PC/WI: A Russian grab of Galicia in 1859/1866?

CaliGuy

Banned
Would it have been plausible for Russia to declare war on Austria either during the Second Italian War of Independence (in 1859) or during the Austro-Prussian War (in 1866) with the purpose of acquiring Galicia?

Basically, a Russian grab of Galicia would eliminate a source of territorial dispute between Russia and Austria (thus making a future Russo-Austrian alliance at least a little more likely) and would also punish Austria for its neutrality during the Crimean War.

Also, if this would have been plausible, what exactly would the consequences of this have been? For instance, how would Ukrainian nationalism have developed in this TL?
 
I think that at that point, the three partitioners of Poland were still quite happy with their informal agreement that Poland should be split and kept off the map, thus I doubt either of them would want to get more Polish lands. Also, here's the thing - at this point Russia was just out of the Crimean War, weakened and having made enemies with quite a few other powers. It wouldn't want to risk being the aggressor just a few years later, would it? In 1859, they weren't yet on very good terms with France - they were pretty isolated diplomatically speaking, actually. If Prussia decides that it is wary of Russian panslavic ambitions and backs up Austria with military force, then Russia is getting shafted. Or even if the Ottomans or the British join (or both). Essentially it'd be like Russia breaking the peace treaty established just a couple years before.

Russian-Austrian enmity had nothing to do with Galicia, as Russia wasn't Poland, and didn't claim any Polish-inhabited territories on an ethnic basis. Their rivalry had everything to do with the Crimean War and the subsequent fight for influence over the Balkans - with Russia trying to worm its way towards Constantinople and Austria trying to prop up the Ottomans and contain Russian influence.

Russia might be militarily able to snatch Galicia in 1866, but after the January Uprising, I doubt Russia would want even more rebellious Poles. (And once again, there would be no valid reason for a casus belli.) At any rate, with Galicia-Lodomeria being a core Austrian territory, it would lead to an even quicker German-Austrian reconciliation, with Austria doing its very best to reclaim Galicia with German backing, forcing Russia to defend its impoverished and ravaged hotbed of dissent against the German states and subsequently lose influence in Central Asia against Britain. Since Russia is an autocracy at this point, technically the incumbent monarch could go ahead anyway, but all of his advisors would be going "no no no wtf are you doing?" and it's rather unlikely altogether.

Basically, a Russian grab of Galicia would eliminate a source of territorial dispute between Russia and Austria

This doesn't even make sense anyway. It wouldn't eliminate the territorial dispute (if we assume that Russia ever seriously desired the area to begin with), it'd inflame it, with Austria now motivated by revanchism to reclaim the area. In fact, with little Russian interest in the region (no doubt they'd have taken the land if they had gotten into a major war with Austria for some other reason and won, e.g. if WWI had gone super-well for Russia, but I don't think they were actively looking to start a war for the land), the tension would only increase.

Ignoring everything else, Galicia-Lodomeria belonging to Russia would make Polish and Ukrainian nationalism more of a threat as their respective nationalist organizations would now be able to coordinate their efforts within a single country, with fewer borders to split them up.
 
Ignoring everything else, Galicia-Lodomeria belonging to Russia would make Polish and Ukrainian nationalism more of a threat as their respective nationalist organizations would now be able to coordinate their efforts within a single country, with fewer borders to split them up.
I agree with most of your post, but not with this. Russia controlling Galicia would actually enable it to clamp down harder with its Russification efforts because these ethnic groups wouldn't have an open place to organize in and promote their culture like they did in Habsburg Galicia.


Though Russian possession of Galicia might actually cow Austria into being less hostile as a Russia sitting on the Carpathians is an opponent that they really cannot handle.
 
I agree with most of your post, but not with this. Russia controlling Galicia would actually enable it to clamp down harder with its Russification efforts because these ethnic groups wouldn't have an open place to organize in and promote their culture like they did in Habsburg Galicia.


Though Russian possession of Galicia might actually cow Austria into being less hostile as a Russia sitting on the Carpathians is an opponent that they really cannot handle.

... or it causes them to go running to Britain and France for the sake of maintaining some semblance of balance of power on the Continent. The rest of Europe was already very touchy about Russian expansionist tendencies during this period, and St.Petersburg can't stand up very well if they decide to push back.
 
