It require the Soviets not to invade the Czech area held by Germans, Slovakia and Hungary. The Western Allies have to get there first, which is unlikely to be the case. But, if Czechoslovakia was liberated by the Allies, it'd probably be a strategic base for NATO.
Excellent post, David!I doubt whether Patton liberating Prague would ultimately have made a difference. Benes had already made up his mind well before the liberation in favor of the policies which ultimately led to February 1948: a Soviet-friendly foreign policy, giving up Capatho-Ruthenia to the USSR, expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, a temporary government with representatives both from the London government-in-exile and from Communists who had been in Moscow, etc. The government he formed in March-April 1945 seems to have been on quite favorable terms for the Communists--they got the very important Interior Ministry (i.e., the police), the pro-Soviet General Swoboda got the Defense Ministry, and the pro-Communist nominal Social Democrat Fierlinger got the Premiership, etc. All this was decided on before the question of whether Patton should liberate Prague. Moreover, even if the Americans liberated Prague, the Red Army would still be in some parts of Czechoslovakia, and Benes would still want to preserve good relations with the USSR to get them out.
The 1946 elections, one should remember, were held *after* Soviet troops had withdrawn from Czechoslovakia. It is by no means clear to me that the Communists would have done much worse in them if Prague had been liberated by the Americans. IMO the key to the Communist victory was the widespread belief that only the Soviet Union could safeguard Czechoslovakia against German and Hungarian revanchism. It is interesting that the non-Communist parties were surprised that the Communists did so well in the 1946 elections. They thought that the left-wing wave in Central Europe in 1945 had already started to recede, pointing to the recent Communist setbacks in the Austrian and Hungarian elections. (In Hungary, the free elections which for some reason the Soviet Union decided to allow in late 1945 were a disaster for the Communists--the decidedly pro-private-property Smallholders Party won 57 percent of the vote. Or rather the elections *would have been* a disaster for the Communists if not for the fact that the Red Army was in Hungary and was the real power there, so in spite of the elections it insisted on a Cabinet where the Communists and their allies held key positions, again including the Interior Ministry.) As Karel Kaplan notes: "These calculations neglected to take into account one crucial fact: the Czechoslovak Communists based their position not on the momentum of the European revolutionary wave, but rather on nationalist--that is, anti-German and anti-Hungarian--sentiment, which was intensely held in all quarters. It had its sources in domestic tensions, and the Communists considered the elections and Parliament as one front of the political power struggle but not the only one and not even the main one..." *The Short March: The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia*, p. 55.
Now you might say that if the Americans had liberated Prague, more Czech voters would have trusted America, rather than the USSR, to be the guarantor against future German aggression. But it was widely thought that just as after World War I the Americans would before long withdraw their troops from Europe--whereas the Red Army would always be nearby. Just how nearby was brought home when on May 22, 1946--four days before the election--it was announced (rather than requested) that Soviet troops would cross Czechoslovakia from Hungary and Austria to the Soviet zone of Germany. The intervention of Jan Masaryk stopped this from happening, but the point had been made...
One thing that *might* have made a difference in the 1946 election results would have been fewer people being disfranchised for "collaboration." According to Benjamin Frommer, in *National Cleansing: Retribution Against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia,* p. 216, "The Communists' political competitors retrospectively blamed disfranchisement for their election debacle. They claimed that machinations by partisan national committees unfairly prevented as many as 250,000 to 300,000 alleged collaborators from casting ballots. Although claims that disfranchisement cost the 'democratic' parties at least ten parliamentary mandates are probably exaggerated, had a mere three seats (approximately 72,000 votes) changed hands, the Communists and their thus-far obedient Social Democratic allies would have lost their majority in the new Constituent National Assembly." But Frommer adds that "Even ifthe numbers are accurate, there is still no reason to assume that all of those denied the vote would have supported non-Marxist parties." http://books.google.com/books?id=gU-dZ5Zk2-YC&pg=PA216&sig=HsHIYZXGkhQFWJ7jWkhY8kCXMSQ
In such a scenario, though, memories of Munich 1938 might still be fresh in many Czechoslovakians' minds.It require the Soviets not to invade the Czech area held by Germans, Slovakia and Hungary. The Western Allies have to get there first, which is unlikely to be the case. But, if Czechoslovakia was liberated by the Allies, it'd probably be a strategic base for NATO.
Excellent post, David!Indeed, it appears that memories of Munich 1938 were still understandably fresh in many Czechoslovakians' minds in 1945-1946 and that thus many Czechoslovakians preferred protection from the Soviet Union--which wasn't a party to the Munich Agreement back in 1938--than from Britain and France--which were parties to the 1938 Munich Agreement.
Also, though, I've got a question--had the Czechoslovakian Communists and Social Democrats combined barely fail to win a majority in the Czechoslovak Parliament, what would have happened afterwards? Could this have completely butterflied away the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia?
Local politics are irrelevant. Stalin wasnt going to allow a non-satellite state to exist on his European borders.
Finland.
A) Finland and its citizens had little ability to subvert other satellite states or the Soviet Union itself. No shared borders, no common ethnicity.
