PC: Beauharnais Grand Duchy of Frankfurt

[Nuraghe]

@TrickyApe @Nuraghe @Historymaster

So I presume you all would agree that an expansion of Lombardy–Venetia into Modena and possibly the Papal Legations of Bologna, Ferrara, Forli, and Ravenna would have been a better path for Austria to take in addition to re-establishing Habsburg rule in Tuscany? That enlarged area under direct Habsburg rule, bordering Sardinia, Parma, Tuscany, the Papal States, and San Marino, seems controlable to me.

This might however also require some border changes, though. The Garfagnana, Lucca, the Lunigiana, and Massa-Carrara would likely be divvied up in this case, likely just between Parma-Piacenza and Tuscany, especially if Parma were given directly to the House of Bourbon-Parma. Generally I'd say one could just directly attach the lands of the Napoleonic Principality of Lucca to Tuscany, giving them the Garfagnana, Massa-Carrara, and Lucca. Maybe expand it a bit further with (most of) Fivizzano, Viano, and Fosdinovo. The rest could then go to Parma, as compensation for Guastalla going to Lombary-Venetia. Maybe Sardinia-Piedmont gains some small bits of it, too, like Cavanella, Rocchetta, and Suvero. [See this map as reference]

The Pope wouldn't be happy at losing the Legations again, but given the Treaty of Tolentino and how stable that border was from 1797/98 to 1808, it would make sense for Austria to push for that. After all, they were both wealthy and would make Austria's direct Italian territory very defensible thanks to several forts and the Apennine Mountains forming a natural border. Additionally, with their territory expanding southwards, I could see them not using Milan as capital in this scenario, maybe picking Mantua instead? It'd be very centrally located and it's still a very defensible city, with it being part of the Quadrilatero and being near to Guastalla, too, which may just become the fifth fortress in this system.

I also found this passage by Guglielmo Ferrero in his 1941 book "The Reconstruction of Europe. Talleyrand and the Congress of Vienna 1814-1815" interesting and related, since it summarizes the views of the people of Tuscany at the time:

"But Tuscany was a different case. The Grand Duke had ceded it by a formal treaty to France, who, by formal treaty, had ceded it to the Duke of Parma. [...] The former Grand Duke of Tuscany, Ferdinand [...] had in September, just before the opening of Congress, without any authorization, motu proprio, returned to the Palazzo Pitti and resumed the government of Tuscany. The population had welcomed him and obeyed him as their legitimate sovereign. And so he was, if not by letter of the treaty, by virtue of the 'ancient law of posession', which Talleyrand had acknowledged to be one of the foundations of legitimacy, comparing it to the interpretation of common law. An absence of thirteen years had not made the people of Tuscany forget their ancient dynasty and the peaceful prosperity which they had enjoyed under its government. Everyone in Tuscany knew the latter, and no one knew the treaties and the distant powers which, since 1801, had twice changed the regime without in the least troubling to find out what were the desires and interests of the people." (p. 198-199)​

Certainly Rome would not be happy to lose Bologna, which was the 2nd most important city of the Papal States and the one with the best industrial base in the state ( but Pio VII could have some grievances on a personal level, given that his native Cesena would also be lost ), but at least the money that in Otl was wasted to control, quell and garrison said legations, here would be totally directed towards the development of Rome, further favoring the restoration of the Papal government, which would be supported by the citizens, very grateful to see important works begin to improve the Eternal City ( considering that in any case a 1/4 of the entire papal tax revenues come from the Urbe, it would be appropriate to spend resources that would have the possible result of increasing this turnover )

 

[TrickyApe]

So I presume you all would agree that an expansion of Lombardy–Venetia into Modena and possibly the Papal Legations of Bologna, Ferrara, Forli, and Ravenna would have been a better path for Austria to take in addition to re-establishing Habsburg rule in Tuscany? That enlarged area under direct Habsburg rule, bordering Sardinia, Parma, Tuscany, the Papal States, and San Marino, seems controlable to me.​

I think so, yes. Austria would be much better off actually having the resources of these areas than setting them up as little states that it hoped (but OTL failed) to control indirectly.

