Is it possible for the Russians to conduct an amphibious landing in Constantinople in late 1915 or early 1916? The objective would be to keep the Ottoman troops tied up in Turkish Thrace after Gallipoli at least or enable the Entente to continue the advance to Constantinople. Could the assault succeed or would it fail with every battleship involved, including 2 Russian dreadnoughts? And, would submarines be useful? What would be the consequences of the assault failing or the Ottomans leaving WW1 in early 1916?
pc: Landings at Constantinople in WW1
- Thread starter ghappy1000
- Start date
Simple. Gallipoli goes better, and the entene control most of the peninsula. They neutralise the fortresses and they sink the goeben (The French would send a dreadnought and the Lord Nelson's weren't that rubbish) They Russians land a force at the top of the straights and with the royal navy and French navy shelling Istanbul, the Ottomans soon come to a agreement.
jahenders
Banned
Corrected:
I don't think they could. The Russian Navy did largely control the Black Sea by 1915, but they didn't have strong enough amphibious assault capability to succeed in landing against what would be very strong Turkish opposition.
Likewise, if they tried to just sail to Constantinople, they'd face a similar challenge to what the Brits and French faced leading up to Gallipoli. Instead of the Dardanelles, the Russians would have to try to sail through the Bosphorous which was mined in places and which the Turks had covered with strong shore guns that the Russians would have at least as much trouble knocking out as the Brits and French did. The assaulting Russian naval squadron would be severely damaged before fleeing.
I don't think they could. The Russian Navy did largely control the Black Sea by 1915, but they didn't have strong enough amphibious assault capability to succeed in landing against what would be very strong Turkish opposition.
Likewise, if they tried to just sail to Constantinople, they'd face a similar challenge to what the Brits and French faced leading up to Gallipoli. Instead of the Dardanelles, the Russians would have to try to sail through the Bosphorous which was mined in places and which the Turks had covered with strong shore guns that the Russians would have at least as much trouble knocking out as the Brits and French did. The assaulting Russian naval squadron would be severely damaged before fleeing.
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Do you mean the Russians or is this just a typo? Otherwise, the Russians would be elated to continue with 1 or 2 battleships damaged [if not sunk] by minefields. If not, could a landing on the Bulgarian coast and an advance to Constantinople or meeting with Entente forces from Salonika or support of the Romanians be possible?
In the event that the British [,Japanese] and French have to send battleships to the North Sea or the Austrians have naval superiority in the Mediterranean, would a diversionary assault be intended to destroy Goeben and/or enable a breakout after Ottoman surrender or an Austrian reinforcement of the Black Sea possible?
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Assault on Constantinople in 1916
In 1916, after several stalemates on the Western Front during the Verdun and Somme battles and the Brusilov Offensive's mediocre successes [the pods involved could be anything you like], the Russians decided on a landing in Constantinople to break the stalemate. The Royal Navy had suffered heavy losses at Jutland and although the Germans lost many of their ships simultaneously, the British had to transfer pre dreadnoughts to the Harwich Force and Grand Fleet. Despite the inferiority and questions of the admirals, it was decided to return them to Britain and after the action of 18 August 1916, in which the pre dreadnoughts, along with many cruisers and destroyers were sunk for the loss of a German dreadnought, some obsolete light and armoured cruisers and a couple of destroyers, the British asked the French for assistance in the North Sea, which required the consent of the Italians and Russians.
In response to the British requests, the Russians decided on an assault on the Bosphorus. It was believed that frequent attacks on the Ottoman Navy, while successful, were not decisive and an amphibious landing on the Bosphorus, with a corps, would help in the end. Diversionary bombardments of Turkish cities and minings of Turkish ports [instead of the Bosphorus] would help in confusing the Turks as to their true intentions.
The Russian dreadnoughts Imperatritsa Maria and Imperatritsa Ekaterina, along with 4 pre dreadnoughts and 2 cruisers, plus 7 destroyers and a yacht would assault the defences of the Bosphorus. Submarines from the Black Sea Fleet were to disrupt Turkish and Bulgarian reinforcements and shipping in the Black Sea, causing the transfer of u boats and destroyers to convoy escort, which would enable the attack to succeed. The invasion force consisted of an infantry corps in several troop transports and minesweepers would sweep the mines, covered by aircraft from a seaplane carrier. A Russian pre dreadnought bombardment would scare the Bulgarians and give some confusion to the Central Powers' reinforcements. Once the Bulgarians lose the coastline, the Russian troops would make their way south to link up with the troops in Constantinople. Otherwise, a drive north after taking Constantinople and knocking the Ottomans out of WW1 would influence Romania to join the Entente and Bulgarian surrender. It seemed very risky because of the Bosphorus's defences, but if anything went right, it would be a war changer.
The landings were to begin in September 1916. It was hoped that by then, the Central Powers' counter offensive in the east would run out of steam, if it had occurred. The French navy would provide a diversion with the battleships Suffren, Gaulois, Jaureguiberry, Henri IV, Charlemagne and Saint Louis. It was hoped that the diversion would keep German and Austrian u boats from the Bosphorus Front and assist in the eventual capture of Constantinople. Operational surprise was necessary and planned refits were cancelled. The news provided by a captured German officer from a sunken warship would state that the Goeben was under repairs, which would make the starting date of the offensive September 1916.
In 1916, after several stalemates on the Western Front during the Verdun and Somme battles and the Brusilov Offensive's mediocre successes [the pods involved could be anything you like], the Russians decided on a landing in Constantinople to break the stalemate. The Royal Navy had suffered heavy losses at Jutland and although the Germans lost many of their ships simultaneously, the British had to transfer pre dreadnoughts to the Harwich Force and Grand Fleet. Despite the inferiority and questions of the admirals, it was decided to return them to Britain and after the action of 18 August 1916, in which the pre dreadnoughts, along with many cruisers and destroyers were sunk for the loss of a German dreadnought, some obsolete light and armoured cruisers and a couple of destroyers, the British asked the French for assistance in the North Sea, which required the consent of the Italians and Russians.
In response to the British requests, the Russians decided on an assault on the Bosphorus. It was believed that frequent attacks on the Ottoman Navy, while successful, were not decisive and an amphibious landing on the Bosphorus, with a corps, would help in the end. Diversionary bombardments of Turkish cities and minings of Turkish ports [instead of the Bosphorus] would help in confusing the Turks as to their true intentions.
The Russian dreadnoughts Imperatritsa Maria and Imperatritsa Ekaterina, along with 4 pre dreadnoughts and 2 cruisers, plus 7 destroyers and a yacht would assault the defences of the Bosphorus. Submarines from the Black Sea Fleet were to disrupt Turkish and Bulgarian reinforcements and shipping in the Black Sea, causing the transfer of u boats and destroyers to convoy escort, which would enable the attack to succeed. The invasion force consisted of an infantry corps in several troop transports and minesweepers would sweep the mines, covered by aircraft from a seaplane carrier. A Russian pre dreadnought bombardment would scare the Bulgarians and give some confusion to the Central Powers' reinforcements. Once the Bulgarians lose the coastline, the Russian troops would make their way south to link up with the troops in Constantinople. Otherwise, a drive north after taking Constantinople and knocking the Ottomans out of WW1 would influence Romania to join the Entente and Bulgarian surrender. It seemed very risky because of the Bosphorus's defences, but if anything went right, it would be a war changer.
The landings were to begin in September 1916. It was hoped that by then, the Central Powers' counter offensive in the east would run out of steam, if it had occurred. The French navy would provide a diversion with the battleships Suffren, Gaulois, Jaureguiberry, Henri IV, Charlemagne and Saint Louis. It was hoped that the diversion would keep German and Austrian u boats from the Bosphorus Front and assist in the eventual capture of Constantinople. Operational surprise was necessary and planned refits were cancelled. The news provided by a captured German officer from a sunken warship would state that the Goeben was under repairs, which would make the starting date of the offensive September 1916.
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BooNZ
Banned
I understood one of the reasons the Russians extended their Black Sea fleet was to force the straights, but that was never going to work. In the first instance, the defences were more robust than those faced at Gallipoli, closer to transportation infrastructure. Further, the Russians did not have the naval resources to experiment with that the French/ British had.
Alternative landing sites have logistical issues. In the first instance, to maintain a credible land force a decent port would need to be captured more-or-less intact and held. Also, as a rule of thumb, the maximum range an army of that period could operate from a rail head was around 100 miles, so I assume a similar range would also apply to a port.
Russian naval "control" of the Black sea was held by a number of slower capital ships, which would be ill equipped to defend a supply ships etc. I cannot imagine a better suited role for the Goeben and Breslau than picking off Russian merchantman.
BooNZ
Banned
You are suggesting that the Russian navy and around 30,000 troops could achieve what the combined English and French fleets with over 500,000 could not...
Assault on Constantinople in 1916: The landings
The attacks on Constantinople began on 1 September 1916 and Turkish troops supporting counterattacks in Thrace had to be rushed back to defend their homeland. The assaults on the defences began with surprise at 5:00 a.m. and the Ottoman troops woke up in shock as defenders were shelled unceasingly. Unfortunately for them, the Entente had launched an offensive in Macedonia and although the Bulgarians were able to defend their frontline, it was feared that Constantinople would fall. In fact, the Sultan, Mehmed V, ordered counterattacks during the battle to save his palace and government offices from capture, where the end would come for them and a reserve corps tasked with coastal defence or reinforcing beleagured fronts was on its way to Constantinople. It was hoped that the trains would arrive in time without disruption by pre dreadnoughts' gunfire. The Germans and Bulgarians would reinforce Constantinople with a division each from Macedonia to assist the defence of the city. Ottoman and Bulgarian navy vessels were put on alert and Bulgarian torpedo boats were to assault Russian reinforcement convoys and escorts. With Constantinople's dire situation, the Ottoman Navy couldn't be expected to intervene against the convoys, as the Russians thought, especially with the 'loss' of one German crewed Ottoman warship, the Breslau, to a dreadnought attack on 21 July. Troops from Gallipoli were also placed on alert for reinforcement of their capital city's defences.
The Russians shelled the naval guns to cover the minesweeping and landing efforts of a division. Reinforcements would be on the way and Russian battleship shells, after causing the destruction of the Ottoman Navy, would result in deaths or surrender of Ottoman troops. The Ottoman Navy asked the Constantinople Flotilla's only available submarine and another Bulgarian to be ready for sortie and reach the city in 48 hours. It seemed that if they didn't make it, the city would fall and if they didn't lose the war, the troops on the other fronts would become demoralized. After the requests were accepted, Bulgaria's only submarine would proceed to the city's defence. In the meantime, few of the the Austrian Navy's submarines at sea were placed in a state of alert to proceed to Gallipoli and sink anything that attempted to force the straits. Despite a desperate Ottoman defence, there was only an obsolete pre dreadnought sunk among the Russian ships and another protected cruiser would be torpedoed by Bulgaria's only submarine, which was nearly destroyed shortly afterwards by a shell from the escorting destroyer it sank as well. Coastal defences sank another destroyer.
However, the Ottomans were the Central Powers' bigger concern. As they were crucial to the holding of British and Russian troops from action against Germany, they had to continue fighting. In fact, the Romanians and Greeks might declare war once Constantinople fell. The length of resistance was expected to be a week long, but after falling, there would be no reprieve if the Ottoman government was lost. However, torpedoes or mines caused the sinking of 2 Russian battleships. It was hoped that further Russian losses and an Ottoman naval victory would boost morale, as it did in the naval forcing of the Dardenelles straits attempt before the Entente's costly Gallipoli Campaign.
Nevertheless, the Russians decided to push on. The Ottomans, Germans and Bulgarians were ready to counterattack, but the Russians' gunnery was somewhat accurate. The main reason was the 12 inch gunfire of Imperatrista Maria, earlier responsible for the 'sinking' of the Breslau. The light cruiser [as in reality] was returning from a minelaying mission off the Russian Caucasian coast and was intercepted by the battleship. At slow speed and without any evasion due to the cruiser pursuing a destroyer, which was damaged, the guns of the dreadnought sank the Breslau. About 300 survivors were captured and the information taken from the prisoners revealed the Goeben's repair for propeller screw issues until September. With the information in mind, and the offensives against the Central Powers faltering, this gave impetus for the final decision to invade the Bosphorus. The next day, just as they were on the verge of success, an Ottoman counterattack was launched. It was day 3 of the Russian offensive and the need to push on caused Russian dreadnought gunfire to assist the attackers and break down Ottoman counteroffensives. Suddenly, Bulgarian torpedo boats came out of the blue and fired torpedoes. Admiral Kolchak couldn't believe his shock when his flagship was struck by two torpedoes from a[n] 'remarkably inferior and unexpected' enemy torpedo boat. As it sank, he took his command on the other Russian dreadnought, only to find it struck by Ottoman torpedoes and it sank. The aggressive admiral would persevere, but news of a German submarine, the UB 14, coming would be the final straw. On 8 September, returning to the Bosphorus and watching the last Russians evacuate, he sighted and torpedoed a Russian pre dreadnought, with another sunk earlier. The Russians lost most, if not all of their Black Sea Fleet ships in the failed assault, including every battleship and cruiser involved plus a submarine with another being mined. Now, it was time for the Russians to face the repercussions.
Meanwhile, the offensive on the first day took control of several fortresses, summer palaces and urban centres, causing the urgency that led to the government's initial departure. After the offensive reached the old city walls and blocks, it bogged down and the Ottomans counterattacked, leading to the supporting dreadnoughts' sinking by torpedoes. The Russians evacuated under pressure when the dreadnoughts were sunk and it was obvious that morale was decreasing, which would prevent victory in the battle. After the battle, Russians [especially prisoners of war from the soldiers and sailors captured], Caucasian Orthodox Christians, Greeks and Arabs were placed under scrutiny and some were arrested for treason and collaboration with the Russians in violating the Ottomans' sacred soil and city.
The attacks on Constantinople began on 1 September 1916 and Turkish troops supporting counterattacks in Thrace had to be rushed back to defend their homeland. The assaults on the defences began with surprise at 5:00 a.m. and the Ottoman troops woke up in shock as defenders were shelled unceasingly. Unfortunately for them, the Entente had launched an offensive in Macedonia and although the Bulgarians were able to defend their frontline, it was feared that Constantinople would fall. In fact, the Sultan, Mehmed V, ordered counterattacks during the battle to save his palace and government offices from capture, where the end would come for them and a reserve corps tasked with coastal defence or reinforcing beleagured fronts was on its way to Constantinople. It was hoped that the trains would arrive in time without disruption by pre dreadnoughts' gunfire. The Germans and Bulgarians would reinforce Constantinople with a division each from Macedonia to assist the defence of the city. Ottoman and Bulgarian navy vessels were put on alert and Bulgarian torpedo boats were to assault Russian reinforcement convoys and escorts. With Constantinople's dire situation, the Ottoman Navy couldn't be expected to intervene against the convoys, as the Russians thought, especially with the 'loss' of one German crewed Ottoman warship, the Breslau, to a dreadnought attack on 21 July. Troops from Gallipoli were also placed on alert for reinforcement of their capital city's defences.
The Russians shelled the naval guns to cover the minesweeping and landing efforts of a division. Reinforcements would be on the way and Russian battleship shells, after causing the destruction of the Ottoman Navy, would result in deaths or surrender of Ottoman troops. The Ottoman Navy asked the Constantinople Flotilla's only available submarine and another Bulgarian to be ready for sortie and reach the city in 48 hours. It seemed that if they didn't make it, the city would fall and if they didn't lose the war, the troops on the other fronts would become demoralized. After the requests were accepted, Bulgaria's only submarine would proceed to the city's defence. In the meantime, few of the the Austrian Navy's submarines at sea were placed in a state of alert to proceed to Gallipoli and sink anything that attempted to force the straits. Despite a desperate Ottoman defence, there was only an obsolete pre dreadnought sunk among the Russian ships and another protected cruiser would be torpedoed by Bulgaria's only submarine, which was nearly destroyed shortly afterwards by a shell from the escorting destroyer it sank as well. Coastal defences sank another destroyer.
However, the Ottomans were the Central Powers' bigger concern. As they were crucial to the holding of British and Russian troops from action against Germany, they had to continue fighting. In fact, the Romanians and Greeks might declare war once Constantinople fell. The length of resistance was expected to be a week long, but after falling, there would be no reprieve if the Ottoman government was lost. However, torpedoes or mines caused the sinking of 2 Russian battleships. It was hoped that further Russian losses and an Ottoman naval victory would boost morale, as it did in the naval forcing of the Dardenelles straits attempt before the Entente's costly Gallipoli Campaign.
Nevertheless, the Russians decided to push on. The Ottomans, Germans and Bulgarians were ready to counterattack, but the Russians' gunnery was somewhat accurate. The main reason was the 12 inch gunfire of Imperatrista Maria, earlier responsible for the 'sinking' of the Breslau. The light cruiser [as in reality] was returning from a minelaying mission off the Russian Caucasian coast and was intercepted by the battleship. At slow speed and without any evasion due to the cruiser pursuing a destroyer, which was damaged, the guns of the dreadnought sank the Breslau. About 300 survivors were captured and the information taken from the prisoners revealed the Goeben's repair for propeller screw issues until September. With the information in mind, and the offensives against the Central Powers faltering, this gave impetus for the final decision to invade the Bosphorus. The next day, just as they were on the verge of success, an Ottoman counterattack was launched. It was day 3 of the Russian offensive and the need to push on caused Russian dreadnought gunfire to assist the attackers and break down Ottoman counteroffensives. Suddenly, Bulgarian torpedo boats came out of the blue and fired torpedoes. Admiral Kolchak couldn't believe his shock when his flagship was struck by two torpedoes from a[n] 'remarkably inferior and unexpected' enemy torpedo boat. As it sank, he took his command on the other Russian dreadnought, only to find it struck by Ottoman torpedoes and it sank. The aggressive admiral would persevere, but news of a German submarine, the UB 14, coming would be the final straw. On 8 September, returning to the Bosphorus and watching the last Russians evacuate, he sighted and torpedoed a Russian pre dreadnought, with another sunk earlier. The Russians lost most, if not all of their Black Sea Fleet ships in the failed assault, including every battleship and cruiser involved plus a submarine with another being mined. Now, it was time for the Russians to face the repercussions.
Meanwhile, the offensive on the first day took control of several fortresses, summer palaces and urban centres, causing the urgency that led to the government's initial departure. After the offensive reached the old city walls and blocks, it bogged down and the Ottomans counterattacked, leading to the supporting dreadnoughts' sinking by torpedoes. The Russians evacuated under pressure when the dreadnoughts were sunk and it was obvious that morale was decreasing, which would prevent victory in the battle. After the battle, Russians [especially prisoners of war from the soldiers and sailors captured], Caucasian Orthodox Christians, Greeks and Arabs were placed under scrutiny and some were arrested for treason and collaboration with the Russians in violating the Ottomans' sacred soil and city.
