in this timeline Paul von Hindenburg and Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord launched military coup in 1932 and banned NSDAP and KPD. Hitler managed to escape into Austria but died in 1937 some historians have argued that the death was an act of defenestration by agents of Germany, although local police in Austria stated that it was a suicide. After Hindenburg death Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord established new government and led Germany until 1943 when retried due to bad health. How this would have affected WW2 and Cold War?
Paul von Hindenburg and Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord coup saves Germany from Nazism and Communism
- Thread starter estonian man
- Start date
1.) Hindenburg was crucial in bringing Hitler to power. The conservative forces to whom Hindenburg and Hammerstein belonged were in coalition with the Nazis basically all the way (some jumped ship very late, when the war turned bad). What would change their minds? An ASB telling them about how WW2 ended?
2.) No Hitler and no Nazis most likely means no WW2 as we know it.
3.) Instead of a cold war, you have an ongoing isolation of the Soviet Union (and Mongolia) as the only communist state(s) in the world.
I don't see how this military coup equates with democracy...
Well, I won't discard the possibility of such a Hindenburg-Hammerstein Putsch too easily. ... also not the proposed time of 1932.
Hammerstein is known to have been ... 'sceptical' of Hitler since 1931 at least. Already in 1923 he titled him and his Putsch as "some private in Munich has gone mad" though such he might have said about every putschist at that time. IMHO it is rather fair to say Hammerstein was all these years 'aware' of Hitler and his and his party's development.
He was also kinda ... 'compagnion' - though probably too much of a word - or at least clollegial subordinate of Schleicher and his entourage around Hindenburg.
After the July election - as well as after the November election - of 1932 Hitler made himself with his continuing stubborn refusal of some kind of colation or 'shared' goverment 'impossible' to be trusted with power within said conservative militarian circles. ... including Schleicher, Bredow, etc. as well as Hammerstein.
With Papen also obviously 'failing' within the political sphere - like the frist session of the Reichstag after the July election sending him into dissolution of it without even having the chance to say a word at all before - Schleicher might come to the conclusion that the kind of coup d'etát as proposed in winter 1932/33 - and btw, by some state lawyers 'approved' :
In such a scenario Hammerstein might serve as the military 'face'. He later proved to be ready to participate in similar actions during Hitler reign on and again. Hindenburg would serve as the ... 'Ersatz-Kaiser and King" and offering a minimum of seemingly 'lawfullness'. Schleicher might act as the 'brain' behind' but he was never found of stanting in the spotlight.
Btw. ... also Hammerstein was noone keen on doing the nitty-bitty work of daily 'ruling'.
IMHO it would have to be someone else to take the part as 'face of the goverment' and the duties of the Reichschancellor.
Additionally maybe Schleicher might become convinced (by whatever minimalistic PoD you wish) sometime in Autumn 1932 that his IOTL preferred "Querfront"-concept of an alliance from the trade unions, conservative parts of the SPD over the civil service and the military to the Gregor Strasser wing of the NSDAP - won't work.
This might NOT be a 'democratic' Weimar but might evolve in time in kinda authoritarion pseudo-republik/democracy as there were so many in the first half of the 20th century.
... and a point to strat further discussions regarding the OP
P.S.: I recommend using the german wiki sources linked with some translator as first stops as they are much more detailed and rather well sourced that the anglophone wiki.
Hammerstein is known to have been ... 'sceptical' of Hitler since 1931 at least. Already in 1923 he titled him and his Putsch as "some private in Munich has gone mad" though such he might have said about every putschist at that time. IMHO it is rather fair to say Hammerstein was all these years 'aware' of Hitler and his and his party's development.
He was also kinda ... 'compagnion' - though probably too much of a word - or at least clollegial subordinate of Schleicher and his entourage around Hindenburg.
After the July election - as well as after the November election - of 1932 Hitler made himself with his continuing stubborn refusal of some kind of colation or 'shared' goverment 'impossible' to be trusted with power within said conservative militarian circles. ... including Schleicher, Bredow, etc. as well as Hammerstein.
With Papen also obviously 'failing' within the political sphere - like the frist session of the Reichstag after the July election sending him into dissolution of it without even having the chance to say a word at all before - Schleicher might come to the conclusion that the kind of coup d'etát as proposed in winter 1932/33 - and btw, by some state lawyers 'approved' :
- declaration of National emergency well justfied by the daily political streetfighing and similar events
- dissolution of the actual goverment due to lack of support within the Reichstag followed by
- dissolution of the Reichstag at all
- adjourning by the 'power' of Article §48 and the State of Emergency any new election either repeatedly or for an undefined lapse of time "... until law and order are reestablished". ... with this definition left to the discretion of the Reichspresident ... and his entourage and govermental advisors.
In such a scenario Hammerstein might serve as the military 'face'. He later proved to be ready to participate in similar actions during Hitler reign on and again. Hindenburg would serve as the ... 'Ersatz-Kaiser and King" and offering a minimum of seemingly 'lawfullness'. Schleicher might act as the 'brain' behind' but he was never found of stanting in the spotlight.
Btw. ... also Hammerstein was noone keen on doing the nitty-bitty work of daily 'ruling'.
IMHO it would have to be someone else to take the part as 'face of the goverment' and the duties of the Reichschancellor.
Additionally maybe Schleicher might become convinced (by whatever minimalistic PoD you wish) sometime in Autumn 1932 that his IOTL preferred "Querfront"-concept of an alliance from the trade unions, conservative parts of the SPD over the civil service and the military to the Gregor Strasser wing of the NSDAP - won't work.
