The Khawarij are a heterodox branch of islam, who are known for their disregard towards (arab) ethnicity as a precedent for islamic rule and their extensive practice of takfir (accusing certain muslims of not following the correct interpretation of islam), among many other doctrinal differences. They were most prevalent in western Morocco (among the Berghawata berbers), Oman (today still a majority-khawarij country), Algeria (Rustamid dynasty) and a few scattered communities in Iraq and Arabia. Khawarij ideology was most popular among non-arab ethnic groups conquered during the expansion of islam.
So, i ask: what is the best overall performance achievable by the Khawarij against the more orthodox muslim powers? Could they achieve numerical majorities in the persian gulf and the Maghreb? What more?
 
The Barghawata had their own heresy involving a new prophet, they were not Kharijite in any sense.
The distinction between Sunni, Sh'ia and Khawarij was much more moot (up to the point of irrelevance if rarily, when it comes to the content exchanges) up to the Xth century and the necessity to really have a clear definition with the Fatimid rise. That Berghawata Islamic practices might be heterodox (as influed by a lot of pre-Islamic features and heterodox Arab teachings) is true, but there's simply no evidence that they considered themselves other than Muslims (and even less they had a new prophet : the Armenian Genocide is as much a bad source than you could expect on this).

At worst, we're talking of a similar difference between Adventists in their prime and mainstream Protestantism, altough @John7755 يوحنا might have a better comparison.
Still, how it did evolves and how it divided itself makes it a agreeable (if flawed) one, as we have to distinguish

- Azâriqa (Azariqites), particularily radical and violent, considering other Muslims as muchrik and eligible for raiding and warring against.
These in particular didn't really last : their own radicalism made them really vulnerable to outright extermination.

- Najadât (Najadatis) which was a bit less radical than Azâriqa (especially on the necessity of the religious murder) knew more or less a similar fate.

- Ṣufriyya (Sufrites), and close branches such as Nakkariyya, were clearly less dogmatics and much less violents even if they still opposed orthodox branches and saw political and military fight as legit.
They're partically responsible for the climate of religious/political ebullition in Maghrib and Ifriqiya in the Midlle-Ages : as less intransigants than the first brands (which was close ro Azariqa), they saw interest with allying with other Islamic polities against one other, which made them valuable but unreliable allies.

- Eventually, Ibāḍiyya (Ibadi) from what remains mostly of Khawarij nowadays, that is a puritain (morally and socially) society but pacifists and relatively open. Ibāḍī are so different from historical groups as Azâriqa that many claims not being Khawarij.


Anyway.

I think, @GauchoBadger you'd have several possibilities* (with Mascate history, for instance and the possibility of Ibadi African Muslims), but I'll focus on Berbers being rembered that you didn't have a clear cut distinction between Sunni, Alid (rather than Sh'ia IMO) and Khwaraji schools.
The Great Berber Revolt of 739-740 was mostly (altough not only) supported religiously trough Khwaraij's schools, stressing that Berbers were Muslims, and better ones than the lackeys of Ummayads. It took the form of a general confederation/great alliance that was defeated at Kairouan (Karwan), preventing them to conquer the whole of Ifriqiya (altough Khawarij did formed communities in the highlands that survived into the XXIth century).

While I think this great alliance will collapse sooner or later, and more sooner than later, it could last just enough to defeat Arabs at Kairouan and take most of Ifriqyia for themselves (at the very least restore the Berber confederations and rough unity between IOTL Algeria and south Tunisia that existed until the VIIth century), and maybe to have an hold in al-Andalus.
I doubt it would make the Berber "anti-Caliphate" last much more, due to tribal interference, and I don't think it would survive these as a common group, but it could sceal a more Khawarijit Arabo-Berber ensemble in Maghrib and Ifriqiya (possibly in Andalus) that would survive the coming collapse, if certainly mixed with Alid, Sunni and pre-Islamic features more or less importantly.