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BooNZ
Banned
Please tell us more about how Russian dreadnaughts managed to corner a modern german crewed light cruiser and how pre-dreadnaughts threatened rail connections > 15 miles from the coast. I understand that a corp is only two divisions, so a Bulgarian and a German division would only be required to bag [Russian] bodies, not reinforce. IMHO
jahenders
Banned
This sounds like Churchill proposing what could have happened at Gallipoli -- an unworkable plan, likely to fail, far more so than Gallipoli.
FWIW, I believe that the Gallipoli campaign COULD potentially have worked if carried out much better. The odds may not have been great, but there was potential.
1) Had the fleet action been better coordinated, better led, more aggressive, and had decent minesweepers (as opposed to very slow fishing trawlers with skittish civilian crews), they might have been able to force the Dardanelles.
2) Had the landings been decently coordinated, given clear orders, led well, and moved quickly, they might have made enough progress to secure most of the pennisula before the Turks got organized. The Wallies could then reinforce at will and either push the Turks back, shell the guns on the other shores from land-based artillery to allow ships through, etc.
FWIW, I believe that the Gallipoli campaign COULD potentially have worked if carried out much better. The odds may not have been great, but there was potential.
1) Had the fleet action been better coordinated, better led, more aggressive, and had decent minesweepers (as opposed to very slow fishing trawlers with skittish civilian crews), they might have been able to force the Dardanelles.
2) Had the landings been decently coordinated, given clear orders, led well, and moved quickly, they might have made enough progress to secure most of the pennisula before the Turks got organized. The Wallies could then reinforce at will and either push the Turks back, shell the guns on the other shores from land-based artillery to allow ships through, etc.
Aftermath of the Constantinople disaster
The Ottomans would launch a counterattack at the British troops advancing from Gallipoli and supported by French battleships with the Goeben and its destroyer escort, along with the Ottoman troops placed in Constantinople during the crucial battle and sank the French battleships Suffren and Gaulois. The French would lose 3 pre dreadnoughts, in addition to one heavily damaged and later lost [, plus 8 destroyers to minefields or torpedoes]. The shock inflicted on the French Navy would force it to be more cautious in the Eastern Mediterranean, despite the heavy Ottoman losses of its remaining gunboats, a few destroyers, a coastal defence ship and a cruiser. With Goeben as the only ship of significance, the Ottoman Navy had to be cautious, but they could be proud of inflicting a massive defeat on the Russian Navy and forcing it to mutiny, along with increasing chaos that would lead to the first, but forgotten Russian Revolution, initial succeeding until a coup d' etat temporarily restored the Tsar Nicholas II as Russia's last emperor, with his insistence in continuing the war leading to the March Revolution.
Like the first Gallipoli Campaign, the corps would lead their way to Constantinople, but this time, it would be more of a raid/diversion to keep Gallipoli forces occupied. After the failure of the Bosphorus and 2nd Dardenelles naval assaults, the recall of the British Corps was ordered. However, only one division was off the beaches before the final Ottoman and German counteroffensive threw the British out for good, capturing some 10,000 prisoners and wrecking an entire division. A second Dardenelles gambit had failed.
Meanwhile, bad news from the Somme and Verdun, along with the collapse of Brusilov's Offensive, weren't helping the Entente either, especially with Romanian and Greek refusal to join the Entente. In fact, Romania would join the war on the Central Powers' side. True, the Germans were suffering heavily, but the Entente's miseries were even worse. And, 1917 would begin with more offensives that won't help collapsing Russia's fragile state, with the Bolsheviks receiving more support from the local population and causing its surrender. The details would be explored in more detailed in WW1: The Desperate Years Of Struggle From 1914 to 1920. [With the latter year being this scenario's ending year of WW1 itself, most of the Somme and Western Front details being covered in the Failure on the Somme]. The individual Ottoman and Bulgarian navies' submarines did score successes on unescorted Russian ships and a few, albeit smaller sized and insignificant Entente warships in the Mediterranean after Russia's November Armistice with the Central Powers, causing some trouble due to convoy escort necessities. Admiral Kolchak was imprisoned after capture and discredited when he returned to Russia in 1918, too disgraced to command an army and was executed by the Bolsheviks in 1919, after the failed defence of the Crimea. Mutinies and sabotage put an obsolete pre dreadnought and cruiser yacht out of commission with desertions and damage. The Russian armies and populace were affected by the defeats, with desertion rates rising by 5,000 each month and hindering offensive operations. Really, Russia squandered its last opportunity to win WW1 with a supposedly successful, but failed naval offensive to knock out the Ottomans and never recovered, along with the failures of the Riga, Lake Naroch, Brusilov, Baranovchi and Biltis Offensives and the only major offensive sized action launched by the Russians in 1917 would be the notorious Kerensky Offensive, which ended up as an epic failure and served as a catalyst for the German capture of Estonia and the Bolshevik Revolution. Working on the battleships Imperator Aleksandr I and Imperator Nikolai I was delayed after launch and they ended up in Ottoman hands, along with the remnants of the humiliated, shocked and war weary light units of the Black Sea Fleet.
Meanwhile, the Ottomans did take some precautions. True, they won a battle, but they had realized the value and danger of minefields and the only unit of capital ships left was their pride, Goeben. This was proven after the Goeben left port in January 1918, fought 2 monitors [replacing Renown class battlecruisers to be sent] and after sinking both 2, one to torpedo or minefield ambush and the other to an explosion, which would permanently end the battlecruiser concept in the Royal Navy, ran into a minefield and struck them, causing its near sinking. For effective purposes, the tiny Ottoman Navy was impotent, if not gone, despite their best efforts and luck received. Of course, the Ottomans threatened the Caucasian coast with capture in 1917 after landings on the Crimea supported by the Romanian Navy, the last Bulgarian and Ottoman escorts, Goeben and 2 submarines. Mutiny in the Black Sea Fleet would disrupt an attempt to oppose the landings. The Ukrainian Rebellion in conjunction with the Central Powers' 1917 Eastern Front Counter Offensive compounded Russia's problems.
The French Navy nevertheless was affected minimally by its participation the disaster. It had plenty of ships to be used, and the ships lost were among the most obsolete of the fleet. The oldest reserve battleships at Brest were transferred to the Mediterranean when U52, after sighting them in a row and escorted by 2 destroyers, sank a battleship. After his torpedoes sank the escorting destroyers, he put a final torpedo that sank the other battleship. Although the battleship losses were nothing in the strategic context, the losses would be the submarine's second great anti warship success after sinking 2 British warships in the 18/19 August 1916 action that decided its outcome. The Central Powers' exploitation of the 1916 offensive failures and subsequent failures would cause mass desertion and pave the road to 1917's Bolshevik Revolution.
The Ottomans would launch a counterattack at the British troops advancing from Gallipoli and supported by French battleships with the Goeben and its destroyer escort, along with the Ottoman troops placed in Constantinople during the crucial battle and sank the French battleships Suffren and Gaulois. The French would lose 3 pre dreadnoughts, in addition to one heavily damaged and later lost [, plus 8 destroyers to minefields or torpedoes]. The shock inflicted on the French Navy would force it to be more cautious in the Eastern Mediterranean, despite the heavy Ottoman losses of its remaining gunboats, a few destroyers, a coastal defence ship and a cruiser. With Goeben as the only ship of significance, the Ottoman Navy had to be cautious, but they could be proud of inflicting a massive defeat on the Russian Navy and forcing it to mutiny, along with increasing chaos that would lead to the first, but forgotten Russian Revolution, initial succeeding until a coup d' etat temporarily restored the Tsar Nicholas II as Russia's last emperor, with his insistence in continuing the war leading to the March Revolution.
Like the first Gallipoli Campaign, the corps would lead their way to Constantinople, but this time, it would be more of a raid/diversion to keep Gallipoli forces occupied. After the failure of the Bosphorus and 2nd Dardenelles naval assaults, the recall of the British Corps was ordered. However, only one division was off the beaches before the final Ottoman and German counteroffensive threw the British out for good, capturing some 10,000 prisoners and wrecking an entire division. A second Dardenelles gambit had failed.
Meanwhile, bad news from the Somme and Verdun, along with the collapse of Brusilov's Offensive, weren't helping the Entente either, especially with Romanian and Greek refusal to join the Entente. In fact, Romania would join the war on the Central Powers' side. True, the Germans were suffering heavily, but the Entente's miseries were even worse. And, 1917 would begin with more offensives that won't help collapsing Russia's fragile state, with the Bolsheviks receiving more support from the local population and causing its surrender. The details would be explored in more detailed in WW1: The Desperate Years Of Struggle From 1914 to 1920. [With the latter year being this scenario's ending year of WW1 itself, most of the Somme and Western Front details being covered in the Failure on the Somme]. The individual Ottoman and Bulgarian navies' submarines did score successes on unescorted Russian ships and a few, albeit smaller sized and insignificant Entente warships in the Mediterranean after Russia's November Armistice with the Central Powers, causing some trouble due to convoy escort necessities. Admiral Kolchak was imprisoned after capture and discredited when he returned to Russia in 1918, too disgraced to command an army and was executed by the Bolsheviks in 1919, after the failed defence of the Crimea. Mutinies and sabotage put an obsolete pre dreadnought and cruiser yacht out of commission with desertions and damage. The Russian armies and populace were affected by the defeats, with desertion rates rising by 5,000 each month and hindering offensive operations. Really, Russia squandered its last opportunity to win WW1 with a supposedly successful, but failed naval offensive to knock out the Ottomans and never recovered, along with the failures of the Riga, Lake Naroch, Brusilov, Baranovchi and Biltis Offensives and the only major offensive sized action launched by the Russians in 1917 would be the notorious Kerensky Offensive, which ended up as an epic failure and served as a catalyst for the German capture of Estonia and the Bolshevik Revolution. Working on the battleships Imperator Aleksandr I and Imperator Nikolai I was delayed after launch and they ended up in Ottoman hands, along with the remnants of the humiliated, shocked and war weary light units of the Black Sea Fleet.
Meanwhile, the Ottomans did take some precautions. True, they won a battle, but they had realized the value and danger of minefields and the only unit of capital ships left was their pride, Goeben. This was proven after the Goeben left port in January 1918, fought 2 monitors [replacing Renown class battlecruisers to be sent] and after sinking both 2, one to torpedo or minefield ambush and the other to an explosion, which would permanently end the battlecruiser concept in the Royal Navy, ran into a minefield and struck them, causing its near sinking. For effective purposes, the tiny Ottoman Navy was impotent, if not gone, despite their best efforts and luck received. Of course, the Ottomans threatened the Caucasian coast with capture in 1917 after landings on the Crimea supported by the Romanian Navy, the last Bulgarian and Ottoman escorts, Goeben and 2 submarines. Mutiny in the Black Sea Fleet would disrupt an attempt to oppose the landings. The Ukrainian Rebellion in conjunction with the Central Powers' 1917 Eastern Front Counter Offensive compounded Russia's problems.
The French Navy nevertheless was affected minimally by its participation the disaster. It had plenty of ships to be used, and the ships lost were among the most obsolete of the fleet. The oldest reserve battleships at Brest were transferred to the Mediterranean when U52, after sighting them in a row and escorted by 2 destroyers, sank a battleship. After his torpedoes sank the escorting destroyers, he put a final torpedo that sank the other battleship. Although the battleship losses were nothing in the strategic context, the losses would be the submarine's second great anti warship success after sinking 2 British warships in the 18/19 August 1916 action that decided its outcome. The Central Powers' exploitation of the 1916 offensive failures and subsequent failures would cause mass desertion and pave the road to 1917's Bolshevik Revolution.
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OMG, Rusisan can't beat these superhuman Germans, right? OTL Breslau with luck escaped from Imperatritsa Mariya. In action few of Breslaus were killed by splinters. Or before it hit the mine. Less luck and its going down.
As to rail connection. Imperatritsa Mariya's main guns had range 29 km!
BooNZ
Banned
No, I questioned how a Breslau was "caught" by a Russian dreadnaught - this was relevant because the Breslau survived numerous actions against the Russians over the course of the war before being sunk by the British. The Breslau was also faster than the said Russian dreadnaught and its demise deserved more than an OP hand wave...
Yes and that would be a dreadnaught, not the pre-dreadnaught as raised by the OP. In any case, even in range, firing blind at a target 20km away is unlikely to be a productive use of ammunition. I thought all naval firepower would have been best used to support the Bosphorus landing where...
...an ill equipped and untrained Russian troops were attempting an opposed landing against established fortresses, where the defenders would outnumber the attackers more than 5-1.
Revolutions of 1916 and 1917
October Strikes of 1916
In the imperial capital city of Petrograd, a series of strikes that took place amid a growing revolutionary situation in Russia. The strikes were mainly political and reflected the mass protest of the proletariat against the antipopular policies of tsarism, against the war, and against the critical shortage of food.
The revolutions began in late September and early October, the capital was hit by spontaneous food riots, accompanied by the sacking of stores. Striving to give the movement organization and conscious direction, the Petrograd Bolsheviks attempted to explain to workers the reasons for the food crisis. They called upon the working class to attend mass meetings and demonstrations and to widen their strike activities. The losses of a Russian Army and its last fleet, plus the failure of the grand offensive against the Austrians by a later disillusioned Imperialist General who changed his opinions on hearing the failures of his follies.
The October Strikes began on October 17 at the large metal-working plants in the Vyborg district. The strikers’ actions were supported by revolutionary soldiers of the 181st Reserve Infantry Regiment. The strikers and soldiers were dispersed only by the arrival of detachments of the Moscow Guard Regiment. On that and following days, the strike spread to enterprises in the Petrograd, Vasil’evskii Island, and Moscow districts and became a city-wide political strike. The number of strikers exceeded 83,000. Concluding that the aim of the strike had been attained, the St. Petersburg committee of the RSDLP called a halt to the strike, which ended on the morning of October 21.
However, the revolutionary mood continued to grow rapidly, as was evidenced by a second strike that began on October 26. This second strike was sparked by news of the trial, scheduled to begin that day, of 130 soldiers from the 181st Regiment and of members of the Kronstadt Squadron group of the RSDLP. The St. Petersburg committee of the RSDLP called upon the proletariat of the capital to stage a three-day political strike in defense of the lives of the revolutionary sailors and soldiers. On hearing of the news of the imminent 'glorious proletariat revoluton and liberation', the sailors broke out and the Baltic Fleet's remnants almost defected when czarist senior officers broke it up by impounding the vessels. The strike was accompanied by mass meetings and demonstrations in the Vyborg, Vasil’evskii Island, and Narva districts; there were also clashes between workers, revolutionaries, police and gendarmes.
On October 27 and 28, the commander of the Petrograd Military District ordered the closing of 20 large enterprises and the impounding of several ships for “an indefinite period” in the hope of ending the strike; 39,300 oppressed workers lost their jobs. The traditional and at that time of poorer quality meat, soup and noodles meal was suspended until the revolts stopped and later, it was discovered that there were bugs in a ship's kitchen, which might be a delliberate Tsarist punishment for the sailors. Answers to the sailors' questions stated that the loss of Ukrainian farmland, Latvia, revolts and famine were responsible in a somewhat incompetent manner. In response, the workers heeded an appeal by the St. Petersburg committee of the RSDLP and agreed to strike until the lockout was ended. More than 91,000 men took part in the strike; the wave of political protests by the Petrograd proletariat saved the lives of the revolutionary sailors and compelled the authorities to end the lockout on November 1 and to reopen the plants. Strike-related demonstrations also took place in the industrial cities of the Central Zone, the Donbas, Transcaucasia, the Volga Region, and the Ukraine. The October Strikes of 1916 were a prologue to the bourgeois democratic revolution in Russia.
[Source: The Great Soviet Encyclopedia of 1979. Material might be ideologically biased towards Communism.]
February Revolution
After the October strikes of 1916, which nearly took control of St. Petersburg, morale and trust in the corrupt Tsar decreased. After the mass arrest of several political figures and stricter censorship laws implied, the roots for a second revolution were sowed. The Duma (lower house of parliament), composed of liberal deputies, warned Tsar Nicholas II of the impending danger and counselled him to form a new constitutional government, like the one he had dissolved after some short-term attempts in the aftermath of the 1905 Revolution. The Tsar ignored the Duma's advice for the second time, in his delusions. The famine in 1916 was severe and exacerbated by the loss of Ukrainian farmland. Meanwhile, refugees from German occupied Europe were entering Russia by the millions, decreasing morale and supplies. The Russian economy was blocked from trading with the world market by the war itself. With his measures, Nicholas lost the support of his people, from the nobles to the landless peasants by failing to reach an agreement with the Duma and further paved the way for revolution.
The revolution began with factory strikes on 7 March at Putilov, Petrograd's largest industrial plant, following several demonstrations. The firing of strikers and closing of shops, along with unemployment, occurred after some strikers fired on the Tsar and his bodyguards, killing one of them. The next day, a series of meetings and rallies were held for International Women's Day, which gradually turned into economic and political gatherings with prominent mutineers from 1916 being released on the first days and contributing to the chaos. Demonstrations were organised to demand bread, and these were supported by the industrial working force who considered them a reason for continuing the strikes. The women workers marched to nearby factories bringing out over 60,000 workers on strike. By 10 March, virtually every industrial enterprise in Petrograd had been shut down, together with many commercial and service enterprises. With unemployment and chaos raging, the intensity of the strikes increased. Students, white-collar workers and teachers joined the workers in the streets and at public meetings. In the streets, red banners appeared and the crowds chanted slogans such as, "Down with the imperialist war!" "Down with the Tsar!" "Down with his shameful German wife and her treason!" "Down with Protopopov! [The Minister of Interior]".
To avert the riots, Tsar Nicholas turned to his imperial army recruits. At least 200,000 thousand troops were in the capital city of the Russian Empire, but most were elderly, teenage, ill or working class and poor quality reservists recalled to proper duty from retirement or reserve. The morale of the Petrograd Garrison was low and most of the officers either deserted or were incompetent and there was a severe shortage of them in ready advance. Out of respect for the crowds of demonstrators, which included females, people not fit for military service, very poor and homeless inhabitants and grieving revolutionaries who were suffering, the 20,000 loyal troops refused to fire after seeing officers seem to desert or hold their gunfire. When the Tsar decided to halt the revolting by gunfire force and execution on 11 March, thousands of troops and officers joined the revolutionaries.
On 7 March, the Tsar returned to his frontline base and threatened to shoot disobedient soldiers and [junior] officers. After the eruption of violence against his unpopular rule, Mikhail Rodzianko, the chairman of the Duma, sent a telegram of warning to the Tsar of the chaos and disorder.