I also think there would be a cost though. Austria did very well for itself at the Vienna Congress and I don't think it's feasible for it to just take extra gains for itself, certainly not on this scale. Some sort of deals would have to be done with Russia and Prussia, perhaps including acceptance of the original Saxony-Poland proposal. Austria might also have to give Russia some assurances on Balkan interests. In my opinion all of this would be better for Austria in the long run than the OTL situation of being in the way of French, Prussian, and Russian interests all at the same time in Italy, Germany, and the Balkans respectively.

"But Tuscany was a different case. The Grand Duke had ceded it by a formal treaty to France, who, by formal treaty, had ceded it to the Duke of Parma. [...] The former Grand Duke of Tuscany, Ferdinand [...] had in September, just before the opening of Congress, without any authorization, motu proprio, returned to the Palazzo Pitti and resumed the government of Tuscany. The population had welcomed him and obeyed him as their legitimate sovereign. And so he was, if not by letter of the treaty, by virtue of the 'ancient law of posession', which Talleyrand had acknowledged to be one of the foundations of legitimacy, comparing it to the interpretation of common law. An absence of thirteen years had not made the people of Tuscany forget their ancient dynasty and the peaceful prosperity which they had enjoyed under its government. Everyone in Tuscany knew the latter, and no one knew the treaties and the distant powers which, since 1801, had twice changed the regime without in the least troubling to find out what were the desires and interests of the people." (p. 198-199)

That's very interesting and not something I'd heard before. I wonder how accurate it really is. The bit about the people of Tuscany and loyalty to their "ancient dynasty" sounds rather romantic to me, particularly since the Habsburgs had only ruled the Grand Duchy since 1737 and lost it 62 years later Moreover they had acquired it through a power grab not dissimilar to the way it changed hands in the Napoleonic period, not through a system of timeworn legitimacy.

I'd be interested to learn more about Ferdinand. He was seemingly happy to be part of the Confederation of the Rhine while at Wurzburg and I've read that Napoleon considered deposing Francis in Vienna in favor of Ferdinand in 1809. Beyond that I don't know much about him.

 

[TrickyApe]

I also found this passage by Guglielmo Ferrero in his 1941 book "The Reconstruction of Europe. Talleyrand and the Congress of Vienna 1814-1815" interesting and related, since it summarizes the views of the people of Tuscany at the time:

"But Tuscany was a different case. The Grand Duke had ceded it by a formal treaty to France, who, by formal treaty, had ceded it to the Duke of Parma. [...] The former Grand Duke of Tuscany, Ferdinand [...] had in September, just before the opening of Congress, without any authorization, motu proprio, returned to the Palazzo Pitti and resumed the government of Tuscany. The population had welcomed him and obeyed him as their legitimate sovereign. And so he was, if not by letter of the treaty, by virtue of the 'ancient law of posession', which Talleyrand had acknowledged to be one of the foundations of legitimacy, comparing it to the interpretation of common law. An absence of thirteen years had not made the people of Tuscany forget their ancient dynasty and the peaceful prosperity which they had enjoyed under its government. Everyone in Tuscany knew the latter, and no one knew the treaties and the distant powers which, since 1801, had twice changed the regime without in the least troubling to find out what were the desires and interests of the people." (p. 198-199)​

I've been digging around a little since this got my attention. The sources that I've found tell a somewhat different story from that of a local population rising up and demanding the return of their ancient sovereign.

Per The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813-1814 by George F. Nafziger, Marco Gioannini (2002), the British attempted to land in Tuscany at the close of 1813 but discovered that the people there were loyal to the regime of Elisa Bonaparte.

On 13 December the advanced guard of Catinelli’s force landed at Calambrone, two miles north of Leghorn. The day after, however, stiff resistance by Colonel Dupre`’s small garrison, supported by a force of National Guards, unexpectedly frustrated the first assault to the city ramparts. Then came a French counterattack, led by General Pouchain, who had succeded in rallying his troops
after the engagement at Viareggio. It was, in turn, repulsed. Meanwhile, a meeting with a deputation of Leghorn civil authorities had the effect of convincing Catinelli that the people of Tuscany were attached to their grand duchess and that his plan of fulminating insurrectional movements was doomed to failure. Consequently, on 15 December he reembarked his troops, and the day after, the British squadron left Leghorn. After an irresolute movement toward La Spezia, Rowley and Catinelli decided to set sail back to Palermo.

