Is it possible for the Qarmatian state in Arabia, which lasted from the late 9th till the late 10th centuries, to linger for a bit longer?
From what i can discern of them, they were an apocalyptic, very radical Shia Muslim sect, who were bent on avenging Ali's death no matter the cost. Their most famous atrocity was the Sack of Mecca (circa 930 AD), in which they desecrated holy sites and massacred large crowds of pilgrims. They even managed to steal the Qaaba (some Ocean's Eleven style shit, if less subtle) and hold it for a large ransom, eventually paid for by the Abbasid caliph. Their center of power was in eastern Arabia and far southern Iraq.
So, how can the Qarmatians, despite their infamous status, estabilish a more lasting state?
And what would be the effects of a longer-lasting Qarmatian state?
 
Last edited:
It is certainly possible for the Qarmatians to form several long lasting states if certain events and wars go in their favor. However, in any case, I do not see a totally united Qarmatian state, more so, various alliances of different Qarmatian groups. Most especially, there would become distinctions between the eastern and western versions of the Qarmatians and there would be inevitable splits regarding the rising Fatimid state.

As you did not place a pod in your post, I will assume that you refer to the otl timeline up until their defeats suffered primarily during the regime of al-Muktafi.

To begin, the Qarmatians we assume are a very old group that existed in Eastern Arabia in the Bahrayn and Ahsa region prior to the Zanj rebellion and Anarchy of Samarra. There is several reasons for this opinion of mine and many scholars; Muhammad ibn Ja'far al-Sadiq al-Dibaj, a revolutionary Shi'i Alid from the region of Arabia who had claimed to be Mahdi and rebelled against the Abbasid in Mecca some 50 years prior to the Zanj Revolt. His death, was followed by a group known as the Shumaytiyya or the followers of the Shumayt, those who in their zeal, declared al-Dibaj a deity and maintained power in much of the region of Ahsa and Nejd. There were several rebellions mentioned by chronicles fro the 840s and 850s, mentioning Arab uprisings in the Nejd, Ahsa and Bahrayn, which seemingly crushed the rebels in war. These rebellions, in my interpretation may have been connected to the Shumaytiyya and as we know, were later connected to both the Zanj and Qarmatian rebellions, as in both cases, Arab Bedouin would form major and critical supporters for both of these groups, neither of which differed terribly from each other. The other evidence that I bring forward regarding this issue, is the life of Muhammad ibn Ali al-Dibaj, the Sahib al-Zanj or the master/leader of the Zanj revolt; in his life, we see the journey of a character in Islamic history that is constantly appearing in our chronicles of this period. A person of deep convictions and a will to start some form of rebellion using comrades and claiming to be either an incarnation of the Mahdi or some sort of Shurha/Khawairj narrative. Regardless, in his journey to ferment a rebellion, his path began in Ahsa and Bahrayn, wherein he attempted to gain an alliance or following among the Shi'i of the region; there he claimed ot be the awaited Shumayt, al-Dibaj and the reincarnation of the dead Mahdi previously killed by the Abbasid and buried later in Iran. The Shi'i whom Sahib al-Zanj would attempt to gain following with, from my opinion and that of many who are interested in this field, was none other than what would become the Qarmatians, a populated group of Shi'i refugees of diverse stock who had fled from other parts of Arabia and Iran in the wake of failed revolts and persecution levied against Shi'i during the Mihna, which in its persecution, specifically sought the Batiniyyah (today, are primarily of the Ismaili, Nizari or Alevi sects) form of Shi'i with which the Qarmatians were a part of.