*Except with Azariqites : these guys were fire-eaters that couldn't form stable ensembles even if they'd tried to do so.
 
I agree that North Africa would be your best bet, for the reasons outlined by LSCatalina and also might I add for the role that North Africa played in spreading Islam into West Africa and Modern Sudan. The establishment of a Kharijite presence in North Africa would possibly allow for the sects spread to the societies of the Sahel, especially with the conversions of the Berbers that traversed the Sahara.
 
even less they had a new prophet : the Armenian Genocide is as much a bad source than you could expect on this
Let's review the relevant sources then...

Ibn Hawqal, the earliest source to mention their existence, notes the Barghawata in the Kitāb Ṣūrat al-arḍ, which was finished in the late 10th century. He says they originated from a man named "Salih ibn Abdullah," who he describes as such:
He was of Berber origins, a maghribi by birth, fluent in the language of the Berbers, but he also understood languages other than theirs. He called them to believe in him, and he told them that he was a prophet and a messenger, sent to them in their language, taking as evidence the word of God, may he be exalted [in the Qur'an] "We have not sent a prophet but that he spoke the language of his people" [Qur'an 14:4]. He claimed that Muhammad was a true prophet, Arabic of language, sent to his people and to the Arabs especially, and that he was true to what he was given, in terms of the Qur’an and the regulations [which he promulgated]. ... He composed for them some words which he chanted to them in their language, and he made into law that which he desired, along the lines of their old creed. They carefully study [his words] together, considering them great, and they use them in their prayers.
[...]
[Salih] predicted for them an eclipse, and they found it came true, and he warned them of something else, and they found it, too, came true. They found him trustworthy in his speech, so that he was able to deceive their minds, and he changed their belief, and made it obligatory for them to obey him, in traditions which he innovated, and rules which he made up and imposed [upon them].​

In the 11th-century Kitāb al–Milal wa al-Nihal, ibn Hazm says "the Barghawata heretics expect until this day Salih ibn Tarif, who instituted for them their religion, until Allah stamped out their vestiges altogether in our own time, praise be unto God."

Abu 'Ubayd al-Bakri, in the Kitāb al-Masālik w’al-Mamālik, has the most detailed description of the Barghawata to date, where they are again depicted as heretical Muslims with their own prophet and a "Berber Qur'an".

When the Almoravid theologian Abdullah ibn Yasin--who was himself killed by the Barghawata--arrived in Tamasna, he was told that the Barghawata "are a mix of distinct Berber tribes, united by Salih ibn Tarif, who was established in Tamasna when he began to style himself a prophet, in the time of Hisham ibn Abdullah al-Marwani."

The contemporaneous orthodox Muslims seem to be in general agreement on this issue.
 
Let's review the relevant sources then...

The contemporaneous orthodox Muslims seem to be in general agreement on this issue.
I don't think calling late Xth XIth centuries sources contemporaneous is really spot on. ibn Hawqal resorted to what Ifriqiyan sources he had at disposal (including the historical mythos about the Arabity of Berbers), and ibn Hazm pro-Umayyad stance (in a period where Umayyads asserted their dominance over Maghrib) should be taken less at face value; in the same way Christian depictions, no matter how detailed, about heretical practices shouldn't, as they borrow heavily on a set of descriptive tropes.

The accusation of following false prophets ("authorising what was forbidden") is a trope of Arab chronicles until the XIIIth century, explaining trough this both divine punishment and the justification of expeditions against them (or at the very least, justifying treatment of Berbers as sub-Muslims).
Even ibn Khaldun can't do better about Banu Tarif than "they were heretics right from the start, but they hid it for four generations because their subjects wouldn't have accepted it".

Eventually, claiming that Bergwata (or for exemple Suswala) were "not Kharijite in any sense" is indulging ourselves too much in a litterary ensemble that was traditionally hostile to Berbers.
Does that means that Bergwata or Suswala were "orthodox" Khawarij? Of course not (altough the extent of their heterodoxy is impossible to really determine) : but to deny that it was an Islam, essentially radical (while not only Khawaraij in nature) mixed with syncretic Berber practices? I strongly disagree.

