PC: Collapse of the Pusan Perimeter

I'm working on a TL that starts with a delayed Korean War that goes very badly for the United States, and I wanted to see if this passed the smell test.

The PoD is in 1949, with the early death of Stalin. With the Soviet leadership fighting over the succession, the Korean War doesn't happen in 1950. As a result, Louis Johnson is in charge of the Department of Defense for two more years, with all the budget-cutting that implies, and with the international situation seemingly stabilizing the Selective Service Act is allowed to expire in 1950 instead of being renewed.

When the North Koreans cross the border in 1952, the US Army is in much worse shape: they're in the middle of their second transition from a draft force to a volunteer force in five years, and the budget cuts mean their existing supplies of arms and ammunition are much smaller. Then, the North Koreans get lucky and capture Syngman Rhee in their drive south (I think I remember reading that they came within a few hours of doing that IOTL, but correct me if I'm wrong). It becomes clear that the Pusan Perimeter will not hold, and Truman orders the use of an atomic "demonstration shot" off the coast of North Korea to force them to back down.

So, what do you think? I know the usual Korean-War-goes-bad scenario is after the Chinese enter the war, but it's difficult to get the timing on that to work with some other things I want to happen.
 
Sounds reasonable enough. Another thing that might have made the war go badly for the American would be if the Soviet Union used their veto at the Security Council meeting that gave the Americans the green light to intervene. While the Americans would have gone in anyway, it might have delayed them several days or weeks, and would have made the war harder to sell to American allies. I'm assuming someone takes the "demonstration shot" the wrong way, if that were to occur, the Soviets would be out in force, and the Americans would be at DEFCOM 2.
 
Sounds reasonable enough. Another thing that might have made the war go badly for the American would be if the Soviet Union used their veto at the Security Council meeting that gave the Americans the green light to intervene. While the Americans would have gone in anyway, it might have delayed them several days or weeks, and would have made the war harder to sell to American allies. I'm assuming someone takes the "demonstration shot" the wrong way, if that were to occur, the Soviets would be out in force, and the Americans would be at DEFCOM 2.

I am already planning to have the Soviets exercise their veto, but I'm not sure it would make much difference militarily.

My plan, actually, is that the demonstration shot works; the post-Stalin Soviet leadership was divided on whether to approve the Korean adventure in the first place, and the anti-war elements use this as an opportunity to purge their rivals. Also, the board already has enough WW3 timelines.

I'm not entirely sure Truman would authorize any such Atomic 'demonstration'...

My thinking is that a direct atomic attack on North Korea doesn't really yield any advantages, but does make it much harder for the Soviets to back down. The real target, after all, isn't Pyongyang, it's Moscow; if the Soviets choose to escalate the situation further, then the fate of Kim Il-Sung is deeply secondary.
 
My thinking is that a direct atomic attack on North Korea doesn't really yield any advantages, but does make it much harder for the Soviets to back down. The real target, after all, isn't Pyongyang, it's Moscow; if the Soviets choose to escalate the situation further, then the fate of Kim Il-Sung is deeply secondary.

That pretty well goes against Truman's entire character. So I'd say you need to replace him, somehow.
 
That pretty well goes against Truman's entire character. So I'd say you need to replace him, somehow.

Maybe have..what's his name.... Henry Wallace in charge. He was a bit more of a peacenik than Truman. Either that or have FDR still alive, without having had a stroke.
 
The PoD is in 1949, with the early death of Stalin. With the Soviet leadership fighting over the succession, the Korean War doesn't happen in 1950.

Why does the Korean War break out at all?

The Soviet Analysis of the international situation in the early 1950s was that an international financial and economic crisis was inevitable leading to an imperialist or newly fascistic power declaring war on the Soviet Union.

Planned military actions (Unification of China, Unification of Korea, Disciplining Yugoslavia) were in the context of border security and consolidation. Korea was authorised in this context by Stalin, who was perhaps the only politbureau/ political committee member willing to countenance war. In addition, Korea depended upon a rather unique war line winning in Korea itself. The majority of lines in Korea favoured extensifying the guerilla war in the south.

Why, in 1952, with a Political bureau busy resolving issues of primacy towards heavy versus consumer industry in the development of consumer socialism in the USSR, would the Soviet Union allow a client state to go to war?

ROK, with its far looser client relationship with the USA, and its known propensity for reunification through war, is far more likely to cause a war. Historically, the USA was unwilling to fund the ROK a free offensive army.

I am relying on the Korean Institute of Military History's most recent revision of their history of the war, published in English, for this. As an ROK history, it is refreshingly honest about the lack of solid war line in the DPRK.

yours,
Sam R.
 
I am relying on the Korean Institute of Military History's most recent revision of their history of the war, published in English, for this. As an ROK history, it is refreshingly honest about the lack of solid war line in the DPRK.

Really? What's the title - I'll see if I can get it through the university library. Because the impression I've gotten is that Kim Il-Sung and the DPRK were the primary motive force behind the war, and that the Soviet Union approved it because they thought the US wouldn't defend the peninsula, thanks in part to a particularly unfortunate Truman misspeak. I was figuring that the same impulses and misapprehensions would still exist two years later, especially if the US has spent two more years cutting budgets and not giving tanks to the South Koreans.

Random thought: maybe in the 1952 presidential election, the leading candidate mentions that he'll supply heavy weapons to the ROK if elected, and the North Koreans figure it's their last chance for an invasion? Edit: Nah, that wouldn't work. The Soviet Union would take that as a sign the US cared about Korea after all, and therefore wouldn't allow anything.
 
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What's the title - I'll see if I can get it through the university library.

Korea Institute of Military History The Korean War 3 vols. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1997.

Also apparently available as a "Bison" edition. Allan R. Millet introduces the Bison edition at least.

Because the impression I've gotten is that Kim Il-Sung
Yes.
and the DPRK were the primary motive force behind the war
No. The DPRK has four different lines, and there was a major sentiment towards a revolutionary solution to Korean reunification.
and that the Soviet Union approved it because they thought the US wouldn't defend the peninsula,
Not really. It is Stalin specific and connected to the mixed messages signalled by US instrumentalities. Without Stalin, you're not going to get a war authorised.

I was figuring that the same impulses and misapprehensions would still exist two years later, especially if the US has spent two more years cutting budgets and not giving tanks to the South Koreans.

Not if you bump off Stalin. The Soviet Elite had a fundamentally reactive strategy towards war.

I highly recommend the 1997 edition of the KIMH history, at least for its post-dictatorship ROK perspective on the lead up to war and its refreshing scholarship.

yours,
Sam R.
 
Korea Institute of Military History The Korean War 3 vols. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1997.

Also apparently available as a "Bison" edition. Allan R. Millet introduces the Bison edition at least.

Thanks, I'll take a look.
 
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