The reason for this particular insistence on the persecution of the Batiniyyah, was that the Batiniyyah as a Shi'i group, are distinct in their views that there is hidden meanings in texts, or Batin. At the zenith of the Mihna, the Abbasid court was dominated by the Mu'Tazila intelligentsia, whose primary opinions included that, one could reason divinity, that the Quran is a created text and that the text is clear for man, there is no hidden meanings except what is spoken therein. Thus, one can imagine the extents to which groups like the Batiniyyah became enemies of the Mu'Tazila elite, such that all Shi'i pilgrimage was banned in Iraq and Karbala's shrines closed. Within this zeitgeist, famed individuals such as Yahya ibn Umar rose in revolt, and was killed by the Abbasid authorities, inspiring the Zanj rebellion and giving mythical inspiration to the Qarmatians. In fact, this character would provide a certain mythos for much of the Shi'i and Shurha rebellions of the later Abbasid period, more so than even the Shumayt, mainly due to his heroic character, skill as a warrior and his death due to betrayal, mimicking the death and tragedy of Husayn ibn Ali abi Talib.

Despite these, the Sahib al-Zanj would be rejected by this group in Ahsa and forced out by mobs who rejected that he was an incarnation of any Mahdi. However, he was followed by a group of supporters from among the Arab tribes in the area and proceeded. There, he garnered support among more and more Shi'i within the Nejd who joined him in his journey to Iraq. As his rebellion progressed within the Sawad of Iraq, it becomes apparent to any studious individual, that the most important supporters of the Zanj rebels were not necessarily the slaves, but the Arab Bedouin, who connected the rebel state to trade networks in Arabia and provided a constant flow of equipment and warriors to join the rebellion. Such was this connection, that Arabs in connection with the Zanj conquered Makkah and Madinah at the height of the Zanj revolt and began doing the prayers in favor of the Zanj and cursing the Abbasid oppressors.

Within this scene, is where the Qarmatians began, in the wake of the Zanj rebellion and its collapse in 883, after the year long siege of the Zanj capital of al-Mukhtara. One can imagine a large number of warriors who did not surrender to the Abbasid authorities in Iraq, moving southward, providing the now growing Qarmatian groups with experienced warriors. Further, Arabs who had provided the pivotal goods and weapons to the Zanj which made the Zanj rebels unlike any other during the Abbasid Caliphate, not easily forgetting their previous ways and resenting the Abbasid even more. With these two factors, the Qarmatians certainly gained a boon of potential military power against a somewhat resurgent, yet somewhat fatigued Abbasid hegemony. It is no wonder that the Qarmatians would come to deal such large amounts of damage and form a light hegemony over the Mideast region.

During the course of the Qarmatian period, the Qarmatians were split into three groups, all interlinked, yet somewhat each distinct. The first was the traditional Qarmatian powers in the Ahsa region, led by Abu-Sayed al-Jannabi and afterwords, Abu-Tahr al-Jannabi. These would be the primary grouping and most orthodox in their system. They would also lead the invasion of Iraq and the conquest and sacking of the Hijaz region. However, one could say, despite not distinct in leadership, the Iraqi Qarmatians would have separated into distinct Qarmatian groups made up of former rebels from the Zanj revolt and advocating ideals previously held in that rebellion, more so than the apocalyptic vision of the Qarmatians. The other group holding the moniker of the Qarmatian and loosely linked to the Qarmatians, were the Syrian faction. This Syrian faction is famed for fighting in a three way war of sorts between the Tulunids and the Abbasid over the Sham region. Led by two brothers who claimed to prophets and incarnations of earlier Imams, these two brothers, Yahya ibn Zikrawayh or Sahib al-Naqa (lord of the she-camel) who could supposedly control camels and al-Husyan ibn Zikrawayh or Sahib al-Shama (lord of the mole), who had a large birthmark and mole on his face, which he claimed was a sign of his prophethood. Their front of the Qarmatian conflict was successful in pushing the Tulunids out of of much of central Syria and decisively defeating the Abbasids at Palmyra (their base of operations) and later, the brothers defeated the Abbasid at Raqqa, sacking the city and taking the loot to Palmyra. Their defeats began when their victory against the Abbasid came to lead them to attempt an invasion southward into the deeper sections of the Tulunid realm. Despite early success against the Tulunid, the Qarmatians suffered a brutal victory near Damascus, despite the victory against the Tulunids, the Qarmatians suffered the death of their leader Sahib al-Naqa and a large portion of their army and their siege of Damascus failed and their retreat began. al-Husayn ibn Zikrawayh was then defeated once more soon after by the Abbasids near Homs and his army routed in confusion. In his route, he attempted to flee to Dilayah, but was captured by the locals and shipped to Baghdad, where he was cut to pieces and his head displayed in public.