While remaining texts mostly focus on them, there were other heterodox groups in Maghrib that were considered neither Islamic, Christians, Jews or even Pagans : as said Suswala and Bergwata probably shared if not a same set of beliefs, at least similar enough to be considered as the same by malekits. Eventually, the absence of clear description before the Xth century, the heavy use of genealogism (relatively common in al-Andalus with the fitna, interestingly) leans to a different treatment of these western Maghrib tribes maybe less due to their heterodoxy (Ibadi were not considered as kuffars, at least not consistently, by Aghlabids or Zirids) than their remotness as well, with a really late malekite presence in modern Morroco that would have both influed on the region, and would have forced coastal courts to undergo a more "transitional" policy as was the case in the hinterland of Ifriqiya and Khawariji communities.

Rather than a Islamized Berber religion, if you allow me to paraphrase Talbi, it was a Berberized Islam at the service of a wounded national ego.
 
Khawarij by nature are extremely rebellious and to an extent they breed infighting as a rule. However, their call to war was extremely alluring to the seemingly oppressed in the realities of post Sassanid-Byzantine Mid East/Africa.

The call of the Khawarij was simple and without secrets as the Shi'i held. It was that;

- The prince is one of the Muslim. Muslims are separate only by their faith and the safety with which they protect themselves. What this really means, all authority must be questioned. Muslim scholars agree, Khawarij roots derive from an Arab tribe known as the Qurra who rejected Muhammad's right as prophet to divide up the loot. Later, they refused to pay the zakaah claiming that they were free Arabs and masters unto themselves.

An example of this briefly was when the Qurra referred to eventual caliph Mu'awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan inquired as to their lack of payments. They rejected any power of the Caliph Uthman ibn Affan, and exclaimed famously "While the Quryaish (Hijazi) lounged, the Arabs ate from their swords!" This not only showed disobedience, but also a complete rejection of the Arab origin of the Hijaz and a slander of their manliness. Whilst also, explaining that they lived by the sword (meaning of eating from one's sword).

These same Qurra, would be the murderers of Uthman ibn Affan in the famous siege of his home, where he was killed while praying. These same Qurra then latched themselves to Ali ibn Talib, proclaiming him the Caliph and thus beginning the First Fitnah. The reason for this, was that Mu'awiyah without considerable evidence accused the Qurra of murdering Uthman ibn Affan. When Ali Ibn Talib hesitated, Mu'awiyah in righteous anger and zeal to avenge his cousin Uthman, declared a rebellion against Ali ibn Talib.

Another example, was a man who the hadiths describe, was a true Arab with a shaved head, small black eyes and a fearsome gaze and striking black beard. This man when the loot was to divided equally after battle, he exclaimed "O, Muhammad be just!," to which he was chastised by Muhammad and then he turned away and left from the Muslim camp.



- Allah alone can arbitrate the wills of man. Thus, when one is to conclude peace, it is the providence of Allah who commands through battle the victor.


- Takfir is permissible for those who commit lesser sins.

-Lesser indicators.
=============

Regardless, the Khawarij were not just those who are zealots but over time, tended to mix with criminal elements or those who lived within the fringes of society. Any who would benefit from the removal of either Umayyad or Abbasid governmental power. So, it is important to note this. Also, Khawarij existed as those who were experienced in the art of subversion/deception through kitman and actively attempted to infiltrate courts across the Abbasid hegemony. These Khawarij of the deceptive type, were the most feared and myths abound of their skills of deception and masterful infiltration of Islamic institutions.

Outside Ifriqiya, Libya and Maghrebi Khawarij already discussed, there were three other areas that had a large portion of Khawarij movements.

