PC/WI: A large-scale U.S. military intervention in China in the late 1940s?

CaliGuy

Banned
Would it have been plausible for the U.S. to launch a large-scale military intervention in China in the late 1940s in order to try helping the KMT win the Chinese Civil War (or at least to try preventing the KMT from losing all of mainland China)?

Also, if so, what would the consequences of this have been?

For instance, would the KMT have become much more successful on the battlefield as a result of this U.S. military intervention? Also, would Stalin have increased his aid to the Chinese Communists in this TL?
 
My answer is that No, it would not be politically plausible. Even MacArthur said that anyone who favored sending US troops to fight on Chinese soil "should have his head examined." As Jay Taylor notes in his biography of Chiang Kai-shek, *The Generalissimo,* "Even the most pro-Chiang Republicans did not advocate the use of American forces to save the Kuomintang." https://books.google.com/books?id=DUg2KGMQWHQC&pg=PA396
 
My answer is that No, it would not be politically plausible. Even MacArthur said that anyone who favored sending US troops to fight on Chinese soil "should have his head examined." As Jay Taylor notes in his biography of Chiang Kai-shek, *The Generalissimo,* "Even the most pro-Chiang Republicans did not advocate the use of American forces to save the Kuomintang." https://books.google.com/books?id=DUg2KGMQWHQC&pg=PA396
What about large scale use of US Air Force?
 

Wallet

Banned
Wait, why were McCarther and other leaders so opposed to intervening in china but not Korea or Vietnam?
 
That wouldn't have been enough to save the KMT--which certainly had air superiority over the CCP (indeed the CCP had no air force until 1949).
Wasn't the KMT Air Force quite insufficient in terms of quality,size and capabilities?At the very least,couldn't the intervention of the US Air Force at least give KMT a chance to maintain control over the south?
 
Wasn't the KMT Air Force quite insufficient in terms of quality,size and capabilities?At the very least,couldn't the intervention of the US Air Force at least give KMT a chance to maintain control over the south?

The closest thing that was proposed was Chennault's idea of reviving the AVG. For why it was rejected:

"Alarm bells began to clang in Foggy Bottom following the Forrestal-Marshall encounter. Assistant Secretary [William Walton] Butterworth hastened to prepare a memorandum that set forth State's objections to an American volunteer force for China. 'The formation of an AVG,' he wrote on November 29, 1948, 'with or without U.S. Government support or tacit approval, would have serious implications for our policy in China, the position of U.S. nationals there and our relations vis-a-vis the USSR. Such an organization would be viewed by people around the world as direct American intervention in the civil war, a policy 'which we have consistently and scrupulously avoided.' It could also have adverse effects on American nationals residing in areas that were or might later fall under Communist control. Further, Butterworth raised the specter of Russian backing for a 'Soviet Volunteer Group,' leading to aerial combat between American and Soviet fliers over Chinese territory. `It would therefore appear,' the assistant secretary concluded, 'that the formation at this time of an AVG in China would carry with it all the disadvantages of open American intervention in China's civil war and none of the possible advantages. For it is obvious that, while such a group could provide considerable annoyance for the Communists, it could not turn the tide in favor of the Nationalist forces." https://books.google.com/books?id=miaJBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA57
 
The closest thing that was proposed was Chennault's idea of reviving the AVG. For why it was rejected:

"Alarm bells began to clang in Foggy Bottom following the Forrestal-Marshall encounter. Assistant Secretary [William Walton] Butterworth hastened to prepare a memorandum that set forth State's objections to an American volunteer force for China. 'The formation of an AVG,' he wrote on November 29, 1948, 'with or without U.S. Government support or tacit approval, would have serious implications for our policy in China, the position of U.S. nationals there and our relations vis-a-vis the USSR. Such an organization would be viewed by people around the world as direct American intervention in the civil war, a policy 'which we have consistently and scrupulously avoided.' It could also have adverse effects on American nationals residing in areas that were or might later fall under Communist control. Further, Butterworth raised the specter of Russian backing for a 'Soviet Volunteer Group,' leading to aerial combat between American and Soviet fliers over Chinese territory. `It would therefore appear,' the assistant secretary concluded, 'that the formation at this time of an AVG in China would carry with it all the disadvantages of open American intervention in China's civil war and none of the possible advantages. For it is obvious that, while such a group could provide considerable annoyance for the Communists, it could not turn the tide in favor of the Nationalist forces." https://books.google.com/books?id=miaJBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA57
Not sure why the US is afraid of being seen as intervening in a civil war.At any rate,if the US officially entered the war on the nationalists' behalf,would the Soviets have done the same?
 
