution requiring the call of a
Federal convention. In Europe fundamental institutions can only be changed
by revolution, violence and bloodshed. In the United States, where such
changes can be peaceably and constitutionally made, judging from the past,
we are determined to pursue the example of our European ancestors and
change our fundamental institutions only by the same means. I hold that
no state will stand justified in the sight of Heaven who shall resort to
revolutionary measures to change the existing order of things until it has
exhausted all constitutional methods of obtaining redress. That
nullification and seceding from the Union are revolutionary measures
cannot, I think, admit of a rational doubt. The strongest objection I have
to the Carolina doctrine is that its authors have deceitfully and
hypocritically represented both measures to be constitutional
and peaceable. They must have known better, and therefore acted
dishonestly."

https://books.google.com/books?id=_w1_NDy9xeAC&pg=PA208&lpg=PA208

(Crawford evidently viewed Calhoun as a bit too nationalist in the early
1820's and much too anti-nationalist a decade later.)

One final note: As Robert Pierce Ford observed in *The Missouri Comproise
and Its Aftermath* it is curious that the two times the presidential
elections went into the House (1800 and 1824), the cast of characters had
much in common: a dour Adams, a military chieftain suspected of
Bonapartist tendencies (Burr/Jackson), and a states-rights southern
Republican (Jefferson/Crawford).
https://books.google.com/books?id=lPR28UNIXgEC&pg=PA175
 
I commented further on Crawford and the kind of president he would have been at https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/3Se75U753uU/HMZb20eXfE8J

snip

I find this assessment of him rather interesting considering his siding with the Jacksonians after 1824, or rather how his men jumped ship to Jackson. Most notably how Bucktail (and anti-Erie Canal) Martin Van Buren went from a Crawford man to the Jackson man. Was it a matter of his views fundamentally changing by then? Was he suspecting of Adams Jr. as a neo-Federalist or something along those lines?
 
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