1. Al-Jazira: Here was the site of the devastating Khawarij revolt of 866, which famously ravaged the entire region. Here, the Khawarij revolt began as father, Musawir al-Hamid avenged his son's unjust death by murdering officials in the city of Hulwan. This father and his mob of vigilantes, fearing the retribution of the Abbasid overlords, took up the flag of the Khawarij and in short time, the Khawarij joined their ranks and their rebellion was at hand.

The Khawarij under Musawir and his Khawairj ideologues Harun al-Bajali and Ibn Kurzad, amazingly were skilled in the arts of war. They seemingly teleported across northern Iraq avoiding the Abbasid in field battles and then infiltrating local forts, cities and towns and then entering and massacring the populace with utmost brutality. Capturing numerous, cities and depopulating towns, such as Hulwan and devastating the Yezidi. They increased their power constantly by gaining scores of bandits and others who joined the cause for loot.

After the death of Musawir, who united the movement, which had split into at least three to four armies (and unknown numbers of brigands) by this point, the Khawarij revolt began to lose steam as the Khawarij. Part of this, was derived from the inability of the Abbasid powers to turn their full attention to the Khawarij with the Khawarij's allies (and ideological comrades) the Zanj rebels waging an even more furious war in the south. Thus, the infighting of the Khawarij became common place in the absence of concerted Abbasid campaigns; allowing for power struggles to flourish. Ibn Kurzad who hungered for power and also commanded the remaining army under Musawir in Mosul, demanded the command of the rebellion for himself. He was opposed by many, whom he killed, exiled or forced out of the realm by intimidation. Finally, Harun al-Bajali, a commanding general of a fearsome army contingent of the rebels, was proclaimed commander of the revolt. In response, Ibn Kurzad began preparing in 880 for a power struggle of open conflict within the Khawarij ranks. Ibn Kurzad defeated Harun al-Bajali in the province of Ninewah in 881, and claiming the title of Amr of the Khawarij after his victory.

Harun al-Bajali responded in turn by allying with Khawarij sympathizer and helper of Musawir, Hamdan ibn Hamdun, an Arab noble in the province of Anbar. The two then engaged Ibn Kurzad again in his realm of Ninewah and defeated the power hungry commander. However, this dispute had come at the cost of freezing the Khawarij offensive by around 5 years (877-882/883). With precious time, the Abbasid composed a new plan than the previous which centered around chasing the Khawarij individually. Instead, the Abbasid launched an invasion around gaining more and more land.

By this, the Abbasid troops began covering ground and thus almost casting a net sending the divided Khawarij armies fleeing and unable to out maneuver them. Hasan ibn Ali Kurah, hand picked by the Abbasid to launch a renewed invasion of the Khawarij held land, pursued the policy of capturing ground and then catching the Khawarij at river crossings. At the same time, the Khawarij were embroiled in more conflict as one of the three remaining armies revolted against Harun al-Bajali and Hamdan ibn Hamdun. This third army led by Muhammad ibn Ubaydah, was then engaged by Harun al-Bajali and defeated at the Battle of Sinjar. Muhammad ibn Ubaydah escaped with a small contingent and was then captured and defeated by famous Arab strongman, Ahmad ibn Isa al-Shaybani. Muhammad ibn Ubaydah was then sent to grovel before the Caliph, beat with shoes by the populace and then brutally flayed alive (as the Assyrians did) and beheaded. Harun al-Bajali likely shuddered at the news of the death of his former comrade, from this point onward, the Khawarij were in total retreat from the Abbasids, leading to a deprived and starved army. An army based upon loot, has issues prosecuting conflict when the loot runs dry due to flight.