The Army Chiefs and the ministers who had come to advise the Tsar suggested that he abdicate the throne. He did so on 15 March [O.S. 2 March], on behalf of himself and his son, Tsarevich Alexei. Nicholas nominated his brother, the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich, to succeed him. But the Grand Duke realised that he would have little support as ruler, so he declined the crown on 16 March [O.S. 3 March], stating that he would take it only if that was the consensus of democratic action by the Russian Constituent Assembly, which shall define form of government for Russia. Six days later, Nicholas, no longer Tsar and addressed with contempt by the sentries as "Nicholas Romanov", was reunited with his family at the Alexander Palace at Tsarskoye Selo. He and his family and loyal retainers were placed under protective custody by the Provisional Government. The Romanov monarchy in Russia came to an ignomitous end after 304 years of rule. [Taken from the Wikipedia February Revolution [1917] article.]
The most direct consequence of the revolution was a widespread atmosphere of elation and excitement in Petrograd. On 16 March [O.S. 3 March], a provisional republican government was announced. The center-left was well represented, with its politicians taking the majority of seats, and the government was initially chaired by a liberal aristocrat, Prince Georgy Yevgenyevich Lvov, an aristocratic man with no connections to any official party. The Bolshevim [or Leninist Marxist] socialists had formed their rival body, the Petrograd Soviet (or workers' council) four days earlier. The Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Government shared huge dual power over Russia. The Petrograd Soviet had the stronger case for power as it controlled the workers and the soldiers, but it didn't want to be involved in 'bourgeois and uncertain' administration and bureaucracy. On the other hand, the Provisional Government chafed at not having total rule over every aspect of the government, and made many attempts to assure the Petrograd Soviet joined with the Provisional Government.
Between February and April, the Provisional Government, which replaced the Tsar, cooperated reluctantly with the Petrograd Soviet, its initial ally against the Tsar but later its biggest enemy. This arrangement became known as the "Dual Authority" or "Dual Power". However, the de facto supremacy of the Petrograd Soviet was asserted as early as 14 March [O.S. 1 March] (before the creation of the Provisional Government itself), when the Petrograd Soviet issued Order No. 1:
October Strikes of 1916
In the imperial capital city of Petrograd, a series of strikes that took place amid a growing revolutionary situation in Russia. The strikes were mainly political and reflected the mass protest of the proletariat against the antipopular policies of tsarism, against the war, and against the critical shortage of food.
The revolutions began in late September and early October, the capital was hit by spontaneous food riots, accompanied by the sacking of stores. Striving to give the movement organization and conscious direction, the Petrograd Bolsheviks attempted to explain to workers the reasons for the food crisis. They called upon the working class to attend mass meetings and demonstrations and to widen their strike activities. The losses of a Russian Army and its last fleet, plus the failure of the grand offensive against the Austrians by a later disillusioned Imperialist General who changed his opinions on hearing the failures of his follies.
The October Strikes began on October 17 at the large metal-working plants in the Vyborg district. The strikers’ actions were supported by revolutionary soldiers of the 181st Reserve Infantry Regiment. The strikers and soldiers were dispersed only by the arrival of detachments of the Moscow Guard Regiment. On that and following days, the strike spread to enterprises in the Petrograd, Vasil’evskii Island, and Moscow districts and became a city-wide political strike. The number of strikers exceeded 83,000. Concluding that the aim of the strike had been attained, the St. Petersburg committee of the RSDLP called a halt to the strike, which ended on the morning of October 21.
However, the revolutionary mood continued to grow rapidly, as was evidenced by a second strike that began on October 26. This second strike was sparked by news of the trial, scheduled to begin that day, of 130 soldiers from the 181st Regiment and of members of the Kronstadt Squadron group of the RSDLP. The St. Petersburg committee of the RSDLP called upon the proletariat of the capital to stage a three-day political strike in defense of the lives of the revolutionary sailors and soldiers. On hearing of the news of the imminent 'glorious proletariat revoluton and liberation', the sailors broke out and the Baltic Fleet's remnants almost defected when czarist senior officers broke it up by impounding the vessels. The strike was accompanied by mass meetings and demonstrations in the Vyborg, Vasil’evskii Island, and Narva districts; there were also clashes between workers, revolutionaries, police and gendarmes.
On October 27 and 28, the commander of the Petrograd Military District ordered the closing of 20 large enterprises and the impounding of several ships for “an indefinite period” in the hope of ending the strike; 39,300 oppressed workers lost their jobs. The traditional and at that time of poorer quality meat, soup and noodles meal was suspended until the revolts stopped and later, it was discovered that there were bugs in a ship's kitchen, which might be a delliberate Tsarist punishment for the sailors. Answers to the sailors' questions stated that the loss of Ukrainian farmland, Latvia, revolts and famine were responsible in a somewhat incompetent manner. In response, the workers heeded an appeal by the St. Petersburg committee of the RSDLP and agreed to strike until the lockout was ended. More than 91,000 men took part in the strike; the wave of political protests by the Petrograd proletariat saved the lives of the revolutionary sailors and compelled the authorities to end the lockout on November 1 and to reopen the plants. Strike-related demonstrations also took place in the industrial cities of the Central Zone, the Donbas, Transcaucasia, the Volga Region, and the Ukraine. The October Strikes of 1916 were a prologue to the bourgeois democratic revolution in Russia.
[Source: The Great Soviet Encyclopedia of 1979. Material might be ideologically biased towards Communism.]
February Revolution
After the October strikes of 1916, which nearly took control of St. Petersburg, morale and trust in the corrupt Tsar decreased. After the mass arrest of several political figures and stricter censorship laws implied, the roots for a second revolution were sowed. The Duma (lower house of parliament), composed of liberal deputies, warned Tsar Nicholas II of the impending danger and counselled him to form a new constitutional government, like the one he had dissolved after some short-term attempts in the aftermath of the 1905 Revolution. The Tsar ignored the Duma's advice for the second time, in his delusions. The famine in 1916 was severe and exacerbated by the loss of Ukrainian farmland. Meanwhile, refugees from German occupied Europe were entering Russia by the millions, decreasing morale and supplies. The Russian economy was blocked from trading with the world market by the war itself. With his measures, Nicholas lost the support of his people, from the nobles to the landless peasants by failing to reach an agreement with the Duma and further paved the way for revolution.
The revolution began with factory strikes on 7 March at Putilov, Petrograd's largest industrial plant, following several demonstrations. The firing of strikers and closing of shops, along with unemployment, occurred after some strikers fired on the Tsar and his bodyguards, killing one of them. The next day, a series of meetings and rallies were held for International Women's Day, which gradually turned into economic and political gatherings with prominent mutineers from 1916 being released on the first days and contributing to the chaos. Demonstrations were organised to demand bread, and these were supported by the industrial working force who considered them a reason for continuing the strikes. The women workers marched to nearby factories bringing out over 60,000 workers on strike. By 10 March, virtually every industrial enterprise in Petrograd had been shut down, together with many commercial and service enterprises. With unemployment and chaos raging, the intensity of the strikes increased. Students, white-collar workers and teachers joined the workers in the streets and at public meetings. In the streets, red banners appeared and the crowds chanted slogans such as, "Down with the imperialist war!" "Down with the Tsar!" "Down with his shameful German wife and her treason!" "Down with Protopopov! [The Minister of Interior]".
To avert the riots, Tsar Nicholas turned to his imperial army recruits. At least 200,000 thousand troops were in the capital city of the Russian Empire, but most were elderly, teenage, ill or working class and poor quality reservists recalled to proper duty from retirement or reserve. The morale of the Petrograd Garrison was low and most of the officers either deserted or were incompetent and there was a severe shortage of them in ready advance. Out of respect for the crowds of demonstrators, which included females, people not fit for military service, very poor and homeless inhabitants and grieving revolutionaries who were suffering, the 20,000 loyal troops refused to fire after seeing officers seem to desert or hold their gunfire. When the Tsar decided to halt the revolting by gunfire force and execution on 11 March, thousands of troops and officers joined the revolutionaries.
On 7 March, the Tsar returned to his frontline base and threatened to shoot disobedient soldiers and [junior] officers. After the eruption of violence against his unpopular rule, Mikhail Rodzianko, the chairman of the Duma, sent a telegram of warning to the Tsar of the chaos and disorder.
Nicholas' response on 12 March [O.S. 27 February], perhaps based on the Empress' earlier letter to him that the reaction to concern about Petrograd was excessive as he believed that capital punishment, imminent takeover by the Tsar's loyal troops and officers and God's [supposed] blessings over his devout Orthodox faith, was one of irritation that "again, this fat Rodzianko has written me lots of rubbish, to which I shall not even deign to reply." Meanwhile, events were happening in Petrograd. The bulk of the garrison mutinied, starting with the Volynsky Life Guards regiment. In addition, the Cossack units that the government had come to rely on for crowd control, began to show signs that they supported the suffering people. Although few actively joined the rioting, many loyal and senior officers were either shot or went into hiding; the ability of the garrison to hold back the protests was all but eliminated, vestiges of the Tsarist regime were rapidly removed around the city and governmental authority in the capital collapsed — exacerbated by the fact that Nicholas had prorogued the Duma that morning, leaving it with no legal authority to act. The response of the Duma, urged on by the liberal bloc, was to establish a Temporary Committee to reinstate law and order; meanwhile, the socialist parties re-established the Petrograd Soviet, first created during the 1905 revolution, to represent workers and soldiers. The remaining loyal units switched allegiance the next day.
The Army Chiefs and the ministers who had come to advise the Tsar suggested that he abdicate the throne. He did so on 15 March [O.S. 2 March], on behalf of himself and his son, Tsarevich Alexei. Nicholas nominated his brother, the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich, to succeed him. But the Grand Duke realised that he would have little support as ruler, so he declined the crown on 16 March [O.S. 3 March], stating that he would take it only if that was the consensus of democratic action by the Russian Constituent Assembly, which shall define form of government for Russia. Six days later, Nicholas, no longer Tsar and addressed with contempt by the sentries as "Nicholas Romanov", was reunited with his family at the Alexander Palace at Tsarskoye Selo. He and his family and loyal retainers were placed under protective custody by the Provisional Government. The Romanov monarchy in Russia came to an ignomitous end after 304 years of rule. [Taken from the Wikipedia February Revolution [1917] article.]
The most direct consequence of the revolution was a widespread atmosphere of elation and excitement in Petrograd. On 16 March [O.S. 3 March], a provisional republican government was announced. The center-left was well represented, with its politicians taking the majority of seats, and the government was initially chaired by a liberal aristocrat, Prince Georgy Yevgenyevich Lvov, an aristocratic man with no connections to any official party. The Bolshevim [or Leninist Marxist] socialists had formed their rival body, the Petrograd Soviet (or workers' council) four days earlier. The Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Government shared huge dual power over Russia. The Petrograd Soviet had the stronger case for power as it controlled the workers and the soldiers, but it didn't want to be involved in 'bourgeois and uncertain' administration and bureaucracy. On the other hand, the Provisional Government chafed at not having total rule over every aspect of the government, and made many attempts to assure the Petrograd Soviet joined with the Provisional Government.
Between February and April, the Provisional Government, which replaced the Tsar, cooperated reluctantly with the Petrograd Soviet, its initial ally against the Tsar but later its biggest enemy. This arrangement became known as the "Dual Authority" or "Dual Power". However, the de facto supremacy of the Petrograd Soviet was asserted as early as 14 March [O.S. 1 March] (before the creation of the Provisional Government itself), when the Petrograd Soviet issued Order No. 1:
Order No. 1 thus guaranteed that the Dual Authority developed the Soviet's conditions. As the Provisional Government was not a publicly elected body (having been self-proclaimed by committee members of the old Duma), it lacked the political legitimacy to question this arrangement and instead arranged for elections to be held later.
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Kerensky's Offensive failure
By the middle of 1917, the Russian army stood at a crucial point in history, hat in hand, asking for direction as to which path was the best to follow. The path behind showed the ebb and flood of bloodstained footprints from nearly three years of war and could not be turned back upon. Before it laid three paths, each leading toward a different future. Adding to its confusion as to which route to follow, there were the throngs of people who attempted to give directions. One group of would be directors said that the soldiers should remember their place and that no reforms were necessary; only the winning of the war mattered. Some other advisors talked about land reform but only after the war was over. The most vocal arguers told the soldiers to vote with their feet and go home; the war would take care of itself. At this moment of despair Alexander Fedorevich Kerensky stepped into the crossroad. Quickly, he pushed aside all the would-be directors and called upon his revolutionary comrades to remember their obligation to the revolution and Russian pride. He asked the soldiers to take up their weapons and free the ancient soil from the German invaders so that the people's revolution could nurture itself. The mood was infectious, but uplifting and for a brief moment, the soldiers' confusion disappeared.
Kerensky, minister of justice for the Russian Provisional Government which had replaced the Romanov dynasty, assumed the additional responsibility of minister of war in May 1917. To understand the scope of his new role, the minister set off for the war zone to review the troops and assess their potential for continuing the war. His first stop was at Kamenez-Podolsk where he consulted with the commander of the Southwest Front, General Alexei Brusilov. Together they motored from one end of the front to the other.
To his amazement, Kerensky found the combat areas devoid of the roaring sound of artillery and the clatter of small arms fire. In many places, the trenches were almost deserted. The soldiers who could be found were in tatters and complained of not getting their just rations. When Kerensky asked where their comrades were, he was told that they were attending political meetings. He quickly surmised that the rank and file could be sorted into two groups: those who wanted to do the heroic things needed by war and the traitors such as the Bolsheviks(1). The officers whom Kerensky met were lumped into three categories: the majority who were confused, corrupted by Tsarist or Bolshevik and unable to lead, a minority who were sabotaging the liberal revolution, and a smaller group who knew how to approach and lead the revolutionary soldier. Kerensky attended many of the political meetings with the soldiers. At one such meeting, while waiting his turn to speak he realized that what the army needed was inspiration. Slogans! When it came time for him to speak he was ready. From the stage he called out to the soldiers(2), "Forward to the battle for freedom" and "I summon you not to feast but to triumphant death"(3). Thunderous applause! The slogans had had an effect but Kerensky knew that the battlefront was not the appropriate place to begin campaigns of brainwashing in front of the artillery shells and shootings. Something more radical had to be done, and was necessary back home in Russia's most important and biggest cities such as Kiev, Petrograd and Moscow, with the riots, anti war demonstrations and chaos influencing the soldiers.
As the three day tour closed, Kerensky and Brusilov fell to discussing the army's condition in the back seat of the auto that was returning them to the general's headquarters. Both agreed that Kerensky's presence had been well received by the soldiers but they both knew that the impact would be no more than a mosquito bite's itch in days to come. The general and the minister surmised that the soldiers of the Southwest Front were incapable of assuming any further military action as long as the political turmoil existed at the front yet Kerensky was an optimist and pragmatist. As the miles wore on and the countryside faded into darkness, both of the car's occupants came to the same conclusion – the only thing that would restore the army's morale was a successful offensive. Kerensky and Brusilov were of the opinion that once the shooting began the soldiers would ignore the calls for political meetings and return to the trenches to support the comrades who chose to fight on(4).
Preparation for the offensive followed many paths. While Kerensky navigated the political road, Brusilov followed other paths formulating troop concentrations, objectives, and bringing up supplies to meet the planned beginning date of 1 July. The general's duties had increased three fold since the tour with Kerensky. Before his departure for the capital, Kerensky had appointed Brusilov chief of the army's staff. This replacement of leaders without regard to military necessity was an omen of things to come. Brusilov had a little over 30 days to ascertain which officers he could trust to lead a demoralized army in an offensive designed to remotivate the Russian fighting force.
In Petrograd, Kerensky found a mixed atmosphere regarding the continuation of the war. The two most prominent political parties had stirred the social upheaval of the revolution into a veritable morass. The Bolsheviks were adamant about ending the war immediately. The Social Revolutionaries' representatives were making pro-German speeches and were in direct communication with the German government due to their opinion of the anti-German war. The minister poured himself into the turmoil. He reminded his comrades of Russia's obligation to its allies. French and British delegates had asked the Russian Provisional Government to hold out until the end of next year, 1918, when the British would gain superiority in ships with the French against the Germans and the British and Russians would launch simultaneous offensives to defeat the Ottomans. What was needed, the allies said, was a final large offensive that would continue to tie down Central Powers' divisions and wreck as much of the Austrian strength as possible. The added time would allow the British in the east and Italians to deploy their army against any German build up that would occur should Russia feel it necessary to drop out of the war with the surrender of the Bulgarians and the wrecking of Ottomans and Austrians. Kerensky went on to say that the Revolution was having an effect among the Central Powers. Within the Austro-Hungarian army, Slavic units on the Southwest Front were agitating so much that the Austro-Hungarian command had moved a number of divisions to the Italian front. Pilsudski's Polish Legion had already stopped fighting due to . Additionally, the Turkish and Bulgarian governments had sent out peace feelers. The minister's persuasive speeches bore fruit. On 15 June, the All Russian Congress, Bolsheviks refusing to vote, approved an offensive drive. Soon after, the Cossack Congress added their blessing. Kerensky had won the approval he needed but disparaging news came from the front. A number of soldiers and workers committees were still debating if the units they represented should involve themselves in an offensive.
Brusilov's problems started at a fronts' commanders' meeting on 11 June when the general found out that the soldiers of the Northwest and Western Fronts, roughly from Riga to the Galician border, were unreliable and would probably not agree to be a part of any battle no matter how small it might be. On the Western Front alone, the Tenth Army was 63,000 soldiers short while in the Second Army, soldiers' committees interfered in all aspects of administration down to divisional and regimental levels(5). The only good news from the fronts commanders was that the artillery contingents were very reliable. Brusilov realized that the offensive would have to be limited to the Southwest Front, his old command, where his personal prestige among the men still held sway. Therefore, the offensive's strategic target was to inflict as many casualties as possible on the Austro-Hungarians in Galicia with the intention of possibly forcing them out of the war. Tactically, the goal was to capture Lutsk again which would disrupt communication and transportation between the German north and the Austro-Hungarian south. The clear limiting factors of the offensive were that there would be no diversional attacks in the north to keep the Germans from reinforcing their ally and that there would be no pool of reserves to bring forward should the offensive prove successful. Desertions, although decreased since April, had reduced unit strengths by one half to one third. Added to these limitations was a command problem. But, the German threat to the Baltic would include an additional small scale attack to divert German attention from the Austrian front.
When Kerensky had so astutely lumped the officers into three groups during his tour, both he and Brusilov had made notes regarding those who were the ineffectuals. Just three weeks before the offensive was to begin Brusilov and Kerensky began a policy of replacement. The general's hirings and firings were done based on which of his subordinates he could rely on to do the job; but the minister's were based on political factors. Army, corps, and the majority of divisional commanders were replaced(6). Kerensky had wanted to replace the negatively thinking officers with more positive and forward thinking people; however, the firings brought about a backlash that neither the general nor the minister had expected. Mass resignations(7). Officers at every level saw the firings as a threat to the officer corps. Some claimed that old wounds needed rest and recuperation while others simply followed what the private soldiers were doing and went home. In the final week of preparation many units found themselves led by ill prepared noncommissioned officers or men whom their fellow soldiers had elected into officership. Incompetent officers had replaced allegedly ineffectuals. As for the soldiers, they were back at the crossroads trying to decide which new path to follow while political advisers once again harangued them from all sides. To once again sweep the confusion away, Kerensky went to the front on 27 June in support of the soldiers. Artillery preparation began that evening.
