PC/WI: A Russian grab of Galicia in 1859/1866?

There were oil booms even back in the 1860s (Pennsylvania had theirs from 1859 to the 1870s so well within the era) and massive price spikes comparable to the price of oil in the OPEC embargo days and the present. They were producing lubricants (important for industry) and kerosene (replacing whale oil for lighting) so it was fairly lucrative even at the time (Russia's oil production in Baku started in the 1860s so oil was starting to grow in importance in the era). It's not quite as vital as it would be in the World War era but still quite lucrative in the 1860s (1870s and on would see Rockefeller become the world's richest man through Standard Oil, after all).

Nationalism was hindsight, granted, but I took "Strategically and economically, it's no great prize" to be more of an absolute than a historical perspective claim.

But the strategic positioning, with how much more secure Russia's western border would be, is the real prize here.


For that period. Long term, the oil was invaluable in warfare due to the use of motorized vehicles. The 1.1 million tons produced in Galicia would've bumped Russia's total up by over 10%, from 9.2 million to 10.3 million, but most importantly denies the Germanic powers any domestic sources of oil, which cripples a war effort in the 20th century.

And, as said above, Russian Galicia goes both ways, as now Russian Poland is far more defensible due to pincer attacks no longer being viable. The Russians did capture several passes in the Carpathians during WWI and being on the direct border from the start would help any offensive or at least allow the Russians to dedicate more troops to the more vulnerable Russo-German border. If the Carpathians fall, the Hungarian Plains go and that means Austria-Hungary is out of any war.

Loss of manpower is a bit problematic too since Galicia-Lodomeria had over 8 million of Austria-Hungary's 50 million and a fair amount of its armed force hailed from there. Losing it wouldn't have helped ethnic relations all too much seeing as that was administered by the Austrians, not the Hungarians (who were a bit more adverse to sharing power). German jumps to 28% of the population but still is barely a plurality.

Initially, I agree that losing Galicia wouldn't be all that adverse. It's just later that it might come back to haunt the Austrians.

OTL WWI the passes of the Carpathians werent fortified. So taking them OTL is not the same as taking them ATL.

The loss of Oil might hurt however there are factors you didnt consider. You say its invaluable in long term however Galician Oil production didnt manage to remain important in long term OTL. You also assume that Russia would have developed the Oil production of Galicia as Austria did - I have my doubts here.

Another assumption you make is that the alliances for WWI would turn out the same as OTL however the balance of power has been radically altered. For example Germany was an ally of Russia to begin with and if he has to choose between Austria and Russia as OTL it might choose Russia. Brittain is also bound to be much more suspicious of a stronger Russia. There are a lot of possibilities.

Also you are ignoring the issue of national minorties in Austria and pretend or assume that they only were a problem in Hungary. However I have to point out that no Hungarian government had to resign because of issues with national minorities. On the other side I seem to remember an Austrian government that had to resign because of the question of opening a slovenian middle school. A lot of Austrian government resigned because of problems like this.

So losing a huge chunk of national minorities with a lot of problems - especially the polish-ukrainian relations- would get rid of all those problems for the Austrian government. I believe that it would make the austrian government more stable. It would also be an incentive to find an accomodation with the czech and if they manage that they got rid and solved they most serious issues.
 
Austria would have a very defendable border with the Carpathians and even more so if he fortifies it. It looses a lot of national minorities so the Austrian pairlament is more managable. Galicia was also the poorest part of the Empire. In the end I think Austria might be better off without it.

But wouldn't the Russians be drawing the border? If so, they are going to take the passes for themselves
 

raharris1973

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If at some point after Russia takes Galicia, Austria and Germany still end up in an alliance directed at Russia, the Germanic powers may be more amenable to playing the Polish card in wartime. Yes, they still have the Poles of Prussia, but to push back the bear, if it came to war, I could certainly see the Austrians, and maybe the Germans, willing to have all of Russian Poland becoming an independent state with access to the sea through Lithuania and Courland. Giving it Posen might not even be too much for Germany to accept.
 