Hasan ibn Ali Kurah then caught Hamdan ibn Hamdun in his military net at a river crossing and defeated the Khawarij amry in a fearsome engagement with both sides incurring grievous wounds to both armies. However, Hamdan ibn Hamdun was captured by Hasan ibn Ali Kurah and his army disintegrated into fleeing looters. Using the now imprisoned Hamdan ibn Hamdun, he tracked the ever elusive Harun al-Bajali down lurking near Mosul. Seeking to trap his enemy in the region, he watched him and hounded Harun al-Bajali with Turkic riders. Soon after, in an attempt to save his father's life, Husayn ibn Hamdan offered his assistance to the Abbasid commander Hasan ibn Ali Kurah and then led an army of former Khawarij and Arab tribesmen to hunt Harun al-Bajali. Husayn ibn Hamdan then defeated the weakened Harun al-Bajali at the Tigris river while his Abbasid allies watched from a short distance.

Harun al-Bajali escaped and fled into the desert with his Bedouin allies. He however was hunted furiously by the Abbasid forces and was captured in 896. Hamdan ibn Hamdun was released for his cooperation and for the service of his son who begged for the life of his father. Harun al-Bajali, the architect of the rebellion, once a spectre of destruction was then humiliated in the Abbasid capital and given the same fate as his fallen rival, he was flayed alive and beheaded, a most gruesome end...

How to get this rebellion to succeed, is difficult. The Khawarij armies were hindered by not having effective defensive positions and thus had to either avoid their enemies or defeat them in field battles. Both of which were dangerous propositions against the extremely fearsome Mamluk warriors of the Abbasid realm. To be fair, the Khawarij under Musawir, who united the rebels (including Ibn Kurzad and Harun al-Bajali) defeated numerous Abbasid armies in field battles and their ability to infiltrate towns and cause chaos was renowned. However, time is running out for them, the rebellion contributed irreversibly to the fall of the Abbasid, but it simply was not strong enough to fully defeat the Abbasid (unless something else happens to the Abbasid, such as Zanj breakthrough the Sawad and capture Karbala-Najaf-Kufa or Ya'qub al-Saffar defeats the Abbasid and besiege Baghdad, allowing the Khawarij to set up a state in Mosul). Except, surviving as a memory of various Bedouin, who would discuss the renown of the phantom armies of the Khawarij.

=========================

2. The Sawad, this was a serious breeding ground for the Khawarij both due to its proximity to the wildlands of Eastern Arabia and the Nejd, where much of these Khawarij ideas arose and the economy of slavery that prevailed here. Both for massive plantations and salt mines, slaves toiled in the region of the Sawad which name refers to the black land or the black soil, the same soil that birthed the first cities on earth (Sumer and Elam). The swamps further, defended criminal elements whom the Khawarij were adjunct to, both smugglers, slavers, racketeers, pirates, bandits, etc.. inhabited the similar al-Batihah or great swamp that accompanied the Sawad in the interiors between the great twin rivers.

Here, the greatest of all Khawarij inspired rebellions began, known as the Zanj rebellion. The largest slave revolt in human history until the Haitian revolt, it would become the most renowned of all late Abbasid conflicts.

I can give a vast summary of it if you wish (like I did for the above rebellion, infact I may just make a post every now and then and summarize many of these Abbasid wars), but for brevity, I will refrain.

Zanj success is possible... However, it would become a small state centered around the former lands of Sumer, with its capital based around either Basra or the interim capital of al-Mukhtara. Zanju success depends upon the destruction of Abbasid forces in Ahvaz opposing the Zanj in Iran and the crushing of the Abbasid forces in central Iraq by another foe. If the Zanj are able to invade into Karbala, they gain an incredible position and this was likely the strategy from the start of the Zanj. That being, to conquer enough Shi'i dominated areas to then gain their allegiance or alliance in a escalated war with the Abbasid. However, that still leaves Baghdad.... The Zanj will not be able to capture Baghdad, without more allies, Baghdad was infamously hard to capture as the Qarmatians learned, who overextended themselves in their attack on Baghdad several decades later. Unlike the Qarmatians, the Zanj do not have the benefit of Fatimid benefactors either.

