PC/WI: Yet another "Glorious Past" mentality in Prussia

Would it be possible for the German army to become complacent after its stunning victory in 1871, similar to how the Prussian army grew complacent after the passing of Frederick the Great and again after the end of the Napoleonic Wars?

If so, what are the potential implications of a Germany which enters the 1900s as a total paper tiger?
 
Would it be possible for the German army to become complacent after its stunning victory in 1871, similar to how the Prussian army grew complacent after the passing of Frederick the Great and again after the end of the Napoleonic Wars?

If so, what are the potential implications of a Germany which enters the 1900s as a total paper tiger?

As a bonus (in that scenario), Germany might underestimate both France and Russia.

It might happen if the 1870 War goes even more catastrophically for France, and Russia struggles more against the Ottomans in 1878 (probably still winning but at great cost, maybe a pyrrhic victory) and/or against Japan. Plus, British Army having a bad performance as well (maybe against Boers).

Germany feels perfectly secure with her glorious past and "weak" rivals on land... And the Heer is neglected, while the Kriegsmarine's funding is expanded, to match the RN (and USN). Which means Germany is strong on sea, but also means Britain (and the USA) will strengthen and expand their navies too (compared to IOTL).

And then, alternate WWI kicks in...
 
As a bonus (in that scenario), Germany might underestimate both France and Russia.

It might happen if the 1870 War goes even more catastrophically for France, and Russia struggles more against the Ottomans in 1878 (probably still winning but at great cost, maybe a pyrrhic victory) and/or against Japan. Plus, British Army having a bad performance as well (maybe against Boers).

Germany feels perfectly secure with her glorious past and "weak" rivals on land... And the Heer is neglected, while the Kriegsmarine's funding is expanded, to match the RN (and USN). Which means Germany is strong on sea, but also means Britain (and the USA) will strengthen and expand their navies too (compared to IOTL).

And then, alternate WWI kicks in...
I wonder how the consequences of this neglect would manifest. Perhaps dated uniforms and a continuing reliance on some older models of artillery similar to Austria-Hungary? Perhaps smaller army size and slower mobilization procedures?
 
I wonder how the consequences of this neglect would manifest. Perhaps dated uniforms and a continuing reliance on some older models of artillery similar to Austria-Hungary? Perhaps smaller army size and slower mobilization procedures?

Army size is going to tied to the size of the armies surrounding them. One of the reasons for Prussia' complacency in the previous cases was that their neighbors were legitimently slipping into a less threatening and stagnent state (Louis XIV passing out of the scene and leaving his less extraordinary successors with a hard to manage hypercenteralized state and his accumulated war debts, and France post-Napoleon having domestic disturbances every other Thursday with a pair of Monarchies who's support rested on the head of a pin). You'd need France post-1870 to have fallen back into internal turmoil (Not behyond reason) that hinders it's ability to build up and put regional pressure on Germany,and Russia to appear to be a backward laughingstock (A strong Turkey could pull that off by giving them a humiliating repulse,maybe with some British help, so a Strong Ottoman 1870s might be what you're looking for) for that kind of policy to stick,in which case EVERYBODY is probably less prepared for the conflict.
 
I mean if you read Rob Citino's work, pretty much his whole thesis is that exactly this happened to the Germans through their whole history; throughout the World Wars, they were constantly trying to wage war like Moltke the Elder and even skill Frederick the Great rather than trying to tackle the changes in warfare on their own terms.
 
I mean if you read Rob Citino's work, pretty much his whole thesis is that exactly this happened to the Germans through their whole history; throughout the World Wars, they were constantly trying to wage war like Moltke the Elder and even skill Frederick the Great rather than trying to tackle the changes in warfare on their own terms.