On the surface, Kerensky's earlier optimism about the Russian soldiers going back to war as soon as the guns sounded again was paying off. Unlike the May trip when the minister had noted a lack of activity, cannons now roared and machine guns clattered. Everywhere men rushed about gathering supplies that they would need for the coming attack. Vast stores of ammunition, arms, food, and uniforms were available. The supplies that Russia's allies had begun shipping as early as 1915 had finally reached their destinations at the front(8). But, below this veneer surface was the seething confusion of committee politics.
Many of the committee members were asking why they should risk their lives when the war was so close to an end, especially in defeat for them. As the shells whistled overhead in their flight to the enemy's trenches, Kerensky hammered slogans at the soldiers in meeting after meeting. The minister's speeches electrified the Potiiskii Regiment whose members promised to support the battle to their last breathes. Those who posed questions about the offensive's necessity were ridiculed by their comrades. Kerensky labeled one soldier who was particularly outspoken as a coward and ordered him to leave the front immediately. Taken by surprise by the minister's action, the soldier begged to be allowed to stay and fight(9). The crescendo of artillery fire grew as the hours passed. Kerensky waited for the battle to begin at Eleventh Army's observation post.
Since the February Revolution, the Central Powers had had a policy of wait and see(10). Both the Vienna and Berlin army general staffs had prohibited any type of action except in response to a Russian assault. As a consequence, the entire front from the Baltic to Romania had entered into a state of suspended animation. The silence that pervaded the atmosphere was interrupted only by the shouts of one side's soldiers to the others. Although violence was prohibited, fraternization was not. Opposing soldiers met in no-man's-land, exchanged gifts, and talked about the war. Central Powers' soldiers were well schooled in what they were to say: Russians were encouraged to defect or to desert. They also emphasized that the war was of the tsar's doing and the British and French were perpetuating it at the cost of Russian soldiers' lives. Thinned ranks clearly showed that desertion took its toll but defections did not increase. From April to June, the prisoners of war held by the Central Powers increased by only 17,582(11), a slight increase from the 15,000s that had been taken monthly before the Revolution. However, the quiet and friendliness came to an abrupt halt as Brusilov's battle preparation and Kerensky's speeches took hold.
On 12 June, General Max Hoffmann, German chief of staff for the Eastern Front, noted in his diary that the "Russians are getting lively"(12). Aerial photography confirmed the renewed activity. Bridges leading to the front as well as narrow gauge railways were built, repaired, or upgraded in broad daylight and not camouflaged. This was unlike the painstakingly, intricate preparations Brusilov's staff had carried out to mask their successful offensive in the summer of 1916 on the same front. Prior to that attack, Brusilov had ordered each army to designate a corps and a division within that corps to show signs of increased activity. The results of this spreading out of actions confused the Central Powers' staff officers and they were unable to determine where reserves should be placed to thwart the offensive. The Russian staff had also targeted numerous objectives in that drive so that the front was broad rather than narrow with predictable directions. This time, aerial photos and defectors showed that the Russian direction would be toward the Austro-Hungarians in Galicia with the intention of capturing Lutsk and possibly encircling the German Südarmée which was in the center of the front. Hoffmann had proposed a strike of approximately five divisions in this same area, through Tarnopol, shortly after news arrived of the February Revolution but the general staff had decided not to carry out the plan.
On 29 June 1917, the Russian army was better prepared than at any time during the war for an offensive, except for the Brusilov Offensive. The two main thrusts of the attack were to be on the north and south of the Southwestern Front. In the north, the Eighth Army was to attack the Austro-Hungarian Second Army at its hinge with the Südarmée. In the south, the Seventh Army was to assault the juncture of the Austro-Hungarian Third and Seventh Armies. While these two operations were going on the Russian Sixth Army would frontally assault the Südarmée with the intention of keeping it from reinforcing their ally either to the north or the south. Although the entire front was nearly 200 kilometers long, the foci were less than 50 kilometers each. Along the whole front Brusilov's staff had arranged 40 infantry and 8 cavalry divisions, mostly of Finnish, Siberian, and Caucasian origins, along with 800 light, 158 medium, and 370 heavy guns(13). Opposing the Russian hordes were 26 infantry divisions, one cavalry brigade, and 988 guns of which only 60 were of a heavy caliber(14). Most of the Russian artillery had recently arrived from Arkhangelsk and Vladivostok and had either Japanese or English markings. Along with the cannon had come more than enough shells both from the allies and Russian factories. Small arms too were in abundance as a result of American and Japanese shipments. This glut of materiel showed in the first few hours of the preparation barrage. Central Powers' observers noted that the cannonade was the most intense they had witnessed and that its duration was unprecedented. However, the shells dropped on positions that were devoid of manpower. Well warned of the offensive through deserters and the Petrograd news media, the Central Powers' staffs had evacuated the front line trenches. The barrage lasted two days. Strangely enough, most anticipated artillery duels did not erupt; the Central Powers guns were mostly silent.
In the morning of 1 July the artillery stopped. Kerensky, looking through binoculars from the Elghth Army's observation post, faced a few anxious moments. He was unsure if the soldiers would leave their trenches. His answer soon came as a few specks appeared in no-mans'-land. These were followed by a few more and then there was a general onslaught. Kerensky noted, however, that the soldiers advanced without artillery support or did the artillery respond when the Austro-Hungarians' cannons finally opened fire. The counter fire drove Kerensky and the Eighth Army's staff into a bunker to await further reports.
News that the Austro-Hungarian 19th Division, made up primarily of Czechs, was in the trenches dictated Eighth Army's direction. The Russians had placed a battalion of former Czech prisoners of war who had gone over to them across from the Czech division. In the calm before the battle, words were traded between the two groups. When the assault began, the 3000 men of the 19th Division surrendered to their fellow Czechs(15). The result was a huge gap in the Second Army's line. Resistance to the Russian push was minimal. The Zoraisky Regiment took a village and the Fourth Finnish Division, assisted by the Czech brigade, moved into good positions on the heights of Dubno. After the first day of fighting, the Russians had taken nearly 18,000 prisoners along with 21 guns and 16 machine guns(16). Kerensky was jubilant and telegraphed Petrograd to recommend that the divisions be awarded the Red Banner; however, as the hours wore on, no further reports of advances were received along the Eleventh's front. Kerensky's mood changed to disappointment and he left for the capital.
The Russian Sixth Army in the center of the line was the strongest of the three engaged in the offensive. It had 20 infantry divisions along with four cavalry divisions. This should have been enough manpower to carry the Südarmée which was comprised of 10 infantry divisions, four German and six Austro-Hungarian, but the task was more than they could accomplish. The attack began on 4 July instead of in conjunction with the assault on the Second Army. The delay undoubtedly alerted their enemy. The Russians, after occupying the abandon front trenches, ran into a heavy fusillade of artillery and machine gun fire. Losses were horrendous. In a number of places, not even the abandon trenches could be held. Nevertheless, by the end of the day, the Sixth Army had gained a few kilometers but there were no reports of multitudes of prisoners being taken or materiel captured. The Südarmée still held the line.
On the left flank, Seventh Army's progress was more successful than the other two armies. Eight infantry divisions and four cavalry division attacked the Austro-Hungarian Third Army consisting of six infantry divisions on 7 July. The Russians exploited the gaps creating by the abandonment of the front line defenses and created a salient that bulged ahead to capture Lutsk on the following day. Fearing the worst, the Austro-Hungarian commander threw in German reserves to shore up the line. Hoffmann had placed these soldiers in reserve to be used when the Russian advance waned. Sent in too soon, they were chewed up and the Russian moved on. After three days fighting, the Eighth Army had netted approximately 10,000 prisoners and 80 artillery pieces(17).
The Central Powers' reaction to the Russian offensive was, at best, reserved. When First Quartermaster General Erich Ludendorff received reports of the attacks he quickly telephoned Hoffmann, but the conversation was not centered on containing the drive. Instead, Ludendorff asked if Hoffmann still thought a drive through Tarnopol would be successful and how many divisions would he need to accomplish the task. Hoffmann felt that the assault would succeed and asked for four divisions(18). Ludendorff gave the go ahead for the drive and promised six divisions, if all could be spared from the French and Belgian fronts, in 14 days. However, a major French offensive was ongoing, although defeated within a week's time. Hoffmann noted in his diary on 1 July that "the Russians are attacking" and he hoped that they would keep it up for eight to 10 days. Such a duration would extend the Russian supply and communication lines to the point of breaking; however, within a few days the offensive was already showing faltering signs.
The recapture of Lutsk on 7 July severed the rail link between Kowel and Brody. By the end of the day, the Russians had crossed the forests and were assaulting Guwno which the Austro-Hungarians, now without reserves, were forced to abandon. The following day, bolstered by the newly arrived Bavarian Cavalry Division, the Reserve Jaeger Guard Battalion, the Reserve Guard Shützen Battalion and an armored train, the Dual Monarchies' soldiers attempted to retake the town. The counterattack was initially successful but the Russians, with superior numbers and flashing bayonets in house to house fighting, soon forced their enemies out of the town. The retreating Central Powers' soldiers pulled back to the left bank of a tributary of the Dniester River where they managed to hold the Russians with the aid of heavy rains that turned the otherwise tranquil streams in the area into raging torrents and made roads impassable.
The promised German divisions, only four could be spared from the west, began arriving on 9 July and were massed in front of the Russian Eleventh Army. These divisions were the 1st Guard, 2nd Guard, 5th and 6th Divisions. The two Guard divisions were designated as the lead elements of the counteroffensive. The start date was to be 15 July but the heavy rains that had stopped the Russian advance also caused a postponement to 19 July.
In eight days of fighting the Russian Seventh Army had created a gigantic salient in the Central Powers' line.The salient had compressed the Austro-Hungarian Third Army against the flank of the Südarmée threatening that organization's real echelons. Disregarding logical tactical thinking, the Südarmée did not pull back to avoid encirclement. Had it done so, Kerensky and Brusilov would have achieved the victory they were seeking and possibly reformed the Russian army to better protect the fledgling Republic from Bolshevik take over. Instead, the Südarmée stood firm as did the Austro-Hungarian Seventh whose communication with Third Army had nearly been severed. The salient, rather than becoming a means for defeating the Südarmée, became a trap for the Russians.
South of the salient, the Austro-Hungarian Seventh Army had no one to fight. On 15 July they began probing the Russian line along the Lomnitza River. To their amazement, the Russians pulled back from the Lomnitza and took up positions on the Lodziany River. Sensing that the Russian positions were lightly held, the Austro-Hungarians made a concerted effort along a line from Novica to the Lodziany River to Kraisne. Novica was taken. Fresh Russian reserves countered and retook the town but Bavarian and Croatian units took the heights above the village. Two attempts to dislodge the Central Powers' soldiers failed. To avoid the entrapment of their men who were west of the village, the Russians abandoned the captured surrounding villages on 16 July. In the north, Hoffmann applied the coupe de maine.
The 1st and 2nd Guard carried the Russians' first defense line at Brzesany on 19 July at the point where the salient was hinged with the Russian Seventh Army and pushed forward(19). The effect of the attack was felt all along the line. Under pressure from the south and the north, the Russians withdrew from the positions west of Halicz. To keep the withdrawal from turning into a rout, Eighth Army's staff moved the Dagestani, Circassian, and Kabardian Regiments ahead. These fresh troops encouraged those who were withdrawing and for a few brief moments, the Central Powers' soldiers were held at bay but the general retreat had already begun. Thirty-two kilometers south of Brody, the German divisions were momentarily held up but the voluntary retreat of the 607th Mlynovskii Regiment caused a domino effect of unit pullbacks all along the line. A gap of 40 kilometers opened and into it poured the Central Powers' soldiers.
On 21 July, the Germans crossed the Sereth River in numerous places and were on the edges of Tarnopol. Brief counterattacks near Trembowla on 21 and 23 July broke through the German line but strong artillery fire drove the Russians back. The German's 2nd Guard reentered Tarnopol after 2 days fighting. In the Russian Eighth Army's salient, the fresh Caucasian soldiers hadn't been able to hold off the Austro-Hungarians. By 22 July, the salient was gone and the Russians were on the Zlota Lipa. With the fall of Tarnopol, the Eighth pulled back toward the old 1914 Russian border. Three days later, the remaining Seventh Army units took a stand between the Dniester and the Pruth, east of Czernowitz. The Central Powers soldiers managed to breach the line in a few places and take Czernowitz but on the whole, the Russian line held. It was the last action for the Russian 1917 summer offensive as well as the Central Powers' counteroffensive. The Germans and Austro-Hungarians had advanced 145 kilometers in 10 days. Their supply and communication lines were over extended and the soldiers exhausted.
In Petrograd, where there had been joyous celebrations over the victories just three weeks previously, the air was now charged with allegations of why the offensive had failed. News of unit desertions had reached the capital as early as 12 July. With the approval of the soldiers' soviets, unit commanders were given permission to shoot deserters; however, the drastic measure did little to stem the tide. The 28th and 29th Divisions, who had initially pledged to support the offensive to Kerensky, had withdrawn themselves from the action. Other reports stated that the Izmailoveskii, Jaeger, Moscow, Grenadier, and Finland Guard Regiments had left Tarnopol open to the enemy. Most of the reports were countered by the regimental committees who asked the people to consider the realities of war. The 6th Grenadiers Division called attention to their losses during the offensive. Their ranks had had 3400 men when the Central Powers' attack had begun. By the time they had reached Tarnopol, these ranks had been thinned by the loss of 95 officers and 2000 soldiers to all categories of casualties. The Jaegers said that another unit had relieved them and they had simply performed a retreating movement while the Finns reminded their comrades that they had participated in the deadly street by street fighting in Tarnopol. The 2nd Guard said that they were taken out of the line to help the military police force the 1st Strelkoyi Regiment into position for an attack and had also put down a mutiny by the Keksgolm Guard Regiment. Putting all the recriminations aside, Kerensky knew that the army was no longer capable of continuing the war; however, ever an optimist, he felt sure that tighter control would bring them around. His first reaction to the failure was to replace Brusilov with the commander of the Eighth Army, General Lavr Kornilov. The second action was to seek an end to the war that could only result in the new Republic's demise if the slaughter continued. Casualties included 50,000 killed, less than 10,000 captured, and 30,000 wounded. Not included in the wounded count were 7500 cases of wounded fingers and 10,000 having unspecified and unidentified wounds(20). Kerensky opened a channel through the Swedes to the Central Powers in an effort to bring about a peace.
Footnotes
(1). Kerensky, Alexander. The Catastrophe, Kerensky's Own Story of the Russian Revolution, New York and London: D. Appleton and Co., 1927, p. 197
(2). Ibid, 197
(3). Ibid, p. 196
(4). Ibid, p. 199
(5). Browder, Robert and Alexander F. Kerensky. The Russian Provisional Government 1917 Documents. Stanford University Press, 1961, p. 940
(6). Lincoln, W. Bruce. Passage Through Armageddon, The Russians in War and Revolution 1914-1918. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986, page 407
(7). Thompson, Holland, Ed. The Book of History, The World's Greatest War, Vol. 17, New York: The Grolier Society, 1920 – 21. page 716
(8). Kerensky, Alexander. The Catastrophe, Kerensky's Own Story of the Russian Revolution, New York and London: D. Appleton and Co., 1927, p. 221
(9). Ibid, page 219
(10). Ludendorff, Erich. Concise Ludendorff Memoirs 1914-1918. London: Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., Undated. Page 195
(11). Golovine, Nicholas V. The Russian Army in the World War. New York: Yale University, 1931, page 90-91
(12). Hoffmann, Max. War Diaries and Other Papers, Vol. 1. Translated by Eric Sutton. London: Martin Secker, 1926
(13). Stone, Norman. "Kerensky Offensive", The Marshall Cavendish Illustrated Encyclopedia of World War 1, Vol. 8, pages 2449-2453
(14). Ibid
(15). Herwig, Holger H. The First World War, Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918. London, New York, Sydney, Auckland: Arnold. 1997, page 334
(16). Dupuy, Trevor Nevitt and Wlodzimierz Onacewicz. Triumphs and Tragedies in the East 1915-1917. New York: Franklin Watts Inc., 1967, page 72
(17). Thompson, Holland, Ed. The Book of History, The World's Greatest War, Vol. 17, New York: The Grolier Society, 1920 – 21. page 719
(18). Hoffmann, Max. The War of Lost Opportunities. Nashville Tenn.: Battery Press, 1999, page 182
(19). Ibid, page 185
(20). Browder, Robert and Alexander F. Kerensky. The Russian Provisional Government 1917 Documents. Stanford University Press, 1961, p. 989
Written by Michael Kihntopf
kihnt@swbell.net
Copyright © 200http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwi/articles/kerenskyoffensive.aspx4 Michael Kihntopf
By the middle of 1917, the Russian army stood at a crucial point in history, hat in hand, asking for direction as to which path was the best to follow. The path behind showed the ebb and flood of bloodstained footprints from nearly three years of war and could not be turned back upon. Before it laid three paths, each leading toward a different future. Adding to its confusion as to which route to follow, there were the throngs of people who attempted to give directions. One group of would be directors said that the soldiers should remember their place and that no reforms were necessary; only the winning of the war mattered. Some other advisors talked about land reform but only after the war was over. The most vocal arguers told the soldiers to vote with their feet and go home; the war would take care of itself. At this moment of despair Alexander Fedorevich Kerensky stepped into the crossroad. Quickly, he pushed aside all the would-be directors and called upon his revolutionary comrades to remember their obligation to the revolution and Russian pride. He asked the soldiers to take up their weapons and free the ancient soil from the German invaders so that the people's revolution could nurture itself. The mood was infectious, but uplifting and for a brief moment, the soldiers' confusion disappeared.
Kerensky, minister of justice for the Russian Provisional Government which had replaced the Romanov dynasty, assumed the additional responsibility of minister of war in May 1917. To understand the scope of his new role, the minister set off for the war zone to review the troops and assess their potential for continuing the war. His first stop was at Kamenez-Podolsk where he consulted with the commander of the Southwest Front, General Alexei Brusilov. Together they motored from one end of the front to the other.
