PC/WI: No Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia?

CaliGuy

Banned
Would it have been plausible with a PoD of 1946 or later to completely butterfly away the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia?

If so, how exactly would Czechoslovakia have looked like over the last seven decades in this TL?

Any thoughts on this?
 
It require the Soviets not to invade the Czech area held by Germans, Slovakia and Hungary. The Western Allies have to get there first, which is unlikely to be the case. But, if Czechoslovakia was liberated by the Allies, it'd probably be a strategic base for NATO.
 
It require the Soviets not to invade the Czech area held by Germans, Slovakia and Hungary. The Western Allies have to get there first, which is unlikely to be the case. But, if Czechoslovakia was liberated by the Allies, it'd probably be a strategic base for NATO.

As it was, the US had around nine Divisions in western and central Czechoslovakia

Don't need too many PoDs for US troops to get farther, simply have Ike not Order Patton and Patch to secure the Alpine 'National Redoubt', and Third and Seventh Armies drive East.
OTL Patton kept asking Bradley for permission to take more of Czechoslovakia, starting mid April when forces had reached the Border

Bradley asked, "Why does everyone in Third Army want to liberate the Czechs?" Patton replied, "On to Czechoslovakia!," he whooped, "...and fraternization! How in hell can you stop an army with a battle cry like that?"

He didn't get permission till May 4th

The German 7th Army was in no shape to stop him, as most of their effort was in slowing the Soviet advance
 
I doubt whether Patton liberating Prague would ultimately have made a difference. Benes had already made up his mind well before the liberation in favor of the policies which ultimately led to February 1948: a Soviet-friendly foreign policy, giving up Capatho-Ruthenia to the USSR, expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, a temporary government with representatives both from the London government-in-exile and from Communists who had been in Moscow, etc. The government he formed in March-April 1945 seems to have been on quite favorable terms for the Communists--they got the very important Interior Ministry (i.e., the police), the pro-Soviet General Svoboda got the Defense Ministry, and the pro-Communist nominal Social Democrat Fierlinger got the Premiership, etc. All this was decided on before the question of whether Patton should liberate Prague. Moreover, even if the Americans liberated Prague, the Red Army would still be in some parts of Czechoslovakia, and Benes would still want to preserve good relations with the USSR to get them out.

The 1946 elections, one should remember, were held *after* Soviet troops had withdrawn from Czechoslovakia. It is by no means clear to me that the Communists would have done much worse in them if Prague had been liberated by the Americans. IMO the key to the Communist victory was the widespread belief that only the Soviet Union could safeguard Czechoslovakia against German and Hungarian revanchism. It is interesting that the non-Communist parties were surprised that the Communists did so well in the 1946 elections. They thought that the left-wing wave in Central Europe in 1945 had already started to recede, pointing to the recent Communist setbacks in the Austrian and Hungarian elections. (In Hungary, the free elections which for some reason the Soviet Union decided to allow in late 1945 were a disaster for the Communists--the decidedly pro-private-property Smallholders Party won 57 percent of the vote. Or rather the elections *would have been* a disaster for the Communists if not for the fact that the Red Army was in Hungary and was the real power there, so in spite of the elections it insisted on a Cabinet where the Communists and their allies held key positions, again including the Interior Ministry.) As Karel Kaplan notes: "These calculations neglected to take into account one crucial fact: the Czechoslovak Communists based their position not on the momentum of the European revolutionary wave, but rather on nationalist--that is, anti-German and anti-Hungarian--sentiment, which was intensely held in all quarters. It had its sources in domestic tensions, and the Communists considered the elections and Parliament as one front of the political power struggle but not the only one and not even the main one..." *The Short March: The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia*, p. 55.

Now you might say that if the Americans had liberated Prague, more Czech voters would have trusted America, rather than the USSR, to be the guarantor against future German aggression. But it was widely thought that just as after World War I the Americans would before long withdraw their troops from Europe--whereas the Red Army would always be nearby. Just how nearby was brought home when on May 22, 1946--four days before the election--it was announced (rather than requested) that Soviet troops would cross Czechoslovakia from Hungary and Austria to the Soviet zone of Germany. The intervention of Jan Masaryk stopped this from happening, but the point had been made...

