PC/WI: Saddam invades Saudi Arabia 1980

I Think this only makes sense as part of a soviet masterplan, so thats my premise.
If we Think the Soviets really plan this, there could be a number of SU instructers training with the Iraqis for a while before. And having their own handful of nukes define this as a very costly Endeavour.
At least the Oil infrastructure and Israel gets destroyed. And a lot of the US troops because of tactical nukes.
 
I Think this only makes sense as part of a soviet masterplan, so thats my premise.
If we Think the Soviets really plan this, there could be a number of SU instructers training with the Iraqis for a while before. And having their own handful of nukes define this as a very costly Endeavour.
At least the Oil infrastructure and Israel gets destroyed. And a lot of the US troops because of tactical nukes.

Iraq was a client state of the USSR but it was not an ally. Further, the Soviets maintained tight control over the deployment of nukes and unless they want to start WWIII, they arent going to use them in the for an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. Your premise isnt quite ASB but close enough.

By itself, the desert environment isn't that big an issue for Iraqi mechanized formation. Logistically, it would be a bitch and a half for the supply trucks to cross, but for actual tanks and personnel carriers it's pretty simple. What is a big issue is the Iraqis total inability to navigate large formations away from the roads. The issue isn't equipment, armies have managed to get their bearings on otherwise tractless wastelands using astronomical navigation for centuries, but that their men either just don't really care enough to learn how.

I'm thinking of the logistics, maintenance and resupply. A tank loses a tread because it goes over the wrong rock and it needs to be fixed. Too much sand gets in the engine and it needs to be fixed. The lead elements need to be refueled. Factor in the air assets, maybe some A10's or Cobra's, that arrive fairly quickly and Iraqi armor will be moving pretty slow.
 
Iraq was a client state of the USSR but it was not an ally. Further, the Soviets maintained tight control over the deployment of nukes and unless they want to start WWIII, they arent going to use them in the for an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia. Your premise isnt quite ASB but close enough.



I'm thinking of the logistics, maintenance and resupply. A tank loses a tread because it goes over the wrong rock and it needs to be fixed. Too much sand gets in the engine and it needs to be fixed. The lead elements need to be refueled. Factor in the air assets, maybe some A10's or Cobra's, that arrive fairly quickly and Iraqi armor will be moving pretty slow.

I acknowledge the nukes is quite a gamble, but not quite unlikely Cuba.
The rest is like Vietnam, less than Afghanistan
 
I'll take the opening to elaborate on my own post.
Iraq invading Saudi-Arabia is so crazy that it only makes sense with heavy SU backing (much beyond OTL).
That does not mean it makes immediate sense to the SU, except as a desperate gamble for World dominance. Could the neurons in a geriatric politbureau brain malfunction?
Not ASB at all, just not straight forward, and someones neurons need to malfunction to have Iraq attack Saudi-Arabia
 
Could the neurons in a geriatric politbureau brain malfunction?
Not ASB at all, just not straight forward, and someones neurons need to malfunction to have Iraq attack Saudi-Arabia

This is actually the definition of ASB. For this to happen, you are requiring a biological change to one or more individuals, of which there is no OTL reason to have happen. ASB.

Further, it is so illogical that even Der Fuhrer on his worst day would not have ordered this. If they want to grab oil and the gulf while risking WWIII, they invade Iran where they share a border. They cant supply Iraq without flying over Iran or Turkey, neither of which is going to be too happy having the USSR arm up an enemy by flying over their airspace, or without sailing through the heavily trafficked Persian Gulf. Any supply effort will be so obvious that the even the Guatemalan intelligence services will see it. And again, Iraq is not allied to the USSR so they have no reason to act on the USSR's behalf and neither do the Soviets have a basis to trust the Iraqi's. The USSR's relations with Iraq are in no way similar to that of Cuba or Vietnam where there were at least ideological similarities.
 
This is actually the definition of ASB. For this to happen, you are requiring a biological change to one or more individuals, of which there is no OTL reason to have happen. ASB.

es.
Often wrong but never in doubt.
You need to see the Big picture.
What does Iran, Iraq and SU have in common?
 
Perhaps change the setting in the Mid-East.

What if Saudi Arabia were to fall to an Islamist Uprising instead of Iran? Would the US instead back an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia?

Additionally, we could have the Iranian Revolution modified or butterflied away. Thus Saudi Arabia is a relatively more attractive option than an American backed iran.
 