The effect of the Russians taking Galicia depends heavily on whether it occurs in 1859 or 1866.

It is, perhaps LEAST likely that Russia taking Galicia in either 1859 or 1866 would bring about the same alignment of Austro-Hungary+Prussian dominated Germany against France+Russia+(half heartedly) Britain with an eventual blowout in the early 20th century. Not that I'm a fan of butterflies but this would be taking thing too far.

let's consider the different scenarios:

1859-
Napoleon proposed more than Russia taking Galica- he favored supporting Hungarian independence. This is only a decade after the crushing of the 1848 rebellions and much of the Magyar elite is unreconciled to collaboration with Austria so Austrian collapse on both fronts might well lead to this outcome. Of course, there were several reasons why Russia chose not to intervene in this war. The top three were:
a. Fear of Prussian intervention following the coming to power of william I after his more conservative and pro Russian brother's heart attack.
b. The final phase of the Chechen and Circassian wars (the first would end in 1859 and the latter in 1864), dragged out to to the insistence of Dmitri Milyutin of making a finish of it by ethnically cleansing the Circassians. This conflict tied up a third or more of the Russian military budget.
c. Ongoing administrative and millitary reforms.
d. concern that collapsing Austria might disturb the balance of power with Prussia and lead to German unification.

In my TL I had the heart attack delayed, and the reformers convinced that "a short victorious war" would help establish their credbility and carry out reforms, leading them to offer a more generous deal to the Circassian and Chechen insurgents, mobilize, and enter the war after Napoleon III wins a more desicive Soliffino. Hungary secedes following a Russian incursion across the Carpathians and the death of Franz Joseph when he tries to break out of the siege of lake Garda leads to a peace which limits the Austrian empire to Bohemia, Moravia, the Austiran crown lands, and Croatia-Slavonia. Bismark heavy handedly backstabs and annexes the minor states of Northern Germany, but Bavria et al remain independent and form a southern confederation.

Italy is united in a loose French sponsered confederation under the titular presidency of the Pope, and Hungary is strongarmed into electing a Russian monarch under a regency council- yes, that's Alexander III. I left future German unification an open ended question.

However, to be quite honest, all of the above was gilding the lilly a bit too much in favor of the Russo-French alliance and somewhat railroading affairs into a similiar outcome as OTL- just earlier

More realistically, a POD similiar to what I proposed would probably involve the more Russophile William Fredrick receive some kind of Russian/French reassurance of support for paramouncy in the post war German confederation, and perhaps some minor territorial acquisitions from Austria (Austrian Silesia). I suspect that Russian intervention in Galicia would lead to Austria losing Hungary and Venetia, as well as Lombardy. Hungary would likely elect a Scandinavian, or British, prince as a monarch.

Prussian post war paramouncy in the German confederation might pass unchallenged, leading to a Prussian presidency, and a confederation which includes Prussia's portion of the Polish partition, and alots it more votes in the federal assembly (which was heavily weighted in favor of the smaller states until dissolution) and a Prussian dominated federal army which gradually comes to eclipse the state army. Still, the resulting federal structure is very, very, weak. Both Germany and Austria spent a smaller proportion of their national income on their millitary prior to WWI as compared to Russia and France and underutilized their manpower potential for political reasons stemming from the federal structures of each. I would suspect that a German confederation such as this would be even less prepared for war TTL, if something analogous broke out in the early 20th century and all else is equal. However, all else is not equal.

Prusso-French War in 1860?
First of all, it is possible that Prussian paramouncy IS challenged and that France (and possibly Russia) view their pre-war reassurances to Fredrick William as non-binding. If push comes to a shove and France ends up supporting the minor states against Prussia (WHich Napoleon III might, given greater success in Solofino and Prussia's presumed reluctance to pay him off with the left bank of the Rhine) then the millitary outcome of an earlier war, prior to the kicking in of the Prussian military reforms, in which the southern states (and Hanover and Saxony and Rump Austria) are fighting against Prussia, rather than with it would probably end in very limited Prussian gains in which they might gain Hannover but might be forced to cede the left Bank of the Rhine and forced to recognize a southern German confederation.