As 1814 dawned, both the British and the newly allied Neapolitans made moves on Tuscany and immediately started squabbling over it. Per The Fall of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy, 1814 by Reuben John Rath (1941)

Murat, whose officials were already in control of all Tuscany and a large part of the papal states and were everywhere proclaiming the approaching independence of Italy under the King
of Naples," refused to accede to Lord William's request. He suggested, however, that a compromise be reached whereby the military occupation of Tuscany should be left to him until Lord
Castlereagh would decide its fate. The querulous Bentinck obstinately refused, threatening that if Murat did not first give Tuscany to him, " he would chase the Neapolitans out of the
country, revolutionize the country," take his army to Naples, and then proclaim Ferdinand, the former sovereign of the country, king of Naples.

Castlereagh had to intervene to calm things down.

Lord Castlereagh also dispatched two strong letters to Bentinck, admonishing him that he was to consider his troops only as auxiliary forces subject to Bellegarde's command and that he
was to refrain from further actions that would serve to antagonize Murat

Nonetheless, the British and others Powers soon came to an agreement to restore the Habsburg Grand Duke. Note that this is in the Spring, and not as the result of an unauthorized visit by Ferdinand in September that provoked spontaneous local loyalty.

On May 3, 1814, however, Federico Confalonieri, the president of the Italian deputation at Paris, wrote his wife that "Venice and Lombardy have, beyond all doubt, been assigned
to Austria," and that Parma was to go to Maria Louisa, and Piedmont, Tuscany, Modena, and the greater portion of the papal states were to be returned to their respective former
rulers

I'd still be interested in learning more about Ferdinand and his assumption of power in Tuscany though. Michael Broers has a little to say on it in The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 1796-1814 Cultural Imperialism in a European Context (2005)

The Tuscans feared foreign domination too much to oppose it, but they still regretted not being the masters of their own fate. It was their hope, the French rightly concluded, that the Austrians
would liberate, and then choose not to rule them; they sought not to be ruled at all.

On his return, Ferdinand III may have shown himself pro-clerical, but there was no witch-hunt of collaborators; the leading patriot, Giovanni
Fabbroni, became secretary of the ducal Council of State in 1814 and remained close to the centres of power thereafter. The careful, passive resistance of
the Tuscan magistracy to the harshness of French criminal legislation was also rewarded when Ferdinand III, however reactionary in some respects,
restored the Leopoldine codes and abolished capital punishment. In general, the Tuscan restoration proved successful exactly for these reasons, and the
unpopularity of Austrian rule in Tuscany grew not only because it was reactionary, but increasingly centralised as well.

 

[Kellan Sullivan]

1941 book "The Reconstruction of Europe. Talleyrand and the Congress of Vienna 1814-1815" interesting and related, since it summarizes the views of the people of Tuscany at the time:

"But Tuscany was a different case. The Grand Duke had ceded it by a formal treaty to France, who, by formal treaty, had ceded it to the Duke of Parma. [...] The former Grand Duke of Tuscany, Ferdinand [...] had in September, just before the opening of Congress, without any authorization, motu proprio, returned to the Palazzo Pitti and resumed the government of Tuscany. The population had welcomed him and obeyed him as their legitimate sovereign. And so he was, if not by letter of the treaty, by virtue of the 'ancient law of posession', which Talleyrand had acknowledged to be one of the foundations of legitimacy, comparing it to the interpretation of common law. An absence of thirteen years had not made the people of Tuscany forget their ancient dynasty and the peaceful prosperity which they had enjoyed under its government. Everyone in Tuscany knew the latter, and no one knew the treaties and the distant powers which, since 1801, had twice changed the regime without in the least troubling to find out what were the desires and interests of the people." (p. 198-199)

Out of curiosity, what would the results be if Vienna decided to "hold the line" and tell Ferdinando III to stay in Germany? Would he remain as duke of Würzburg or would he lose that to Bavaria and be relegated to just another archduke?

 

[Nuraghe]

Out of curiosity, what would the results be if Vienna decided to "hold the line" and tell Ferdinando III to stay in Germany? Would he remain as duke of Würzburg or would he lose that to Bavaria and be relegated to just another archduke?

