Can I ask what, where and how 'd be seen action the 65th ('The Borinqueneers') on TTL?
I agree.Less armor, though, and mobility was worse, and Jumbos didn't have cooling issues
There was, and continues to be, a program known as Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA), which integrated personnel of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) into the US Army. It was originally intended to be a stop-gap measure during the war, and was introduced to combat the manpower shortage. Although not considered a great success during the war, the policy continues to this day.Thank you for the feedback on Patton and black soldiers. I did read about the 761st Tank Battalion. It was very interesting. I have learned a lot from this site.
I am also wondering if there was any attempt to rebuild the American Combat Units by adding South Korean soldiers to their ranks. I understand that language is a problem but I would assume that the Koreans soldiers could be taught basic commands and told to do what the American counter part did.
Regards
Patton was Old Army, he understood what the Buffalo Soldiers had done and knew that they were good troops. He stood up for his people if they deserved it in his mind. His orderly Sgt. Meeks was one of the persons he confided in at times and trusted to keep those confidences.I do not know if this has been discussed. How far along was the Army on integration and what did George Patton think about integration?
"Executive Order 9981 was issued on July 26, 1948, by President Harry S. Truman. It abolished discrimination "on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin" in the United States Armed Forces. The executive order led to the end of segregation in the services during the Korean War (1950–1953).[1]"
In ten years, the SKorean troops went from sad joke to terrors of the Jungle in South VietnamTruman said in 1961 of Chiang's troops that they wouldn't have been any good.
OTL they arrived in Korea on September 23. That's a bit far ahead to be deciding what specific regiments are doing yetCan I ask what, where and how 'd be seen action the 65th ('The Borinqueneers') on TTL?
That's not up to Patton. It's not even up to MacArthur, despite what His Majesty would like to think. Also Patton was given explicit orders not to say anything political that might expand the war.Perhaps he might try to get the Nationalist Chinese involved? If he wanted to revive the german army against Stalin,, The Gitmo is an angel compared to the Wehrmacht!
I haven't watched much of MASH, but a look at Wikipedia suggests that there aren't any really high ranking folks in the show, so it probably wouldn't be all that different. An exception might be if they call in George C Scott for a special episode.I’m wondering how this tineline’s MASH would turn out?
Truman said in 1961 of Chiang's troops that they wouldn't have been any good.
I agree.
The first M26 deployed in Europe was knocked out by a Tiger.
Haven't heard the same about Jumbos.
I still stand by the Jumbo as a better tank.The M-46 was an M-26 with a new more powerful engine, and improved drive train. The overall armored protection was better then the Jumbos, except in the front hull. The 90mm gun was far better then the 76mm.
Turret as well, with 6" front/side/rear, with a 7" mantlet It weighed 10.25 tons, to the T26 turret that weighed 10 tons, and the 90mm weighed around 1000 pounds more than the 75mm in the JumboThe M-46 was an M-26 with a new more powerful engine, and improved drive train. The overall armored protection was better then the Jumbos, except in the front hull. The 90mm gun was far better then the 76mm.
It's Patton. He can say it in both at the same time. Mostly I just meant it as an expression of shock.
I'm going to start off by saying that Walton Walker wasn't a terribly good general. MacArthur didn't think very highly of him (and Walker wasn't a glory hound, so that had nothing to do with it), and Mac didn't have very high expectations judging from his own staff picks. Patton repeatedly had to order him to "stop fooling around and take [the objective in question]" in Europe (per War as I Knew It, p152, for one example.). It took him something like a week to break out of the Pusan perimeter AFTER Inchon had happened, despite outnumbering the NKPA by a considerable margin (NK at that time was ~70k IIRC, UN had 180k but that might be including the units at Inchon), and having every advantage in equipment possible.
More to the point, Walker's first reaction in any situation where he wasn't advancing (which he seems to have been quite reckless when he did so), was to drop and run with everything he had. Most notably he did this after the Chinese Thanksgiving offensive, when his troops weren't even in contact with the Chinese but they felt the need to run all the way past Seoul (for a good month after the offensive began) - a lot of people like to bring up the "hold the line at Wonsan-Pyongyang" strategy: this is something that would have been quite achieveable had Walker had enough guts to actually stay and fight. I get that after a surprise attack, a force might retreat a little bit to regroup and gather its bearings, but units don't need to retreat 100+ miles to do so. He did the same sort of thing all the way to between Osan and the Naktong: as soon as the North Koreans showed up in any sort of strength, he'd get spooked and run to the next position. At OTL's Taejon battle, he ordered Dean to hold the city until the 20th so he could set up the next position further back. He wasn't thinking about anything except retreat.
As for TTL, I'm not saying Patton holds the Kum line. From memory that was lost by the 16th of July, a couple days before I have Patton take command in-theatre. Instead I am having Patton fight an urban battle in Taejon itself, and then once that is won, advances on the Kum and establishes a new line just across the river (at which point his offensive momentum has burned out and stalls) around the beginning of August. It is also not just the 24th Division, but the 1st Cavalry as well that is committed to the battle.