PanGerman-Russo-French war in 1864?
Alternatively, Bismark might be smart enough to head this off by using the Shelzig-Holstein dispute to pull off something similiar to what he did OTL- unifying German public opinion behind him and corraling the rulers with it. France alone will probably not intervene against in favor in Denmark under this scenario. Whether Russia does depends heavily on whether the Polish rebllion of 1863 takes place as OTL- if it does, Russia probably doesn't. If it does, then Bismark probably backs dows with some kind of Brith mediated face saving formula.

Franco-RumpAustro-Prussian war in 1866?
The most likely outcome of the war is that Bismark puts Schlzeig-Holstein under the rule of the federal assembly, rather than seeking to annex it to Prussia in order to provoke a war as he did OTL. If he does, than the whole issue is avoided and the confederation remains a loose, albeit economically and socially consolidating mishmash. If push comes to shove as OTL in 1866 in the post war manuvers between Bismark and Austria/minor states, then things look very different. I imagine France WOULD intervene against Prussia. But 1866, even if it is not 1870 is not 1860 either. France is unlikely to do very well against the reformed Prussian millitary and the minor German states and Rump-Austria. You would probably have a remaining southern block, but Prussia would probably keep the left Bank of the Rhine and annex Saxony (whose ruler might be compensated with Austrian Bohemia), as well as Hannover and Kessel.

A silly thing in the Balkans?
Either of these outcomes likely avoids Russian-Austrian conflict in the Balkans and the 1878 Austrian annexation of Bosnia. If the Circassian ethnic cleansing is averted this also likely delays the spontaneous Slavic rebellion against the Ottomans. It is most likely that war, when it comes, is a matter of Russia moving in to sweep the Ottomans away, and Prussia/North Germany, possibly in alliance with Piedmont, moving in to complete their national unification while those powers are otherwise engages, leaving France to oppose this. in all scenarios save the final (war in 1866)- and probably fail, since in absence of defeat in 1870, it is unlikely to reform it's army on the Prussian model. Russia is also likely to lose a drawn out water against the UK if it occurs prior to 1920 or so- the UK simply outproduces it too badly. There is no reason, however, to assume that the Franco-SouthGerman-Prussian and Russian-British-Ottoman conflict need be joined into the same war- it seems more likely that the victor in whichever conflict ends first (Prussia, possibly France if war was fought in 1866 an dlessons drawn), mediates a resolution of the other conflict.

1866-
If Russia actively enters into the Austro-Prussian war this occurs post the 1863 Polish rebellion. indeed, denying future rebels a home base in Galicia might be the reason for their entry. Hungary, in this scenario, is unlikely to break away unless Bismark fails to restrain Fredrick William. If he doesn't than a Franco-Prussian war in 1866 seems likely with a similiar outcome to that described above (Statues quo on the Rhine, Prussian annexation of Saxony and Hannover, consolidation of loose South German confederacy).

If he does restrain him, which seems more likely, then the pragmatic compromise likely unfolds as OTL, but Hungary has more power in the relationship and is probably able to gain greater budgets for the Honved. Assuming the Franco-Prussian war proceeds as OTL (which seems likely), that Austria occupies Bosnia in agreement with Russia in 1877, the question then arises as to whether Bismark would choose to support Britain and Austria in pushing minimizing Ottoman losses in 1878. I guess he probably would and that the gradual consolidation of rival Austro-German and Russo-French blocks occurs as OTL.

A related question is whether Russian involvement in 1866 poses enough of a menace to Austria so that Italy's performance in the war is less underwhelming, enabling them to claim Italia Irrendetia. If it does then Italy probably remains in the Austro-German camp.

FInally, the question is what touches off WWI. My guess is that Hungarian secession is more likely to touch it off than conflict with Serbia. 1906 was a very near thing.

