To archive it on this board, here's a TL that I posted on the old board and on SHWI with the same PoD as my OP for this thread.
The thread is more focused on Vietnam (& US foreign policy globally) than Africa, and it also only postpones the independence of Algeria and French Africa by 4 years rather than 15 years:
12/21/00
The AH challenge:
Have Vietnam take an alternate approach to independence
Remove Ho Chi Minh and Marxism as a decisive factor in Vietnamese
history, without the
usual cheap shot of having him killed at a
convenient moment:
How? Prevent the short-lived Viet Minh takeover of Vietnam in Sept.
1945, and the prior
period since March 1945, where the Viet Minh had been the principal
resistance force in
Vietnam.
Basically, Paris orders its Indochina forces to not provoke the
Japanese. In OTL, the Japanese deposed the French in
Indochina in March 1945 when
they caught wind of preparations for a French uprising in Indochina.
After that, they put in a
puppet regime, but then did not have the resources to administer the
interior, which left a
power vacuum that the Viet Minh started to fill. Also, the Allies were
forced to rely on the
Viet Minh for intelligence and assistance in rescuing pilots, which
they had gotten before
from the French.
So, remove the French uprising plot, and the Japanese reaction to it,
and you have a whole
different situation at the end of the war. There is continuous French
authority throughout
Indochina, under Japanese supervision, until the end of the war. The
Viet Minh remain a
marginal force along the China-Vietnam border region. They are unable
to take over the
whole country and do a proclamation of independence as they did in
OTL's Sept. 1945.
The French disarm the Japanese after the surrender. FDR may still be
tempted to have
other powers disarm the Japanese, but the British have no reason to get
involved and the
Chinese don't have that much more. At most the French can prevent
China from
intervening by bribing Chinese generals with the equivalent of whatever
loot they had been
expecting, maybe a share of that year's opium crop.
This scenario assumes that the last 6 months of the war, when they had
some US support,
really gave the Viet Minh a leg up that they otherwise wouldn't have
had. Beyond that, the
year and a half between Sept. 1945 and about March 46, when they had
almost complete
control of northern Vietnam, and most Japanese weapons, without French
interference
probably gave them an even bigger leg up. In that time they also
released food stockpiles
to the public, in this TL, the French would. Without this window of
opportunity, a Viet Minh
victory by 1954 is very, very unlikely.
Impact: Between 1945 and 1950 the French manage to contain the Viet
Minh and other
assorted nationalist groups or political factions.
In this TL, Ho Chi
Minh is not able to
eliminate or co-opt most nationalist groups. In 1947, the Indian
independence movement
may inspire some imitators in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
The Chinese
Communist
victory of 1949 gives Ho Chi Minh a much needed material boost and
secure rear base, but
the French and Ho's nationalist competition use his dependence on
support of the hated
Chinese against him. During the 50s Vietnam experiences some economic
growth that it
did not in our timeline because there is no major war there, and the
French economy is
recovering. Vietnam gets some benefit from the Korean War boom and
manufacturing
grows some, although its not like the French have any kind of
progressive development policy. In the 50s, Ho Chi Minh sticks with
what he knows best,
rural insurgency, even if by the end of the decade he would be better
off using more of the
urban guerrilla techniques pioneered in Latin America in the 1960s and
70s. Taiwan may
support anti-French schemes by some Vietnamese nationalists in
Vietnam's cities.
China may invest more in the Burmese communists, but probably backs off
once it
becomes clear that this is bothering India, that the Burmese Reds
bicker among
themselves, and the Burmese government is willing to accommodate
China's interests in
its foreign policy. The Malayan and Philippine insurgency peter out in
the 50s with little to
show for it.
The Algerian war for independence does not begin in November 1954. it
begins later. I
don't think the outbreak of that war the same year as Dien Bien Phu was
simple
coincidence. However, it does break out, a year and a half later, in
part because the
French settlers preemptive measures against a potential rebellion are
so high-handed, but
also Nasser has emerged as an inspiring figure in Egypt by 1955, buying
arms from the
Soviets and becoming a player in the non-aligned movement.
The
Algerian revolt begins in
1957.
The Suez war still happens and Nasser gets an even bigger reputation
after that.
In OTL, France gave Morocco and Tunisia independence in 1956, Guinea
independence in
1958 and most of West Africa and Madagascar independence in 1960. I
think that the
Algerian war spurred French departure from other colonies, so I think
this whole process
takes longer.
[The alternative to this is the postponement of much African
independence into the 1970s]
The French have more resiliency in Algeria because they didn't fight in
Indochina, but they
also don't have the counterinsurgency experience.