In short, it is possible for the Zanj to carve out a state in the south of Iraq and Khuzestan, but they are hard pressed to do this due to the power of the Abbasid forces once they pass the swamplands and canals dotting the Sawad. Zanj forces at their zenith, were defeated in the more open lands of central Iraq by the Mamluk cavalry. Famously, the armies of the Abbasid prince al-Mu'tadid defeated the Zanj outside the cover of the rivers and swamps a in the battle of Fam al-Simh, using heavy armored cavalry and feigned attacks (which were previously a specialty of the Zanj, which the Abbasid began employing). Further, the Zanj have no answer to when the Abbasid decide to divide its armies into smaller units seeking to attack and hound the Zanj commanders. Without the commanders (some of the best commanders in the late Abbasid period were Zanj rebels), the Zanj armies will disintegrate into squabbling brigands. This was actually the result. The so called Great Swamp Emirate of al-Batihah (Sultanate al-Batihah), was remnants of the Zanj, who were essentially an alliance of criminals and other various outlaws who formed a state to defend their interests encased in the swamps.

=====================

3. The Khawarij of the east. Which was snuffed out by Ya'qub al-Saffar. I can discuss this if one asks and probably will anyways. This is perhaps the most plausible, more so than either of the more powerful Iraqi movements or the famous Berber Khawarij of Africa.
 
Last edited:
@John7755 يوحنا
Some good facts right there! :)
Say, why do you consider the Zanj rebels to be part of the Khawarij?

The Zanj rebels were irreversibly influenced by revolutionary Khawarij much as the Khawarij under Musawir were. Ali al-Dibaj, was one of the most interesting figures in the saga of the Abbasid caliphate. All accounts describe him as a man of unmatched cunning and skill in the art of deception. He seemingly valued nothing but the revolution and thrill of overturning the Abbasid order. Originally, he travelled to the lands of the eventual Qarmatians, where he claimed to be the reborn Shumaytiyya (a movement of Shi'i in the early Abbasid period, who were the predecessors of the Qqaramtians). This sort of claim, meant that he was attempting to claim the spirit of Ali ibn Talib or in clear terms, claiming to be an Imam and thus one step below divinity or actual divinity. It is then interesting to note, al-Masudi and al-Jahiz, contemporary chroniclers of the period, said that Ali al-Dibaj was not Shi'i and simply claimed to be so to gain support. Which was rejected to him by the eventual Qarmatians who expelled him from Bahrain. Ali al-Dibaj then took a different approach and sought support from the Khawairj elements in the Sawad. He also however, never lost his Shi'i streak as he claimed to be the reincarnated Yahya ibn Umar in 868.

It is unknown to me the actual religious views of Ali al-Dibaj, but he seemingly had only the ideology of revolt and the removal of Abbasid authority at any cost. This was likely due to some sort of ego or false sense of importance, which explains his continual insistence of being a reincarnation of various mystical rebels in recent Abbasid history. However, my reasoning for calling the Zanj rebellion a Khawarij revolt, is that at the outset of the rebellion, after Shi'i pandering failed Ali al-Dibaj, he called upon the mantra of the Khawarij in 869 in the mosque. He exclaimed to the amazement of all in attendance, that Allah is the sole arbiter of humanity and then launched into a Kharajite critique of the Abbasid hegemony. His speech became a rallying call for all those in the Sawad, including slaves, Bedouin, outlaws, Khawarij revolutionary. It is my view, that Ali al-Dibaj wanted to take the mantle of the Shi'i Alids and the acclaim he would be given as an Imam or reincarnated mystical figure or Allah within the body of man (common view then amongst Ghulat), but he was never believed to be an Alid. Thus, he used the Khawarij to gain his power, to his discomfort mind you. Ali al-Dibaj, attempted until his death to convince his Khawairj supporters, unaffiliated Zanj and Shi'i to agree to his claims of being the reborn Shumayytiyya Muhammad ibn Ja'far al-Sadiq, obviously, his Khawarij followers rejected his claims and likely worked in tandem to keep Ali al-Dibaj in the Zanj capital of al-Mukhtara.
 
Top