... or it causes them to go running to Britain and France for the sake of maintaining some semblance of balance of power on the Continent. The rest of Europe was already very touchy about Russian expansionist tendencies during this period, and St.Petersburg can't stand up very well if they decide to push back.
Britain and France can't actually protect them very well, even if they are willing to do so (though why would France post-Franco-Prussian war have such an interest?). Austria will have to deal with the fact that if there there is a war with Russia and they break out into the Hungarian plains, their empire may very well be over and no maritime power could stop that. It'll make them even more dependent on Germany. Aggressive revanchism against Russia won't be in the cards.
 
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Britain and France can't actually protect them very well, even if they are willing to do so (though why would France post-Franco-Prussian war have such an interest?). Austria will have to deal with the fact that if there there is a war with Russia and they break out into the Hungarian plains, their empire may very well be over and no maritime power could stop that. It'll make them even more dependent on Germany.

One, a 1859 claim could very well butterfly German Unification to a certain extent. After all, if Russia wants to keep Austria under her thumb the last thing she needs is a new superpower ploping down right on her borders with a cultural and political drive to pry her prize out from under her, causing her to push back against the process.

Two, if Austria does aquese then the rest of Europe sees her as a tool of Russia and that nation's attempt to break a balance of power. In that case, I can see Britian and France throwing more weight behind the Ottomans, supporting Italian unification (and breaking parts off the threatening Great Power Russia's toady)... basically making Austria's international position even weaker. Hell, if ethnic tensions break out maybe even trying to pull a Congress of Berlin-esque situation to try to partially partition the Empire. The actions of Austria do not exist in an international vacuum
 
One, a 1859 claim could very well butterfly German Unification to a certain extent. After all, if Russia wants to keep Austria under her thumb the last thing she needs is a new superpower ploping down right on her borders with a cultural and political drive to pry her prize out from under her, causing her to push back against the process.
I was thinking mainly of a 1866 POD there, but yes 1859 could butterfly many things. I don't know that it extends to Russia intervening into Prussia's wars when Prussia is the friendliest power in Europe to Russia at this point.
Two, if Austria does aquese then the rest of Europe sees her as a tool of Russia and that nation's attempt to break a balance of power. In that case, I can see Britian and France throwing more weight behind the Ottomans, supporting Italian unification (and breaking parts off the threatening Great Power Russia's toady)... basically making Austria's international position even weaker. Hell, if ethnic tensions break out maybe even trying to pull a Congress of Berlin-esque situation to try to partially partition the Empire. The actions of Austria do not exist in an international vacuum
Now this doesn't really fit how any of these powers acted in this era. Britain in her splendid isolation thinks Austria isn't a firm enough opponent to Russia and so seeks to break apart its empire in a way that would only benefit Russia?
 
@yboxman had started a good TL on this premise a while ago, but that's been on hiatus for a long time.
It turns out that Russia actually considered joining France against Austria in 1859, which would have likely ended in Russia annexing Galicia and possibly in a complete breakup of Austria (Hungary would probably try to go its own way in this context).
 
Russia could probably take it either time. In both cases she would have allies (1859 France and Piedmont) and 1866 Prussia and Italy. In 1859, Prussia might intervene but that's doubtful an in 1866 France might but if she does, it will be against Prussia not Russia Russia could then take even more of Austria. Britain would not have time to intervene

If they take it in 1866, they could grab Hungary during the Franco-Prussian War

Alexander II missed s many golden opportunities. If he'd played his cards right, he could have had all of Eastern Europe
 
Russia was secretly pledged to join on the side of the Germans in 1870 if Austria intervened in the war against France, so there's a possibility that a Russian Army of Poland could take Galicia then, while German armies redeploy out of France and into Saxony or Bavaria. From there, the future would depend if the Germans prioritize Austrian interests in the Balkans as per OTL, or if they give the Russians a free hand there to keep France isolated from strong allies, and push the weak ally towards them.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
I think that at that point, the three partitioners of Poland were still quite happy with their informal agreement that Poland should be split and kept off the map, thus I doubt either of them would want to get more Polish lands. Also, here's the thing - at this point Russia was just out of the Crimean War, weakened and having made enemies with quite a few other powers. It wouldn't want to risk being the aggressor just a few years later, would it? In 1859, they weren't yet on very good terms with France - they were pretty isolated diplomatically speaking, actually. If Prussia decides that it is wary of Russian panslavic ambitions and backs up Austria with military force, then Russia is getting shafted. Or even if the Ottomans or the British join (or both). Essentially it'd be like Russia breaking the peace treaty established just a couple years before.

Would Prussia actually want to fight Russia over Galicia, though?