Wasn't the KMT Air Force quite insufficient in terms of quality,size and capabilities?At the very least,couldn't the intervention of the US Air Force at least give KMT a chance to maintain control over the south?

The Air Force was as throughly demobilized as the Army. The ability to deploy enough aircraft to China would have required calling up tens of thousands of reservists & some National Guards. Nearly all of these men would be WWII veterans & very pissed off about being packed off half abandoned airbases and camps to prepare the ground echelon for deployment overseas. To fight the Korean war a large number of reservist were recalled for cadres and technicians, The Army and Air Force could not handle the swell of draftees with the cadre on active service. this was possibly the most unpopular part of the Korean war.
 
The US started to. Several corps were scattered into Korean & NE China. By mid 1946 it looked like the the KMT had things in hand so the residual forces were withdrawn. Keeping substantial forces for intervention in China in 1947-48 means radical changes to demobilization, changes starting with planning pre 1945, and executed in 1945. By early 1946 its too late most combat units were vaporized by then & the remainder rendered ineffective. The US military by mid 1946 barely qualified as a training organization & the remaining standing units were disorganized shells, understrength and fresh draftees filling the ranks.
 
At any rate,if the US officially entered the war on the nationalists' behalf,would the Soviets have done the same?

Most likely, but Mao would've hated seeing the Soviets. Stalin and Mao had a mutual dislike for each other and butted heads over everything. The higher-ups of the CCP were not happy that Stalin was trying to call the shots in their insurgency. Had the Soviets become involved, that would've meant a stronger Soviet influence over the Chinese communists, which would've angered the higher-ups of the CCP.
 
Most likely, but Mao would've hated seeing the Soviets. Stalin and Mao had a mutual dislike for each other and butted heads over everything. The higher-ups of the CCP were not happy that Stalin was trying to call the shots in their insurgency. Had the Soviets become involved, that would've meant a stronger Soviet influence over the Chinese communists, which would've angered the higher-ups of the CCP.
They'd need the help to balance the odds in any case so Mao would have to swallow his pride.

It would of course result in a quagmire and a lot of dead Americans.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
The US started to. Several corps were scattered into Korean & NE China. By mid 1946 it looked like the the KMT had things in hand so the residual forces were withdrawn. Keeping substantial forces for intervention in China in 1947-48 means radical changes to demobilization, changes starting with planning pre 1945, and executed in 1945. By early 1946 its too late most combat units were vaporized by then & the remainder rendered ineffective. The US military by mid 1946 barely qualified as a training organization & the remaining standing units were disorganized shells, understrength and fresh draftees filling the ranks.
Was that why the U.S. failed to win the Korean War several years later?
 
Wait, why were McCarther and other leaders so opposed to intervening in china but not Korea or Vietnam?

In Korea, MacArthur didn't believe the Chinese Communists would intervene. He assured president Truman at Wake Island they were unlikely to intervene, and if they tried, "there would be the greatest slaughter." https://books.google.com/books?id=zZ4Nnah5P6UC&pg=PA213 He has been much criticized for saying that, but he was hardly alone. As the same page notes, on October 12, the CIA had found that overt Chinese intervention was unlikely in 1950.
 
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CaliGuy

Banned
In Korea, MacArthur didn't believe the Chinese Communists would intervene. He assured president Truman at Wake Island were unlikely to intervene and if they tried, "there would be the greatest slaughter." https://books.google.com/books?id=zZ4Nnah5P6UC&pg=PA213 He has been much criticized for saying that, but he was hardly alone. As the same page notes, on October 12, the CIA had found that overt Chinese intervention was unlikely in 1950.
So, basically, U.S. military leaders and politicians didn't want to fight a massive force like the Chinese Communist army but had no problem fighting smaller forces like the Korean and Vietnamese Communist armies?
 

