PC: Better follow up to Fort Donelson

Reading his memoirs, Grant actually offers up an intriguing alternate history scenario:
Ulysses S Grant said:
My opinion was and still is that immediately after the fall of Fort Donelson the way was opened to the National forces all over the South-west without much resistance. If one general who would have taken the responsibility had been in command of all the troops west of the Alleghenies, he could have marched to Chattanooga, Cornith, Memphis and Vicksburg with the troops we had, and as volunteering was going on rapidly over the North there would have been force enough at all these centers to operate offensively against any body of the enemy that might have found be found near them. Rapid movements and the acquisition of rebellious territory would have promoted volunteering, so that reinforcements could have been had as fast as transportation could have been obtained to carry them to their destination. On the other hand there were tens of thousands of strong able-bodied young men still at their homes in the south-western states, who had not gone into the Confederate army in February, 1862, and who had no particular desire to go. If our lines have been extended to protect their homes, many of them never would have gone. Providence ruled differently. Time was given the enemy to collect armies and fortify his new positions; and twice afterwords he came near forcing his north-western front up to the Ohio River.
What do you guys think; is the general right in his assessment? If so, how could it have happened? And what would the effects?
 
I would sort of agree with Grant; while I would say that capturing Chattanooga and Vicksburg would be a bit of a stretch, Grant wasn’t wrong about the opportunity to capture Corinth. Between the end of the battle of Fort Donelson (Feb 16) and the start of the Battle of Shiloh (April 6th), the Army of the Mississippi (more famously known as the Army of Tennessee) was scattered for the most part, the concentration at Corinth took as long as late March to complete: in early March Bragg had around 10,000 troops at Corinth with detachments at Bethel Station while Polk's 7,000 men were at Humboldt and would march to Corinth days later, and Hardee's 13,000 men arrived on March 27th along with New Orleans militia coming from the south. Hypothetically, a more aggressive Union commander could have disrupted the concentration of Confederate forces and take Corinth, and thus avoid the siege of Corinth and has an opportunity to defeat the Confederate forces in detail. In addition, Memphis and West Tennessee become virtually untenable due to the Union occupation of Corinth.

However, it is rather difficult to achieve the necessary conditions for this scenario. Halleck was not a particularly aggressive officer, the siege of Corinth took place at a glacial pace. Kicking him upstairs to be General-in-Chief of the Union Army might be possible with the removal of McClellan, but would he even consider creating a command that encompasses the entire Western Theater? Grant would be an excellent for such a strategy, but what about his commands? The Army of the Tennessee would probably be commanded by M.G. C.F. Smith, Grant's mentor and 'Old Army' officer. C.F. Smith showed considerable skill during his command at Paducah, Fort Donelson and the lead up to Shiloh, favoured by Grant and Halleck. However, there was an issue of seniority, as McClernand insisted that he was senior to Smith.

The Army of the Ohio's commander would be the same, which is a bit of an issue for Grant. Buell was disinclined to serve under anyone he had outranked at one time or anyone who had only recently been elevated above him in a relative sense. Buell's lack of subordination to Grant had, as far as we know, nothing to do with whatever he thought of Grant's performance. Grant himself stated he knew perfectly well Buell wouldn't accept orders from him. Buell refused to return to service in 1864 when offered the chance because he would not serve under men he had once outranked like Sherman and Canby, even though both had been senior to him in the pre-war army and Sherman had ranked him as brigadier. Buell's lack of subordination could throw a spanner in Grant's plan and ultimately render it a failure.
 
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