To his amazement, Kerensky found the combat areas devoid of the roaring sound of artillery and the clatter of small arms fire. In many places, the trenches were almost deserted. The soldiers who could be found were in tatters and complained of not getting their just rations. When Kerensky asked where their comrades were, he was told that they were attending political meetings. He quickly surmised that the rank and file could be sorted into two groups: those who wanted to do the heroic things needed by war and the traitors such as the Bolsheviks(1). The officers whom Kerensky met were lumped into three categories: the majority who were confused, corrupted by Tsarist or Bolshevik and unable to lead, a minority who were sabotaging the liberal revolution, and a smaller group who knew how to approach and lead the revolutionary soldier. Kerensky attended many of the political meetings with the soldiers. At one such meeting, while waiting his turn to speak he realized that what the army needed was inspiration. Slogans! When it came time for him to speak he was ready. From the stage he called out to the soldiers(2), "Forward to the battle for freedom" and "I summon you not to feast but to triumphant death"(3). Thunderous applause! The slogans had had an effect but Kerensky knew that the battlefront was not the appropriate place to begin campaigns of brainwashing in front of the artillery shells and shootings. Something more radical had to be done, and was necessary back home in Russia's most important and biggest cities such as Kiev, Petrograd and Moscow, with the riots, anti war demonstrations and chaos influencing the soldiers.
As the three day tour closed, Kerensky and Brusilov fell to discussing the army's condition in the back seat of the auto that was returning them to the general's headquarters. Both agreed that Kerensky's presence had been well received by the soldiers but they both knew that the impact would be no more than a mosquito bite's itch in days to come. The general and the minister surmised that the soldiers of the Southwest Front were incapable of assuming any further military action as long as the political turmoil existed at the front yet Kerensky was an optimist and pragmatist. As the miles wore on and the countryside faded into darkness, both of the car's occupants came to the same conclusion – the only thing that would restore the army's morale was a successful offensive. Kerensky and Brusilov were of the opinion that once the shooting began the soldiers would ignore the calls for political meetings and return to the trenches to support the comrades who chose to fight on(4).
Preparation for the offensive followed many paths. While Kerensky navigated the political road, Brusilov followed other paths formulating troop concentrations, objectives, and bringing up supplies to meet the planned beginning date of 1 July. The general's duties had increased three fold since the tour with Kerensky. Before his departure for the capital, Kerensky had appointed Brusilov chief of the army's staff. This replacement of leaders without regard to military necessity was an omen of things to come. Brusilov had a little over 30 days to ascertain which officers he could trust to lead a demoralized army in an offensive designed to remotivate the Russian fighting force.
In Petrograd, Kerensky found a mixed atmosphere regarding the continuation of the war. The two most prominent political parties had stirred the social upheaval of the revolution into a veritable morass. The Bolsheviks were adamant about ending the war immediately. The Social Revolutionaries' representatives were making pro-German speeches and were in direct communication with the German government due to their opinion of the anti-German war. The minister poured himself into the turmoil. He reminded his comrades of Russia's obligation to its allies. French and British delegates had asked the Russian Provisional Government to hold out until the end of next year, 1918, when the British would gain superiority in ships with the French against the Germans and the British and Russians would launch simultaneous offensives to defeat the Ottomans. What was needed, the allies said, was a final large offensive that would continue to tie down Central Powers' divisions and wreck as much of the Austrian strength as possible. The added time would allow the British in the east and Italians to deploy their army against any German build up that would occur should Russia feel it necessary to drop out of the war with the surrender of the Bulgarians and the wrecking of Ottomans and Austrians. Kerensky went on to say that the Revolution was having an effect among the Central Powers. Within the Austro-Hungarian army, Slavic units on the Southwest Front were agitating so much that the Austro-Hungarian command had moved a number of divisions to the Italian front. Pilsudski's Polish Legion had already stopped fighting due to . Additionally, the Turkish and Bulgarian governments had sent out peace feelers. The minister's persuasive speeches bore fruit. On 15 June, the All Russian Congress, Bolsheviks refusing to vote, approved an offensive drive. Soon after, the Cossack Congress added their blessing. Kerensky had won the approval he needed but disparaging news came from the front. A number of soldiers and workers committees were still debating if the units they represented should involve themselves in an offensive.
Brusilov's problems started at a fronts' commanders' meeting on 11 June when the general found out that the soldiers of the Northwest and Western Fronts, roughly from Riga to the Galician border, were unreliable and would probably not agree to be a part of any battle no matter how small it might be. On the Western Front alone, the Tenth Army was 63,000 soldiers short while in the Second Army, soldiers' committees interfered in all aspects of administration down to divisional and regimental levels(5). The only good news from the fronts commanders was that the artillery contingents were very reliable. Brusilov realized that the offensive would have to be limited to the Southwest Front, his old command, where his personal prestige among the men still held sway. Therefore, the offensive's strategic target was to inflict as many casualties as possible on the Austro-Hungarians in Galicia with the intention of possibly forcing them out of the war. Tactically, the goal was to capture Lutsk again which would disrupt communication and transportation between the German north and the Austro-Hungarian south. The clear limiting factors of the offensive were that there would be no diversional attacks in the north to keep the Germans from reinforcing their ally and that there would be no pool of reserves to bring forward should the offensive prove successful. Desertions, although decreased since April, had reduced unit strengths by one half to one third. Added to these limitations was a command problem. But, the German threat to the Baltic would include an additional small scale attack to divert German attention from the Austrian front.
When Kerensky had so astutely lumped the officers into three groups during his tour, both he and Brusilov had made notes regarding those who were the ineffectuals. Just three weeks before the offensive was to begin Brusilov and Kerensky began a policy of replacement. The general's hirings and firings were done based on which of his subordinates he could rely on to do the job; but the minister's were based on political factors. Army, corps, and the majority of divisional commanders were replaced(6). Kerensky had wanted to replace the negatively thinking officers with more positive and forward thinking people; however, the firings brought about a backlash that neither the general nor the minister had expected. Mass resignations(7). Officers at every level saw the firings as a threat to the officer corps. Some claimed that old wounds needed rest and recuperation while others simply followed what the private soldiers were doing and went home. In the final week of preparation many units found themselves led by ill prepared noncommissioned officers or men whom their fellow soldiers had elected into officership. Incompetent officers had replaced allegedly ineffectuals. As for the soldiers, they were back at the crossroads trying to decide which new path to follow while political advisers once again harangued them from all sides. To once again sweep the confusion away, Kerensky went to the front on 27 June in support of the soldiers. Artillery preparation began that evening.
On the surface, Kerensky's earlier optimism about the Russian soldiers going back to war as soon as the guns sounded again was paying off. Unlike the May trip when the minister had noted a lack of activity, cannons now roared and machine guns clattered. Everywhere men rushed about gathering supplies that they would need for the coming attack. Vast stores of ammunition, arms, food, and uniforms were available. The supplies that Russia's allies had begun shipping as early as 1915 had finally reached their destinations at the front(8). But, below this veneer surface was the seething confusion of committee politics.
Many of the committee members were asking why they should risk their lives when the war was so close to an end, especially in defeat for them. As the shells whistled overhead in their flight to the enemy's trenches, Kerensky hammered slogans at the soldiers in meeting after meeting. The minister's speeches electrified the Potiiskii Regiment whose members promised to support the battle to their last breathes. Those who posed questions about the offensive's necessity were ridiculed by their comrades. Kerensky labeled one soldier who was particularly outspoken as a coward and ordered him to leave the front immediately. Taken by surprise by the minister's action, the soldier begged to be allowed to stay and fight(9). The crescendo of artillery fire grew as the hours passed. Kerensky waited for the battle to begin at Eleventh Army's observation post.
Since the February Revolution, the Central Powers had had a policy of wait and see(10). Both the Vienna and Berlin army general staffs had prohibited any type of action except in response to a Russian assault. As a consequence, the entire front from the Baltic to Romania had entered into a state of suspended animation. The silence that pervaded the atmosphere was interrupted only by the shouts of one side's soldiers to the others. Although violence was prohibited, fraternization was not. Opposing soldiers met in no-man's-land, exchanged gifts, and talked about the war. Central Powers' soldiers were well schooled in what they were to say: Russians were encouraged to defect or to desert. They also emphasized that the war was of the tsar's doing and the British and French were perpetuating it at the cost of Russian soldiers' lives. Thinned ranks clearly showed that desertion took its toll but defections did not increase. From April to June, the prisoners of war held by the Central Powers increased by only 17,582(11), a slight increase from the 15,000s that had been taken monthly before the Revolution. However, the quiet and friendliness came to an abrupt halt as Brusilov's battle preparation and Kerensky's speeches took hold.
On 12 June, General Max Hoffmann, German chief of staff for the Eastern Front, noted in his diary that the "Russians are getting lively"(12). Aerial photography confirmed the renewed activity. Bridges leading to the front as well as narrow gauge railways were built, repaired, or upgraded in broad daylight and not camouflaged. This was unlike the painstakingly, intricate preparations Brusilov's staff had carried out to mask their successful offensive in the summer of 1916 on the same front. Prior to that attack, Brusilov had ordered each army to designate a corps and a division within that corps to show signs of increased activity. The results of this spreading out of actions confused the Central Powers' staff officers and they were unable to determine where reserves should be placed to thwart the offensive. The Russian staff had also targeted numerous objectives in that drive so that the front was broad rather than narrow with predictable directions. This time, aerial photos and defectors showed that the Russian direction would be toward the Austro-Hungarians in Galicia with the intention of capturing Lutsk and possibly encircling the German Südarmée which was in the center of the front. Hoffmann had proposed a strike of approximately five divisions in this same area, through Tarnopol, shortly after news arrived of the February Revolution but the general staff had decided not to carry out the plan.
On 29 June 1917, the Russian army was better prepared than at any time during the war for an offensive, except for the Brusilov Offensive. The two main thrusts of the attack were to be on the north and south of the Southwestern Front. In the north, the Eighth Army was to attack the Austro-Hungarian Second Army at its hinge with the Südarmée. In the south, the Seventh Army was to assault the juncture of the Austro-Hungarian Third and Seventh Armies. While these two operations were going on the Russian Sixth Army would frontally assault the Südarmée with the intention of keeping it from reinforcing their ally either to the north or the south. Although the entire front was nearly 200 kilometers long, the foci were less than 50 kilometers each. Along the whole front Brusilov's staff had arranged 40 infantry and 8 cavalry divisions, mostly of Finnish, Siberian, and Caucasian origins, along with 800 light, 158 medium, and 370 heavy guns(13). Opposing the Russian hordes were 26 infantry divisions, one cavalry brigade, and 988 guns of which only 60 were of a heavy caliber(14). Most of the Russian artillery had recently arrived from Arkhangelsk and Vladivostok and had either Japanese or English markings. Along with the cannon had come more than enough shells both from the allies and Russian factories. Small arms too were in abundance as a result of American and Japanese shipments. This glut of materiel showed in the first few hours of the preparation barrage. Central Powers' observers noted that the cannonade was the most intense they had witnessed and that its duration was unprecedented. However, the shells dropped on positions that were devoid of manpower. Well warned of the offensive through deserters and the Petrograd news media, the Central Powers' staffs had evacuated the front line trenches. The barrage lasted two days. Strangely enough, most anticipated artillery duels did not erupt; the Central Powers guns were mostly silent.
In the morning of 1 July the artillery stopped. Kerensky, looking through binoculars from the Elghth Army's observation post, faced a few anxious moments. He was unsure if the soldiers would leave their trenches. His answer soon came as a few specks appeared in no-mans'-land. These were followed by a few more and then there was a general onslaught. Kerensky noted, however, that the soldiers advanced without artillery support or did the artillery respond when the Austro-Hungarians' cannons finally opened fire. The counter fire drove Kerensky and the Eighth Army's staff into a bunker to await further reports.
)
News that the Austro-Hungarian 19th Division, made up primarily of Czechs, was in the trenches dictated Eighth Army's direction. The Russians had placed a battalion of former Czech prisoners of war who had gone over to them across from the Czech division. In the calm before the battle, words were traded between the two groups. When the assault began, the 3000 men of the 19th Division surrendered to their fellow Czechs(15). The result was a huge gap in the Second Army's line. Resistance to the Russian push was minimal. The Zoraisky Regiment took a village and the Fourth Finnish Division, assisted by the Czech brigade, moved into good positions on the heights of Dubno. After the first day of fighting, the Russians had taken nearly 18,000 prisoners along with 21 guns and 16 machine guns(16). Kerensky was jubilant and telegraphed Petrograd to recommend that the divisions be awarded the Red Banner; however, as the hours wore on, no further reports of advances were received along the Eleventh's front. Kerensky's mood changed to disappointment and he left for the capital.
The Russian Sixth Army in the center of the line was the strongest of the three engaged in the offensive. It had 20 infantry divisions along with four cavalry divisions. This should have been enough manpower to carry the Südarmée which was comprised of 10 infantry divisions, four German and six Austro-Hungarian, but the task was more than they could accomplish. The attack began on 4 July instead of in conjunction with the assault on the Second Army. The delay undoubtedly alerted their enemy. The Russians, after occupying the abandon front trenches, ran into a heavy fusillade of artillery and machine gun fire. Losses were horrendous. In a number of places, not even the abandon trenches could be held. Nevertheless, by the end of the day, the Sixth Army had gained a few kilometers but there were no reports of multitudes of prisoners being taken or materiel captured. The Südarmée still held the line.
On the left flank, Seventh Army's progress was more successful than the other two armies. Eight infantry divisions and four cavalry division attacked the Austro-Hungarian Third Army consisting of six infantry divisions on 7 July. The Russians exploited the gaps creating by the abandonment of the front line defenses and created a salient that bulged ahead to capture Lutsk on the following day. Fearing the worst, the Austro-Hungarian commander threw in German reserves to shore up the line. Hoffmann had placed these soldiers in reserve to be used when the Russian advance waned. Sent in too soon, they were chewed up and the Russian moved on. After three days fighting, the Eighth Army had netted approximately 10,000 prisoners and 80 artillery pieces(17).
The Central Powers' reaction to the Russian offensive was, at best, reserved. When First Quartermaster General Erich Ludendorff received reports of the attacks he quickly telephoned Hoffmann, but the conversation was not centered on containing the drive. Instead, Ludendorff asked if Hoffmann still thought a drive through Tarnopol would be successful and how many divisions would he need to accomplish the task. Hoffmann felt that the assault would succeed and asked for four divisions(18). Ludendorff gave the go ahead for the drive and promised six divisions, if all could be spared from the French and Belgian fronts, in 14 days. However, a major French offensive was ongoing, although defeated within a week's time. Hoffmann noted in his diary on 1 July that "the Russians are attacking" and he hoped that they would keep it up for eight to 10 days. Such a duration would extend the Russian supply and communication lines to the point of breaking; however, within a few days the offensive was already showing faltering signs.
The recapture of Lutsk on 7 July severed the rail link between Kowel and Brody. By the end of the day, the Russians had crossed the forests and were assaulting Guwno which the Austro-Hungarians, now without reserves, were forced to abandon. The following day, bolstered by the newly arrived Bavarian Cavalry Division, the Reserve Jaeger Guard Battalion, the Reserve Guard Shützen Battalion and an armored train, the Dual Monarchies' soldiers attempted to retake the town. The counterattack was initially successful but the Russians, with superior numbers and flashing bayonets in house to house fighting, soon forced their enemies out of the town. The retreating Central Powers' soldiers pulled back to the left bank of a tributary of the Dniester River where they managed to hold the Russians with the aid of heavy rains that turned the otherwise tranquil streams in the area into raging torrents and made roads impassable.
The promised German divisions, only four could be spared from the west, began arriving on 9 July and were massed in front of the Russian Eleventh Army. These divisions were the 1st Guard, 2nd Guard, 5th and 6th Divisions. The two Guard divisions were designated as the lead elements of the counteroffensive. The start date was to be 15 July but the heavy rains that had stopped the Russian advance also caused a postponement to 19 July.
In eight days of fighting the Russian Seventh Army had created a gigantic salient in the Central Powers' line.The salient had compressed the Austro-Hungarian Third Army against the flank of the Südarmée threatening that organization's real echelons. Disregarding logical tactical thinking, the Südarmée did not pull back to avoid encirclement. Had it done so, Kerensky and Brusilov would have achieved the victory they were seeking and possibly reformed the Russian army to better protect the fledgling Republic from Bolshevik take over. Instead, the Südarmée stood firm as did the Austro-Hungarian Seventh whose communication with Third Army had nearly been severed. The salient, rather than becoming a means for defeating the Südarmée, became a trap for the Russians.
South of the salient, the Austro-Hungarian Seventh Army had no one to fight. On 15 July they began probing the Russian line along the Lomnitza River. To their amazement, the Russians pulled back from the Lomnitza and took up positions on the Lodziany River. Sensing that the Russian positions were lightly held, the Austro-Hungarians made a concerted effort along a line from Novica to the Lodziany River to Kraisne. Novica was taken. Fresh Russian reserves countered and retook the town but Bavarian and Croatian units took the heights above the village. Two attempts to dislodge the Central Powers' soldiers failed. To avoid the entrapment of their men who were west of the village, the Russians abandoned the captured surrounding villages on 16 July. In the north, Hoffmann applied the coupe de maine.
The 1st and 2nd Guard carried the Russians' first defense line at Brzesany on 19 July at the point where the salient was hinged with the Russian Seventh Army and pushed forward(19). The effect of the attack was felt all along the line. Under pressure from the south and the north, the Russians withdrew from the positions west of Halicz. To keep the withdrawal from turning into a rout, Eighth Army's staff moved the Dagestani, Circassian, and Kabardian Regiments ahead. These fresh troops encouraged those who were withdrawing and for a few brief moments, the Central Powers' soldiers were held at bay but the general retreat had already begun. Thirty-two kilometers south of Brody, the German divisions were momentarily held up but the voluntary retreat of the 607th Mlynovskii Regiment caused a domino effect of unit pullbacks all along the line. A gap of 40 kilometers opened and into it poured the Central Powers' soldiers.
On 21 July, the Germans crossed the Sereth River in numerous places and were on the edges of Tarnopol. Brief counterattacks near Trembowla on 21 and 23 July broke through the German line but strong artillery fire drove the Russians back. The German's 2nd Guard reentered Tarnopol after 2 days fighting. In the Russian Eighth Army's salient, the fresh Caucasian soldiers hadn't been able to hold off the Austro-Hungarians. By 22 July, the salient was gone and the Russians were on the Zlota Lipa. With the fall of Tarnopol, the Eighth pulled back toward the old 1914 Russian border. Three days later, the remaining Seventh Army units took a stand between the Dniester and the Pruth, east of Czernowitz. The Central Powers soldiers managed to breach the line in a few places and take Czernowitz but on the whole, the Russian line held. It was the last action for the Russian 1917 summer offensive as well as the Central Powers' counteroffensive. The Germans and Austro-Hungarians had advanced 145 kilometers in 10 days. Their supply and communication lines were over extended and the soldiers exhausted.
