PC/AHC: Conventional WWIII in the 1960's

Outside of the Atlantic and Med the Soviet Navy would constitute a nuisance requiring attention but would end up like the German Asiatic Squadron in WWI - if lucky make a splash do some damage, but eventually go down. In the Med, the issue would be how much damage the Soviet Navy could do to NATO navies before they moored on the bottom. To the extent any surface ships of any size survived the Soviet Navy would control the Black Sea, and at least the Eastern Baltic - I doubt any NATO surface vessels other than small combatants belonging to Germany/Denmark would be seen east of Denmark. The key areas would be the Atlantic, whatever other naval actions went on around the world. Heavy equipment for the US forces in Europe comes almost exclusively by sea, so the basic Soviet plan was to close this pipeline down as much as possible for long enough to allow the land forces to achieve their goals. Obviously the more warning/buildup there is to the war, this works in favor of NATO as they can ship freely until the war starts, it does allow the Soviets to surge their submarines which will be detected and comprise a war warning.

Obviously there were other missions for the Soviet Navy, although their capabilities in the 60s were more limited than in the late 70s and 80s - supporting amphibious assaults in Norway and the Baltic is one example. Since the few boomers they had in the 60s had short range (relatively) missiles, establishing and protecting an SSBN bastion was not a mission yet. If we a saying the war remains entirely conventional, then the "close the Atlantic bridge" mission becomes even more critical for both sides, as conventional reinforcement of NATO by the USA, if slowed enough, means that the option of replacing tanks and infantry with tactical nukes is not there.
 
Outside of the Atlantic and Med the Soviet Navy would constitute a nuisance requiring attention but would end up like the German Asiatic Squadron in WWI - if lucky make a splash do some damage, but eventually go down.

If it was stupid enough to try and play a deep water offensive routine, sure, then the Soviet surface navy would be a nuisance. However, in it's intended coastal defense and brown water role, it could make extended operations along the Soviet coast (particularly amphibious operations) too risky for it to be worth it for NATO, particularly when coordinated with Soviet land-based air forces and AShM batteries. "In and out"-style carrier raids would still be entirely feasible, of course, but the damage they could inflict would be more limited. Taking out the USSR's navy in such a case would be a more extended process.

Now, as you alluded too, the Soviet sub fleet could try for an interdiction mission. However, it is rather dubious whether it would be necessary. Reforger is still more then a decade away from being established and without it, the ability to reinforce Europe from the America's in a faster timeframe then Soviet mobilization (which hasn't rotted yet like it did by the 1980s and hence would be quite rapid) can overwhelm NATO's West European forces is dubious. Of course, that just leads to NATO breaking out the tactical nukes and we escalate from there...
 

CalBear

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So basically have the Reagan-Thatcher approach to military affairs arrive early? I see. And funny you mention this since in a TL I have conceptualized that deals with a great war in the 60's, this kind of thing happens because of an alternate ending to the Korean War where the UN-US forces win (then again that involved a pre-1960 POD).
You can't get the "Reagan era" expansion for most of the '60's/early '70's since the U.S. was thigh deep in SE Asia.
 
You can't get the "Reagan era" expansion for most of the '60's/early '70's since the U.S. was thigh deep in SE Asia.

That is an issue. Part of what did the US's commitment to Vietnam in at the turn of the '70s was because the US was reaching a point where it couldn't continue to support military forces there without either reducing it's already inadequate conventional forces in Europe or conducting the sort of military mobilization that would be economically impinging and politically devastating given the controversy of the war by that point. The US Government had to choose between maintaining their strength in Vietnam, maintaining their strength in Europe, or political suicide. Europe was far more important then Vietnam and committing political suicide is a non-starter to any administration, so naturally they cut Vietnam...
 
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