One thing that *might* have made a difference in the 1946 election results would have been fewer people being disfranchised for "collaboration." According to Benjamin Frommer, in *National Cleansing: Retribution Against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia,* p. 216, "The Communists' political competitors retrospectively blamed disfranchisement for their election debacle. They claimed that machinations by partisan national committees unfairly prevented as many as 250,000 to 300,000 alleged collaborators from casting ballots. Although claims that disfranchisement cost the 'democratic' parties at least ten parliamentary mandates are probably exaggerated, had a mere three seats (approximately 72,000 votes) changed hands, the Communists and their thus-far obedient Social Democratic allies would have lost their majority in the new Constituent National Assembly." But Frommer adds that "Even ifthe numbers are accurate, there is still no reason to assume that all of those denied the vote would have supported non-Marxist parties." http://books.google.com/books?id=gU-dZ5Zk2-YC&pg=PA216&sig=HsHIYZXGkhQFWJ7jWkhY8kCXMSQ
 
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CaliGuy

Banned
I doubt whether Patton liberating Prague would ultimately have made a difference. Benes had already made up his mind well before the liberation in favor of the policies which ultimately led to February 1948: a Soviet-friendly foreign policy, giving up Capatho-Ruthenia to the USSR, expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, a temporary government with representatives both from the London government-in-exile and from Communists who had been in Moscow, etc. The government he formed in March-April 1945 seems to have been on quite favorable terms for the Communists--they got the very important Interior Ministry (i.e., the police), the pro-Soviet General Swoboda got the Defense Ministry, and the pro-Communist nominal Social Democrat Fierlinger got the Premiership, etc. All this was decided on before the question of whether Patton should liberate Prague. Moreover, even if the Americans liberated Prague, the Red Army would still be in some parts of Czechoslovakia, and Benes would still want to preserve good relations with the USSR to get them out.

The 1946 elections, one should remember, were held *after* Soviet troops had withdrawn from Czechoslovakia. It is by no means clear to me that the Communists would have done much worse in them if Prague had been liberated by the Americans. IMO the key to the Communist victory was the widespread belief that only the Soviet Union could safeguard Czechoslovakia against German and Hungarian revanchism. It is interesting that the non-Communist parties were surprised that the Communists did so well in the 1946 elections. They thought that the left-wing wave in Central Europe in 1945 had already started to recede, pointing to the recent Communist setbacks in the Austrian and Hungarian elections. (In Hungary, the free elections which for some reason the Soviet Union decided to allow in late 1945 were a disaster for the Communists--the decidedly pro-private-property Smallholders Party won 57 percent of the vote. Or rather the elections *would have been* a disaster for the Communists if not for the fact that the Red Army was in Hungary and was the real power there, so in spite of the elections it insisted on a Cabinet where the Communists and their allies held key positions, again including the Interior Ministry.) As Karel Kaplan notes: "These calculations neglected to take into account one crucial fact: the Czechoslovak Communists based their position not on the momentum of the European revolutionary wave, but rather on nationalist--that is, anti-German and anti-Hungarian--sentiment, which was intensely held in all quarters. It had its sources in domestic tensions, and the Communists considered the elections and Parliament as one front of the political power struggle but not the only one and not even the main one..." *The Short March: The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia*, p. 55.

Now you might say that if the Americans had liberated Prague, more Czech voters would have trusted America, rather than the USSR, to be the guarantor against future German aggression. But it was widely thought that just as after World War I the Americans would before long withdraw their troops from Europe--whereas the Red Army would always be nearby. Just how nearby was brought home when on May 22, 1946--four days before the election--it was announced (rather than requested) that Soviet troops would cross Czechoslovakia from Hungary and Austria to the Soviet zone of Germany. The intervention of Jan Masaryk stopped this from happening, but the point had been made...

One thing that *might* have made a difference in the 1946 election results would have been fewer people being disfranchised for "collaboration." According to Benjamin Frommer, in *National Cleansing: Retribution Against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia,* p. 216, "The Communists' political competitors retrospectively blamed disfranchisement for their election debacle. They claimed that machinations by partisan national committees unfairly prevented as many as 250,000 to 300,000 alleged collaborators from casting ballots. Although claims that disfranchisement cost the 'democratic' parties at least ten parliamentary mandates are probably exaggerated, had a mere three seats (approximately 72,000 votes) changed hands, the Communists and their thus-far obedient Social Democratic allies would have lost their majority in the new Constituent National Assembly." But Frommer adds that "Even ifthe numbers are accurate, there is still no reason to assume that all of those denied the vote would have supported non-Marxist parties." http://books.google.com/books?id=gU-dZ5Zk2-YC&pg=PA216&sig=HsHIYZXGkhQFWJ7jWkhY8kCXMSQ
Excellent post, David! :) Indeed, it appears that memories of Munich 1938 were still understandably fresh in many Czechoslovakians' minds in 1945-1946 and that thus many Czechoslovakians preferred protection from the Soviet Union--which wasn't a party to the Munich Agreement back in 1938--than from Britain and France--which were parties to the 1938 Munich Agreement.

