Is it plausible for Saddam Hussein, perhaps through not pissing off the US too much, to become leader of a late UAR of sorts? How many Arab countries can he properly sweep under his wing? How would a "Husseinist" UAR differ from a "Nasserist" UAR?
 
In OTL, he took over Iraq and stopped the merger with Syria since he'd be lower in the pecking order than Hafez and al-Bakr. Had he allowed the merger to proceed, he could've come out on top a few years later. Lebanon would likely come under this union's wing if it doesn't clash with Israel too much or if it somehow beats Israel in a skirmish over Lebanon. They could also possibly defeat Iran over Arabistan. Their main weapon could be the fact that the new union is now the standard-bearer of panarabism, which could also benefit the wider Ba'ath movement.
 
I discussed the possibility of a Syria-Iraq union in an old soc.history.what-if post (basically, Syria didn't want it except perhaps as a loose federation, being afraid that otherwise she would be treated by the more numerous Iraqis as a mere province, as she had been by the Egyptians in Nasser's UAR):

***

"In 1963, there were talks on a Syria-Iraq union, the Ba'ath party being in control of both countries. Whatever chance there was for unity was lost on November 18, 1963 when the Iraqi Ba'athists were overthrown by General Arif. When in 1968 the Ba'athists regained power in Iraq, there not only was no unity, but relations between the two countries sharply deteriorated. One reason is that the Iraqi Ba'athists' leadership (Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and his relative Saddam Hussein) had been selected by the old 'National Command' of the Ba'ath (led by Michel Aflaq, who had founded the party), and the National Command had lost power in Damascus in 1966. So the question is, had the National Command stayed in power in Syria, would there have been a union after 1968? I doubt it, at least whether there would have been a lasting union. By 1968 it was apparent that Bakr and Saddam Hussein, even if originally designated by Aflaq et al, were more Iraqi nationalist than Arab nationalist. The Syrians for their part remembered the way Egypt had dominated the UAR and had in effect treated Syria as a mere province. This made them reluctant to get into any more unions with more powerful nations.

"In any event, after 1963 the Syrian military was largely dominated by religious minorities (especially Alawites like Assad) who had reason to be suspicious that any Syria-Iraq union would be dominated by Sunnis.

"After years of bitter recriminations between the two Ba'athist regimes, there was again talk of unity in 1978-79. This was the result of Camp David, which had put the Syrian regime in a dangerous position--it could no longer count on Egyptian help against Israel. A 'Charter of Joint National Action' was arrived at, and a joint defense pact was supposed to 'provide the groundwork for complete military union.' But nothing ever came of this--Syria wanted military support from Iraq, including the financing of arms purchases, but not any merger of the two armies. Syria also balked at unifying the two Ba'ath parties. Furthermore, the Iraqis wanted a unitary state; the Syrians nothing more than a loose federation. Finally, the Iranian revolution gave the Syrians an alternative to an alliance with Iraq. Soon Iraqi-Syrian relations returned to a state of open conflict.

"One final point on the 'unity' moves of 1978-9: both superpowers opposed them (as did most Arab regimes). The US viewed a union of two 'radical' Arab states as a threat to Israel and to Western interests in the Middle East. More interesting is that the USSR while not opposed to better relations among its Arab allies, opposed any close union. Evgenii Primakov, then director of the Institute for Middle East Studies at the Soviet Academy of Sciences warned at the congress of the (pro-Assad) Syrian Communist Party in early 1979 that any such union would entail increasing openings to the West. What he did not say, but doubtless had in mind, was that a union of the two countries would have enhanced their bargaining power vis-a-vis the USSR.

"For a detailed discussion of the Iraq-Syrian conflict, see a book on which I have heavily relied here: Eberhard Kienle, *Ba'th v. Ba'th: The conflict between Syria and Iraq 1968-1989 (1990)."

https://soc.history.what-if.narkive.com/jOD2zzfI/iraq-and-syria-unite-in-1979#post4
 
In OTL, he took over Iraq and stopped the merger with Syria since he'd be lower in the pecking order than Hafez and al-Bakr.

But he met that problem by forcing al-Bakr into retirement. Unity talks continued after that, and the real sticking point is that Syria really wanted nohinng more than a loose federation that would allow it to receive Iraqi military aid without being dominated by Iraq.
 
Would such a scenario require additional butterflies?
I'm under the impression that a more communist-oriented Iranian regime after the 1979 Revolution and a murder of Hafez Al-Assad in Syria could help Saddam's position.
 
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