In a Grand Strategy sense... did they have a choice? To paraphrase the late great Von Bismark "Here is Russia, here is France, and we're in the middle. That is my map of Africa"; such sentiments could apply equally well to North Germany's geographic dillema in terms of anywhere. She has no easily securable access to the seas or broad land areas: hemmed into the (limited potential)) Baltic by the North Sea and Alps, no good interconnected or far reaching river networks, and with centers of population with much broader access to the world on both sides (The Eurasian reaches of Russia and France who can very easily dominate routes into the Atlantic, including cutting North Germany's access). In an extended slong that turns more into a resource/internal economic audit, the entrapped German economic zone will crack before the Western Europe 99 times out of a 100 unless they dominate the one route to resources they have securable access to (Eastern Europe), which they can only do if Russia is removed as a threat. While this can temporarily be achieved via diplomacy, over the longer term Russia needs to keep potential threats out of Eastern Europe in order to be powerful and secure themselves (As there's no geographic barrier protecting their Volga heartland, distance with forward deployment of defenses is the only buffer they can get) a Germany and Russia that are both powers in far more natural rivals than allies over any extended period of time. Germany NEEDS to fight a war that involves both Russia and France as unfriendly/potentially threatening by securing the initiative and keeping up the pressure to avoid getting ground under: Look what happened in the 7 Years War: Even Fredrick the Great needed his Miracle of the House of Brandenburg to emerge from that conflict intact.

This is a diplomatic problem, not a military-strategic one, and is really hard needle to thread if both France and Russia are strong, unified polities with a Continental focus. And military policy has to adjust to the diplomatic situation.
 
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In a Grand Strategy sense... did they have a choice? To paraphrase the late great Von Bismark "Here is Russia, here is France, and we're in the middle. That is my map of Africa"; such sentiments could apply equally well to North Germany's geographic dillema in terms of anywhere. She has no easily securable access to the seas or broad land areas: hemmed into the (limited potential)) Baltic by the North Sea and Alps, no good interconnected or far reaching river networks, and with centers of population with much broader access to the world on both sides (The Eurasian reaches of Russia and France who can very easily dominate routes into the Atlantic, including cutting North Germany's access). In an extended slong that turns more into a resource/internal economic audit, the entrapped German economic zone will crack before the Western Europe 99 times out of a 100 unless they dominate the one route to resources they have securable access to (Eastern Europe), which they can only do if Russia is removed as a threat. While this can temporarily be achieved via diplomacy, over the longer term Russia needs to keep potential threats out of Eastern Europe in order to be powerful and secure themselves (As there's no geographic barrier protecting their Volga heartland, distance with forward deployment of defenses is the only buffer they can get) a Germany and Russia that are both powers in far more natural rivals than allies over any extended period of time. Germany NEEDS to fight a war that involves both Russia and France as unfriendly/potentially threatening by securing the initiative and keeping up the pressure to avoid getting ground under: Look what happened in the 7 Years War: Even Fredrick the Great needed his Miracle of the House of Brandenburg to emerge from that conflict intact.

This is a diplomatic problem, not a military-strategic one, and is really hard needle to thread if both France and Russia are strong, unified polities with a Continental focus. And military policy has to adjust to the diplomatic situation.

It's a complex question, but I think you can make a reasonable case that the Germans in the World Wars were overcommitted to the offensive. On the strategic level, they began preparing for an air/naval war against the Anglosphere before they had decisively won the land war in Russia, wasting the glut of production Tooze believed the German superstate was capable of. On the lower operational level, making simultaneous offensive drives in Egypt, the Volga, and the Caucasus in 1942 was probably an overextension; it would have been better to concentrate everything on the drive to Stalingrad first, with holding actions elsewhere, then drive into the Caucasus once they had an operational roof over their heads. In the First World War, they probably shouldn't have tried the Spring Offensive; by that point, they controlled much of the European continent, and could probably have stayed in the game a lot longer until a compromise peace was possible. Moreover, the necessity of war with France was very much open to question in the first place; they were electing lots of antiwar socialists, and consistently held to the 'most favored nation' clause of the gunpoint treaty of the Franco Prussian War for the next forty years. Much like in the interwar (and indeed postwar) period, much could have been attempted through careful economic stewardship rather than force; Germany was an economic powerhouse, but its leaders were too wedded to war as a tool. Now, you can definitely quibble with all these individual examples, but there are lots to choose from that indicate the Germans were trying to operational-offensive out of a strategic hole they got themselves into.
 