Still, if all other things are equal and a war IS touched off around 1914 with Italy still clamoring for Italia Irendete, then the opening phases of WWI look very different. Whoever is holding the passes, Russia can probably play defense against Austria while focusing on Germany. Germany is likely to realize this, and opt to play defense against France while pushing RUssia to the Vistula or the Bug- which the Russian war plans OTL called for not contesting until mobilization was complete and the French assaulted the German Western front. Absent a Gorlice Tarnow Russia will be able to put up more of a fight in 1915 and 1916- but fewer Gemrans bogged down in the West means more Germans fighting in the East. Also, a common (German) command of the Easter front will be in place from the get go with Austria playing a second fiddle (and likely trouncing the Serbs earlier). ANd Britain is less likely to intervene, at least in 1914 and by land.

Expect a Russian collapse (but no Bolsheviks) earlier rather than later and a German protectorate/personal union in Poland and the Baltics accompanied by a staues quo agreement, in the West.

If Germany, in a brain dead move still pivots through Belgium then... well, it's screwed. It will face four, rather than two armies in the opening battles, and probably abandon Eastern prussia with it's grain surplus and manpower. The Russians aren;t marching on Berlin, and probably fail to make much of an incursion into Silesia. indeed, they are probably pushed back to the Vistula in 1915. But there is no Great Retreat and the Austro-Geermans face a siege which they probably lose in 1916.
 

raharris1973

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Would it have been plausible for Russia to declare war on Austria either during the Second Italian War of Independence (in 1859) or during the Austro-Prussian War (in 1866) with the purpose of acquiring Galicia?

This is an interesting what-if to think about. -

The first thing to consider and 1859 and 1866 is "Are the Russians guaranteed to easily win wherever they fight the Austrians and be able to claim the whole of Galicia". Most of the thread discussion so far has rested on this assumption. But what was the comparative quality of armaments, troop training, officership and the size or order of battle on both sides of the Austro-Russian border in 1859 and 1866. We should consider the possibility the Austrians might be able to throw back the Russians.

Also, is *all* Galicia necessarily the Russian objective? The Russians have several options of semi-historical territorial claims they could make against Austrian Galicia, and may feel they are easier to secure by fait accompli than a grand all-Galician conquest.

These options include:
a) The Tarnopol area, to to restore the Austro-Russian border to what it was after Tilsit. Should be easy to win and to get Austria to accept.
b) Old Rus Galicia (eastern, mainly Ukrainian Galicia). This requires more effort and is harder for Austrians to accept, it might be desirable to gather in the Ukrainians without gathering in all the Poles and Jews of western Galicia. Russia has a, quite distant, historical claim and a demographic one.
c) All Galicia - this is the most ambitious and is in part, naked conquest based on a specious "natural borders" argument at best.

Now, we could conceivably have a Russian invasion of Galicia at other times as well.

The main motive to do it in 1859 or 1866 is that Austria is tied down fighting someone else, but there's no real context or excuse for invading at those points.

However, Russian motivation to attack Austrian Galicia and excuse could be stronger in the summer of 1864 right during or after the June 64 suppression of the Polish Uprising.

Russia's justification to war with Austria and conquer Galicia could be Austria's comparatively lenient attitude toward the Polish rebels of 1863 and 1864 (a great contrast with Prussia's very pro-Russian stance, from the Alvensleben convention in early 1863 onward). The Russian argument could be that the Austrians have proven they cannot "handle" administering or controlling rebellious Poles, so Russia needs to directly intervene and take over Galicia.

Under these circumstances Austria is better able to resist; it is fighting the Schleswig war, but it is doubtful that is tying down the amount of Austrian resources that the 1859 wars with France and Piedmont and the 1866 war with Prussia tied down. Austrian "aggression" on Denmark could be an additional excuse.

Austria was allied with Prussia and other German states at the time, for the purposes of the Schleswig War against Denmark, but Russia would no doubt be careful to not declare war on Prussia or any other German state save Austria. Bismarck and probably the Prussian King would see no benefit to their state in aiding Austria against Russia either.
 

raharris1973

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Would it have been plausible for Russia to declare war on Austria either during the Second Italian War of Independence (in 1859) or during the Austro-Prussian War (in 1866) with the purpose of acquiring Galicia?