Also, though, I've got a question--had the Czechoslovakian Communists and Social Democrats combined barely fail to win a majority in the Czechoslovak Parliament, what would have happened afterwards? Could this have completely butterflied away the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia?
 

CaliGuy

Banned
It require the Soviets not to invade the Czech area held by Germans, Slovakia and Hungary. The Western Allies have to get there first, which is unlikely to be the case. But, if Czechoslovakia was liberated by the Allies, it'd probably be a strategic base for NATO.
In such a scenario, though, memories of Munich 1938 might still be fresh in many Czechoslovakians' minds.
 
Excellent post, David! :) Indeed, it appears that memories of Munich 1938 were still understandably fresh in many Czechoslovakians' minds in 1945-1946 and that thus many Czechoslovakians preferred protection from the Soviet Union--which wasn't a party to the Munich Agreement back in 1938--than from Britain and France--which were parties to the 1938 Munich Agreement.

Also, though, I've got a question--had the Czechoslovakian Communists and Social Democrats combined barely fail to win a majority in the Czechoslovak Parliament, what would have happened afterwards? Could this have completely butterflied away the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia?

I doubt it. The Communists would still have been by far the largest party and thus with a good claim to make Gottwald Premier. The Communists in OTL got 38.1 percent of the vote to only 18.4 percent for Benes' National Socialist Party. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Czechoslovak_parliamentary_election,_1946 Even if it had been, say, 36 percent to 20 percent instead, this would have been a huge victory for the Communists; no party in Czechoslovakia between the wars had ever done better than the 25.65 percent that the Social Democrats got in 1920 before the Communists split away from them. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Czechoslovak_parliamentary_election,_1920 More typical were elections where no one party got more than 15 percent of the vote. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Czechoslovak_parliamentary_election,_1929

More important than the distribution of seats were other factors. As I noted in soc.history.what-if some years ago, "The first thing to remember is that the non-Communist parties had largely imprisoned themselves with their cult of the National Front for the previous three years. (For obvious reasons, given Czechoslovakia's history, fear of a future resurgent Germany, not of the Soviet Union, was the chief fear. The National Front and friendship with the USSR were considered the only guarantee against the German menace.) This made the idea of a government without the Communists, who were by far the largest party in the Front, almost unthinkable. Moreover, in each of the non-Communist parties there were some outright stooges of the CPCz, as well as some who took a temporizing attitude during the crisis. This enabled the Communists even after February to maintain the fiction that a multiparty National Front still governed Czechoslovakia--though of course all the non-Communists in it had to be approved by the CPCz." https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/89i8DcHfkFA/SlYGM5OTKLkJ

I mentioned Communist influence over the armed forces, the police, and the trade unions. The Ministry of the Interior was already controlled in 1945-6 by a Communist, Vaclav Nosek; the non-Marxist parties were hardly in a position to demand that he be removed after the election, even if they had done a little better. The same with General Svoboda at defense. As for the trade unions,

"The end of the Second World War caught most Czechoslovak trade union officials in a state of organisational unpreparedness. It is true that the Influential trade union resistance group PVVZ, which was only one among many, could point to substantial successes in the battle against the German occupier, but planning for the future was subject to Unpardonable delay. Whilst the spring of 1945 found almost all the free trade union resistance groups still engaged exclusively in the physical struggle against the occupying forces, the communists were already well on the way — they actually started in January — towards completion of a practical plan of action for the new Revolutionary Trade Union Movement. This programme, astutely oriented tactically and geared to making skilful use of the radical upsurge manifested by workers in almost all countries in the last months of the war, not only proclaimed the need for trade union unity in all circumstances, but also condemned, root and branch, what it called 'trade union reformism'; it was to be the foundation stone of the communists’ subsequent complete takeover of power in the Czechoslovak labour movement...