It's a complex question, but I think you can make a reasonable case that the Germans in the World Wars were overcommitted to the offensive. On the strategic level, they began preparing for an air/naval war against the Anglosphere before they had decisively won the land war in Russia, wasting the glut of production Tooze believed the German superstate was capable of. On the lower operational level, making simultaneous offensive drives in Egypt, the Volga, and the Caucasus in 1942 was probably an overextension; it would have been better to concentrate everything on the drive to Stalingrad first, with holding actions elsewhere, then drive into the Caucasus once they had an operational roof over their heads. In the First World War, they probably shouldn't have tried the Spring Offensive; by that point, they controlled much of the European continent, and could probably have stayed in the game a lot longer until a compromise peace was possible. Moreover, the necessity of war with France was very much open to question in the first place; they were electing lots of antiwar socialists, and consistently held to the 'most favored nation' clause of the gunpoint treaty of the Franco Prussian War for the next forty years. Much like in the interwar (and indeed postwar) period, much could have been attempted through careful economic stewardship rather than force; Germany was an economic powerhouse, but its leaders were too wedded to war as a tool. Now, you can definitely quibble with all these individual examples, but there are lots to choose from that indicate the Germans were trying to operational-offensive out of a strategic hole they got themselves into.

Oh, Germany made strategic mistakes in WW II (though, I'd argue that the general trend/underlying principal was sound; Germany in general needed to keep the NET iniative/pressure on Russia. They insisted on acting offensively all the time everywhere instead though, which meant they weren't in a position to parry/surpress Russian attempts to go on the offensive once they did finally get a plan together). But in WW I? No: by Brest-Litovisk the economies of the CP were already deep into the proverbial seed corn and their "control" of Eastern Europe was tenious at best and needed time and focus in order to be turned into something economically productive. Given they had no reason to believe France would crack without a hard kick or the US would prove any less willing to pay blood than any of their other opponents had been, digging in would be a gamble with much worse odds,especially since France could now cycle it's infantry units out to let the Yanks take the casulties in order to lower tge casulty figures and shore up domestic support for the war as a result. Nobody knew just how much they could squeeze out of eastern Europe in the immediate term... it was a better (if still bad) gamble to try for a knock out punch.

As for war with France... Germany may not be interested, but if Germany swings at Russia and can't knock them out quickly France might be VERY interested in a war with them. There was no grounds on which they could have predicted the Bear could be delt heavy blows quickly and that French offensives into A-L would hit the (not yet conducted in Europe on any scale) tar pit of Trench Warfare, and time is not on your side if France does decide to declare (which you have no control over: prepare for the worst even if you hope for the best). A different geopolitical strategy in which the government had a friendly relationship with France or Russia is a different kettle of fish, of course, but that's not a military question
 
Oh, Germany made strategic mistakes in WW II (though, I'd argue that the general trend/underlying principal was sound; Germany in general needed to keep the NET iniative/pressure on Russia. They insisted on acting offensively all the time everywhere instead though, which meant they weren't in a position to parry/surpress Russian attempts to go on the offensive once they did finally get a plan together). But in WW I? No: by Brest-Litovisk the economies of the CP were already deep into the proverbial seed corn and their "control" of Eastern Europe was tenious at best and needed time and focus in order to be turned into something economically productive. Given they had no reason to believe France would crack without a hard kick or the US would prove any less willing to pay blood than any of their other opponents had been, digging in would be a gamble with much worse odds,especially since France could now cycle it's infantry units out to let the Yanks take the casulties in order to lower tge casulty figures and shore up domestic support for the war as a result. Nobody knew just how much they could squeeze out of eastern Europe in the immediate term... it was a better (if still bad) gamble to try for a knock out punch.

As for war with France... Germany may not be interested, but if Germany swings at Russia and can't knock them out quickly France might be VERY interested in a war with them. There was no grounds on which they could have predicted the Bear could be delt heavy blows quickly and that French offensives into A-L would hit the (not yet conducted in Europe on any scale) tar pit of Trench Warfare, and time is not on your side if France does decide to declare (which you have no control over: prepare for the worst even if you hope for the best). A different geopolitical strategy in which the government had a friendly relationship with France or Russia is a different kettle of fish, of course, but that's not a military question

Both wars with France and the US were wars of choice, not necessity. Germany was the one who declared war and invaded in the first instance, despite the lack of French initiative in the July Crisis and general public disinterest in war; without Russia, France can't beat Germany, with its lower population, birth rates, and weaker economy. Germany could have focused on a sustained (~3 years) war against Russia, while retaining a strong and fortified defensive force in the west, and probably come out on top, but their focus on winning another Seven Weeks War pushed them to overreach what was possible and embroil them in a wider war than was necessary, with disastrous consequences. Like a defensive war in the West and an offensive in the East against just France and Russia would have been winnable. Drawing Britain in complicated measures, but the Germans still shot themselves in the foot by overreaching what was possible in the submarine war. USW or no, knocking out Britain with U boats was frankly illusory, and drawing in the United States just as they were triumphing over Russia torpedoed (heh) their best chance of winning the war.
 