In Petrograd, where there had been joyous celebrations over the victories just three weeks previously, the air was now charged with allegations of why the offensive had failed. News of unit desertions had reached the capital as early as 12 July. With the approval of the soldiers' soviets, unit commanders were given permission to shoot deserters; however, the drastic measure did little to stem the tide. The 28th and 29th Divisions, who had initially pledged to support the offensive to Kerensky, had withdrawn themselves from the action. Other reports stated that the Izmailoveskii, Jaeger, Moscow, Grenadier, and Finland Guard Regiments had left Tarnopol open to the enemy. Most of the reports were countered by the regimental committees who asked the people to consider the realities of war. The 6th Grenadiers Division called attention to their losses during the offensive. Their ranks had had 3400 men when the Central Powers' attack had begun. By the time they had reached Tarnopol, these ranks had been thinned by the loss of 95 officers and 2000 soldiers to all categories of casualties. The Jaegers said that another unit had relieved them and they had simply performed a retreating movement while the Finns reminded their comrades that they had participated in the deadly street by street fighting in Tarnopol. The 2nd Guard said that they were taken out of the line to help the military police force the 1st Strelkoyi Regiment into position for an attack and had also put down a mutiny by the Keksgolm Guard Regiment. Putting all the recriminations aside, Kerensky knew that the army was no longer capable of continuing the war; however, ever an optimist, he felt sure that tighter control would bring them around. His first reaction to the failure was to replace Brusilov with the commander of the Eighth Army, General Lavr Kornilov. The second action was to seek an end to the war that could only result in the new Republic's demise if the slaughter continued. Casualties included 50,000 killed, less than 10,000 captured, and 30,000 wounded. Not included in the wounded count were 7500 cases of wounded fingers and 10,000 having unspecified and unidentified wounds(20). Kerensky opened a channel through the Swedes to the Central Powers in an effort to bring about a peace.
Footnotes
(1). Kerensky, Alexander. The Catastrophe, Kerensky's Own Story of the Russian Revolution, New York and London: D. Appleton and Co., 1927, p. 197
(2). Ibid, 197
(3). Ibid, p. 196
(4). Ibid, p. 199
(5). Browder, Robert and Alexander F. Kerensky. The Russian Provisional Government 1917 Documents. Stanford University Press, 1961, p. 940
(6). Lincoln, W. Bruce. Passage Through Armageddon, The Russians in War and Revolution 1914-1918. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986, page 407
(7). Thompson, Holland, Ed. The Book of History, The World's Greatest War, Vol. 17, New York: The Grolier Society, 1920 – 21. page 716
(8). Kerensky, Alexander. The Catastrophe, Kerensky's Own Story of the Russian Revolution, New York and London: D. Appleton and Co., 1927, p. 221
(9). Ibid, page 219
(10). Ludendorff, Erich. Concise Ludendorff Memoirs 1914-1918. London: Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., Undated. Page 195
(11). Golovine, Nicholas V. The Russian Army in the World War. New York: Yale University, 1931, page 90-91
(12). Hoffmann, Max. War Diaries and Other Papers, Vol. 1. Translated by Eric Sutton. London: Martin Secker, 1926
(13). Stone, Norman. "Kerensky Offensive", The Marshall Cavendish Illustrated Encyclopedia of World War 1, Vol. 8, pages 2449-2453
(14). Ibid
(15). Herwig, Holger H. The First World War, Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918. London, New York, Sydney, Auckland: Arnold. 1997, page 334
(16). Dupuy, Trevor Nevitt and Wlodzimierz Onacewicz. Triumphs and Tragedies in the East 1915-1917. New York: Franklin Watts Inc., 1967, page 72
(17). Thompson, Holland, Ed. The Book of History, The World's Greatest War, Vol. 17, New York: The Grolier Society, 1920 – 21. page 719
(18). Hoffmann, Max. The War of Lost Opportunities. Nashville Tenn.: Battery Press, 1999, page 182
(19). Ibid, page 185
(20). Browder, Robert and Alexander F. Kerensky. The Russian Provisional Government 1917 Documents. Stanford University Press, 1961, p. 989
Written by Michael Kihntopf
Copyright © 200http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwi/articles/kerenskyoffensive.aspx4 Michael Kihntopf
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Counteroffensive on the Russian front
To the north, an offensive conducted by the Russians on the Germans near Pskov ended up in a decisive failure. Whoever considered the 2nd Riga Offensive [as its aims suggested] as appropriate support would prove themselves wrong in the fight, which took place from 1-16 July. The 12th Army was encircled in a trap intentionally made by the Germans, who counterattacked and demoralized other attacking troops with propaganda about Bolshevism, failures on the frontlines, victories over the Russians, starvation and imminent unrest at home. After an attempt, it escaped, only to meet fierce German attacks and most of it was forced to surrender save for two corps. The countering tactics used were experimental, but quite similar to the Hutier tactics done by the Germans during the battle of Reval, where the remnants of the decimated 12th Army were destroyed and the 'sacrificial lamb' role of the Russian military leadership would prove to be its final downfall, along with the Bolshevik Revolution and end the Eastern Front for good. A third Tannenburg [after the original in 1914 and the second, which befell the 3rd Army in the Baranovichi Offensive and contributed to failure of its successful supporting Brusilov Offensive] caused much elation for the Germans, who chased them all the way to Estonia, hoping that several locals would assist them, but the locals were unenthusiastic about German occupation. However, the fall of Reval and its surroundings, along with the rest of Estonia in September and several failed counteroffensives to disrupt German operational planning would prove the doom of the Russian Army.
The offensive began the morning of 1 September 1917. After a three-hour bombardment in which German artillery guns wrecked their counterparts, the Germans launched the assault and began the construction of three wooden pontoon bridges over the Lake Peipius. 1500 German artillery guns fully suppressed the 50 opposing Russian guns left after the heavy losses inflicted. Artillery fire forced Russian 186th Division to withdraw from the right bank of the Daugava, thus allowing the Germans to successfully cross the river. The commander of the Russian 12th Army's remains, General Parsky, ordered the XLIII Army corps to counterattack the German bridgehead and deployed for this task four infantry divisions in a last attempt to break up the German attack, however, he lost the initiative and was wounded, with his army remnants collapsing shortly after the destruction of a division.
The Russian force,, received orders in the afternoon of 1 September and started to move from Tartu against the Germans. The 24th Army Corps reached fortified German positions along the lake in the late afternoon and threatened to destroy an entire German division. After heavy shelling at midday of 2 September by German artillery, the German attack against the corps' positions started. Intense fighting started along the entire 14 km front line of the bridgehead. The Germans used aviation, flame throwers and gas attacks but despite this and the encirclement through flanking attacks, the troops managed to hold back the German advance for 26 hours. This allowed the other Russian Armies (including a corps from the 12th Army, which was used as replacement for casualties incurred and still was in positions near Tartu) to safely withdraw from Tartu. Although heavy casualties had been taken against the Germans, the advance to Reval was halted temporarily due to the counterattacks and supply issues, ensuring that the mission of the Northern Front was accomplished.
However, Ludendorff was confident that a final surprise offensive would take the Russians out of the war, or threaten Petrograd for good. A surprise attack, using the same Hutier tactics, took place on 20 September and broke up the front north of Tartu, with a fient launched at Lake Peipius. After losing another division, the Russians retreated in a rout as anticipated and following the encirclement of an army corps, the Germans pursued the Russians to Reval, which fell on 5 October. Counterattacks by the Russians only resulted in desertions and the Germans on the flanks were able to take control of Reval. In anticipation of the occupation of their supposed nation's capital city, an Estonian National Salvation Government committee was formed, but was disbanded by the Germans, giving the Estonians 'second invader' impressions.
What happened to the Estonian National Salvation Committee and the provisional government they intended to form in Reval in anticipation of Russian collapse or German occupation? In October 1917, upon the disintegration of the Russian Empire and succeeding republic following the chaos of German offensives and Bolshevik takeover, a diet of the Autonomous Governorate of Estonia, the Estonian Provincial Assembly, which had been elected in the spring of that year, proclaimed itself the highest authority in Estonia. Soon thereafter, the Germans dissolved the Estonian Provincial Assembly and temporarily forced the pro-independence Estonians underground in the capital Tallinn [Reval at the time] to go underground]. The members had used the interval between the Russian Army's retreat and the arrival of the Imperial German Army, the Salvation Committee of the Estonian National Council Maapäev issued the Estonian Declaration of Independence in Tallinn on 4 October 1917 and formed the Estonian Provisional Government. This first period of independence and self determining rule for the Estonians after centuries of foreign colonization from Danes to Russians was extremely short-lived, as the German troops entered Tallinn on the following day. The German authorities recognized neither the provisional government, nor its claim for Estonia's independence, counting them as a self-styled group usurping deserved sovereign rights of the Baltic German nobility they were expected to support and form puppet states and self-governing provinces under the Imperial German Empire for them to rule.
To the north, an offensive conducted by the Russians on the Germans near Pskov ended up in a decisive failure. Whoever considered the 2nd Riga Offensive [as its aims suggested] as appropriate support would prove themselves wrong in the fight, which took place from 1-16 July. The 12th Army was encircled in a trap intentionally made by the Germans, who counterattacked and demoralized other attacking troops with propaganda about Bolshevism, failures on the frontlines, victories over the Russians, starvation and imminent unrest at home. After an attempt, it escaped, only to meet fierce German attacks and most of it was forced to surrender save for two corps. The countering tactics used were experimental, but quite similar to the Hutier tactics done by the Germans during the battle of Reval, where the remnants of the decimated 12th Army were destroyed and the 'sacrificial lamb' role of the Russian military leadership would prove to be its final downfall, along with the Bolshevik Revolution and end the Eastern Front for good. A third Tannenburg [after the original in 1914 and the second, which befell the 3rd Army in the Baranovichi Offensive and contributed to failure of its successful supporting Brusilov Offensive] caused much elation for the Germans, who chased them all the way to Estonia, hoping that several locals would assist them, but the locals were unenthusiastic about German occupation. However, the fall of Reval and its surroundings, along with the rest of Estonia in September and several failed counteroffensives to disrupt German operational planning would prove the doom of the Russian Army.
The offensive began the morning of 1 September 1917. After a three-hour bombardment in which German artillery guns wrecked their counterparts, the Germans launched the assault and began the construction of three wooden pontoon bridges over the Lake Peipius. 1500 German artillery guns fully suppressed the 50 opposing Russian guns left after the heavy losses inflicted. Artillery fire forced Russian 186th Division to withdraw from the right bank of the Daugava, thus allowing the Germans to successfully cross the river. The commander of the Russian 12th Army's remains, General Parsky, ordered the XLIII Army corps to counterattack the German bridgehead and deployed for this task four infantry divisions in a last attempt to break up the German attack, however, he lost the initiative and was wounded, with his army remnants collapsing shortly after the destruction of a division.
The Russian force,, received orders in the afternoon of 1 September and started to move from Tartu against the Germans. The 24th Army Corps reached fortified German positions along the lake in the late afternoon and threatened to destroy an entire German division. After heavy shelling at midday of 2 September by German artillery, the German attack against the corps' positions started. Intense fighting started along the entire 14 km front line of the bridgehead. The Germans used aviation, flame throwers and gas attacks but despite this and the encirclement through flanking attacks, the troops managed to hold back the German advance for 26 hours. This allowed the other Russian Armies (including a corps from the 12th Army, which was used as replacement for casualties incurred and still was in positions near Tartu) to safely withdraw from Tartu. Although heavy casualties had been taken against the Germans, the advance to Reval was halted temporarily due to the counterattacks and supply issues, ensuring that the mission of the Northern Front was accomplished.
However, Ludendorff was confident that a final surprise offensive would take the Russians out of the war, or threaten Petrograd for good. A surprise attack, using the same Hutier tactics, took place on 20 September and broke up the front north of Tartu, with a fient launched at Lake Peipius. After losing another division, the Russians retreated in a rout as anticipated and following the encirclement of an army corps, the Germans pursued the Russians to Reval, which fell on 5 October. Counterattacks by the Russians only resulted in desertions and the Germans on the flanks were able to take control of Reval. In anticipation of the occupation of their supposed nation's capital city, an Estonian National Salvation Government committee was formed, but was disbanded by the Germans, giving the Estonians 'second invader' impressions.
What happened to the Estonian National Salvation Committee and the provisional government they intended to form in Reval in anticipation of Russian collapse or German occupation? In October 1917, upon the disintegration of the Russian Empire and succeeding republic following the chaos of German offensives and Bolshevik takeover, a diet of the Autonomous Governorate of Estonia, the Estonian Provincial Assembly, which had been elected in the spring of that year, proclaimed itself the highest authority in Estonia. Soon thereafter, the Germans dissolved the Estonian Provincial Assembly and temporarily forced the pro-independence Estonians underground in the capital Tallinn [Reval at the time] to go underground]. The members had used the interval between the Russian Army's retreat and the arrival of the Imperial German Army, the Salvation Committee of the Estonian National Council Maapäev issued the Estonian Declaration of Independence in Tallinn on 4 October 1917 and formed the Estonian Provisional Government. This first period of independence and self determining rule for the Estonians after centuries of foreign colonization from Danes to Russians was extremely short-lived, as the German troops entered Tallinn on the following day. The German authorities recognized neither the provisional government, nor its claim for Estonia's independence, counting them as a self-styled group usurping deserved sovereign rights of the Baltic German nobility they were expected to support and form puppet states and self-governing provinces under the Imperial German Empire for them to rule.
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Revolutionary July days
After the failure of the Kerensky Offensive, soldiers and workers launched spontaneous revolutions in Petrograd to depose the 'warmongering' government or force it to change its opinions on the war. Leadership was assisted by the Bolsheviks. Also, the Kadets [Constitutionalist Democratic] party left the government due to its decreasing popularity following the offensive's impact. Anti-war feelings were rife among the populace at that time, as the failed Galician offensive which had caused an estimated 200,000 Russian casualties and these feelings later intensified with the news of a 'third Tannenberg'. Discontented workers started protests which soon spiraled into violent riots.
Demonstrations broke out in Petrograd on 16 July to initiate the revolts and these were started by the 1st Machine Gun Regiment, with the soldiers having been influenced by Anarchists. At a secret meeting on 15 July, the anarchists had decided to call the Petrograd workers and soldiers out to an anti-government demonstration in favour of peace.
The machine gunners’ requests met with support from the soldiers of the Moscow, Pavlovsky, Grenadiers, and 1st Reserve regiments. These units marched out in a demonstration under the slogans “All Power to the Soviets”. Workers from factories joined them. The leadership of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, dominated by Mensheviks and SRs, prohibited the demonstration.
The Bolsheviks decided to provide leadership to the movement in order to provide an organized and peaceful character with the "support of the oppressed masses". On the afternoon of 17 July, a peaceful demonstration of 500,000 workers, soldiers, and sailors under the slogan “All Power to the Soviets” was held. Anti-government demonstrations were also held in Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Krasnoyarsk, and other cities to stop the war against Germany, claiming that it was the Russian government's fault that they kept fighting and suffered disaster after disaster.
The military authorities sent troops against the demonstration, leaving more than 500 people killed and wounded. The SRs and Mensheviks supported punitive measures against the insurgents. They began to disarm workers, disband revolutionary military units, and carry out arrests. In response, more parades and rallies came out in support of the Bolsheviks. On 18–19 July, the offices and printing plant of Pravda and the headquarters of the Bolshevik Central Committee were attacked and destroyed before revolutionaries threatened to capture the troops involved. On 19 July, the Provisional Government issued a decree for the capture of Lenin, who was forced into hiding. On 25 July, troops loyal to the regime arrived in Petrograd from the front after several German counterattacks delayed their arrival, causing the government several worries.
The grievances expressed by the workers and sailors proved the Bolshevik influence that spread across the frontlines like wildfire. The well known 'All Powers to the Soviets' and 'Peace, Land and Bread' slogans, among others, were taken to the streets by workers and soldiers. The demonstration was organized by the Bolshevik Military Organization without consultation from the Central Committee, as it was believed that the masses and Bolshevik leadership would approve of such a movement after their pressure. To restrain the developing situation, on the afternoon of 16 July, the decisive day, the top leaders of the Central Committee, Trotsky; Zinoviev and Kamenev took some action to reduce the evolts, but despite the support from the rebelling workers and soldiers, their urgent grievances intensified the situation's pressure, not reducing it. As the masses took their way to the streets, the leadership of the Bolshevik Military Organization, Petersburg Committee and later, the Central Committee would support the demonstrations by coming to the streets to provide leadership roles. Both Trotsky and Zinoviev persistently argued that the street protests remain peaceful. After this decision, the Bolshevik Military Organization actively organized and supported the demonstration, mobilizing reinforcements from the front lines and dispatching armored cars to capture key posts including bridges and the Peter and Paul Fortress, Petrograd's original citadel and a prison for political criminals, especially under the Tsars and now planned by the Provisional Government for usage to detain Bolsheviks caught in the city.
No evidence made of the internal debates of the Bolshevik Party around the July Days was recorded in public. There were some within the party itself who asked for an increase in revolutionary activities such as strikes and anti government activism on 17 July. Most prominent among those were Nikolai Podvoisky and Vladimir Nevsky, leaders of the Bolshevik Military Organization, V. Volodarsky, a member of the Petersburg Committee and Martin Latis of the Vyborg District Bolshevik Organization, who was highly critical of the Central Committee's decision to hold back the masses. Others in the Bolshevik Party, including V.I. Lenin, the party leader himself, were split on what to do. On 25 July at two or three o'clock in the morning, after the Provisional Government sent a number of loyal and patriotic troops from the front to the streets of Petrograd and won the support of a number of previously neutral garrisons of troops, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party decided to call off the street demonstrations out of fear of their safety.
Later, Kerensky ordered the arrest of Lenin and the other leading Bolsheviks, accusing them of inciting revolt with German financial backing. Lenin successfully went into hiding, staying first in the apartment of Benyamin Kayurov, a fellow socialist revolutionary with his support before fleeing to temporary exile in Finland, but many other Bolshevik leaders were arrested, including Trotsky, Kamenev and Lunacharskii who were apprehended on 4 August. They remained in prison until Kerensky released them in response to the Kornilov Affair.
The government crisis was aggravated by the resignation of Prime Minister Lvov in response to the failures of the latest offensive and chaos. On 21 July, Kerensky became prime minister. The SR-Menshevik leadership of the Soviets proclaimed the Provisional Government and made a statement that acknowledged it to have “unlimited powers" in government. The soviets became a powerless appendage of the government and the subsequent suppression of the demonstrations marked the end of dual power and negotiation between the Bolsheviks and Provisional Government until the Kornilov Affair. The peaceful development of the revolution was seen as impossible, especially with chaos and war.
After the failure of the Kerensky Offensive, soldiers and workers launched spontaneous revolutions in Petrograd to depose the 'warmongering' government or force it to change its opinions on the war. Leadership was assisted by the Bolsheviks. Also, the Kadets [Constitutionalist Democratic] party left the government due to its decreasing popularity following the offensive's impact. Anti-war feelings were rife among the populace at that time, as the failed Galician offensive which had caused an estimated 200,000 Russian casualties and these feelings later intensified with the news of a 'third Tannenberg'. Discontented workers started protests which soon spiraled into violent riots.