I would not go so far as to call this scenario ASB [I think that term is overused and should be reserved for things violating the laws of physics], but it does seem unlikely, random and contrived.

Invading Austrian Galicia in 1859 or 1866 would lack the specific context that justified Russia's other wars with the Ottomans in 1853 and 1876.

In 1853 Russia had its "right to protect Christians and Christian Holy Places" in the Ottoman Empire to defend and assert.

In 1876 it was helping Slavic Orthodox Christians who had suffered massacres by the Muslim Ottoman Turks, an emotional appeal and a humanitarian excuse.

In contrast, in 1859 and 1869, indeed any other time in the 19th century, these elements were lacking in Galicia:
-There was no native separatist movement to aid.
-There were no Austrian massacres of Galicians to stop or avenge.
-While the Polish and Ruthenian population was Slavic, they were not fellow Eastern Orthodox Christians ruled by Muslims, rather they were Roman Catholics and Uniate ruled by other Roman Catholics and were not complaining much about it.

This leaves the justification as purely to punish Austrian "betrayal" in the Crimean War.
This is still a bit problematic as a justification, at least for war against Austria in 1859, because while punishing Austrian "betrayal" Russia would be de facto allying with France and Sardinia, both of whom invaded the soil of the motherland earlier in the same decade during the Crimean War!

If you are looking to have a war of Russian aggression in Europe between the end of the Crimean War (1856) and the beginning of the Russo-Turkish War (1876), the Danubian Principalities/Romania are a much better place to look for it than Galicia, IMHO.

Russia has a nationalistically justifiable excuse, reclaiming the 1812 border on the Danube they had been forced to retreat from after the Crimean War. Moldavia or later Romania have no hope of resisting the Russians without outside great power aid. In OTL the Russians waited until the 1870s war when they were able to soften the blow to the Romanians of taking this territory back by "compensating" Romania with Dobruja.

It is easy to imagine Russia instead not waiting this long and reclaiming southern bessarabia without providing compensation at any point post-Crimean War when they feel they could get away with it.

With Austria busy in 1859, 1864 and 1866, or even Prussia and France busy in 1870-71, that's the ideal time to make a move on southern Bessarabia. If the Russians wish they can probably get away with going further, invading and annexing all of Moldavia, or even Wallachia as well.
 
Last edited:

CaliGuy

Banned
This is an interesting what-if to think about. -

The first thing to consider and 1859 and 1866 is "Are the Russians guaranteed to easily win wherever they fight the Austrians and be able to claim the whole of Galicia". Most of the thread discussion so far has rested on this assumption. But what was the comparative quality of armaments, troop training, officership and the size or order of battle on both sides of the Austro-Russian border in 1859 and 1866. We should consider the possibility the Austrians might be able to throw back the Russians.

Also, is *all* Galicia necessarily the Russian objective? The Russians have several options of semi-historical territorial claims they could make against Austrian Galicia, and may feel they are easier to secure by fait accompli than a grand all-Galician conquest.

These options include:
a) The Tarnopol area, to to restore the Austro-Russian border to what it was after Tilsit. Should be easy to win and to get Austria to accept.
b) Old Rus Galicia (eastern, mainly Ukrainian Galicia). This requires more effort and is harder for Austrians to accept, it might be desirable to gather in the Ukrainians without gathering in all the Poles and Jews of western Galicia. Russia has a, quite distant, historical claim and a demographic one.
c) All Galicia - this is the most ambitious and is in part, naked conquest based on a specious "natural borders" argument at best.

The Russian objective should at least be B. Basically, the main goal for Russia should be to put the Ukrainians (minus the Rusyns, for the time being) in Austria under its own rule. Indeed, anything else would merely be a bonus.

Basically, the utmost Russian objective is to strangle Ukrainian nationalism in its cradle. After all, this would certainly help in reducing Ukrainian separatism in Russia proper later on. (Plus, it might gradually result in the Russification of large numbers of Ukrainians.)

Now, we could conceivably have a Russian invasion of Galicia at other times as well.

