Japanese Oil reserves, how long they can operate, and how long until partial production can be restored once the SRA can be secured.
Japanese oil reserves were required for the operation of the Japanese fleet, the Japanese merchant marine, aviation, and army. The navy burned the most, then the marus. The merchant marine's usage could not be lowered without economic damage, s how long the reserves could last depended on how lavish the Imperial Navy (which consumed over half the amount) was with its operations. With some measures for economy, the reserves might last maybe about 2 years. With robust naval operations such as attacking Hawaii, maybe about 1.5 years.
Production in the NEI could commence about 3 months after capture, taking at least a year, if ever, to reach pre-war levels. There are two territories in question, Sumatra and Borneo. Of the two, Sumatra was the main production sight, but Borneo could be taken more easily and generate maybe about 1 million tons per year, (ie, extend the reserve from 1.5 years to 2 years).
As it turns out, the Japanese have a big shortfall in tankers, if they were getting the oilfields intact, but not so bad with limited production coming online only months later, like in OTL. I'll be wanting to find out just what kind of production the Japanese managed from the captured oil fields, and when this happened.
Rough figures. The initial reserves were 6 million tons. This appears to be in reserve after all initial-op allocations. The amount imported to Japan from the NEI during the entire war was roughly 4 million tons. The total NEI production was much higher, something like 35 million tons during the entire war. That is to say, the strategy of moving the oil to the home islands via tanker was never viable. The fleet and merchant marine eventually had to operate with the NEI as its base of supply.
Where do the Japanese land in the Hawaiian islands, when, and with how many troops? I want to have them hitting as many places as possible, as soon as possible, as the US defense will never be weaker and less prepared than the second week of Dec 1941, and as many airfields must be captured as they can get, in order to start basing large numbers of land based aircraft on the occupied islands.
Every landing needs to be escorted by warships, so it's not a question of a large number of invasions with ridiculous numbers of ships. It's more a question of a couple convoys "making the rounds" to various invasion sights over a period of time. This has to be after the initial battles, though a small number of landings might occur during it. (So, for example, you could feasibly plan a landing on Kauai for a few airfields there and a seaplane base on undefended Niihau in the first day or few of a war).
Do the Japanese have enough aircraft ferries to bring land based planes forward in large numbers?
If Hawaii is the primary objective, even over the NEI, IJN/IJA occupation forces transport is not the bottleneck. The bottlenecks are the inherent brittleness of the IJN fleet carriers to being knocked out of action, (even one bomb can take a flight deck out of action), limited numbers of the best (A6M2, D3A1, B5N2) aircraft and the need to spend large amounts of time in the waters off Hawaii covering landings and supressing air defenses.
In order to stage land based fighter aircraft into occupied Hawaiian islands, do they need midway, assumes that with drop tanks, the aircraft in question would have the range to make it all the way from forward staging bases, if they can use midway as a fueling stop, as if this is not possible, then midway still has to be taken ASAP, but the only fighters making it to the rest of the Hawaiian islands will have to be carrier fighters or ferried in.
Depends on the fighter. A6M2's can be ferried by a small carrier to within maybe 500nm of Hawaii then fly the remaining distance on its own. An a5m4 or KI-27 would need to be ferried much closer, to within perhaps 100nm, or just transported all the way. Twin engine bombers and 4-engine seaplanes could get there on their own.
How much shipping is going to have to be earmarked for this operation, and how much do they have to spare, given OTL operations against the UK and the DEI are delayed?
Tonnange required depends on the plan executed. Maybe 1 to 1.5 million tons, plus tankers. The attack on Malaya can go forward via Thailand, (the Guards Division marched into Malaya overland) with only small landing operations, (say Singora, Thailand only, for example). Luzon cannot occur, but Mindanao can be taken to blockade Luzon from the south. Borneo can still be taken immediately and its oil production re-established as a top priority.
Also, given that the air campaign against the FEAF must go on like OTL, to prevent these forces from being withdrawn and redeployed, how many land based aircraft are going to be available for use in the Hawaiian theater?
That question is backwards to how operational planning occurs. How many aircraft would be required to take the primary objective, Hawaii. Then, deducting them, how would the remaining aircraft assigned to the Southern Operation be used to be effect? (The way you worded it is the formula for disaster, falling between two stools).
Seaplanes, the types, numbers and capabilities.
Seaplanes are more dependent on base availability, but assuming that's not an issue, probably something about 60 single engine and 12 4-engine types in Hawaii, with 60/12 in reserve at the Marshalls as attritional replacements.
Basically, if the Japanese are coming to take over, they need to plan to bring everything they can, and keep it in theater as long as the issue is in doubt.
Right, do the plan to win in Hawaii, then draft the plan for the Southern Op with what's left.
This means that the historical raid needs augmented, as the OTL results didn't eliminate US airpower entirely, and I don't see the KB being able to do that at the same time as they are hitting the fleet. The only thing I can think of that could be used in the ATL PH attack is something with the one-way range to bring a large weapon to bear against high value targets with very great accuracy is the H6K configured as a Kamikaze.
No, that's a very bad idea.
At the time of the PH attack, 1st Air Fleet command intended to launch two distinct waves of two deckloads each. But around this time - so shortly that the idea probably was already being contemplated - Kusaka and Genda were considering massed tactics where multi-deck strikes would be combined into one giant wave. To do this, the first wave launches to orbit while the second wave is brought up on deck. When the 2nd wave launch commences, the first wave departs towards Hawaii and the second wave catches up during transit. A third group of search aircraft departs after the second wave. The first wave is composed of 48 fighters and 126 Kate bombers. The second wave is 36 fighters and 108 dive bombers, (only 108 dive bombers because the 2nd wave has to be limited to 18 strike aircraft per carrier for speed, so the ships with 27 dive bombers would only send 18). The search forces are 4 E13 seaplanes and 18 Kates. The reserve elements are 27 x D3A1 (9 each from Kaga, Shokaku and Zuikaku).
The 108 dive bombers and 84 fighters all hit the airfields simultaneously, not in two waves. 90 bombers attack the battleships, the other 36 attack airfields. That attack plan will, for all intents and purposes, wipe out Hawaii's land based airpower in the first strike. AA losses will be minimal, and a second full-strength strike can be launched on the same day.