Demonstrations broke out in Petrograd on 16 July to initiate the revolts and these were started by the 1st Machine Gun Regiment, with the soldiers having been influenced by Anarchists. At a secret meeting on 15 July, the anarchists had decided to call the Petrograd workers and soldiers out to an anti-government demonstration in favour of peace.
The machine gunners’ requests met with support from the soldiers of the Moscow, Pavlovsky, Grenadiers, and 1st Reserve regiments. These units marched out in a demonstration under the slogans “All Power to the Soviets”. Workers from factories joined them. The leadership of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, dominated by Mensheviks and SRs, prohibited the demonstration.
The Bolsheviks decided to provide leadership to the movement in order to provide an organized and peaceful character with the "support of the oppressed masses". On the afternoon of 17 July, a peaceful demonstration of 500,000 workers, soldiers, and sailors under the slogan “All Power to the Soviets” was held. Anti-government demonstrations were also held in Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Krasnoyarsk, and other cities to stop the war against Germany, claiming that it was the Russian government's fault that they kept fighting and suffered disaster after disaster.
The military authorities sent troops against the demonstration, leaving more than 500 people killed and wounded. The SRs and Mensheviks supported punitive measures against the insurgents. They began to disarm workers, disband revolutionary military units, and carry out arrests. In response, more parades and rallies came out in support of the Bolsheviks. On 18–19 July, the offices and printing plant of Pravda and the headquarters of the Bolshevik Central Committee were attacked and destroyed before revolutionaries threatened to capture the troops involved. On 19 July, the Provisional Government issued a decree for the capture of Lenin, who was forced into hiding. On 25 July, troops loyal to the regime arrived in Petrograd from the front after several German counterattacks delayed their arrival, causing the government several worries.
The grievances expressed by the workers and sailors proved the Bolshevik influence that spread across the frontlines like wildfire. The well known 'All Powers to the Soviets' and 'Peace, Land and Bread' slogans, among others, were taken to the streets by workers and soldiers. The demonstration was organized by the Bolshevik Military Organization without consultation from the Central Committee, as it was believed that the masses and Bolshevik leadership would approve of such a movement after their pressure. To restrain the developing situation, on the afternoon of 16 July, the decisive day, the top leaders of the Central Committee, Trotsky; Zinoviev and Kamenev took some action to reduce the evolts, but despite the support from the rebelling workers and soldiers, their urgent grievances intensified the situation's pressure, not reducing it. As the masses took their way to the streets, the leadership of the Bolshevik Military Organization, Petersburg Committee and later, the Central Committee would support the demonstrations by coming to the streets to provide leadership roles. Both Trotsky and Zinoviev persistently argued that the street protests remain peaceful. After this decision, the Bolshevik Military Organization actively organized and supported the demonstration, mobilizing reinforcements from the front lines and dispatching armored cars to capture key posts including bridges and the Peter and Paul Fortress, Petrograd's original citadel and a prison for political criminals, especially under the Tsars and now planned by the Provisional Government for usage to detain Bolsheviks caught in the city.
No evidence made of the internal debates of the Bolshevik Party around the July Days was recorded in public. There were some within the party itself who asked for an increase in revolutionary activities such as strikes and anti government activism on 17 July. Most prominent among those were Nikolai Podvoisky and Vladimir Nevsky, leaders of the Bolshevik Military Organization, V. Volodarsky, a member of the Petersburg Committee and Martin Latis of the Vyborg District Bolshevik Organization, who was highly critical of the Central Committee's decision to hold back the masses. Others in the Bolshevik Party, including V.I. Lenin, the party leader himself, were split on what to do. On 25 July at two or three o'clock in the morning, after the Provisional Government sent a number of loyal and patriotic troops from the front to the streets of Petrograd and won the support of a number of previously neutral garrisons of troops, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party decided to call off the street demonstrations out of fear of their safety.
Later, Kerensky ordered the arrest of Lenin and the other leading Bolsheviks, accusing them of inciting revolt with German financial backing. Lenin successfully went into hiding, staying first in the apartment of Benyamin Kayurov, a fellow socialist revolutionary with his support before fleeing to temporary exile in Finland, but many other Bolshevik leaders were arrested, including Trotsky, Kamenev and Lunacharskii who were apprehended on 4 August. They remained in prison until Kerensky released them in response to the Kornilov Affair.
The government crisis was aggravated by the resignation of Prime Minister Lvov in response to the failures of the latest offensive and chaos. On 21 July, Kerensky became prime minister. The SR-Menshevik leadership of the Soviets proclaimed the Provisional Government and made a statement that acknowledged it to have “unlimited powers" in government. The soviets became a powerless appendage of the government and the subsequent suppression of the demonstrations marked the end of dual power and negotiation between the Bolsheviks and Provisional Government until the Kornilov Affair. The peaceful development of the revolution was seen as impossible, especially with chaos and war.
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Kornilov Affair
After dispopularity on the front and losing support from his once loyal troops and officers, and later the government, Brusilov resigned in disillusion. He would later desert to the Red side in 1920 after the fall of the White Russian Armies. His replacement was General Lavr Kornilov, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Army, who attempted a coup d' etat in August 1917. To ensure his success, his army advanced on Petrograd, with the Provisional Government under the leadership of Alexander Kerensky, seemingly powerless to stop him. This gave an opportunity for the Bolsheviks to take the lead in the saving Petrograd from Kornilov.
The Red Guards, under Trotsky's direction, organised the defence of the city. Bolshevik agents infiltrated Kornilov's troops and encouraged them to desert. The Bolsheviks also organised strikes by railway workers which caused chaos to Kornilov's supplies and communications. Within a few days, Kornilov's attempt at seizing power was over. Ignoring Boris Savinkov's mediation efforts due to suspicions of misunderstandings, Kerensky desposed his chief army commander on 9 September from duties, claiming that he was trying to overthrow the government. Kornilov responded to Kerensky's replies by stating he was threatened with arrest or brainwashing by the Bolsheviks and was coming to his rescue and restoration, saying that he was saving the government, military and nation from dying under the hands of the Germans and Bolsheviks.
Unconfident of the support of the generals in his army, Kerensky was forced to seek help in other parties, such as the Bolsheviks and their Red Guards. When Alexander Kerensky asked General Alexander Krymov to stop the advance of the Third Cavalry Corps against Petrograd, Krymov obeyed the new instructions after realizing that the capital was not, in fact, under the hands of the Bolsheviks or Kornilov.
Kornilov's attempt to takeover Petrograd collapsed without bloodshed, when his Cossacks abandoned the cause.He and about 7,000 supporters were arrested for 'treason' despite their roles and justification for doing the revolutionary government a big 'disservice'.
Following the coup, the Bolsheviks, who were released after weeks to months in prison despite their potential danger, decided to take over the government. They were probably the biggest beneficiaries, who enjoyed a revival in support after the attempted coup's failure. Vladimir Lenin was accused of being a German puppet and traitor, but he fled to Finland, eventually returning after his party's successful revolution. His plea for support by the government had resulted in not only the release of Bolshevik political prisoners, but also the rearmament of the party and its military organization for the fight against Kornilov. Though these weapons and Bolsheviks were surplus and not necessary to fight off Kornilov's advancing troops in August, they were retained by the Bolsheviks and used in their own successful armed revolution. Bolshevik support amongst the Russian public also increased following the Kornilov affair, a consequence of dissatisfaction with the Provisional Government and their incompetent dealing of the affair.
Another important consequence of the Kornilov Affair is that it severed the tie between Kerensky and the military. For although the officer corps, confused about the issues and unwilling to defy the government openly, refused to join in Kornilov's mutiny, it despised Kerensky for his treatment of their commander, the arrest of many prominent generals and his pandering to the left. When the Bolsheviks staged their revolution in October 1917, Kerensky appealed to the military to help defend the government from the insurrection, but his appeal fell on deaf ears. Following the failure of the affair, the namesake general himself was removed from his position as commander in chief of the Russian Army and impounded in Bykhov Fortress alongside 30 other army officers found complicit of involvement in the conspiracy and harm to the nation. Shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution, Kornilov escaped from Byknov and after evading capture from the Bolsheviks, went on to establish the Volunteer Army, which fought against his key ideological and government enemies and was killed in battle action in 1918.
Additional background:
Following the fall of the corrupt Russian Empire's monarch in the February Revolution from power, the liberals and left-wingers, who made up the majority of the revolutionaries, some represented in the Duma and others in the Petrograd Soviet, took power and formed a provisional government, leading to chaos in politics as mentioned earlier. The new government passed legislation that even Lenin stated that Russia's government must be the freest of all the belligerent countries despite his actual contempt for their supposed weakness, rule, war support, hindering of his revolutionary progress and envy. However, unrest due to Russia's continued participation in World War 1 against Germany on the Entente side decreased support for the Provisional Government and it subsided to the extent that even the initial supporters caused unrests in the cities and towns. The demonstrations during the critical "July Days" sparked calls for a need for more discipline and for a stronger government - a resurgence occurred in right-wing feeling amongst sections of Russian society. Officers of the Russian Army, Kornilov amongst them, led these calls. The officers feared that ill-discipline amongst their troops contributed to the continued poor performance of the Russian army during the First World War and was responsible for the failure of Kerensky's Offensive. They wanted the restoration of the death penalty at the front line as well as the termination of the various soldiers' committees that had sprung up in the months following February to restore fear, discipline and faith in a strong government. Unease also existed among Russia's businessmen and industrialists and escalated, while even among the politicians who formed the provisional government, support for the restoration of the old Tsarist order of discipline was common in their words.
After dispopularity on the front and losing support from his once loyal troops and officers, and later the government, Brusilov resigned in disillusion. He would later desert to the Red side in 1920 after the fall of the White Russian Armies. His replacement was General Lavr Kornilov, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Army, who attempted a coup d' etat in August 1917. To ensure his success, his army advanced on Petrograd, with the Provisional Government under the leadership of Alexander Kerensky, seemingly powerless to stop him. This gave an opportunity for the Bolsheviks to take the lead in the saving Petrograd from Kornilov.
The Red Guards, under Trotsky's direction, organised the defence of the city. Bolshevik agents infiltrated Kornilov's troops and encouraged them to desert. The Bolsheviks also organised strikes by railway workers which caused chaos to Kornilov's supplies and communications. Within a few days, Kornilov's attempt at seizing power was over. Ignoring Boris Savinkov's mediation efforts due to suspicions of misunderstandings, Kerensky desposed his chief army commander on 9 September from duties, claiming that he was trying to overthrow the government. Kornilov responded to Kerensky's replies by stating he was threatened with arrest or brainwashing by the Bolsheviks and was coming to his rescue and restoration, saying that he was saving the government, military and nation from dying under the hands of the Germans and Bolsheviks.
Unconfident of the support of the generals in his army, Kerensky was forced to seek help in other parties, such as the Bolsheviks and their Red Guards. When Alexander Kerensky asked General Alexander Krymov to stop the advance of the Third Cavalry Corps against Petrograd, Krymov obeyed the new instructions after realizing that the capital was not, in fact, under the hands of the Bolsheviks or Kornilov.
Kornilov's attempt to takeover Petrograd collapsed without bloodshed, when his Cossacks abandoned the cause.He and about 7,000 supporters were arrested for 'treason' despite their roles and justification for doing the revolutionary government a big 'disservice'.
Following the coup, the Bolsheviks, who were released after weeks to months in prison despite their potential danger, decided to take over the government. They were probably the biggest beneficiaries, who enjoyed a revival in support after the attempted coup's failure. Vladimir Lenin was accused of being a German puppet and traitor, but he fled to Finland, eventually returning after his party's successful revolution. His plea for support by the government had resulted in not only the release of Bolshevik political prisoners, but also the rearmament of the party and its military organization for the fight against Kornilov. Though these weapons and Bolsheviks were surplus and not necessary to fight off Kornilov's advancing troops in August, they were retained by the Bolsheviks and used in their own successful armed revolution. Bolshevik support amongst the Russian public also increased following the Kornilov affair, a consequence of dissatisfaction with the Provisional Government and their incompetent dealing of the affair.
Another important consequence of the Kornilov Affair is that it severed the tie between Kerensky and the military. For although the officer corps, confused about the issues and unwilling to defy the government openly, refused to join in Kornilov's mutiny, it despised Kerensky for his treatment of their commander, the arrest of many prominent generals and his pandering to the left. When the Bolsheviks staged their revolution in October 1917, Kerensky appealed to the military to help defend the government from the insurrection, but his appeal fell on deaf ears. Following the failure of the affair, the namesake general himself was removed from his position as commander in chief of the Russian Army and impounded in Bykhov Fortress alongside 30 other army officers found complicit of involvement in the conspiracy and harm to the nation. Shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution, Kornilov escaped from Byknov and after evading capture from the Bolsheviks, went on to establish the Volunteer Army, which fought against his key ideological and government enemies and was killed in battle action in 1918.
Additional background:
Following the fall of the corrupt Russian Empire's monarch in the February Revolution from power, the liberals and left-wingers, who made up the majority of the revolutionaries, some represented in the Duma and others in the Petrograd Soviet, took power and formed a provisional government, leading to chaos in politics as mentioned earlier. The new government passed legislation that even Lenin stated that Russia's government must be the freest of all the belligerent countries despite his actual contempt for their supposed weakness, rule, war support, hindering of his revolutionary progress and envy. However, unrest due to Russia's continued participation in World War 1 against Germany on the Entente side decreased support for the Provisional Government and it subsided to the extent that even the initial supporters caused unrests in the cities and towns. The demonstrations during the critical "July Days" sparked calls for a need for more discipline and for a stronger government - a resurgence occurred in right-wing feeling amongst sections of Russian society. Officers of the Russian Army, Kornilov amongst them, led these calls. The officers feared that ill-discipline amongst their troops contributed to the continued poor performance of the Russian army during the First World War and was responsible for the failure of Kerensky's Offensive. They wanted the restoration of the death penalty at the front line as well as the termination of the various soldiers' committees that had sprung up in the months following February to restore fear, discipline and faith in a strong government. Unease also existed among Russia's businessmen and industrialists and escalated, while even among the politicians who formed the provisional government, support for the restoration of the old Tsarist order of discipline was common in their words.
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October Revolution
On 10 October, the Bolshevik Central Committtee voted 10-2 for an uprising against the present provisional government, with Lenin stating that the appropriate time had come and the city was ripe for revolution and takeover, along with the support from the majority of populace stating the ongoing war would end with their takeover.
On 13 October, the Bolsheviks launched their uprising against the government. The first intention was to liberate the starving sailors impounded in the Peter and Paul Fortress and inspire the others to follow them to victory. Then, demonstrations would follow asking for the deposition of the government. Leon Trotsky distributed arms to the revolutionaries, demonstrating workers, Red Guards and disgruntled sailors, resulting in the Bolsheviks capturing government buildings and threatening the capital's safety. In the Winter Palace, initially used by the Tsars and now by the Provisional Government, Kerensky ordered the recalling of his troops from the city and the front, where troops were on their way to stop the German advance in Estonia. The Petrograd Garrison rebelled against the government simultaneously, claiming that it was 'an enemy of the people's tool' against their necessary rights. For a few days, the assault was bloody, until a counterattack threatened to annihilate the defenders and the Bolsheviks took the opportunity to assault the Winter Palace, which fell in half an hour after the end of a street fight.
The assault began with a shot from a defending gun captured in the first hour of fight and enthusiastic workers and sailors joined them. After the cadets, Cossacks and assorted battalions were defeated or diverted, the Bolsheviks stormed the Winter Palace and captured it, according to the Soviet version of events.
More contemporary research on the important event using government archives significantly corrected myths and Soviet edited and embellished history. The archives stated that after liberating prisoners using troops sent from the Smolny, all critical centres in the city were taken after 3 days of fighting. The attrition street battle between the Russian Government's loyal troops and the Bolsheviks ended up with a breakthrough that threatened to capture the Winter Palace and the street it was located. Then, the Bolshevik troops took advantage of the temporary disruption in defence of the government to storm the palace. All critical centres of the city fell to the Bolsheviks without a fight after the capture of the Winter Palace and provisional government. The fall of the Winter Palace was no less dramatic, with its fall on 16 October being quick enough to prevent the Russians from launching an effective counterattack before its fall to save it. The decreased number of Cossacks, cadets and 1,500 members of each respective battalion [Women's, Finnish, Siberian, Baltic, Caucasian] defending their government's palace caused them to desert or surrender when combined with propaganda upon the Bolshevik entrance. Any captured guns and light naval units were ordered to fire on the palace as a sign of initiating the revolution and rejection of the government. In fact, the Winter Palace fell and the government was captured because a back gate and several doors were left open for reinforcements to come and space to defend. A Red Guard named Adamovich remembered gasping as he burst into the palace, as he had never before seen such luxury and splendour. A small group which broke in, got lost in the cavernous interior, and accidentally happened upon the remnants of Kerensky's provisional government in the imperial family's breakfast room. The illiterate revolutionaries then forced those arrested to write up their own arrest and surrender papers, admitting defeat, complicity in corruption, incompetence and war participation. After the government was captured and effectively overthrown, they were questioned as to their fate, but most of them surrendered without a fight and Kerensky was held hostage, with his ministers resigning to their eventual fates after his capture. The stories about the " Winter Palace's Desperate Defence" and " Eventual Storming After Several Hours Of Fighting" were conjured by Bolshevik propaganda, but had some basis in light of the actual events while grandiose paintings depicting the desperate defence of several battalions, such as the Women's, being overcome by Bolshevik strength. With the Petrograd Soviet, Red Guards and Bolsheviks nowe in charge of the government, the Second All-Russian Committee Of Soviets Meeting was organized, with the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries dismissed for the unnecessary role, capture of their fellow politicians and association with the overthrown government and war.
Some sources believed that the leader of Tsentrobalt, Pavlo Dybenko, played a more enormous role in the revolution to its success than he actually did. The same mariners then dispersed by force the elected parliament of Russia,and used machine-gun fire against protesting demonstrators in Petrograd. About a hundred demonstrators were killed, and several hundreds were wounded. Dybenko in his memoirs mentioned this event as "several shots in the air". Later, during the first hours after the taking the Winter Palace, Dybenko personally entered the Ministry of Justice and destroyed there the documents concerning the financing of the Bolshevik party by Germany. These are disputed by various sources such as Louise Bryant, who claims that news outlets in the west at the time reported that the unfortunate loss of life occurred in Moscow not Petrograd and the number was much less than is suggested above. As for the "several shots in the air", there is little evidence suggesting otherwise. The alleged action of Dybenko entering the Ministry of Justice to destroy documents as recalled by Savchenko can also be challenged. According to reports received, Dybenko was in Helsingfors, later the independent Finnish capital city, arranging the return of sailors and revolutionaries from Finland to Petrograd in anticipation of its success and government takeover. From the book Radio October...On the “Krechet” in Helsingfors, radio operator Makarov hands a telegram to Pavel Dybenko with the report of the “Samson” commissar, Grigoriy Borisov: “To Tsentrobalt. Everything is calm in Petrograd. The power is in the hands of the revolutionary committee. You have to immediately get in touch with the front committee of the Northern Army in order to preserve unity of forces and stability."