"Step by step, communist trade union officials of the pre-war period took over all the key posts in the new, unified trade union organlsation which was being created. While the democratic trade union officials were trying to clear themselves of the 'blame' of reformism in the Spring and Summer of 1945, the communists were busy consolidating their positions of power..." http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/netzquelle/a-14574.pdf

In short, one has to look at the power of the Communists in areas that were more important than the exact number of parliamentary seats they held.
 
Local politics are irrelevant. Stalin wasnt going to allow a non-satellite state to exist on his European borders. Stalin already didnt trust Truman and George Kennan's telegram was already in circulation both in the US and in Moscow. The Marshall Plan posed a clear threat to Soviet influence as well. So, Czechoslovakia was doomed.
 

A) Finland and its citizens had little ability to subvert other satellite states or the Soviet Union itself. No shared borders, no common ethnicity - it was as much a threat to say East Germany as Sweden. Czechoslovakia bordered East Germany, Poland, and Hungary and linked them to Austria and West Germany.
B) Czechoslovakia ran like a highway from West Germany to the Soviet Union and effectively separated the southern part of what was to be the Warsaw Pact from the northern part. In the event of a war, compare supplying US forces in Finland with US forces in Czechoslovakia. No comparison.
 
A) Finland and its citizens had little ability to subvert other satellite states or the Soviet Union itself. No shared borders, no common ethnicity.

Finland didn't border the Soviet Union? It hadn't fought it during World War II? It didn't present a potential threat to Leningrad? As for no common ethnicity and threats of subversion, during the Great Terror of the 1930's, "In Karelia, he [Zhdanov] violently attacked the leadership-—Irglis, Gylling, Rovio, and others, all of whom were arrested as Finnish spies. All the ten Finnish-language newspapers were closed down." https://books.google.com/books?id=ubXQSk2qfXMC&pg=PA222

I don't doubt the strategic importance of Czechoslovakia. But if there had been a Communist seizure of power in Finland, people would say that it was inevitable because of course Stalin would never allow a non-Communist Finland--which had resisted his demands in 1939 and fought him in both the Winter War and later in the Continuation War--to continue to exist, especially given its proximity to Leningrad....

In any event, the internal political situation of Czechoslovakia did matter in that it allowed the Communists to seize power *without* the use of Soviet troops. I am not saying that Stalin would not have used them if necessary but "The newly released documents argue against the currently widespread version, which claims that the Kremlin considered it appropriate for the Soviet Army in Hungary to move towards the frontier with Czechoslovakia or even to enter Czechoslovak territory. It is clear from the telegrams, that the Soviet leadership considered the Soviet demonstration of military might at the frontier with Czechoslovakia, which according to Zorin Premier Gottwald and General Secretary Slansky were demanding, to be inappropriate..." http://web.archive.org/web/20030709111152/http://www.usd.cas.cz/usdeng/zorin.html
 
Finland didn't border the Soviet Union? It hadn't fought it during World War II? It didn't present a potential threat to Leningrad? As for no common ethnicity and threats of subversion, during the Great Terror of the 1930's, "In Karelia, he [Zhdanov] violently attacked the leadership-—Irglis, Gylling, Rovio, and others, all of whom were arrested as Finnish spies. All the ten Finnish-language newspapers were closed down." https://books.google.com/books?id=ubXQSk2qfXMC&pg=PA222

I was speaking with regards to the rest of Eastern Europe and how relatively isolated Finland was. As to the Soviets, by 1946, Stalin and the communist party had firm control of the USSR so no, Finland was not a subversive threat to the USSR. And Finland was about as much of a military threat to the USSR as Cuba was to the US, except the USSR would have rolled through Finland in slightest hint of any Western military presence. Yes, Finnish troops were quite effective in WWII but its one thing to put up a defense in a satellite front and another to withstand the full weight. There's a reason it was called "Finlandization".

In any event, the internal political situation of Czechoslovakia did matter in that it allowed the Communists to seize power *without* the use of Soviet troops. I am not saying that Stalin would not have used them if necessary but "The newly released documents argue against the currently widespread version, which claims that the Kremlin considered it appropriate for the Soviet Army in Hungary to move towards the frontier with Czechoslovakia or even to enter Czechoslovak territory. It is clear from the telegrams, that the Soviet leadership considered the Soviet demonstration of military might at the frontier with Czechoslovakia, which according to Zorin Premier Gottwald and General Secretary Slansky were demanding, to be inappropriate..." http://web.archive.org/web/20030709111152/http://www.usd.cas.cz/usdeng/zorin.html
[/QUOTE]

Fair point as it relates to implementation. And its a definite PR victory for the Soviets to have it be an internal coup rather than an invasion. But, as you acknowledge, it was going to happen with or without troops.
 