Russian-Austrian enmity had nothing to do with Galicia, as Russia wasn't Poland, and didn't claim any Polish-inhabited territories on an ethnic basis. Their rivalry had everything to do with the Crimean War and the subsequent fight for influence over the Balkans - with Russia trying to worm its way towards Constantinople and Austria trying to prop up the Ottomans and contain Russian influence.

Actually, I was talking about Galicia's Ukrainian population rather than about Galicia's Polish population here.

Russia might be militarily able to snatch Galicia in 1866, but after the January Uprising, I doubt Russia would want even more rebellious Poles. (And once again, there would be no valid reason for a casus belli.)

What about coming up with some casus belli? For instance, having Russia send a couple of agitators into Galicia only for Austria to assert them afterwards.

At any rate, with Galicia-Lodomeria being a core Austrian territory, it would lead to an even quicker German-Austrian reconciliation, with Austria doing its very best to reclaim Galicia with German backing, forcing Russia to defend its impoverished and ravaged hotbed of dissent against the German states and subsequently lose influence in Central Asia against Britain. Since Russia is an autocracy at this point, technically the incumbent monarch could go ahead anyway, but all of his advisors would be going "no no no wtf are you doing?" and it's rather unlikely altogether.

Would Germany really want to spark a war with Russia over Galicia, though? Indeed, please keep in mind that Austria doesn't appear to have wanted to reclaim Milan and Venice after it lost those territories to Piedmont-Sardinia/Italy.

This doesn't even make sense anyway. It wouldn't eliminate the territorial dispute (if we assume that Russia ever seriously desired the area to begin with), it'd inflame it, with Austria now motivated by revanchism to reclaim the area. In fact, with little Russian interest in the region (no doubt they'd have taken the land if they had gotten into a major war with Austria for some other reason and won, e.g. if WWI had gone super-well for Russia, but I don't think they were actively looking to start a war for the land), the tension would only increase.

Couldn't Austria simply get over the loss of Galicia like it did with Milan and Venice, though?

Ignoring everything else, Galicia-Lodomeria belonging to Russia would make Polish and Ukrainian nationalism more of a threat as their respective nationalist organizations would now be able to coordinate their efforts within a single country, with fewer borders to split them up.

You appear to be forgetting the fact that having more Polish and Ukrainian people under its rule would give Russia a greater opportunity to crack down on both Polish and Ukrainian nationalism, though. After all, as far as I know, Austria was both prettty pro-Polish and pretty pro-Ukrainian during this time.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
I agree with most of your post, but not with this. Russia controlling Galicia would actually enable it to clamp down harder with its Russification efforts because these ethnic groups wouldn't have an open place to organize in and promote their culture like they did in Habsburg Galicia.

Completely agreed; after all, wasn't Austria pretty pro-Ukrainian (and pro-Polish as well)?

Though Russian possession of Galicia might actually cow Austria into being less hostile as a Russia sitting on the Carpathians is an opponent that they really cannot handle.

Yes, that--and/or it could cause Austria to become even more dependent on Germany for its protection.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
The bonus for Russia in gaining Galicia is strictly ethnographic and historic, regaining some lands of medieval Rus and gathering in "Little Russians". Strategically and economically, it's no great prize.
 
The bonus for Russia in gaining Galicia is strictly ethnographic and historic, regaining some lands of medieval Rus and gathering in "Little Russians". Strategically and economically, it's no great prize.
Galicia's got the most oil in all of Europe. 4th in the world by 1900. Wouldn't have even taken that long to get use of it, seeing as development started on it in the 1880s. Plus it cripples any potential Austro-German alliance since it means no domestic oil production for either German power. There's also the border at the Carpathians, preventing the Ukrainians from organizing as effectively in their nationalist movement, being able to encourage Pan-Slavism (not just ethnographic since it helps to prevent separatism later on)...

It's rather useful economically and a bit strategically, I'd say.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
Galicia's got the most oil in all of Europe. 4th in the world by 1900. Wouldn't have even taken that long to get use of it, seeing as development started on it in the 1880s. Plus it cripples any potential Austro-German alliance since it means no domestic oil production for either German power. There's also the border at the Carpathians, preventing the Ukrainians from organizing as effectively in their nationalist movement, being able to encourage Pan-Slavism (not just ethnographic since it helps to prevent separatism later on)...