Well I believe that everything would depend on the continuation of the negotiations in Vienna, and on the fact that Bavaria would seek some compensation for this renunciation elsewhere, perhaps along the Rhine or to the detriment of Wurttemberg / Baden, but the real question would be whether Vienna was willing to leave Tuscany in Bourbon hands or Francis as the eldest son of Leopold II would try to leverage the feeling of commonality with the Florentines to try to obtain the passage of Tuscany under his control ( perhaps promising to regularly visit Florence ) in theory, having grown up in the city and having who knows how many illegitimate brothers in the area ( as well as important political allies in key positions in the grand ducal government ) , it wouldn't be too difficult for him to score a big score, but I admit that it would be a rather risky move

 

[TrickyApe]

Out of curiosity, what would the results be if Vienna decided to "hold the line" and tell Ferdinando III to stay in Germany? Would he remain as duke of Würzburg or would he lose that to Bavaria and be relegated to just another archduke?

When did he leave Napoleon? I've never seen reference to what Ferdinand or Wurzburg did in the Rhine Confederation or during the war in 1813.

 

[Kellan Sullivan]

Well I believe that everything would depend on the continuation of the negotiations in Vienna, and on the fact that Bavaria would seek some compensation for this renunciation elsewhere, perhaps along the Rhine or to the detriment of Wurttemberg / Baden, but the real question would be whether Vienna was willing to leave Tuscany in Bourbon hands or Francis as the eldest son of Leopold II would try to leverage the feeling of commonality with the Florentines to try to obtain the passage of Tuscany under his control ( perhaps promising to regularly visit Florence ) in theory, having grown up in the city and having who knows how many illegitimate brothers in the area ( as well as important political allies in key positions in the grand ducal government ) , it wouldn't be too difficult for him to score a big score, but I admit that it would be a rather risky move

I was actually wondering more along the lines of it being used as an excuse for why Prussia doesn't have to be compensated for the "losses" of Ansbach and Bayreuth which they ceded to Bavaria by similar treaty.

 

[Kellan Sullivan]

When did he leave Napoleon? I've never seen reference to what Ferdinand or Wurzburg did in the Rhine Confederation or during the war in 1813.

that is a valid point. Especially since as late as after the return from Moscow and the Hundred Days there were still ambassadors pressing for matches to Napoléonic nieces (the Prussian ambassador in Paris in particular)

 

[Nuraghe]

I was actually wondering more along the lines of it being used as an excuse for why Prussia doesn't have to be compensated for the "losses" of Ansbach and Bayreuth which they ceded to Bavaria by similar treaty.

Oh this is a really intriguing scenario, a Prussia having to compensate Bavaria could transform the power dynamics in Germany ( especially if the Habsburgs end up with two potentates in their hands ) also because it would really modify the Austro-Prussian dualism, in favor of a third political Germany

 

[OxSpace]

I was actually wondering more along the lines of it being used as an excuse for why Prussia doesn't have to be compensated for the "losses" of Ansbach and Bayreuth which they ceded to Bavaria by similar treaty.

It's simple, by fait accompli via the renunciation of Berg & Jülich to Prussian occupation & later annexation. To quote myself from another post:

The Ried treaty (which Prussia had ratified) had in theory promoted that the future re-cessions between Austria and Bavaria would be equally applicable to Prussia and Bavaria, in such a way that Prussia would have the same obligations towards Bavaria in this regard. Yet there was little to no territory that Prussia could reasonably offer Bavaria back for these territories (Ansbach and/or Bayreuth).

Prussia simply had bigger issues at hand and different goals that a serious interest in former Hohenzollern Franconia was simply not realistic. Between negotiations with Bavaria and balancing Austria's interests, the trouble was not worth the gain.

 

[Iserlohn]

When did he leave Napoleon? I've never seen reference to what Ferdinand or Wurzburg did in the Rhine Confederation or during the war in 1813.

I recently stumbled across a massive, modern history book on the subject: "Politik im Krieg. Ferdinand III. von Toskana und das Großherzogtum Würzburg" by Maximilian Th. L. Rückert, released in 2022. In it, for example, he posits the following general ideas on Ferdinand III.:

1) Both in his time in Tuscany during the Wars of the First and Second Coalition and later in his time in Würzbug, he always was trying to stay on good terms with Napoleon and avoid directly antagonizing him. Especially during his time in Würzburg, this was deemed necessary, because he feared being deposed and Würzburg being turned into a French bargaining chip. This diplomatic independence earned the admiration of Napoleon.