There's a reason it was called "Finlandization".

Given Benes' eagerness to please the Soviet Union--giving up Carpatho-Ruthenia without a fuss, agreeing to an important role for Communists in the provisional government. etc.--it is at least plausible that "Czechification" could have been as satisfactory to the USSR as "Finlandization." Yes, a Czechoslovakia that aligned itself with the West might be dangerous to Soviet security in east-central Europe, but it was not really necessary to have a complete Communist take-over to prevent such an alliance.
 
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A) Finland and its citizens had little ability to subvert other satellite states or the Soviet Union itself. No shared borders, no common ethnicity - it was as much a threat to say East Germany as Sweden. Czechoslovakia bordered East Germany, Poland, and Hungary and linked them to Austria and West Germany.
B) Czechoslovakia ran like a highway from West Germany to the Soviet Union and effectively separated the southern part of what was to be the Warsaw Pact from the northern part. In the event of a war, compare supplying US forces in Finland with US forces in Czechoslovakia. No comparison.
In principle, both of these objections could have been dealt with if Czechslovakia had been split into a Czech Republic and a Slovak Socialist Republic. The Slovak portion would link the northern and southern portions of the Warsaw Pact and provide a buffer against Western Europe, while Czechia could be neutralized like Austria and pose about the same degree of threat.

I suppose this is unlikely, but I'm not sure it's impossible...
 
Nit of reactionary political analysis.

You would have to do two thinks:
1) Participation of right wing parties on Election would be permitted.
Only Communists, National Socialist, Christian democrats and Social democracy were permitted in Elections of 1946.
Most Right wing votes went to , quite paradoxically to Communists as they Grabbed rural areas.
"We will not nationalize you I promise"
2) Do not allow take over of Internal Security apparatus by Communists before the coup or allow creation of parallel security apparatus.

vis:
https://www.kosmas.cz/knihy/202387/protistatni-bezpecnost/

Czech might congratulate them-selfs as being in elite club who voted for communists.
One might notice that role of Beneš in Czech history was not so rosy.


If Czechoslovakia did not fall for communisms and Joined NATO. NATO would have good ally and good economy for trade.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
I want to return to this thread (it's less than a year old, so yeah):

Given Benes' eagerness to please the Soviet Union--giving up Carpatho-Ruthenia without a fuss, agreeing to an important role for Communists in the provisional government. etc.--it is at least plausible that "Czechification" could have been as satisfactory to the USSR as "Finlandization." Yes, a Czechoslovakia that aligned itself with the West might be dangerous to Soviet security in east-central Europe, but it was not really necessary to have a complete Communist take-over to prevent such an alliance.
If Czechoslovakia manages to become neutral like Finland and Austria during the Cold War, would these things have been the likely consequences of this? :

-Czechoslovakia would have been as wealthy as Germany or France by the start of the 21st century.

-There would be much more immigration to Czechoslovakia in the decades after 1945 and thus much more diversity and multiculturalism in Czechoslovakia today.

-The breakup of Czechoslovakia would be completely avoided.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Finland didn't border the Soviet Union? It hadn't fought it during World War II? It didn't present a potential threat to Leningrad? As for no common ethnicity and threats of subversion, during the Great Terror of the 1930's, "In Karelia, he [Zhdanov] violently attacked the leadership-—Irglis, Gylling, Rovio, and others, all of whom were arrested as Finnish spies. All the ten Finnish-language newspapers were closed down." https://books.google.com/books?id=ubXQSk2qfXMC&pg=PA222

I don't doubt the strategic importance of Czechoslovakia. But if there had been a Communist seizure of power in Finland, people would say that it was inevitable because of course Stalin would never allow a non-Communist Finland--which had resisted his demands in 1939 and fought him in both the Winter War and later in the Continuation War--to continue to exist, especially given its proximity to Leningrad....

