PC Mao's Long March Cut Short

[John Fredrick Parker]

In 1934, during Chiang's Fifth Encirclement Campaign, say Zhou Enlai's spies don't get the Red Army warning of Chiang's final push, and the communist leadership is obliterated. Chiang no longer has to worry about the commies. Is this plausible?

 

[rcduggan]

If Mao and Zhou Enlai's army is wiped out, wouldn't that just leave a leadership vacuum? (Not that I know much about the era...) One could expect that Xu Xiangqian and Zhang Guotao would take over leadership of the Chinese communists and begin the Long March in Mao's stead.

 

[jakewilson]

The problem is that Chinese peasants have a whole raft of problems that will make the communists perennially appealing, even with Mao out of the picture. However, enough Kuomintang wins would possibly convince the Soviets to believe that further support for the Chinese communists is futile and support the KMT gov't in hopes of gaining influence that way instead.

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

One could expect that Xu Xiangqian and Zhang Guotao would take over leadership of the Chinese communists and begin the Long March in Mao's stead.

The former served under the latter, didn't he? While I suppose Zhang could continue for a period as a thorn in Chiang's side, AIUI he was a fan of Stalinist purges, so I don't see him pulling out a victory.

 

[Cyclone]

The problem is that Chinese peasants have a whole raft of problems that will make the communists perennially appealing, even with Mao out of the picture. However, enough Kuomintang wins would possibly convince the Soviets to believe that further support for the Chinese communists is futile and support the KMT gov't in hopes of gaining influence that way instead.

...as opposed to what they did historically?

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

Would anyone here object to seeing this PoD having a minimal effect on WWII? I know the role Mao played in anti-Japanese resistance is a point of some controversy...

 

[Rediv]

Would anyone here object to seeing this PoD having a minimal effect on WWII? I know the role Mao played in anti-Japanese resistance is a point of some controversy...

I'd object, but for a different reason. If the Communists are no longer a significant problem for Chiang after, say, 1935 or so, then he would likely take bolder actions against Japanese encroachment. The Sino-Japanese conflict would likely break out into full-scale war a lot sooner.

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

Could Zhang Guotao be enough of a thorn to keep Chiang from taking the Japanese head on? Would another year be enough?

And how much sooner could the Japanese invasion come, while not taking away from the plausibility of events in Europe and Pearl Harbor happening as OTL?

 

[DuQuense]

In 1935 China and japan fought -The War of the Wall - The War set the Border of Manchuria as the Great Wall, and China agreed to a 100 mile demilitarized zone south of the Wall.
The year before the Incident of the Bridge that started the 1936 War, allowed Chaing to regroup, and prepare.
If the War of the Wall is not a Border Incident, but the opening of a longer more general war, Chaing doesn't get this extra needed time. I see China doing worse in the long war.

 

[Rediv]

Could Zhang Guotao be enough of a thorn to keep Chiang from taking the Japanese head on? Would another year be enough?

And how much sooner could the Japanese invasion come, while not taking away from the plausibility of events in Europe and Pearl Harbor happening as OTL?

Good point. Even if you move things up a few months, the course of the war is likely to stay more or less the same.

One small change would be that without the Xi'an Incident, we'll still have Zhang Xueliang floating around. He probably wouldn't be too influential, but he might cause somewhat of a post-war fuss if he tries to re-establish himself in Manchuria after the Japanese have left.

 

[Fearless Leader]

IIRC Mao also did a great deal of work adapting communism to better fit the Chinese context. Without his influence, Communism may remain solely an urban phenomenon in China and not take hold with the peasants as much as it did in OTL.

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

In 1935 China and japan fought -The War of the Wall - The War set the Border of Manchuria as the Great Wall, and China agreed to a 100 mile demilitarized zone south of the Wall.
The year before the Incident of the Bridge that started the 1936 War, allowed Chaing to regroup, and prepare.
If the War of the Wall is not a Border Incident, but the opening of a longer more general war, Chaing doesn't get this extra needed time. I see China doing worse in the long war.

I don't see why this would necessarily go any differently from OTL...

One small change would be that without the Xi'an Incident, we'll still have Zhang Xueliang floating around. He probably wouldn't be too influential, but he might cause somewhat of a post-war fuss if he tries to re-establish himself in Manchuria after the Japanese have left.

I'm pretty sure the Soviets are going to be looking to set up a communist state in Manchuria anyway, especially if they have troops there at the end of WWII...

IIRC Mao also did a great deal of work adapting communism to better fit the Chinese context. Without his influence, Communism may remain solely an urban phenomenon in China and not take hold with the peasants as much as it did in OTL.

Or communism anywhere for that matter.

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

Here's my last LoBPC* --

Is it plausible that this doesn't have any recognizable butterflies in US politics through 1948? (Obviously, it does by 1950...)

*an acronym I've used before

 

[loughery111]

Here's my last LoBPC* --

Is it plausible that this doesn't have any recognizable butterflies in US politics through 1948? (Obviously, it does by 1950...)

*an acronym I've used before

Chances are that without Mao, Communism just isn't "Chinese" enough to have anymore than limited urban appeal... which means that any Soviet attempt to set up a communist state in Manchuria will result in a puppet state rather than an authentically Chinese government. This will get American attention, given that Czechoslovakia's Communist party staged a coup in 1948 IOTL, and Eastern Europe's "democratic elections" aren't forthcoming. The Chinese Civil War IOTL was largely viewed as a Chinese affair in which we and the Soviets had some concern, and which was unlikely to result in a Kuomintang defeat (until it did). Here, the Chinese Civil War is much less important, and the match-up between the Soviets and their Manchurian puppets on one hand and the Chinese on the other seems a lot less likely to result in Chinese victory. Thus, American support will flow much more freely, and Chiang is decidedly unlikely to decide he should invade Manchuria and bring the Soviet Army down on his head. We might see a Korean War-like situation, but a Soviet puppet is much less likely to take China than a somewhat independent and clearly Chinese state.

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

More or less my thinking there...