2) Talleyrand's personal agenda and beliefs, including his beginnings of establishing contingencies for himself and his general ideal of a stable European order (s. p. 195-198), allowed for greater autonomy for Würzburg and the maintenance of secret backchannels between Würzburg and Vienna, with the former even serving as a diplomatic and espionage outpost.

3) Würzburg also served as a tool for Napoleon to keep Bavaria in check, since it made Bavarian pushes westwards more difficult, and the choice of a Habsburg ruler was even seen as a benefit, since that would, potentially, make Vienna less willing to encourage Munich to betray Napoleon and to push into Würzburg and from there to the Palatinate and southern Hesse.

4) Würzburg was forced to support the French at times militarily, and soldiers from it took part in e.g. the Peninsular War. That campaign was disastrous for Würzburg's soldiers, with it constantly lacking even basic supplies such as boots, but then again, the entire Peninsular War was a disaster.

5) Ferdinand was a key player in negotiating/arranging the "Alliance of Dresden" in 1812 ahead of the Russian Campaign, and he fully decided to switch sides after the failure of that campaign, and for that purpose held secret meetings with his brother Franz, other princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, and even the meeting between Emperor Franz and tsar Alexander I. in the summer months of 1813. Apparently at the end of those meetings, the general idea that Ferdinand would be restored to Tuscany was already planned.

 

[TrickyApe]

I recently stumbled across a massive, modern history book on the subject: "Politik im Krieg. Ferdinand III. von Toskana und das Großherzogtum Würzburg" by Maximilian Th. L. Rückert, released in 2022. In it, for example, he posits the following general ideas on Ferdinand III.:

That's fascinating. Ferdinand sounds like a very interesting albeit minor player and it's good to see some coverage of the workings inside the Rhine Confederation.

 

[TrickyApe]

The Ried treaty (which Prussia had ratified) had in theory promoted that the future re-cessions between Austria and Bavaria would be equally applicable to Prussia and Bavaria, in such a way that Prussia would have the same obligations towards Bavaria in this regard. Yet there was little to no territory that Prussia could reasonably offer Bavaria back for these territories (Ansbach and/or Bayreuth).

How was it that Austria managed to claim the territories that it traded to Bavaria in return for the former Habsburg lands? It's not as if any of these lands, except Wurzburg itself, were actually Austrian or Habsburg to begin with.

Metternich always seemed a step ahead of the other powers when it came to planning for territorial aggrandizement. Giving up ancestral Prussian lands definitely didn't go down well in Prussia. I know Blucher in particular was very mad about losing what he called loyal Protestants and receiving in return Catholics.

 

[Rafi_T]

that is a valid point. Especially since as late as after the return from Moscow and the Hundred Days there were still ambassadors pressing for matches to Napoléonic nieces (the Prussian ambassador in Paris in particular)

Really? Do share the sources and potential matches.

I’ve always been a fan of the idea of Napoleon being able to establish an interwoven web of marriages across Europe to assert his legacy.

 

[Rafi_T]

Now this would've been cool.

Beauharnais in Genoa, and Murat in Naples, even cooler.

Exactly! I wonder what it would’ve looked like if Beauharnais had gotten each and every territory that was proposed.

Genoa, Ionanian Islands, Frankfurt, etc. What would be the list, and what would it look like both dynastically and in terms of his and Napoleon’s legacies?

Also, what was the extent of Murat’s territorial ambitions? What’s the max he wanted?

Same with the other Italian territories. What’s the least Italian states you can have? (Because they’re annexed by others).

 

[OxSpace]

How was it that Austria managed to claim the territories that it traded to Bavaria in return for the former Habsburg lands? It's not as if any of these lands, except Wurzburg itself, were actually Austrian or Habsburg to begin with.

Metternich always seemed a step ahead of the other powers when it came to planning for territorial aggrandizement. Giving up ancestral Prussian lands definitely didn't go down well in Prussia. I know Blucher in particular was very mad about losing what he called loyal Protestants and receiving in return Catholics.

Karl Theodor von Dalberg abdicated as Grand Duke of Frankfurt, Aschaffenburg, which was the domain ruled by Dalberg was essentially free territory, and since the Austrians provisionally governed Frankfurt, it was their discretion on what to do with it. Other areas like Fulda was a bishopric, which in the lens of 1803, had no sovereign, so it was divided between Bavaria and Hesse-Kassel. Hannau was simple an extension of Hesse-Kassel so it was given back to them when they were restored. Other areas like Alzenau, Amorbach, Mosbach, and Steinfeld were willingly ceded to Bavaria by other polities. As far as the left-bank territories, there was no desire (at least among the great powers) to try to reconstruct the pre-revolution situation here.

