PC: No Kornilov Affair Scenario

OK, so I had a rough scenario in mind for how a "no Kornilov Affair" TL could start:

Brusilov greets the Minister President at the railroad station in late July, thus isn't stupidly thrown under the bus; thus Kornilov doesn't get a promotion. OTL, the elections were delayed on August 9 from September to November; that may or may not still happen. What we can say is Kerensky's plot to take power as Supreme Commander won't play out TTL -- it may be he's smart enough to realize Brusilov won't go along with taking Petrograd by military force; if he's not so smart and tries to pull the plot with him, Brusilov will not play along, and will out the President to the PG Cabinet, and possibly to the public at large. OTL, when Kornilov went along, Kerensky either got cold feet or double crossed him, and (idiotically) called out the leftist militias to defend the revolution; here he'll be outed, and unceremoniously (or more likely, with much yelling) from the government.

The new PG coalition will see Nikolai Nekrasov, Vice-President and Minister of Finance, take over as Minister President, and someone else, possibly Brusilov himself, taking over Alexander's duties as Minister of War and Navy. This new government will stand on shaky ground and have no desire to delay elections ever further; they may even move them back up, just to get somebody clear in charge again. The Bolsheviks and the Soviets, meanwhile, won't have as much opportunity to reconstitute their forces, and will thus be less likely to seize power prior the the CA elections. I imagine that, as OTL, the (defensist) SRs will get a plurality in said elections.

From there... I don't know, right now. I imagine Brusilov would be asked to continue as Supreme Military Commander / Minister of War / etc., which could mean he his "political" career could continue after the war. And it may be that upon some general crisis, like the Depression (which TTL, is worse for Russia), Kerensky and his followers could make a comeback. But those are just some broad ideas that could be interesting.

So, any thoughts?
 
Don't Jump Ahead Too Quickly

You really need to focus on what happens in the near years before speculating about happens during the Depression.

In particular you need to address the period of SR dominance. There are certain things they were in agreement on:

Abolish the monarchy. Probably bloodless though I would not rule out them executing the Tsar himself but sparing the rest of the family. Does this prompt a civil war with the monarchists? My opinion is yes.

Land redistribution: Does this go smoothly? Or does it lead to violence, perhaps contributing another element to the RCW?

Food production and distribution in 1918: Does the redistribution help or hurt agricultural production? And even if the harvest is abundant if it cannot reach the cities because the rail network is dysfunctional you will still get unrest. Just because there is no Bolshevik revolution in 1917 doesn't mean there cannot be one in late 1918/early 1919.

Are the SR really sincere about letting the peripheral regions leave if they want and if so do they?

Is there still war with Poland at some point?
 
You really need to focus on what happens in the near years before speculating about happens during the Depression.
Yeah, like I said, I really don't know what comes next; my ideas for Brusilov and Kerensky were really just things that I thought might be cool to see, more than any serious speculation.
In particular you need to address the period of SR dominance.
The interesting thing is, this could really be true SR dominance (as opposed to an SR-Bolshevik coalition, like in other scenarios); by having power handed to them directly by the PG, the army is more likely to see the CA as the ultimate authority in Russia.
Abolish the monarchy. Probably bloodless though I would not rule out them executing the Tsar himself but sparing the rest of the family.
AIUI, that was Lenin's paranoia more than anything; just about any other government, including one with Bolsheviks, might have let them live, or possibly even "escape" abroad.
Land redistribution: Does this go smoothly? Or does it lead to violence, perhaps contributing another element to the RCW?
Well, the SRs were a lot tighter with the peasants, so I think we can safely say it goes a lot more smoothly than OTL.
Food production and distribution in 1918: Does the redistribution help or hurt agricultural production? And even if the harvest is abundant if it cannot reach the cities because the rail network is dysfunctional you will still get unrest.
Answer here may depend on your economic theory and ideology.
Just because there is no Bolshevik revolution in 1917 doesn't mean there cannot be one in late 1918/early 1919.

Are the SR really sincere about letting the peripheral regions leave if they want and if so do they?

Is there still war with Poland at some point?
So short version, TTL Russia could still have problems. Fair enough, though they'll still be a lot easier than OTL.
 
To the best of my knowledge the Tsarist government was willing to let Poland go, the problem is what can the army feasibly do, what also doomed Kerensky was the provisional government still staying in the war.
 
the problem is what can the army feasibly do, what also doomed Kerensky was the provisional government still staying in the war.
It was a little more complicated than that -- OTL, the PG began secret negotiations with the Germans shortly after the February Revolution, only to balk when pushed to hard (demands for the Baltic border moving to practically the outskirts of Petrograd); granted, this was before Kerensky had risen to such prominence, and he made no efforts on the diplomatic front I know of; but even after the Bolsheviks came to power, (new) negotiations with Germany lasted months, eventually leading to an ultimatum that, long story short, Russia came close to rejecting but was eventually accepted by the Bolsheviks precipitating most of the Russian Civil War.

What this means for TTL -- at the very least, there won't be any government or army leadership standing ready to accept anything like Brest-Litovsk, so no East Front (or lasting) armistice.
 
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