Ak-84

Banned
As said the US Military would have had to recall hundreds of thousands of WW2 Veterans as the did in 1950 OTL. In said OTL, they had been recalling men who had becomes husbands and fathers and home owners in the meantime and who were not happy about it. (Seriously see Maj Winters of Band of Brothers fame and his determined and ultimately successful efforts to get out of Korea).

In the late forties these men would have been leaving new families and putting off buying a home. Add to the fact that the US Economy was in pretty major recession post-1945,till at least '47. Politically impossible.

One of the reasons that the US decided to maintain a large standing Army post-Korea.

So I guess the POD would be a decision in 1945 to maintain a large Army. Certainly possible, many men wanted to stay in the Army post war OTL, as jobs were still scarce as War Contracts wore down.
 
Was that why the U.S. failed to win the Korean War several years later?

Its why the US nearly lost in 1950. The formations of the 8th Army garrisoning Japan were less than 50% combat effective. Infantry regiments had a battalion stood down, battalions were short a rifle company. Same for the artillery regiment & other support units. Most equipment was in storage, with just training weapons and administrative vehicles in use.

The 1st Marine Division formed a expeditionary brigade by stripping the rest of the division of men & weapons and the air wing & service support group of their assets. The division was rebuilt by stripping the 2 Mar Div & calling up reservists. The Army had the same experience as the Marines, hastily filling out units for Korea with reservists & National Guards, & stripping stay behind formations.

What saved the Army in Korea was the cadre was near 100% veterans. Effectively every officer from captain up and NCO above buck sgt was a veteran of WWII operations. A significant portion of the lower ranking reservists were veterans as well. They pulled together on the run a mass of ill trained draftees & held them together for three bad years.

The Korean War revealed the bankruptcy of the air power doctrine school of modern warfare. Louis Johnson the new Secretary of defense represented a coalition of groups that favored a tiny defense establishment. National Security would be guaranteed by a small high tech air force using atomic weapons. Overseas expeditionary forces, if needed at all would be a mop up and occupation army, and the US Navy a transport service. This doctrine was popular during the latter 1940s on both the right and left. Fiscal conservatives saw the military as a waste of tax dollars, social conservatives did not like the cultural implications in a large national military, many saw a danger in a military/industrial complex that Eisenhower identified years later, others saw a large military as a method of repression & social control by the upper classes. When the S Korean Army collapsed in June 1950 Sec Def Johnson and the USAF were forced to admit airpower and atomic weapons were not capable of saving South Korea alone.
 
Sending an actual ground force to stop the commies in the late forties would have turned into an endless quagmire and Chiang would have lost even more support-after all a foreign invader had just recently pillaged China.

Also remember at this time there still existed a not insignificant prejudice against Asiatics and I can't imagine American soldiers would always conduct themselves in a professional and respectable manner and that would cause a lot of problems.

Also let's say a US force around 250,000-500,000 men in China that's way more than would have ever been but whatever the Lemays have taken over the government.

They would be able to hold down the major cities and roads but they'd be constantly whittled down and attacked.

China had been in civil war and under occupation not a decade earlier and I can't imagine the folks in the US would be happy to hear reports of little Johnny or Fred coming home in a body bag as the war dragged on. No matter how much the anti-communist propaganda machine pumped out material.

It would a decade long struggle and the US would probably kill far more Chinese than Chinese killed Americans but in the end the US would be forced to withdraw.

I'm not sure how this would affect the situation in Europe.

Stalin would most definitely support the communists and Mao would have to put up or shut up.

Also I can't imagine the US would have the resources to devote to rebuilding Europe when it's bogged down fighting in China.
 
Stalin would most definitely support the communists and Mao would have to put up or shut up.

Not necessarily. In the late 20s the Central Committee tried to gain traction with the 28 Bolsheviks. Mao saw that as interference and not true communism.

Actually that might be an interesting POD. If the 28 Bolsheviks had succeeded and Mao succeeded in taking over China that early it might have caused difficulties for the Japanese if the Soviets helped them. At the very least the butterflies might have prevented the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in 1939.
 
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