This might NOT be a 'democratic' Weimar but might evolve in time in kinda authoritarion pseudo-republik/democracy as there were so many in the first half of the 20th century.
... and a point to strat further discussions regarding the OP
P.S.: I recommend using the german wiki sources linked with some translator as first stops as they are much more detailed and rather well sourced that the anglophone wiki.
IMHO matches it even better
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Hindenburg won't coup the government. Von Schleicher had made the Planspiel Ott to show him that the Reichswehr wouldn't be able to fight the Nazis, the Reichsbanner and the Rotfrontkämpferbund. That's why von Schleicher tried the Querfront, to integrate the Nazis or at least split them in half.
Exactly. Remember, these were the days in which the Zentrum would've rather entered a coalition with Hitler than opposed him. The vast majority of the Reichswehr higher echelons embraced Hitler as the saviour of Germany. And, as was stated, Hindenburg was literally the guy that made Hitler Reichskanzler.
Rubbish. If the "conservative forces" had been "in coalition with the Nazis", Hitler would have become Reichkanzler after the election of July 1932, in which the NSDAP gained by far the most seats. Instead Hindenburg stretched his emergency powers to the limit to avoid appointing Hitler for six months.
As for Hammerstein-Equord: he was known as the Red General for his friendships with trade unionists, two of his children were Communists, he referred to the NSDAP as a gang of criminals and perverts, and he resigned as Reichswehr C-in-C rather than serve under Hitler.
There can be no doubt that the conservatives sympathized with Hitler. Allthough in the end only the DNVP ended up in a coalition with Hitler, they were not the only ones to try. When the Boxheim Documents came to light in fall of 1931, Brüning actively downplayed them in order not to alienate the NSDAP from a potential coalition with the Zentrum.
Concrete negotiations about a coalition bewteen the NSdAP and Zentrum took place allready in mid 1932, however they were temporarily halted by the two parties defeat in the Reichstag elections of November 1932.
On November 16, 1932, negotiations between Papen, Kaas and Joos about the potential support of the Zentrum for the new government took place. Kaas demanded the resignation of the government and spoke at least indirectly for a coalition government including the NSDAP. In a meeting with Reich President Paul von Hindenburg, Kaas professed the goal of an authoritarian government and opposed parliamentarianism: “For the goal of national concentration, the committed and sustained cooperation of the Zentrum is absolutely at your disposal. I already said in my election speech in Munster that I see a permanent way out of the difficult situation only if 3 or 4 courageous party leaders make a loyalty pact among themselves in order to support a government. We don't want to fall back into parliamentarism, we want to give the Reich President political and moral support for an authoritarian government that is inspired and instructed by the Reich President. We don't want to go backwards, we want to go forward.” Kaas stuck to plans for a coalition government with the NSDAP. In fact, the Zentrum had long seen Hitler's chancellorship, provided that he could rely on a parliamentary majority and promised to uphold the constitution, as the only legitimate solution to the political crisis.
After Hitler became Reichskanzler on January 30, Kaas believed that the conservative majority in the cabinet would succeed in taming Hitler. Hitler began coalition talks with Kaas immediately after his appointment. The ministry of justice was kept open for Zentrum as a sign of good will.
From Hitler's point of view, these were only sham negotiations, with which he wanted to demonstrate that the formation of a stable government was not possible with the parliament elected in 1932. Kaas, on the other hand, was actually still interested in a government alliance with the NSDAP. Even after the dissolution of the Reichstag, the Zentrums opposition to Hitler's actions was minimal since they still yet hoped to enter a coalition with the NSdAP. The party newspaper (Germania) didn't loose a word about the terror against the communists and social democrats. They openly endorsed Hitler's Chancellorship, and publicly announced the Zentrums interest in a Coalition. After promises of concessions from Hitler, Zentrum decleared itself willing to vote for the Ermächtigungsgesetz. And so they did.
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Hitler formed a coalition with the DNVP, who were conservatives. There 's no room for debate here, I think. Hugenberg left after a few months, but Gürtner, Neurath, Schacht etc. stayed on for years.
Oh, and by the way, regarding Hindenburg in specific: After November 1932 he believed Hitler to be a good Reichskanzler to unite the political right against the bolshevist threat. On January 4th 1933, Papen met with Hitler, and the formation of a coalition government Hitler-Papen-Hugenberg was agreed upon. Hindenburg was informed about the agreement on the formation a majority government Hitler-Papen-Hugenberg, and was assured that the Zentrum and DNVP would successfully be able to 'frame' (,,Einrahmen") Hitler, i.e. force him and his party to integrate into the parliamentary system through realpolitik-neccessity. This greatly eased Hindenburg's doubts about Hitler's chancellorship. On January 30th, and under pressure from Hindenburg, Hitler met with Kaas to negotiate about the formation of a government, however Hitler intentionally sabotaged these talks, and they resulted in nothing. On February 1st, Hindenburg followed Hitlers urges and dissolved the parliament. So much for 'Hindenburg did everything he could to oppose the Nazis'.
And as for Hammerstein-Equord, yes he didn't like the NSdAP, but he also stated that, should they gain power via parliamentary means, he wouldn't oppose them. In the event of a Nazi coup, he stated, he would indeed use force to suppress them, but he wouldn't like it and would be very reluctant.
The conservatives of all stripes (DNVP, Zentrum, non-party) played a crucial role in bringing Hitler to power. Without them, the Nazis could not have taken over. That's a historical fact.
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