On the eastern Qarmatian front, the victories occurred at similar times to the Syrian victories. Abu-Sayed al-Jannabi defeating the Abbasid in the region of Kuwayt and forging an Arabia state on the eastern section of the peninsula and controlling lands in the Nejd until it reached Palmyra, the territory of the aligned Zikrawayh brothers. His successor, Tahr al-Jannabi, would see massive growth in the Qarmatian powerbase. Most especially, in the 926 invasion of Iraq, which would last for 3 years of Qarmatian rule and hegemony in the lower Tigris-Euphrates region. 926, the Qarmatians captured and sacked the ruins of Basra (long devastated by the Zanj), soon after, the Qarmatians extended control over Karbala, Najaf and Kufa, then in 928, besieged the outskirts of Baghdad before retreating due to supply line issues presumably. Then after the Iraqi invasion, the Qarmatians in 930, extended control over the Hijaz, famously dismantling the Kaaba and carrying it to their base and stuffing the bodies of pilgrims into the wells of Makkah and Madinah.

Following the rule of Tahr al-Jannabi (died in 944), the Qarmatians would further extend their power over the Omani desert, Majan, Masqat and toward Yemen. Their zenith was thus in the 950s, where they accepted tributes from the Abbasid Caliphate and from their supposed ally, the Fatimids in Egypt. In fact, the relation between the Qarmatians and the Fatimids was one of outward friendship and alliance, but deeper hatred between the two. The Fatimids tolerating the Qarmatians as allies against the Abbasids and other eastern enemies, but also blasphemous upstarts who rejected their Imam (the Fatimids claimed their founder Abdallah al-Mahdi Billah was an Imam from among the Ahl ul-Bayt [family of Ali ibn abi Talib]) and ought to respect their superiors. Qarmatians on the otherhand, recognized the Fatimids as a powerful force that was more amiable to them than others, but also heretical and decadent, not worthy of the title of Shi'i.

Later the Qarmatians would face sharp declines by the 970s and in 976, their power had mostly disappeared outside Bahrayn and localities in Ahsa, where they persisted to be the primary force until the 1080s. However, the power the Qarmatians had long asserted over the south of Iraq, would make possible the difficulties the Buyyids would face in controlling the region, against the Batihah al-Sawad state led by criminals in the swamplands, controlling the region of the lower Iraq not unlike the way pirates ruled islands in the Caribbean.

Now for assessing the possibilities of the Qarmatian victory, wank or survival. On could imagine the regime of al-Muktafi having much less success in its campaigns against the Zikrawayh faction of the Qarmatians in Syria. Also, more importantly, the Qarmatians in Syria do not suffer their devastating battle in Damascus and instead are able to gain a similar victory there and fully push the Tulunids out of Syria and begin to cement control over the region of Syria south of Aleppo. The obvious result, would be the formation of a Syrian Qarmatian state based out of Palmyra with rough control of most of central and southern Syria and begin extending toward the Tulunids sparse holdings in Palestine and bordering the receding Abbasid power and their vassals in northern Syria, Anatolia and Lebanese coast. If this victorious string of events occurred in Syria and the Qarmatian state in Syria cemented its power in say, year 910-915, the Jannabite faction in Ahsa-Bahrayn could have coordinated further invasions of Iraq and by 930, you have two powerful Qarmatian states dominating a large portion of the Mid East, a weakened Abbasid power , rising Fatimid power in Egypt and the Byzantines to the north, who will certainly attempt to challenge the Qarmatians in Syria.