They were all extraordinary focused on self preservation.
Quite wrong, they already have oil.
Then consider Iran and Iraq, totally wrong.

There are many motives for a move like this. This one:
With no Saudi and Iraqi oil on Western markets the price for USSR oil goes through the roof saving it from disintegration in the process.
Actually fits your claim vis-a-vis the SU.

I dont think there is any question that Saddam Hussein is crazy enough with a superpower backing him up. What you need is to have Breznev make a huge gamble.
As for covering his back before going South, well, think of Kuwait.
Please dont play the ASB Card here, it is after all alternative history, and I didn't even say it was likely. Just that SU was needed to make it likely that Saddam would go for Saudi-Arabia.
 

James G

Gone Fishin'
Quite wrong, they already have oil.
Then consider Iran and Iraq, totally wrong.

There are many motives for a move like this. This one:

Actually fits your claim vis-a-vis the SU.

I dont think there is any question that Saddam Hussein is crazy enough with a superpower backing him up. What you need is to have Breznev make a huge gamble.
As for covering his back before going South, well, think of Kuwait.
Please dont play the ASB Card here, it is after all alternative history, and I didn't even say it was likely. Just that SU was needed to make it likely that Saddam would go for Saudi-Arabia.

Here you show a total lack of understanding. This is alternate history, not alternative history. Such is why this is implausible.
 
Here you show a total lack of understanding. This is alternate history, not alternative history. Such is why this is implausible.
Mental typo, unfortunate one, but still a typo, so it proves nothing. Please tell me your plausible motivation for an Iraqi attack on Saudi-Arabia in 1980?
I didn't claim that ine was likely, just a way of making the OP's question have sense going forward. There will be a lot of explanation going backwards.
 

James G

Gone Fishin'
It appears that I have offered you and you seek redress in a petty word dispute. I don't. I withdraw my remarks and apologize for any offence caused.
 
Quite wrong, they already have oil.
Then consider Iran and Iraq, totally wrong.

There are many motives for a move like this. This one:
With no Saudi and Iraqi oil on Western markets the price for USSR oil goes through the roof saving it from disintegration in the process.


Actually fits your claim vis-a-vis the SU.

I dont think there is any question that Saddam Hussein is crazy enough with a superpower backing him up. What you need is to have Breznev make a huge gamble.
As for covering his back before going South, well, think of Kuwait.
Please dont play the ASB Card here, it is after all alternative history, and I didn't even say it was likely. Just that SU was needed to make it likely that Saddam would go for Saudi-Arabia.

You have your causality wrong. In 1979 and 1980, very few were predicting the decline in oil prices that were experienced in the late 80s (Just like in 2013 when oil was $100 very few thought it would head to $40), even fewer were predicting the demise of the Soviet Union, and even fewer still were exploring the link. So, it cant be a motivating factor if they dont expect it to happen.

As to Brezhnev, by 1979, he was in ill health due to the after effects of his stroke in 1974. Also, Brezhnev was cautious by nature. Actually, he was beyond cautious and did almost nothing to jeopardize the status quo, at least not intentionally. So, you expect a cautious and il individual to make a big gamble that might start WWIII? Remember, none of the senior Politburo guys were alive when the USSR collapsed - Brezhnev, Suslov, Kirilenko, Andropov, Chernenko, Ustinov, and Gromyko. They wanted to die in peace. And they werent going to jeopardize that on some hypothetical scenario 10 years down the road. That was for the next generation to sort out, as it always is everywhere.

Think about it. The US placed intermediate range nuclear missiles in Germany that they believed could destroy the Kremlin in 6 minutes and they did nothing. Even better they retreated diplomatically and negotiated away their SS-20s. They wont make a gamble about nuclear missile deployments but you believe they will risk WWIII over oil at a time when oil prices are at all time highs?

As to Saddam, he has clear motivation to NOT do this. Once Soviet troops are on your soil there is a risk they stay, particularly given the strategic location. And if they stay there is always a risk of a mysterious car accident or an intervention to "save the country". Keeping the Soviets out of Iraq has clear benefits for him, particularly since he was not a communist.

Finally, the only time I said it was ASB was when you suggested neurons misfiring in a few politburo members. Interfering with the mental capacity of people without explanation is, by definition, ASB.
 
As to Brezhnev, by 1979, he was in ill health due to the after effects of his stroke in 1974.

