PC: Russians winning WWI, Russian Revolution still happens

As it says in the title. Can the Russians experience a revolution even if they are winning, contrary to losing as IOTL?
 
Exactly what revolution? I mean the bourgeois one or the soviet coup called revolution?

I can see the first even if the Entente is wining and the second one tried but failing miserable.
 
Winning WW1 Russian Empire gets more time but it will be overthrown perhaps on 1920's. But it is different thing how it would happen. Monarchy of Russia was pretty much doomed on this point.
 
As it says in the title. Can the Russians experience a revolution even if they are winning, contrary to losing as IOTL?

Depends on how they are winning. The Ottoman Empire cutting away major supply routes created a big part of the turmoil that led to the fall of the Empire. If the Entente is winning in a way which still involves Russia getting militarily and economically pummeled, it's a question of time and there might still be a revolution if the fighting drags on for too long. If Russia itself is doing visibly better in the war, probably not.
 
Depends on how they are winning. The Ottoman Empire cutting away major supply routes created a big part of the turmoil that led to the fall of the Empire. If the Entente is winning in a way which still involves Russia getting militarily and economically pummeled, it's a question of time and there might still be a revolution if the fighting drags on for too long. If Russia itself is doing visibly better in the war, probably not.

So even if the Russians saw some good leadership and were able to bring the Germans to a stalemate, the Russians still revolt(assuming Communist revolution) if no food through Constantinople?
 
So even if the Russians saw some good leadership and were able to bring the Germans to a stalemate, the Russians still revolt(assuming Communist revolution) if no food through Constantinople?

If there's no food through Constantinople - and the whole thing drags on for a long enough time - yeah, I believe it could still happen.

The revolution will not be Communist, at least not at first. Probably a mess of liberals, constitutionalists and socialists similar to what was in charge after OTL's first Russian revolution.
 

jahenders

Banned
How that flows depends, on how or to what degree Russia wins. Russia winning certainly strengthens faith in the Czar and the Russian system and buys them some time. However, some form of revolution is still likely before the mid 20s.

From there, lots of options:
1) The Czar could win but be forced to accept some constitutional constraints and, hence, remain stable for some time if they can get the economy working.
2) You could have a civil war in which the White forces are considerably more successful. That could keep the Czar, or descendents, in power or result in some long-lasting Red/White split.
 
So maybe the Russian leadership in 1916 says "we are not doing any offensives", No Lake Naroch, No Brusilov. We will just hold the line until the final peace. Its all we can do.

Allies still win in November. Czar still in power. Russia gets the Ukrainian parts of Austria and a chunk of Turkey and some reparation money.

After the war. Once everyone returns, the dead are buried, the costs are counted, people calm down, crops are planted, stuff is rebuilt.

Without war going on. A revolution in the classic sense isn't likely. Russia is a conservative place. The church is still a factor. The people in power can feed bits of reforms to placate most of the people.
 
The best way to avoid the revolution is to have Gallipoli campaign succeed handily and have the Imperial City fall early in the war IOTL.

Perhaps if you strengthen the Ottomans before the war but slightly weaken Germany and Austria, you'll get the result you want.
 
It's very rare for regimes to crumble in the aftermath of a significant military victory, so a Bolshevik takeover is off the table. The Bolsheviks' appeal lay largely in their opposition to the war (and Lenin's 'revolution' was more a glorified coup in practice, anyway). For a good while, political dissent of any shade is likely to be marginalized, the Tsar's popular cult effectively able to ride him out of the revolutionary crosshair. The impetus for something politically drastic and immediate just isn't there. Nevertheless, the contradictions inherent to imperial Russia are simply too urgent to sustain Nicholas' rule in the long run, and the masses now have a precedent in the toppling of Kaiser Wilhelm, an autocrat with a style of governance lifted directly from the Romanovs.

I don't foresee any major Marxist involvement in the inevitable upheaval, and I don't even think it would resemble the February Revolution. ATL's revolution is going to be a 'second 1905', with a combination of disorganized urban and rural unrest boiling over into civil society petitioning for economic and political reform along German lines. The biggest issue the Tsar faces is one of his own making - that he's already proven himself a totally unreliable partner, ready to bask in his own absolutist legend at the expense of any semblance of constitutionalism. This isn't going to be like the first revolution, in that his unwillingness to cooperate with reformers is no longer a matter of speculation (see his undermining of the Duma between 1906-1914). Either the whole monarchy is going to be done away (in favour of a government likely dominated by SRs), or a more pliable figurehead (ideally the Tsarevich, in his late-teens around this point) placed on the throne. The only means via which Nicholas can survive this trap would be to demonstrate a lot more political rationale in his dealings with the post-war civilian authorities, and his track record up to this point is not good at all - modesty and pragmatism divorced of naked ideology came about as naturally to him as it did to Adolf Hitler.

From here, we enter uncharted territory. The revolutionary government is likely to face some serious struggles with the military, particularly emboldened in the light of its triumph on the Eastern Front, and other reactionary columns, although the lack of a strong radical leftist bloc, and thereby its perceived influence over the leadership, means tensions won't necessarily reach the excesses they did IOTL, being a mostly behind-the-scenes deal. The nature of the relationship will, at any rate, undermine the Republic's democratic credentials. There will be no instantaneous transfer of clear, hegemonic authority to elected forces, and the quest for a stable Russian constitutionalism of the British or French variety is set to be perilous and by no means successful.
 
Top