The French grant
Morocco, Tunisia and
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia independence no later than 1959 or 1960.
Not only is the
Algeria spurring the loosening of the French grip, but Malaysian
independence, granted in
1957, makes the French Indochina colony, under any reformist guise, too
much of an
anachronism in the Southeast Asian region. By 1960, Burma and the
Philippines and
Indonesia would have been
independent for over 10 years. Especially when Malaysia becomes
independent, I don't see how French Indochina would
remain politically viable as a French
colony.
On the ground, the pre-eminent Vietnamese nationalist leader of the
1950s is Buddhist
monk, Thich Tri Quang, who gave Ngo Dinh Diem so much trouble in OTL.
He leads a
nonviolent resistance movement partially inspired by Gandhi, Tunisian
leader Habib
Bourguiba and the Dalai Lama. Their most serious protest tactic is
self-immolation by
monks in front of French administrative offices. By the late 1950s the
French are no longer
the hardened colonialists they were a decade earlier, and they respond
to Thich Tri Quang
as they did to Habib Bourguiba, with a dialogue leading to
independence.
French West African colonies are made independent in 1964, after De
Gaulle takes over.
France gets out of Algeria in 1966, having won the war militarily but
not politically. Media
coverage of
Algerian women and kids throwing rocks at the French,
locally called the
intifadeh, is decisive.
T
he Vietnamese National Congress, an umbrella group led by the
Buddhists, is the dominant party in Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh is very out
of style, like the
Colombian FARC has been for most of its existence.
When the Chinese
cut off support to
his group, the remnants need to rely on heroin trafficking to support
themselves, a la the
FARC. Although still part of the French Union at independence, Vietnam
leaves the
organization within a year of the last French troops leaving, 1960.
In
the first all Vietnamese
elections, Ho Chi Minh fares poorly and dies disappointed soon
thereafter. Independent
Vietnam follows a
'non-aligned' foreign policy course, having decent relations with
France and India. It does
not become an outpost for anticommunist alliances.
US Presidential politics can be unpredictably affected, but they might
be the same, and
we
may get to see what happens when Lyndon Johnson does not have to deal
with the
Vietnam War, and gets to focus on the Great Society Agenda.
Will the US be drawn into another military engagement with communist
forces on the
periphery, quite possibly.
Perhaps without Indochina occupying their attention,
both superpowers
play more
aggressively when the Congo gains independence in 1963 or 1964, and
prevent the UN
peacekeeping mission. If that's the case the US has the logistical
edge and can probably
impose its desired solution before public patience runs out. Any
opponents we face in Latin
America or Africa will not have the logistical advantages that the
VC-NVA did.
Possibly the US intervenes in South Yemen after the British leave, if
the British give us a
chance to get in. Again, if we have troop intervention, the Marxists
are limited in their
response by logistics, none of the neighboring countries, Oman, Saudi
Arabia or North
Yemen, are pro-Communist.
When the Portuguese Empire folds, probably still in 1975, the US moves
to ensure that no
perceived pro-Soviet faction comes to power. The Soviets probably
don't dare send the
Cubans in without the Vietnam War weakening us, and we resist them by
supporting local
factions we favor, or our own troops if need be.
These 'brushfire wars' may upset certain liberal constituencies,
Fulbright may hold
hearings, some folks may march on Washington, but they are never costly
enough to make
the US accept a negative outcome.
Without the Vietnam war the US can be more attentive to the Middle East
in the 1960s.
When Nasser asks UNEF to leave and blockades the Straits of Tiran, the
United States,
Britain and France may do a 're-flagging' or escort mission of Israeli
ships thru the strait,
reminiscent from our POV of the 're-flagging' of Kuwaiti tankers during
the Iran-Iraq war.
We may have some fighter engagements with Egypt. This takes away
Israeli justification
for a pre-emptive strike, and forces Nasser to account for US naval
forces when
contemplating moves against Israel. The only reason we might not do
this would be if we
were involved in some other intense, but probably short, third world
conflict. If prospects for
conventional war in the Middle East are constrained, the struggle
continues more through
guerrilla warfare and infiltration. At least in the near-term, most
Arab states increase their
ties with the USSR in anger about overt US protection for Israel.
Egypt
may remain a
Soviet client thru the 70s or 80s. If Sadat still has an inclination
to tilt towards the US, even
without the need for its help in getting back Sinai, he may make
diplomatic moves towards
the US, but will not engage in any peace process with the Israelis, the
maximum he will
accept will be the restoration of UNEF.