PC/WI: Soviet Army capability with more Career NCOs?

So while the Soviet Army was quite powerful in terms of numbers, organization, and equipment, it's widely acknowledged that the NCO corps, such as it was, was the weak link in the force structure. Most were simple conscripts, and were able to reach the highest enlisted rank within their period of compulsory service, leaving them little choice but to leave the service for a civilian career. What would it take for the Soviet Army to retain enlisted personnel to form an experienced NCO corps, and would such a corps of junior leaders significantly affect performance?

Just doing some envelope numbers, it would look like there are about 800 company, platoon, and squad NCOs in a motorized rifle division's rifle companies; these are the most important units to have good junior leadership in. In terms of simply attracting them with pay for years past their compulsory service, about 200$ a month per NCO puts them above average in terms of wages in the Soviet Union, which would be about 160,000$ of NCO pay per division, or about 192,000,000$ a year for the 100 Soviet divisions necessary to crush NATO's main strength in the 20 German, American, and British divisions in Central Europe. This is out of a military budget that in 1970, was just shy of 40 billion dollars.

Obviously, you can adjust the numbers to include more or less slots out of a division, but the order of magnitude makes monetary incentives look very affordable. Maybe in terms of putting it into practice, only select conscripts who have completed their two years of service for NCO school, instead of choosing them immediately after their orientation training? From there, extend the time in grade requirements to become a senior sergeant, or include more graduations of rank to highlight a career path, or a combination of both.
 
I remember reading something about this-even the imperial Russian army had issues with NCOs and what not.

It was a long running structural problem.
 
Should there have been another zero here?

And how important were these ex-NCOs in the civilian economy? Would this weaken the Soviet economy as it boosted the military?

fasquardon
The Institute of Strategic Studies's tabulation of the relevant data listed the Soviet military spending in 1970-1 as 39.7 billion dollars, 8.1% of a GNP of 490 billion, compared the US 78.7 bn, 8.1% of a GNP of 977 bn. See The Military Balance, 1971-1972.

I personally doubt moving to a more professional NCO corps would significantly impact the civilian economy; every NCO who stays on another tour is a man they don't have to draft out of the civilian economy to replace him.
 
I remember reading something about this-even the imperial Russian army had issues with NCOs and what not.

It was a long running structural problem.

For sure, though the Russian military culture was still much better than it was during Tsarist times...

The Institute of Strategic Studies's tabulation of the relevant data listed the Soviet military spending in 1970-1 as 39.7 billion dollars, 8.1% of a GNP of 490 billion, compared the US 78.7 bn, 8.1% of a GNP of 977 bn. See The Military Balance, 1971-1972.

Yikes. That's right. Early 70s was before a whole heck of alot of inflation.

I personally doubt moving to a more professional NCO corps would significantly impact the civilian economy; every NCO who stays on another tour is a man they don't have to draft out of the civilian economy to replace him.

Hm. Plausible.

fasquardon
 
There would have to be a wholesale change in the Soviet low level tactical sub battalion command culture. In the 70's the rule of thumb was that the job done by a British Corporal was done by a Soviet Subaltern. If you simply retain trained NCOs in the Soviet Army you are making a group of more efficient Lance Corporals not Sergeant Majors whatever rank they hold.

Afghanistan and Chechnya taught them that every sub unit down to sections had to be able to act on their initiative. Even now they appear to only able to readily action this in special forces. Hence a proliferation of them rather than being able to task infantry with such tasks.
 

Ak-84

Banned
You need to change the whole path of Russian and then Soviet military history to effect that.
The Professional NCO corps comes from an Anglo culture of small armies. Where your average soldier was either the scum of the Earth (British) or a farmboy doing service for a few months (the US), and needed a professional at a lower level to ensure everything did not go to shit. Where the main focus was on small unit actions on the frontier (the US) in the colonies (the UK) and armies would be raised as needed during larger wars (both).

Hell, the Anglo-American armies have diverged in philosophy since 1776 due to differing pressures. The British give a lot of leeway and authority to junior officers (who during the Empire would often be stationed in remote areas, with enormous responsibility), while Americans trust their Subaltern's about as far as they can throw them (since before WW2 many of these were men elected by their soldiers or appointed as a political favour).

The Russian experience has been large armies fighting over huuuge swaths of territory. In that case the initiative of individual squad or even Company leadership is not as important as the coordinated actions of larger units and formations; infact initiative at lower level is counterproductive.

Soviet/Russian Special Forces are excellent and they** do** have a large cadre of professional NCO's. So its not like the Russians are incapable, its just that their situation does not call for it.
 
Well, remember that there was also other army with strong professional NCO culture that can be drawn from by Soviets: Germany. Other countries in WP had sort of mixed system: for example in Poland there was both conscript (cpl) and professional NCOs (sgt and WO).
A opportunity for implementing such system in Soviet Army could be for example reforms and reductions during Khrushchev times.
 
The USSR, at least through WWII and 10-15 years thereafter had an issue with the enlisted force. A large percentage of the conscripts, and almost all enlisted were conscripts or at least started that way had very deficient educational levels. It would have taken a large effort to get them up to the level needed for an NCO. Those who came in to the military who had the sort of educational background to make a good NCO could do much better outside the military. Furthermore the whole system with the conscripts, even those who were to become instant NCOs was not at all conducive for retention - and that did not change until after the end of the USSR.

To get the sort of long service and qualified NCOs you see in the US, British, Canadian, and other western militaries you have to change the entire Soviet military system. FWIW in the Soviet Navy you did not have the sort of petty officers and chiefs you have in the USN. Warrant officers or even commissioned officers have to do the sort of hands on technical work done by those POs/CPOs in the USN or other western navies.
 
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