I don't know much about US congressional history, so this may be a stupid idea, but here goes...
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was a somewhat unique institution in congress, especially in its first seven years. Its primary task was overseeing the Atomic Energy Commission, but it went well beyond the usual watchdog role to being a simultaneous advocate for the AEC within Congress and helping to set AEC policy - for example, one source says the idea of PAL locks actually originated in the JCAE. The JCAE and the AEC had, for many years, a symbiotic relationship; especially early on, the JCAE tended to badger the AEC commissioners about whether they could use more money rather than trying to find savings, and not infrequently insisted on restoring parts of the budget that the OMB had cut. The unique JCAE-AEC relationship explains a lot of why the AEC was able to do as much as they did for as long as they did without being terribly constrained by budget.
There were a lot of reasons why this happened. The JCAE was the only permanent joint committee with legislative authority, including, after 1954, authority over appropriations bills. They had a unique ability to hire staff as they wanted with salaries they set, rather than being limited like other committees. The secrecy and technical obscurity of much of what the AEC did, along with its self-evident importance to the nation, tended to enhance the power within Congress of those select few who oversaw it. The law creating the AEC gave the JCAE an unusual degree of access to their operations, requiring them to be kept "fully and currently informed" of what was going on and frequently sending JCAE staff for personal inspections of AEC operations. Unlike most committees, the JCAE was considered an "extra committee", so prospective members did not have to give up membership on other committees to join. And, more informally, the JCAE tended to recruit primarily members who already had considerable stature, and had an unusual degree of internal coherence and a sense of a common mission; although there were times when they split - such as over the Dixon-Yates contract or the public-private power controversy - most of the time they tended to work together to advance a mutual agenda in Congress.
What if Congress adopted the JCAE as a model for permanent joint committees overseeing other technical programs, like space travel and the response to the oil shocks? The JCAE was an imperfect model - oversight tended to turn into collaboration - but it was a model for Getting Things Done. I'm not sure if you could actually replicate that secret sauce, or that it would necessarily be a good thing if you could, but I thought I'd throw it out there and see what those more expert on legislative matters than myself think.
(Note: Here's a good online source on the history of the JCAE. Warning: pdf)
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was a somewhat unique institution in congress, especially in its first seven years. Its primary task was overseeing the Atomic Energy Commission, but it went well beyond the usual watchdog role to being a simultaneous advocate for the AEC within Congress and helping to set AEC policy - for example, one source says the idea of PAL locks actually originated in the JCAE. The JCAE and the AEC had, for many years, a symbiotic relationship; especially early on, the JCAE tended to badger the AEC commissioners about whether they could use more money rather than trying to find savings, and not infrequently insisted on restoring parts of the budget that the OMB had cut. The unique JCAE-AEC relationship explains a lot of why the AEC was able to do as much as they did for as long as they did without being terribly constrained by budget.
There were a lot of reasons why this happened. The JCAE was the only permanent joint committee with legislative authority, including, after 1954, authority over appropriations bills. They had a unique ability to hire staff as they wanted with salaries they set, rather than being limited like other committees. The secrecy and technical obscurity of much of what the AEC did, along with its self-evident importance to the nation, tended to enhance the power within Congress of those select few who oversaw it. The law creating the AEC gave the JCAE an unusual degree of access to their operations, requiring them to be kept "fully and currently informed" of what was going on and frequently sending JCAE staff for personal inspections of AEC operations. Unlike most committees, the JCAE was considered an "extra committee", so prospective members did not have to give up membership on other committees to join. And, more informally, the JCAE tended to recruit primarily members who already had considerable stature, and had an unusual degree of internal coherence and a sense of a common mission; although there were times when they split - such as over the Dixon-Yates contract or the public-private power controversy - most of the time they tended to work together to advance a mutual agenda in Congress.
What if Congress adopted the JCAE as a model for permanent joint committees overseeing other technical programs, like space travel and the response to the oil shocks? The JCAE was an imperfect model - oversight tended to turn into collaboration - but it was a model for Getting Things Done. I'm not sure if you could actually replicate that secret sauce, or that it would necessarily be a good thing if you could, but I thought I'd throw it out there and see what those more expert on legislative matters than myself think.
(Note: Here's a good online source on the history of the JCAE. Warning: pdf)