Blücher can throw a fit but the geopolitics made trying to reclaim this area a fools errand. Prussian aspirations since 1805 have been focus on North German hegemony. Turning course and trying to reassert itself south of the Main would not only get itself into conflict with Bavaria but with Austria.

 

[Neoteros]

Exactly! I wonder what it would’ve looked like if Beauharnais had gotten each and every territory that was proposed.

Genoa, Ionanian Islands, Frankfurt, etc. What would be the list, and what would it look like both dynastically and in terms of his and Napoleon’s legacies?

Also, what was the extent of Murat’s territorial ambitions? What’s the max he wanted?

Same with the other Italian territories. What’s the least Italian states you can have? (Because they’re annexed by others).

Murat had lofty ambitions, and he would've taken all of Italy if he could've but, at most, he could've retained Naples, and nothing more than that - without Sicily, that would've remained in Bourbon hands. A Beauharnais-led Genoa and a Murat-led Naples could've easily become the nucleus of a federal Italian state: more so Naples than Genoa, simply due to resources and size but, since both of them tried to unify the peninsula during their Napoleonic days, and neither of them would be willing to lose their crown again, they'd simply try to boost the pre-existing federalist sentiment in Italy, and maybe seek crowned allies in Italy - Cavour would probably try and convince his liege to back their plans, if Piedmont-Sardinia is promised Lombardy, since he didn't really have plans to annex the whole peninsula, anyway.

What makes this scenario implausible, the rest of Europe would not like to have an Italian federation around, led by former Napoleonic generals (and their descendants) that basically took the nationalist sentiment sparked by their former liege to its logical conclusion, and neither would the Pope.

 

[TrickyApe]

Karl Theodor von Dalberg abdicated as Grand Duke of Frankfurt, Aschaffenburg, which was the domain ruled by Dalberg was essentially free territory, and since the Austrians provisionally governed Frankfurt, it was their discretion on what to do with it.

That's what I call being a step ahead of the rest.

Blücher can throw a fit

We don't want to upset his elephant.

 

[Rafi_T]

Murat had lofty ambitions, and he would've taken all of Italy if he could've but, at most, he could've retained Naples, and nothing more than that - without Sicily, that would've remained in Bourbon hands. A Beauharnais-led Genoa and a Murat-led Naples could've easily become the nucleus of a federal Italian state: more so Naples than Genoa, simply due to resources and size but, since both of them tried to unify the peninsula during their Napoleonic days, and neither of them would be willing to lose their crown again, they'd simply try to boost the pre-existing federalist sentiment in Italy, and maybe seek crowned allies in Italy - Cavour would probably try and convince his liege to back their plans, if Piedmont-Sardinia is promised Lombardy, since he didn't really have plans to annex the whole peninsula, anyway.

What makes this scenario implausible, the rest of Europe would not like to have an Italian federation around, led by former Napoleonic generals (and their descendants) that basically took the nationalist sentiment sparked by their former liege to its logical conclusion, and neither would the Pope.

Good on Murat! Love a (Napoleonist) man with ambition!

What did he actually plan per se? (Did he ever express in favor Italian unificationism?)

So Naples and Genoa would become the heads of an Italian quasi-federation, while the idea someone posted about Austria expanding its Venetian possession/puppet going would make Italy look like what?

Did they actually try to unite Italy? I remember the French part of Italy, and then the independent part to the south, but no word on uniforming the peninsula.

Cavour was wasted on incompetent fools, quite frankly Italy would’ve been much better served United under: Joseph Bonaparte, Murat, Beauharnais, or Garibaldi.

Is it possible Europe agrees to it and then concretely boosts Piedmont-Sardinia to serve as a bulwark? (They certainly could use the help.)

In terms of the Papacy, I label that under skill issue. They should’ve let Garibaldi take the city.

 

[Kellan Sullivan]

out of curiosity @Iserlohn @isabella , what would the chances be of the actual HRE being restored? The German Confederation was essentially the HRE in form if not name (at least according to some). And what would the consequences be of such a restoration?