The main motive to do it in 1859 or 1866 is that Austria is tied down fighting someone else, but there's no real context or excuse for invading at those points.

However, Russian motivation to attack Austrian Galicia and excuse could be stronger in the summer of 1864 right during or after the June 64 suppression of the Polish Uprising.

Russia's justification to war with Austria and conquer Galicia could be Austria's comparatively lenient attitude toward the Polish rebels of 1863 and 1864 (a great contrast with Prussia's very pro-Russian stance, from the Alvensleben convention in early 1863 onward). The Russian argument could be that the Austrians have proven they cannot "handle" administering or controlling rebellious Poles, so Russia needs to directly intervene and take over Galicia.

Under these circumstances Austria is better able to resist; it is fighting the Schleswig war, but it is doubtful that is tying down the amount of Austrian resources that the 1859 wars with France and Piedmont and the 1866 war with Prussia tied down. Austrian "aggression" on Denmark could be an additional excuse.

Austria was allied with Prussia and other German states at the time, for the purposes of the Schleswig War against Denmark, but Russia would no doubt be careful to not declare war on Prussia or any other German state save Austria. Bismarck and probably the Prussian King would see no benefit to their state in aiding Austria against Russia either.

Thanks for all of this information. Thus, let's have Russia attack Austrian Galicia in the summer of 1864 and aim for the Ukrainian-majority parts of Galicia--with anything else merely being a bonus.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
I would not go so far as to call this scenario ASB [I think that term is overused and should be reserved for things violating the laws of physics], but it does seem unlikely, random and contrived.

Invading Austrian Galicia in 1859 or 1866 would lack the specific context that justified Russia's other wars with the Ottomans in 1853 and 1876.

In 1853 Russia had its "right to protect Christians and Christian Holy Places" in the Ottoman Empire to defend and assert.

In 1876 it was helping Slavic Orthodox Christians who had suffered massacres by the Muslim Ottoman Turks, an emotional appeal and a humanitarian excuse.

In contrast, in 1859 and 1869, indeed any other time in the 19th century, these elements were lacking in Galicia:
-There was no native separatist movement to aid.
-There were no Austrian massacres of Galicians to stop or avenge.
-While the Polish and Ruthenian population was Slavic, they were not fellow Eastern Orthodox Christians ruled by Muslims, rather they were Roman Catholics and Uniate ruled by other Roman Catholics and were not complaining much about it.

This leaves the justification as purely to punish Austrian "betrayal" in the Crimean War.
This is still a bit problematic as a justification, at least for war against Austria in 1859, because while punishing Austrian "betrayal" Russia would be de facto allying with France and Sardinia, both of whom invaded the soil of the motherland earlier in the same decade during the Crimean War!

Fair points. However, what about having Russia create a separatist movement in Galicia--even a small one--out of scratch? After all, Russia managed to do this in the Donbass in 2014 in our TL; thus, why not in the 1860s in this TL?

If you are looking to have a war of Russian aggression in Europe between the end of the Crimean War (1856) and the beginning of the Russo-Turkish War (1876), the Danubian Principalities/Romania are a much better place to look for it than Galicia, IMHO.

Russia has a nationalistically justifiable excuse, reclaiming the 1812 border on the Danube they had been forced to retreat from after the Crimean War. Moldavia or later Romania have no hope of resisting the Russians without outside great power aid. In OTL the Russians waited until the 1870s war when they were able to soften the blow to the Romanians of taking this territory back by "compensating" Romania with Dobruja.

It is easy to imagine Russia instead not waiting this long and reclaiming southern bessarabia without providing compensation at any point post-Crimean War when they feel they could get away with it.

With Austria busy in 1859, 1864 and 1866, or even Prussia and France busy in 1870-71, that's the ideal time to make a move on southern Bessarabia. If the Russians wish they can probably get away with going further, invading and annexing all of Moldavia, or even Wallachia as well.

Going for all of Moldavia would certainly be interesting. However, invading and annexing Wallachia would create a Russian salient--something that Russia would loathe to do, no?
 
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