Later accounts of events in the Soviet Union would depict the October Revolution's events as far more dramatic and climatic than the truth, due to Bolshevik Propaganda exaggeration [such as the firsthand account of a British General Knox]. This was helped by historic reenactment, with films produced by noted Soviet director Sergei Eisenstein such as October: Twenty Days That Shook The World. In reality, despite the difficulties experienced during the assault, the opposition faced was less otherwise the Bolsheviks would have lost their first decisive battle to power in Russia. After a single day following the revolution, 50 people had been killed, arrested or wounded for their suspected or actual anti-Soviet or anti-communist beliefs and policies. The insurrection was time just in time to ensure that power was handled over to the Soviets in the Second All-Russian Congress Of Soviets, which was supposed to take place on 18 October without delay if the assault succeeded in the new government building, which was also the Winter Palace temporarily.
The Second Congress Of Soviets consisted of 700 members, including some 350 Bolsheviks and 125 Leftist Socialist Revolutionaries, the rest being Mensheviks, new or signing up members to these political parties and activists, all of whom supported the overthrow of the Kerensky government. When the fall of the Winter Palace was announced, the Congress adopted a decree transferring power to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, thus ratifying the Revolution. The transfer of power was not without disagreement. The center and Right wings of the Socialist Revolutionaries as well as the Mensheviks believed that Lenin and the Bolsheviks had seized power illegally without consultation and agreement with the government's policies and walked out in shame, offended and disgraced. Meanwhile, Leon Trotsky, an ex-Menshevik who joined the Bolsheviks, shouted to the politicians in a taunting way: "You are pitiful isolated individuals; you are political bankrupts; your role is played out by our triumph. Go where you belong from now on — into the dustbin of history!"
On 10 October, the Bolshevik Central Committtee voted 10-2 for an uprising against the present provisional government, with Lenin stating that the appropriate time had come and the city was ripe for revolution and takeover, along with the support from the majority of populace stating the ongoing war would end with their takeover.
On 13 October, the Bolsheviks launched their uprising against the government. The first intention was to liberate the starving sailors impounded in the Peter and Paul Fortress and inspire the others to follow them to victory. Then, demonstrations would follow asking for the deposition of the government. Leon Trotsky distributed arms to the revolutionaries, demonstrating workers, Red Guards and disgruntled sailors, resulting in the Bolsheviks capturing government buildings and threatening the capital's safety. In the Winter Palace, initially used by the Tsars and now by the Provisional Government, Kerensky ordered the recalling of his troops from the city and the front, where troops were on their way to stop the German advance in Estonia. The Petrograd Garrison rebelled against the government simultaneously, claiming that it was 'an enemy of the people's tool' against their necessary rights. For a few days, the assault was bloody, until a counterattack threatened to annihilate the defenders and the Bolsheviks took the opportunity to assault the Winter Palace, which fell in half an hour after the end of a street fight.
The assault began with a shot from a defending gun captured in the first hour of fight and enthusiastic workers and sailors joined them. After the cadets, Cossacks and assorted battalions were defeated or diverted, the Bolsheviks stormed the Winter Palace and captured it, according to the Soviet version of events.
More contemporary research on the important event using government archives significantly corrected myths and Soviet edited and embellished history. The archives stated that after liberating prisoners using troops sent from the Smolny, all critical centres in the city were taken after 3 days of fighting. The attrition street battle between the Russian Government's loyal troops and the Bolsheviks ended up with a breakthrough that threatened to capture the Winter Palace and the street it was located. Then, the Bolshevik troops took advantage of the temporary disruption in defence of the government to storm the palace. All critical centres of the city fell to the Bolsheviks without a fight after the capture of the Winter Palace and provisional government. The fall of the Winter Palace was no less dramatic, with its fall on 16 October being quick enough to prevent the Russians from launching an effective counterattack before its fall to save it. The decreased number of Cossacks, cadets and 1,500 members of each respective battalion [Women's, Finnish, Siberian, Baltic, Caucasian] defending their government's palace caused them to desert or surrender when combined with propaganda upon the Bolshevik entrance. Any captured guns and light naval units were ordered to fire on the palace as a sign of initiating the revolution and rejection of the government. In fact, the Winter Palace fell and the government was captured because a back gate and several doors were left open for reinforcements to come and space to defend. A Red Guard named Adamovich remembered gasping as he burst into the palace, as he had never before seen such luxury and splendour. A small group which broke in, got lost in the cavernous interior, and accidentally happened upon the remnants of Kerensky's provisional government in the imperial family's breakfast room. The illiterate revolutionaries then forced those arrested to write up their own arrest and surrender papers, admitting defeat, complicity in corruption, incompetence and war participation. After the government was captured and effectively overthrown, they were questioned as to their fate, but most of them surrendered without a fight and Kerensky was held hostage, with his ministers resigning to their eventual fates after his capture. The stories about the " Winter Palace's Desperate Defence" and " Eventual Storming After Several Hours Of Fighting" were conjured by Bolshevik propaganda, but had some basis in light of the actual events while grandiose paintings depicting the desperate defence of several battalions, such as the Women's, being overcome by Bolshevik strength. With the Petrograd Soviet, Red Guards and Bolsheviks nowe in charge of the government, the Second All-Russian Committee Of Soviets Meeting was organized, with the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries dismissed for the unnecessary role, capture of their fellow politicians and association with the overthrown government and war.
Some sources believed that the leader of Tsentrobalt, Pavlo Dybenko, played a more enormous role in the revolution to its success than he actually did. The same mariners then dispersed by force the elected parliament of Russia,and used machine-gun fire against protesting demonstrators in Petrograd. About a hundred demonstrators were killed, and several hundreds were wounded. Dybenko in his memoirs mentioned this event as "several shots in the air". Later, during the first hours after the taking the Winter Palace, Dybenko personally entered the Ministry of Justice and destroyed there the documents concerning the financing of the Bolshevik party by Germany. These are disputed by various sources such as Louise Bryant, who claims that news outlets in the west at the time reported that the unfortunate loss of life occurred in Moscow not Petrograd and the number was much less than is suggested above. As for the "several shots in the air", there is little evidence suggesting otherwise. The alleged action of Dybenko entering the Ministry of Justice to destroy documents as recalled by Savchenko can also be challenged. According to reports received, Dybenko was in Helsingfors, later the independent Finnish capital city, arranging the return of sailors and revolutionaries from Finland to Petrograd in anticipation of its success and government takeover. From the book Radio October...On the “Krechet” in Helsingfors, radio operator Makarov hands a telegram to Pavel Dybenko with the report of the “Samson” commissar, Grigoriy Borisov: “To Tsentrobalt. Everything is calm in Petrograd. The power is in the hands of the revolutionary committee. You have to immediately get in touch with the front committee of the Northern Army in order to preserve unity of forces and stability."
Later accounts of events in the Soviet Union would depict the October Revolution's events as far more dramatic and climatic than the truth, due to Bolshevik Propaganda exaggeration [such as the firsthand account of a British General Knox]. This was helped by historic reenactment, with films produced by noted Soviet director Sergei Eisenstein such as October: Twenty Days That Shook The World. In reality, despite the difficulties experienced during the assault, the opposition faced was less otherwise the Bolsheviks would have lost their first decisive battle to power in Russia. After a single day following the revolution, 50 people had been killed, arrested or wounded for their suspected or actual anti-Soviet or anti-communist beliefs and policies. The insurrection was time just in time to ensure that power was handled over to the Soviets in the Second All-Russian Congress Of Soviets, which was supposed to take place on 18 October without delay if the assault succeeded in the new government building, which was also the Winter Palace temporarily.
The Second Congress Of Soviets consisted of 700 members, including some 350 Bolsheviks and 125 Leftist Socialist Revolutionaries, the rest being Mensheviks, new or signing up members to these political parties and activists, all of whom supported the overthrow of the Kerensky government. When the fall of the Winter Palace was announced, the Congress adopted a decree transferring power to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, thus ratifying the Revolution. The transfer of power was not without disagreement. The center and Right wings of the Socialist Revolutionaries as well as the Mensheviks believed that Lenin and the Bolsheviks had seized power illegally without consultation and agreement with the government's policies and walked out in shame, offended and disgraced. Meanwhile, Leon Trotsky, an ex-Menshevik who joined the Bolsheviks, shouted to the politicians in a taunting way: "You are pitiful isolated individuals; you are political bankrupts; your role is played out by our triumph. Go where you belong from now on — into the dustbin of history!"
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Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution
On the following day, the Bolshevik members elected a Council Of People's Commissars [Sovarkom] to represent them, with Lenin leading the new government until arrangements could be made and pending the convocations of the Constituent Assembly. Until the assembly was dissolved, the new government was still "provisional", but with different leaders. The Council Of People's Commissars arrested as many opposition leaders as they could find, with the Constitutionalist Democratic, Constituent Assembly, Menshevik, [rightist] Socialist Revolutionary, monarchist and dozens of others of conservative, liberal and disagreeing socialist political leaders being arrested or targeted for such, with those in Petrograd being among the first to be caught and sent to prison in the Peter And Paul Fortress. Posters were pinned on walls and fences by the SRs describing the takeover as a "crime against the motherland and revolution". There was also strong anti-Bolshevik opposition within Petrograd, which was countered with propaganda over the following weeks about the provisional government's failure. Bolshevik control of the country was still weak and there were more protests in other Russian cities.
On 20 October 1917, posters and newspapers started to criticize the revolution of the Bolsheviks and condemned their authority. The Executive Committee of Peasants Soviets "refutes with indignation all participation of the organised peasantry in this criminal violation of the will of the working class". Persistent opposition to the Bolsheviks still continued to operate from several important working class and revolutionary sources.
21 October came to Tsarskoye Selo with Cossacks launching a countercoup supported by Kerensky riding on a white horse and they were welcomed by church bells, hoping for the overthrow of the Bolsheviks. Kerensky gave a notice to the rifle garrison for disarmament, which was ignored They were then fired upon by Kerensky’s Cossacks, which resulted in 10 deaths. This turned the last soldiers in Petrograd who were still fighting against Kerensky because he behaved like the Tsarist regime's officers, police and generals. Kerensky’s last failure to assume leadership over his troops was described by John Reed as a ‘fatal blunder that signalled the final death of the provisional government'.
On 22 October 1917, the battle against the anti-Bolsheviks continued in defeat. The Red Guard fought against Cossacks at Tsarskoye Selo, with the Cossacks breaking rank and fleeing, leaving their artillery behind. On 23 October 1917, the Bolsheviks gained control of Moscow after a week of bitter street-fighting. Artillery had been freely used with an estimated 700 casualties. However, there was continued support for Kerensky in the provinces. On 24 October 1917, there was an appeal to anti-Bolsheviks throughout Russia to join new government of the people, but the Bolsheviks gradually won the support of the Russian people. The next day, there was only minor opposition left against Bolshevism in Russian cities, with newspapers such as Novaya Zhizn criticizing the lack of manpower and organisation of the Bolsheviks to run a party, let alone a government. Lenin confidently claimed that there was "not a shadow of hesitation in the masses of Petrograd, Moscow and the rest of Russia" towards Bolshevik rule in response.
After the armistice signed on 10 November 1917, the Cheka, a Bolshevik secret police organization, was founded by the decree of Lenin, with a plan to starting the Red Terror in 1918. The Jacobin Terror was imitated by the Bolsheviks for the purges, executions and arrests that were to follow, with Trotsky hoping that Lenin would be the radical Bolshevik version of Robespierre, as he stated in 1904.
The Decree On Land ratified the actions of the peasants by seizing land, money and buildings from landowners and property owners and giving them to loyal and revolutionary communist workers and peasants.
Other decrees included the nationalization of banks and confiscation of private, upper class and counterrevolutionary political bank accounts, the Church's properties (including bank accounts) seizure, the repudiation of foreign debts, control of the factories to be given to the soviets, amendments to wages so that were fixed at higher rates than during the war and a shorter, eight-hour working day was introduced.
Bolshevik attempts to seize power in other parts of the former Russian empire succeeded, although chaos and ethnic separation resulted in the formation of several independent states. The liberal and socialist Ukrainian Rada, which was formed in Kiev and declared autonomy in July 1917, along with the efforts of Ukrainian revolutionaries, created the Ukrainian People's Republic on 31 October 1917, assisted by the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets. Conflict with the new Russian Bolshevik authorities led to the formation of a new government on 1 January 1918, which declared independence under the name mentioned. In the remnants of Estonia not under German occupation, an Estonian Provincial Assembly that declared itself supreme legal authority and was later disbanded by German occupation and Bolshevik authorities and a rival Bolshevik government that was led by Communist revolutionary Jaan Anvelt and recognized by Lenin's government as Estonia's leader on 8 December in case the Bolsheviks held Estonia, although forces loyal to Anvelt only controlled several towns.
In Russia, the success of the revolution turned it into a Soviet republic. A coalition of anti Bolshevik groups attempted to depose the Bolsheviks in 1918, supported by the Americans, Japanese, White Russian Army, newly independent states, peasant and guerilla groups and several Entente detachments troops trapped in Russia or sent to intervene with the hope that they would defeat the Bolsheviks and return Russia to World War 1 belligerency. In an attempt to intervene in the civil war after the Bolsheviks' separate peace with the Central Powers, the Entente powers (United Kingdom, United States and Japan) occupied parts of the Soviet Union for over two years before finally withdrawing. The United States did not recognize the new Russian government until 1933. The European powers recognized the Soviet Union in the early 1920s and began to engage in business with it after the New Economic Policy was implemented.
On the following day, the Bolshevik members elected a Council Of People's Commissars [Sovarkom] to represent them, with Lenin leading the new government until arrangements could be made and pending the convocations of the Constituent Assembly. Until the assembly was dissolved, the new government was still "provisional", but with different leaders. The Council Of People's Commissars arrested as many opposition leaders as they could find, with the Constitutionalist Democratic, Constituent Assembly, Menshevik, [rightist] Socialist Revolutionary, monarchist and dozens of others of conservative, liberal and disagreeing socialist political leaders being arrested or targeted for such, with those in Petrograd being among the first to be caught and sent to prison in the Peter And Paul Fortress. Posters were pinned on walls and fences by the SRs describing the takeover as a "crime against the motherland and revolution". There was also strong anti-Bolshevik opposition within Petrograd, which was countered with propaganda over the following weeks about the provisional government's failure. Bolshevik control of the country was still weak and there were more protests in other Russian cities.
On 20 October 1917, posters and newspapers started to criticize the revolution of the Bolsheviks and condemned their authority. The Executive Committee of Peasants Soviets "refutes with indignation all participation of the organised peasantry in this criminal violation of the will of the working class". Persistent opposition to the Bolsheviks still continued to operate from several important working class and revolutionary sources.
21 October came to Tsarskoye Selo with Cossacks launching a countercoup supported by Kerensky riding on a white horse and they were welcomed by church bells, hoping for the overthrow of the Bolsheviks. Kerensky gave a notice to the rifle garrison for disarmament, which was ignored They were then fired upon by Kerensky’s Cossacks, which resulted in 10 deaths. This turned the last soldiers in Petrograd who were still fighting against Kerensky because he behaved like the Tsarist regime's officers, police and generals. Kerensky’s last failure to assume leadership over his troops was described by John Reed as a ‘fatal blunder that signalled the final death of the provisional government'.
On 22 October 1917, the battle against the anti-Bolsheviks continued in defeat. The Red Guard fought against Cossacks at Tsarskoye Selo, with the Cossacks breaking rank and fleeing, leaving their artillery behind. On 23 October 1917, the Bolsheviks gained control of Moscow after a week of bitter street-fighting. Artillery had been freely used with an estimated 700 casualties. However, there was continued support for Kerensky in the provinces. On 24 October 1917, there was an appeal to anti-Bolsheviks throughout Russia to join new government of the people, but the Bolsheviks gradually won the support of the Russian people. The next day, there was only minor opposition left against Bolshevism in Russian cities, with newspapers such as Novaya Zhizn criticizing the lack of manpower and organisation of the Bolsheviks to run a party, let alone a government. Lenin confidently claimed that there was "not a shadow of hesitation in the masses of Petrograd, Moscow and the rest of Russia" towards Bolshevik rule in response.
After the armistice signed on 10 November 1917, the Cheka, a Bolshevik secret police organization, was founded by the decree of Lenin, with a plan to starting the Red Terror in 1918. The Jacobin Terror was imitated by the Bolsheviks for the purges, executions and arrests that were to follow, with Trotsky hoping that Lenin would be the radical Bolshevik version of Robespierre, as he stated in 1904.
The Decree On Land ratified the actions of the peasants by seizing land, money and buildings from landowners and property owners and giving them to loyal and revolutionary communist workers and peasants.
Other decrees included the nationalization of banks and confiscation of private, upper class and counterrevolutionary political bank accounts, the Church's properties (including bank accounts) seizure, the repudiation of foreign debts, control of the factories to be given to the soviets, amendments to wages so that were fixed at higher rates than during the war and a shorter, eight-hour working day was introduced.
Bolshevik attempts to seize power in other parts of the former Russian empire succeeded, although chaos and ethnic separation resulted in the formation of several independent states. The liberal and socialist Ukrainian Rada, which was formed in Kiev and declared autonomy in July 1917, along with the efforts of Ukrainian revolutionaries, created the Ukrainian People's Republic on 31 October 1917, assisted by the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets. Conflict with the new Russian Bolshevik authorities led to the formation of a new government on 1 January 1918, which declared independence under the name mentioned. In the remnants of Estonia not under German occupation, an Estonian Provincial Assembly that declared itself supreme legal authority and was later disbanded by German occupation and Bolshevik authorities and a rival Bolshevik government that was led by Communist revolutionary Jaan Anvelt and recognized by Lenin's government as Estonia's leader on 8 December in case the Bolsheviks held Estonia, although forces loyal to Anvelt only controlled several towns.
In Russia, the success of the revolution turned it into a Soviet republic. A coalition of anti Bolshevik groups attempted to depose the Bolsheviks in 1918, supported by the Americans, Japanese, White Russian Army, newly independent states, peasant and guerilla groups and several Entente detachments troops trapped in Russia or sent to intervene with the hope that they would defeat the Bolsheviks and return Russia to World War 1 belligerency. In an attempt to intervene in the civil war after the Bolsheviks' separate peace with the Central Powers, the Entente powers (United Kingdom, United States and Japan) occupied parts of the Soviet Union for over two years before finally withdrawing. The United States did not recognize the new Russian government until 1933. The European powers recognized the Soviet Union in the early 1920s and began to engage in business with it after the New Economic Policy was implemented.
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