Army size is going to tied to the size of the armies surrounding them. One of the reasons for Prussia' complacency in the previous cases was that their neighbors were legitimently slipping into a less threatening and stagnent state (Louis XIV passing out of the scene and leaving his less extraordinary successors with a hard to manage hypercenteralized state and his accumulated war debts, and France post-Napoleon having domestic disturbances every other Thursday with a pair of Monarchies who's support rested on the head of a pin). You'd need France post-1870 to have fallen back into internal turmoil (Not behyond reason) that hinders it's ability to build up and put regional pressure on Germany,and Russia to appear to be a backward laughingstock (A strong Turkey could pull that off by giving them a humiliating repulse,maybe with some British help, so a Strong Ottoman 1870s might be what you're looking for) for that kind of policy to stick,in which case EVERYBODY is probably less prepared for the conflict.
Yes, but in both cases the Prussia army had (after a while) fallen behind to a degree disproportionate to the degree of their neighbours weakness. So something like Russian army modernization following their defeat against the Ottomans/Japan would have to be over looked by the Germans.
 
Both wars with France and the US were wars of choice, not necessity. Germany was the one who declared war and invaded in the first instance, despite the lack of French initiative in the July Crisis and general public disinterest in war; without Russia, France can't beat Germany, with its lower population, birth rates, and weaker economy. Germany could have focused on a sustained (~3 years) war against Russia, while retaining a strong and fortified defensive force in the west, and probably come out on top, but their focus on winning another Seven Weeks War pushed them to overreach what was possible and embroil them in a wider war than was necessary, with disastrous consequences. Like a defensive war in the West and an offensive in the East against just France and Russia would have been winnable. Drawing Britain in complicated measures, but the Germans still shot themselves in the foot by overreaching what was possible in the submarine war. USW or no, knocking out Britain with U boats was frankly illusory, and drawing in the United States just as they were triumphing over Russia torpedoed (heh) their best chance of winning the war.

Do you seriously think the French,with the prevailing attitudes and basic military calculus of the time, is going to treat the encampment of over a hundred thousand mobalized and heavily armed troops in the border military districts as anything less than an act of war? That's a pretty heavy gamble for the Germans, and they certainly can't predict they'll have the ability to deal early crippling blows to the much larger Czarist army during the years before the war when all these plans are being laid out. And if the French do respond by mobalizing and deploying their troops, as they almost certainly will? Well, now the combined Franco-Russian forces are facing you while you're bogged down in Poland and the clock is ticking as their superior population pool and access to global resources (Britain is at best a highly Pro-Entente neutral) which for a German staff standing on the ground at that moment without the benefit of hindsight of what actually happened in Russia looks like a nightmare scenario that needs to be avoided at all costs.
 
Do you seriously think the French,with the prevailing attitudes and basic military calculus of the time, is going to treat the encampment of over a hundred thousand mobalized and heavily armed troops in the border military districts as anything less than an act of war? That's a pretty heavy gamble for the Germans, and they certainly can't predict they'll have the ability to deal early crippling blows to the much larger Czarist army during the years before the war when all these plans are being laid out. And if the French do respond by mobalizing and deploying their troops, as they almost certainly will? Well, now the combined Franco-Russian forces are facing you while you're bogged down in Poland and the clock is ticking as their superior population pool and access to global resources (Britain is at best a highly Pro-Entente neutral) which for a German staff standing on the ground at that moment without the benefit of hindsight of what actually happened in Russia looks like a nightmare scenario that needs to be avoided at all costs.

The German staff also predicted Russian mobilization would be slow and inefficient; if we're just talking about planning, they might believe landing a blow early on against an enemy only half awake could put them in a very good position going forward. In broad terms, while an Ostmarch is unlikely to lead to results on the same scale as a best-case Schlieffen plan offensive, it is also more likely to succeed in its more modest aims, and a worst case failure is unlikely to lead to a debacle like the Marne and the prolonged bloodletting of the OTL Western Front. There's more to attritional strategies than simply having greater numbers; with their robust economy, ample manpower, and highly professional military leadership, Germany could have fought successful sustained war in the East if they had the patience and forbearance.
 