In any event, the internal political situation of Czechoslovakia did matter in that it allowed the Communists to seize power *without* the use of Soviet troops. I am not saying that Stalin would not have used them if necessary but "The newly released documents argue against the currently widespread version, which claims that the Kremlin considered it appropriate for the Soviet Army in Hungary to move towards the frontier with Czechoslovakia or even to enter Czechoslovak territory. It is clear from the telegrams, that the Soviet leadership considered the Soviet demonstration of military might at the frontier with Czechoslovakia, which according to Zorin Premier Gottwald and General Secretary Slansky were demanding, to be inappropriate..." http://web.archive.org/web/20030709111152/http://www.usd.cas.cz/usdeng/zorin.html
I would like to point out that Finland was able to give the Soviet Union a bloody nose; in contrast, I don't see Czechoslovakia being able to do this. In turn, this makes me suspect that Czechoslovakia would be less likely than Finland was to be able to remain neutral throughout the entire Cold War.
 
Finland didn't border the Soviet Union? It hadn't fought it during World War II? It didn't present a potential threat to Leningrad?

[snip]

But if there had been a Communist seizure of power in Finland, people would say that it was inevitable because of course Stalin would never allow a non-Communist Finland--which had resisted his demands in 1939 and fought him in both the Winter War and later in the Continuation War--to continue to exist, especially given its proximity to Leningrad....

All that Finland remaining independent, not occupied and not an actual satellite state part of the WP proves is that in a certain unique situation, Finland could do this. Much like Finland becoming Communist would not prove that Stalin would have never allowed a non-satellite on the USSR's borders, Finland's OTL role does not prove that any of the OTL satellites could do what Finland did. The Finnish fate was intrinsically tied to the successful showing in both the Winter War and the Continuation War, twice managing a staunch defence against what the Soviet leadership thought would have been enough to beat the Finnish military soundly. Twice avoiding occupation. Its geographical position (despite the proximity to Leningrad) was also so peripheral that it could be neutralized as a threat without direct occupation. After 1944, the Soviet naval and air assets could dominate the Finnish sea areas and airspace, and the USSR had a military base in Porkkala under 50 km of the Finnish capital. Should things come to a head, the USSR could take Finland out if it suddenly appeared a real threat - ie., if it suddenly, mysteriously allied with the West and invited Western troops to the nation. Alone, Finland was not a threat to Leningrad or the (political and geographical) integrity of the USSR.

At the same time, the fact that Finland stayed independent through the war, not being occupied, not becoming a puppet, not being a battleground meant that, internally, Finland was politically and institutionally strong. The military, if weakened, kept its arms and organization. The ordinary police as well was fully loyal to the legal government, even if the State Police was for a time taken over by the pro-Soviet far left. The non-Communist parties stayed strong. The Civil Guards militia was disbanded, but its members formed a cadre of men with military training that both the Soviets and the Finns knew could in coup/revolutionary conditions be called upon to support the bourgeois government - with potentially a lot of the now-demobilized wartime servicemen supporting non-Communist parties from the far right to the SDP. This view was boosted by the so-called Weapons Cache Case. In comparison to Czechoslovakia, Finland in the postwar years was internally much more stronger and able to oppose a Communist takeover.

So - Finland was, simultaneously, able to defend itself, a proven tough nut to crack without a truly major military campaign, and peripheral, easily contained and neutralized on its own. It was internally cohesive, due to the events of the war never really touching the Finnish interior like they did most of eastern-central Europe. It is hard to see that any of the OTL nations that did become Soviet satellites IOTL would manage the same unique feat of consistently managing to punch above its weight and avoid occupation, and still not seem like a real threat. Finland was a special case.
 
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Thomas1195

Banned
Excellent post, David! :) Indeed, it appears that memories of Munich 1938 were still understandably fresh in many Czechoslovakians' minds in 1945-1946 and that thus many Czechoslovakians preferred protection from the Soviet Union--which wasn't a party to the Munich Agreement back in 1938--than from Britain and France--which were parties to the 1938 Munich Agreement.
The US wasn't in a party in Munich. Unlike Britain, the US could describe itself as an alternative choice, probably with distribution of food to liberated civilians, some immediate postwar financial support (earlier Marshall Plan) and a recovery plan, and also allow the German to be expelled. They could also provide money for non-Communist parties.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
The US wasn't in a party in Munich. Unlike Britain, the US could describe itself as an alternative choice, probably with distribution of food to liberated civilians, some immediate postwar financial support (earlier Marshall Plan) and a recovery plan, and also allow the German to be expelled. They could also provide money for non-Communist parties.
The U.S. unfortunately didn't care much for European politics in 1938, though; indeed, while the Soviet Union was trying to form an anti-Nazi coalition, the U.S. was comfortably sitting in isolation.
 
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