What this means and how this transpires, is up to the writer, I can give some opinions certainly if asked. I await questions, suggestions and speculation.
 
Last edited:
Very well typed, Jonny :)

So, i want to ask... considering such a situation in which both Baghdad and Syria have been overrun by the Qarmatian rebels, where are the Abbasids most likely to flee to? Persia?
Protecting the Abbasid Caliph might as well increase the Samanids' prestige and soft power.
Plus, what would be the Qarmatian religious policy towards the dhimmis in their newly-conquered lands? Do we have any proper OTL records on how the Qarmatians treated them?
 
@Aviennca's Pupil The Hamdanids gained power in the region due to the inability of the Abbasids to assert itself after gaining a victory against the Zikrawayh or Palmyran/Tadmur faction of the Qarmatians. If the Qarmatians gain victory in Syria, which they had been moving towards prior to the disaster at Damascus, the Hamdanids will not exist in the same degree. However, one may argue the Hamdanids, were well north and west of Qarmatian influence in the region. So, my opinion would be that their fate is up to the writer, they could either become diminished and cease to exist or remain the powerbase west of Raqqa and north of the deserts of central Syria.

@GauchoBadger It depends, my opinion is certainly, if the Qarmatians came to siege Baghdad and there was a possibility of capture of the city, the Abbasid would certainly flee north into Samarra. Then the options are two, either seeking help from the East in Iran or to the North from Byzantium.
 
@Aviennca's Pupil The Hamdanids gained power in the region due to the inability of the Abbasids to assert itself after gaining a victory against the Zikrawayh or Palmyran/Tadmur faction of the Qarmatians. If the Qarmatians gain victory in Syria, which they had been moving towards prior to the disaster at Damascus, the Hamdanids will not exist in the same degree. However, one may argue the Hamdanids, were well north and west of Qarmatian influence in the region. So, my opinion would be that their fate is up to the writer, they could either become diminished and cease to exist or remain the powerbase west of Raqqa and north of the deserts of central Syria.

@GauchoBadger It depends, my opinion is certainly, if the Qarmatians came to siege Baghdad and there was a possibility of capture of the city, the Abbasid would certainly flee north into Samarra. Then the options are two, either seeking help from the East in Iran or to the North from Byzantium.
Would the Byzantine help them? What is their gain in doing that?
 
In regards to urban settlements affected by the Qarmatians...
-In case Baghdad is successfully captured, what would the Q's do? Would they just sack the city? Destroy it? Convert it into a new capital or base of operations?
-Where would they put their capital city at in case they conquer the majority of the Mashriq? Would it be Raqqa? Karbala, due to its symbolic importance to the Shiites?
 
@Aviennca's Pupil The Hamdanids gained power in the region due to the inability of the Abbasids to assert itself after gaining a victory against the Zikrawayh or Palmyran/Tadmur faction of the Qarmatians. If the Qarmatians gain victory in Syria, which they had been moving towards prior to the disaster at Damascus, the Hamdanids will not exist in the same degree. However, one may argue the Hamdanids, were well north and west of Qarmatian influence in the region. So, my opinion would be that their fate is up to the writer, they could either become diminished and cease to exist or remain the powerbase west of Raqqa and north of the deserts of central Syria.
It is likely that the Hamdanids ally with the Fatimids as fellow Shi'a?

Would the Byzantine help them? What is their gain in doing that?
The Byzantines could prop up the Abbasids as a buffer state or ally against particularly threatening, expansive Qarmatian states. Buying themselves time to fight the Bulgarians and other enemies.

Medieval states in general were constantly forming, disbanding, and reforming alliances, even with former enemies, based on dynamic threats that they usually faced on all sides. The Byzantines know they can negotiate with the Abbasids, but they may not be able to do the same with the expansionist and fanatical Qarmatians.
 
Top