The German staff also predicted Russian mobilization would be slow and inefficient; if we're just talking about planning, they might believe landing a blow early on against an enemy only half awake could put them in a very good position going forward. In broad terms, while an Ostmarch is unlikely to lead to results on the same scale as a best-case Schlieffen plan offensive, it is also more likely to succeed in its more modest aims, and a worst case failure is unlikely to lead to a debacle like the Marne and the prolonged bloodletting of the OTL Western Front. There's more to attritional strategies than simply having greater numbers; with their robust economy, ample manpower, and highly professional military leadership, Germany could have fought successful sustained war in the East if they had the patience and forbearance.

There's nothing vital to land a blow ON. You're taking a lunging punch into a Polish pillow that leaves the Russians will the freedom to concentrate and strike at the point and time of their choosing. That isent good for the stability of your offensive, and units are liable to outrun supplies on Russian rails since youll be capturing next to no rolling stock, and all the while you have to pray the static defenses in the West hold (remember, you don't get to be the Monday morning quarterback). Yes,if you're planning for the war to be a Phyric multi-year struggle to the death against Russia that you know will lead to an internal political collapse that let's you extraction BL and the enemy isent, than you can preform better than them, but Germany dosen't have the benefit of hindsight and has to play the game with a 1910's set of knowledge. Not to mention, if they did have knowledge that the war would extend to such a point, I doubt it would be seriously pursued.

But, I'll leave that as my last comment on the subject so this dosen't derail the basic premise of the thread. Feel free to respond, but I won't be providing a counterpoint and we can agree to disagree.
 
Yes, but in both cases the Prussia army had (after a while) fallen behind to a degree disproportionate to the degree of their neighbours weakness. So something like Russian army modernization following their defeat against the Ottomans/Japan would have to be over looked by the Germans.

Not exactly, I'd argue. France pre-Revolution had a top-heavy, underpaid army with a fossilized officer Corp (Indeed, the military reform measures were a key part in trying to reconcile both breeds of French nobility and like any hasty political compromise failed to saisfy anybody) with the main and extremely rapid reform of the Revolutionary armies early on being mass conscription that Prussia politically coulden't adopt immediately) and pre-Crimea France had governments without the domestic popularity to pull off a major war while Russia was also in a laughable state. Really, there's only about a decade where Prussia had both justification and theoretical means to catch up, and in the 50s they had major issues with securing funding thanks to the Landtag feeling they had rights post-48 and tyinging the reform budget to political reforms until Bismark pulled his tax collection loophole.
 
There's nothing vital to land a blow ON. You're taking a lunging punch into a Polish pillow that leaves the Russians will the freedom to concentrate and strike at the point and time of their choosing. That isent good for the stability of your offensive, and units are liable to outrun supplies on Russian rails since youll be capturing next to no rolling stock, and all the while you have to pray the static defenses in the West hold (remember, you don't get to be the Monday morning quarterback). Yes,if you're planning for the war to be a Phyric multi-year struggle to the death against Russia that you know will lead to an internal political collapse that let's you extraction BL and the enemy isent, than you can preform better than them, but Germany dosen't have the benefit of hindsight and has to play the game with a 1910's set of knowledge. Not to mention, if they did have knowledge that the war would extend to such a point, I doubt it would be seriously pursued.

But, I'll leave that as my last comment on the subject so this dosen't derail the basic premise of the thread. Feel free to respond, but I won't be providing a counterpoint and we can agree to disagree.
The Russians weren't going to abandon Poland except under the most dire circumstances; they would leave behind a vast store of artillery and ammunition, as well as one of the richest and most industrialized regions in the empire. Moreover, the onus would be on them to attack the Austrians to aid Serbia, the whole reason for the war.

The Germans would have good reason to believe the Russian state was weak at its core, being a ramshackle autocracy only moderated by the recent outbreak of leftist revolution; the army had not performed well against the Japanese either. Of course the war would be costly, but any illusions to the contrary were just that. The price could be justified by success; permanently handicapping the Russians before they modernize their military institutions would leave Germany without a real rival on the Continent.

The thing about Germany's attempts to replicate the successes of the Moltkean era was that while they promised greater success at modest cost, they were less likely to succeed and bound to be more costly when they failed. They had alternative paths forward, but it's clear when you read the officer corps's writings that they were very fixated on the past; Rommel was supposed to be the new Seydlitz (the actual heir to Seydlitz also fought in the war, before becoming a Soviet toadie), and the Wehrmacht's professional journal held up the blind aggression of Blucher as a model to emulate (don't ask how strong the enemy is, just where they are).
 
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