PC: Strong CRA in 1957 (one vote away)

PoD here is the 1956 US Senate election in Colorado going the other way, resulting in a 48-48 split in the Senate, and VP Nixon breaking tied votes.

I really do think that had LBJ not been majority leader and Eastman not held the Chairman's chair on the Judiciary Committee, that the Senate would have likely passed a bill much more like the one first submitted by AG Brownell. Putting aside the fate of the filibuster itself at the start of the congress, the countless delaying tactics that were employed in Committee OTL prior to the Easter Recess, combined with Johnson actually allowing a greater slowdown of legislation in general -- which, combined especially, meant that it would be virtually impossible to seek cloture on the CRA without dropping other essential legislative priorities altogether, making said cloture that much harder to accomplish -- all this would have been butterflied if it had been Knowland, Nixon, and Langer dictating procedure and scheduling.

Yes, the 20 Southern Democrats (to the extent LBJ sticks with them) ate going to do everything they can to derail this; yes, Eisenhower OTL did little to exert pressure on the Senate to act; and yes, having these advantages does not assure that the Brownell bill gets passed in the Senate unaltered.

But all that still leaves me with the same conclusion -- that a much stronger Civil Rights Bill, setting the accomplishments of the mid-sixties years ahead, was only one vote in the Senate away. Am I wrong? If so, what am I still missing?

-----

I realize this may seem like needless thread multiplication, but since this I've been reading about this event recently (and the alternative was thread necromancy) I had to revisit it (just so nobody thinks that I'd forgotten the points previously brought up). In fact:

'57 isn't as strong as '64. The major provision was judge instead of jury trials, which given the sympathies of most Southern judges was hardly an enormous improvement.

Wasn't there an entire section -- Section III, I believe -- in the original Brownell Bill that did much of what the 1964 CRA would be known for (allowing the Justice Dept to enforce integration in various public and private facilities)? In fact, IIRC, this section, like the voting rights section, allowed said cases to be heard by federal judges (without juries)?
 
LBJ passed the first civil rights act in 82 years, and he did as much as he could. Anything else is not going to happen. Without LBJ, the chance of ANY civil rights legislation is very slim until Russell dies at least. And even then it will be tens of times harder than OTL. The 1970s were a good example of a failure in leadership, especially a President's relation to Congress.
 
LBJ passed the first civil rights act in 82 years, and he did as much as he could. Anything else is not going to happen. Without LBJ, the chance of ANY civil rights legislation is very slim until Russell dies at least. And even then it will be tens of times harder than OTL. The 1970s were a good example of a failure in leadership, especially a President's relation to Congress.

First off, thank you Plumber for bearing with me on this -- I realize I can sound like a broken record, I'm just trying to make sure that I'm not ignoring something to let this PoD idea establish itself.

For most of this, I take your point -- the Senate is a weird institution, and the idea that anyone not named "Lyndon Johnson" could get it to do anything big and liberal can seem weird. He'll, the 82 years since the last Civil Rights legislation certainly could indicate that the chief reason for inaction in all that time was an absence of Lyneon Johnson. Certainly the lack of big liberal action since President Johnson doesn't hurt the case. I get that.

But that doesn't change the fact that the bolded part isn't strictly speaking accurate -- that first and foremost, LBJ was looking to advance his political prospects, which for him meant staying on good terms with Russell's caucus; and that when he had to choose between them, he proved very willing in the early months of 1957 to sacrifice his support of Civil Rights for this end.

Whether it was tabling the motion to abolish the filibuster at the start of the Congress; whether it was the slowing down of the general business of the Senate (much more than was customary) so that there wouldn't be room in the schedule for cloture;* or whether it was letting the talks between the Southerners and liberals stall while he went on numerous vacations -- in the key time for the bill, Johnson was not, as you say, doing everything he could for the Civil Rights Act.

This point aside -- I would argue that there were several factors, aside from the Majority Leader, that made 1957 a potent year for a Civil Rights Act. Take Nixon, for example -- the presumptive nominee for 1960 -- had spent a good part of 1956 making very public promises to black voters that a second Eisenhower term would give them a Civil Rights Bill. No Presidency since the 19th Century had made such a promise, such a political investment, in legislative action on Civil Rights; if the GOP wanted to do well in 1960, they were going to line up behind the idea. Likewise, Democrats not from the South were quickly realizing their party's record was fat becoming a liability (Johnson, to his credit, pushed this reality hard on Russell and his ilk). Then there was the growing media attention being paid to the CR movement -- with television playing a growingly prominent role. Caro even writes that at the start of 1957, concerning a CRA, "optimism was the order of the day" -- supporters and congressional watchers really believed that this year would be the year for action.

Anyway, I do genuinely see your point -- I apologize if I went on too long here, and I thank you again for bearing with me.

*at least not without sacrificing some of the said key legislative business being held up
 
No Presidency since the 19th Century had made such a promise, such a political investment, in legislative action on Civil Rights
And the ones in the 19th Century, if they even passed, were weak.

Caro even writes that at the start of 1957, concerning a CRA, "optimism was the order of the day" -- supporters and congressional watchers really believed that this year would be the year for action.
Action, maybe. Strong action? No.
 
What would have been the long term implications of the Republicans passing the CRA at that time? Would this have slowed down or even prevented the southern strategy used by Republicans since Nixon in 1968? Would black people vote Republican in percentages like they do Democrats today, or would the economic position of the Republican party still have kept a large share of them part of the Democratic New Deal coalition? If the Republican party did make a play for the black vote, would this combined with the northeast liberal establishment of the party have kept the conservative movement from taking control of the party? Could this have ultimately lead to the parties switching sides by today, with Republicans as the liberal party, and Democrats as the conservatives?
 
There was a real possibility that the black vote could have gone to the GOP or at least become more in play.

The vote had been almost 100% Republican from the Civil War to the Depression, then it shifted to the Democrats (though it still voted 2-1 GOP in 1932).

During the 1952 and 56 elections it had begun to shift back, still 2-1 Democratic in both cases but well down from the 80% for FDR and Truman.

Had a GOP controlled Senate really led the ball on the CRA (even if it failed) and had the GOP picked Rockefeller over Goldwater in 64 I think it is quite possible you could have a scenario where the black vote is up for grabs. Still probably leaning to the Democrats because of economic issues but not the block vote it is now.

And with that shift you might well see the South remain much more Democratic than it is now, with the GOP avoiding the southern strategy in favor of a northern one.

This could well mean both parties still have broad left and right wings.
 
Action, maybe. Strong action? No.

Certainly fair enough -- though, considering OTL's 1957 one was weak anyway, I wouldn't say that goes against my overall point* that LBJ as majority leader was not central to its passage.

*in the last post, not necessarily of the OP
 
Certainly fair enough -- though, considering OTL's 1957 one was weak anyway, I wouldn't say that goes against my overall point* that LBJ as majority leader was not central to its passage.

*in the last post, not necessarily of the OP

No, the liberals' hope was wrong. Without LBJ, Russell defeats civil rights again. The South beat President Truman, who cared about civil rights. The South would beat Vice President Nixon, and Eisenhower didn't care about civil rights.
 
Top