Finland didn't border the Soviet Union? It hadn't fought it during World War II? It didn't present a potential threat to Leningrad? As for no common ethnicity and threats of subversion, during the Great Terror of the 1930's, "In Karelia, he [Zhdanov] violently attacked the leadership-—Irglis, Gylling, Rovio, and others, all of whom were arrested as Finnish spies. All the ten Finnish-language newspapers were closed down." https://books.google.com/books?id=ubXQSk2qfXMC&pg=PA222
[/QUOTE]In any event, the internal political situation of Czechoslovakia did matter in that it allowed the Communists to seize power *without* the use of Soviet troops. I am not saying that Stalin would not have used them if necessary but "The newly released documents argue against the currently widespread version, which claims that the Kremlin considered it appropriate for the Soviet Army in Hungary to move towards the frontier with Czechoslovakia or even to enter Czechoslovak territory. It is clear from the telegrams, that the Soviet leadership considered the Soviet demonstration of military might at the frontier with Czechoslovakia, which according to Zorin Premier Gottwald and General Secretary Slansky were demanding, to be inappropriate..." http://web.archive.org/web/20030709111152/http://www.usd.cas.cz/usdeng/zorin.html
There's a reason it was called "Finlandization".
In principle, both of these objections could have been dealt with if Czechslovakia had been split into a Czech Republic and a Slovak Socialist Republic. The Slovak portion would link the northern and southern portions of the Warsaw Pact and provide a buffer against Western Europe, while Czechia could be neutralized like Austria and pose about the same degree of threat.A) Finland and its citizens had little ability to subvert other satellite states or the Soviet Union itself. No shared borders, no common ethnicity - it was as much a threat to say East Germany as Sweden. Czechoslovakia bordered East Germany, Poland, and Hungary and linked them to Austria and West Germany.
B) Czechoslovakia ran like a highway from West Germany to the Soviet Union and effectively separated the southern part of what was to be the Warsaw Pact from the northern part. In the event of a war, compare supplying US forces in Finland with US forces in Czechoslovakia. No comparison.
If Czechoslovakia manages to become neutral like Finland and Austria during the Cold War, would these things have been the likely consequences of this? :Given Benes' eagerness to please the Soviet Union--giving up Carpatho-Ruthenia without a fuss, agreeing to an important role for Communists in the provisional government. etc.--it is at least plausible that "Czechification" could have been as satisfactory to the USSR as "Finlandization." Yes, a Czechoslovakia that aligned itself with the West might be dangerous to Soviet security in east-central Europe, but it was not really necessary to have a complete Communist take-over to prevent such an alliance.
I would like to point out that Finland was able to give the Soviet Union a bloody nose; in contrast, I don't see Czechoslovakia being able to do this. In turn, this makes me suspect that Czechoslovakia would be less likely than Finland was to be able to remain neutral throughout the entire Cold War.Finland didn't border the Soviet Union? It hadn't fought it during World War II? It didn't present a potential threat to Leningrad? As for no common ethnicity and threats of subversion, during the Great Terror of the 1930's, "In Karelia, he [Zhdanov] violently attacked the leadership-—Irglis, Gylling, Rovio, and others, all of whom were arrested as Finnish spies. All the ten Finnish-language newspapers were closed down." https://books.google.com/books?id=ubXQSk2qfXMC&pg=PA222
I don't doubt the strategic importance of Czechoslovakia. But if there had been a Communist seizure of power in Finland, people would say that it was inevitable because of course Stalin would never allow a non-Communist Finland--which had resisted his demands in 1939 and fought him in both the Winter War and later in the Continuation War--to continue to exist, especially given its proximity to Leningrad....
In any event, the internal political situation of Czechoslovakia did matter in that it allowed the Communists to seize power *without* the use of Soviet troops. I am not saying that Stalin would not have used them if necessary but "The newly released documents argue against the currently widespread version, which claims that the Kremlin considered it appropriate for the Soviet Army in Hungary to move towards the frontier with Czechoslovakia or even to enter Czechoslovak territory. It is clear from the telegrams, that the Soviet leadership considered the Soviet demonstration of military might at the frontier with Czechoslovakia, which according to Zorin Premier Gottwald and General Secretary Slansky were demanding, to be inappropriate..." http://web.archive.org/web/20030709111152/http://www.usd.cas.cz/usdeng/zorin.html
Finland didn't border the Soviet Union? It hadn't fought it during World War II? It didn't present a potential threat to Leningrad?
[snip]
But if there had been a Communist seizure of power in Finland, people would say that it was inevitable because of course Stalin would never allow a non-Communist Finland--which had resisted his demands in 1939 and fought him in both the Winter War and later in the Continuation War--to continue to exist, especially given its proximity to Leningrad....
The US wasn't in a party in Munich. Unlike Britain, the US could describe itself as an alternative choice, probably with distribution of food to liberated civilians, some immediate postwar financial support (earlier Marshall Plan) and a recovery plan, and also allow the German to be expelled. They could also provide money for non-Communist parties.Excellent post, David!Indeed, it appears that memories of Munich 1938 were still understandably fresh in many Czechoslovakians' minds in 1945-1946 and that thus many Czechoslovakians preferred protection from the Soviet Union--which wasn't a party to the Munich Agreement back in 1938--than from Britain and France--which were parties to the 1938 Munich Agreement.
The U.S. unfortunately didn't care much for European politics in 1938, though; indeed, while the Soviet Union was trying to form an anti-Nazi coalition, the U.S. was comfortably sitting in isolation.The US wasn't in a party in Munich. Unlike Britain, the US could describe itself as an alternative choice, probably with distribution of food to liberated civilians, some immediate postwar financial support (earlier Marshall Plan) and a recovery plan, and also allow the German to be expelled. They could also provide money for non-Communist parties.