Finally, the only time I said it was ASB was when you suggested neurons misfiring in a few politburo members. Interfering with the mental capacity of people without explanation is, by definition, ASB.
I just put these two statements of yours close together for clarity. Are you sure this was ASB?

You have your causality wrong. In 1979 and 1980, very few were predicting the decline in oil prices that were experienced in the late 80s (Just like in 2013 when oil was $100 very few thought it would head to $40), even fewer were predicting the demise of the Soviet Union, and even fewer still were exploring the link. So, it cant be a motivating factor if they dont expect it to happen.

As to Brezhnev, by 1979, he was in ill health due to the after effects of his stroke in 1974. Also, Brezhnev was cautious by nature. Actually, he was beyond cautious and did almost nothing to jeopardize the status quo, at least not intentionally.

Think about it. The US placed intermediate range nuclear missiles in Germany that they believed could destroy the Kremlin in 6 minutes and they did nothing. Even better they retreated diplomatically and negotiated away their SS-20s. They wont make a gamble about nuclear missile deployments but you believe they will risk WWIII over oil at a time when oil prices are at all time highs?
For the rest, its not about the Money. Its the global struggle between capitalism and communism. Take away Saudi oil and the West is going to suffer. A lot.

And Brezhnev did invade Afghanistan in 1979....

Saddam, well he did go South a decade later
 
Their both awful. The Saudis are probably worse (they have all the issues the Iraqis do, plus a spoiled rich kid attitude among the officer corps) but not by much. The fact that all the Saudis have to do is buy time until the Americans show up means that the difference doesn't matter much.



Oh, very much so. SOP for an Iraqi mechanized column on meeting resistance - any resistance, even a platoon of militia armed with rifles and nothing else - was to halt, find a defensive position, fire wildly, call for massive artillery bombardment (which could take anywhere from a few hours to a day to even more to materialize), and then wait for new orders from above before moving again (and note: I said "wait for new orders", not "request new orders"). This is not at all conducive for them to be able to reach anywhere important in Saudi Arabia.



It won't be as bloodless, but the US will still probably be pleasantly startled at how easy it is nonetheless. It's true that the US Military was just starting to pull itself out of the pit it had landed itself in after Vietnam, but that is leagues above the Iraqis who are basically still passed out drunk in the bottom of their own and much deeper pit. Incompetence is relative.



By itself, the desert environment isn't that big an issue for Iraqi mechanized formation. Logistically, it would be a bitch and a half for the supply trucks to cross, but for actual tanks and personnel carriers it's pretty simple. What is a big issue is the Iraqis total inability to navigate large formations away from the roads. The issue isn't equipment, armies have managed to get their bearings on otherwise tractless wastelands using astronomical navigation for centuries, but that their men either just don't really care enough to learn how.
In Clancy's novel Executive Orders, an Iran-Iraq force invades SA, but they spend some time doing massive exercises first.
Yes, I know the premise is wild and the book is an ameriw**k thriller, but might the Iraqis grow some brain cells and decide to do the same in this timeline?
If not, what if the Iraqis invade a few years later, first fighting a war somewhere else and applying the lessons learned to the SA invasion?
 
The one flaw of the book is that Pollack does a great job at identifying what the problem with various Arab armies are but doesn't explain why they have managed to be this bad and, yet more, managed to be so bad consistently. I've seen various theories bandied about as to the "why" but the one that intrigues me the most is the artificial nature of most Arab states and how it tends to lead to a lack of investment by their soldiers.

Pollack clearly and repeatedly attributed poor arab performance to lack of tactical initiative. This derived from arab cultural traits e.g. fear of criticism.
 
I've given some thought as to how Iraq could've done things differently:


http://starvisions.blogspot.com/


Scroll down to "Alternate scenarios Iraq 1980-91."

For reasons I give and others have given in this thread, it wouldn't have been wise for Iraq to launch an invasion in 1980.
 
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Pollack clearly and repeatedly attributed poor arab performance to lack of tactical initiative. This derived from arab cultural traits e.g. fear of criticism.

No, tactical initiative is one of the "what"'s. The problem is that a lack of tactical initiative is usually symptomatic of a larger problem.

Cultural reasons are indeed one of the potential explanations, and they may have some weight, but I'm unconvinced that they are the be-all, end-all.
 
Cultural reasons are indeed one of the potential explanations, and they may have some weight, but I'm unconvinced that they are the be-all, end-all.

Rigid Soviet doctrine may have been a factor but Pollack considered it secondary at best. I tend to blame arab strategic leadership the most.
 
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