How useful from an 1859 or 1866 perspective though? Most industrial applications for petroleum (or "rock oil" as it was sometimes called) have not been invented yet and its 20th century value would not have been anticipated in the 1850s or 1860s. Nor did St. Petersburg at the time anticipate how troublesome Ukrainian nationalism could become by the 20th century. You do make a strong argument when we allow hindsight into it, though.
 
The bonus for Russia in gaining Galicia is strictly ethnographic and historic, regaining some lands of medieval Rus and gathering in "Little Russians". Strategically and economically, it's no great prize.

Gaalica had about a fifth of Austria's population and the Carparthians would form a solid defense line. It would also give Russian Poland strategic depth- there would be no risk of a pincer attack cutting the salient. Russia could threaten the heart of Germany and East Prussia would be too exposed to risk any troops there. Effectively, Russia would gain about a 200 mile buffer zone
 
Gaalica had about a fifth of Austria's population and the Carparthians would form a solid defense line. It would also give Russian Poland strategic depth- there would be no risk of a pincer attack cutting the salient. Russia could threaten the heart of Germany and East Prussia would be too exposed to risk any troops there. Effectively, Russia would gain about a 200 mile buffer zone
Not to mention, access to the Carpathians puts them in a great position to break onto the Hungarian plains, and possibly force the Hungarians into a separate peace or otherwise the collapse of the Dual Monarchy. Very useful in case they have to put the screws to the Austrians later.
 
Not to mention, access to the Carpathians puts them in a great position to break onto the Hungarian plains, and possibly force the Hungarians into a separate peace or otherwise the collapse of the Dual Monarchy. Very useful in case they have to put the screws to the Austrians later.
It also puts them in a great position to threaten Bohemia or Silesia, economic heartlands of its western neighbors.

The strategic advantages of acquiring Galicia are actually quite notable, saying it would be no prize is not correct.
 
Austria would have a very defendable border with the Carpathians and even more so if he fortifies it. It looses a lot of national minorities so the Austrian pairlament is more managable. Galicia was also the poorest part of the Empire. In the end I think Austria might be better off without it.
 
How useful from an 1859 or 1866 perspective though? Most industrial applications for petroleum (or "rock oil" as it was sometimes called) have not been invented yet and its 20th century value would not have been anticipated in the 1850s or 1860s. Nor did St. Petersburg at the time anticipate how troublesome Ukrainian nationalism could become by the 20th century. You do make a strong argument when we allow hindsight into it, though.
There were oil booms even back in the 1860s (Pennsylvania had theirs from 1859 to the 1870s so well within the era) and massive price spikes comparable to the price of oil in the OPEC embargo days and the present. They were producing lubricants (important for industry) and kerosene (replacing whale oil for lighting) so it was fairly lucrative even at the time (Russia's oil production in Baku started in the 1860s so oil was starting to grow in importance in the era). It's not quite as vital as it would be in the World War era but still quite lucrative in the 1860s (1870s and on would see Rockefeller become the world's richest man through Standard Oil, after all).

Nationalism was hindsight, granted, but I took "Strategically and economically, it's no great prize" to be more of an absolute than a historical perspective claim.

But the strategic positioning, with how much more secure Russia's western border would be, is the real prize here.

Austria would have a very defendable border with the Carpathians and even more so if he fortifies it. It looses a lot of national minorities so the Austrian pairlament is more managable. Galicia was also the poorest part of the Empire. In the end I think Austria might be better off without it.
For that period. Long term, the oil was invaluable in warfare due to the use of motorized vehicles. The 1.1 million tons produced in Galicia would've bumped Russia's total up by over 10%, from 9.2 million to 10.3 million, but most importantly denies the Germanic powers any domestic sources of oil, which cripples a war effort in the 20th century.

And, as said above, Russian Galicia goes both ways, as now Russian Poland is far more defensible due to pincer attacks no longer being viable. The Russians did capture several passes in the Carpathians during WWI and being on the direct border from the start would help any offensive or at least allow the Russians to dedicate more troops to the more vulnerable Russo-German border. If the Carpathians fall, the Hungarian Plains go and that means Austria-Hungary is out of any war.

Loss of manpower is a bit problematic too since Galicia-Lodomeria had over 8 million of Austria-Hungary's 50 million and a fair amount of its armed force hailed from there. Losing it wouldn't have helped ethnic relations all too much seeing as that was administered by the Austrians, not the Hungarians (who were a bit more adverse to sharing power). German jumps to 28% of the population but still is barely a plurality.

Initially, I agree that losing Galicia wouldn't be all that adverse. It's just later that it might come back to haunt the Austrians.
 
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