It's a complex question, but I think you can make a reasonable case that the Germans in the World Wars were overcommitted to the offensive. On the strategic level, they began preparing for an air/naval war against the Anglosphere before they had decisively won the land war in Russia, wasting the glut of production Tooze believed the German superstate was capable of. On the lower operational level, making simultaneous offensive drives in Egypt, the Volga, and the Caucasus in 1942 was probably an overextension; it would have been better to concentrate everything on the drive to Stalingrad first, with holding actions elsewhere, then drive into the Caucasus once they had an operational roof over their heads. In the First World War, they probably shouldn't have tried the Spring Offensive; by that point, they controlled much of the European continent, and could probably have stayed in the game a lot longer until a compromise peace was possible. Moreover, the necessity of war with France was very much open to question in the first place; they were electing lots of antiwar socialists, and consistently held to the 'most favored nation' clause of the gunpoint treaty of the Franco Prussian War for the next forty years. Much like in the interwar (and indeed postwar) period, much could have been attempted through careful economic stewardship rather than force; Germany was an economic powerhouse, but its leaders were too wedded to war as a tool. Now, you can definitely quibble with all these individual examples, but there are lots to choose from that indicate the Germans were trying to operational-offensive out of a strategic hole they got themselves into.