How that comes about is fairly straightforward: the NKPA knew that it needed Taejon if it was going to get any further in the western half of SK. Basically every major road and rail in that part of the country runs through the city, which meant supplies would, by and large, have to go through there as well. There are other routes, but these require smaller roads (or the single railroad going through Chonan, all the way along the west coast, to get to Kunsan). We also see that it wasn't until Taejon fell that the NK 6th Division really began its drive along the west coast (eventually leading to Masan) in earnest. If Patton is holding it, they're going to fight him there because it is an important strategic position - without it, there's no way they're getting anywhere near Pusan on this axis of advance. Here's a 1951 map for reference (red lines are major roads, black are smaller ones)
View attachment 598711
The only other route to Taegu runs through Sangju, which was defended by the 25th Division at the time. OTL they held that until long after Taejon and surrounds had fallen.
Now yes, the NK did try to outflank Taejon. Twice. Once from the north towards Yongdong (presumably following the road from Poun), which OTL resulted in the Battle of Yongdong. This didn't happen until after Walker had already pulled out of Taejon (the battle was to cover the retreat), but 1st Cavalry still inflicted heavy losses on the NKPA. If Patton has decided to hold Taejon itself, it's easy enough to see the NK forces there being thrown back. The other flanking move was made around Chinsan from the west. All the roads of consequence there lead straight back into the city of Taejon, excepting a circuitous manoeuvre that would make them horribly exposed (or I suppose, they could head south, but that doesn't help them take Taejon). Merely remaining in Chinsan or Kumsan doesn't help either - all of the UN supplies ran along the railroad and road from Taegu-Kumchon-Yongdong-Taejon.
As for the battle itself, Patton has experience from WWII in fighting in urban locations, Metz being one example. He has experience fighting from the defensive, the Germans launched plenty of attacks against Third Army units (he mentions an attack of two SS divisions being the largest he faced, this being an action on Dec 30, '44, and that was a success - NK's attack on Taejon was of similar size to that battle). He may not prefer to fight that way, but he knows how to well enough. The NKPA wasn't dramatically better than SS units were in 1944, so I think comparisons to what happened in Europe are fair enough.
24th Division was still 10000+ men. 1st Cav at least doubles that. Plus any Korean troops that were attached to it. It doesn't really matter if we call them understrength or not. Indeed, they were about the same size as an average NK division was in July (just that US divisions are normally expected to be larger). In August around the Pusan perimeter, UN troops proved more than capable of holding off NK attacks, and there weren't any great amounts of reinforcements on either side between mid-July and mid-August. Equipment shortages, for all that they have been discussed, weren't restricting UN capabilities too much (not to mention, a T-34 isn't going to be terribly useful in a city battle). OTL the US suffered more losses to heatstroke than to enemy action during the summer of 1950. If they were determined to hold something, and could get a couple of divisions there, it was well within their capabilities to do so.
Patton would only need one look at the map to tell him that Taejon had to be held. The NKs can't easily outflank it, and they wouldn't get through the defences, so it can be held. Walker just gave it to them because he rathered fight at the Naktong.
- BNC
All great points! Maybe I've been reading so much of Patton this year I've started thinking like him haha And Walker's strategy at Pusan did work so I guess we can't be too harsh on him.You've clearly studied the Battle of Taejon, and I don't disagree with your assessment of Walker, but I have to disagree with your criticism of his handling of the battle. First let me say I'm not a general, I only play one online, and this is your ATL, but this is my assessment. I don't think your seeing the bigger picture that Walker was looking at. At the end of July the line across Korea was collapsing. 8th Army's supply base was the Port of Pusan, all reinforcements had to come though it. If Patton commits I Corps, 24th &1st Cav to an all out fight to hold Taejon, and restore the Cum River Line, while the front held by the ROK's to the East is collapsing the NKPA will cut them off from Pusan.
By this point the NKPA had 13 Divisions in South Korea, if I Corps is enveloped from the East it doesn't matter if they win their battle, the Corps would be destroyed. Fighting to hold Taejon, no matter how important it is, is an unsound strategy. Walker, or Patton would have no choice but to trade space for time, and retreat. The Naktong River is the place to make the final stand, not the Cum River. The Pusan Perimeter was the place for the ROK's to regroup, and for IX Corps to deploy. It also has the advantage of being close to your vital air bases, and naval support. At the Naktong the NKPA is near the end of it's supply line's, while the UN is near it's main base. At the time MacArthur, the JCS, along with modern military historians, and staff colleges overwhelmingly agree that Walker followed the correct strategy.
After the defeat in NK, Walker wanted to out pace the Chinese, so he could regroup his forces. 8th Army was facing 24 Chinese Divisions, that had just cut his army to pieces. 2nd ID needed to be almost completely rebuilt, the Turkish Brigade had been destroyed, and the ROK had been routed. The ROK's were intimidated by the Chinese, and needed to regroup, and have their confidence restored. 8th Army was also at the end of it's supply lines, that went all the way back to Pusan. Defending Pyongyang would've put 8th Army at great risk. A second defeat could have been catastrophic. Walker decided to retreat on his own authority, and no one, not MacArthur, or the JCS countermanded the order. At the time of his death 8th Army was still North of Seoul.
Even when Matthew Ridgeway, a truly great general took command, it took till February to rebuild 8th Army into a winning team, that could defeat the Chinese. Ridgeway was the real American Hero of the Korean War. I would rate Ridgeway a better general then Patton. Both were brilliant men, with visionary minds, were inspiring leaders, though with radically different command styles, and both were aggressive commanders. Ridgeway had greater attention to detail, was more even tempered, was a better team player, was less prone to unrealistic planning, and not subject to bombast. His diplomatic record, and temperament made Ridgeway a far better choice to lead a coalition command. At the time of the Korean War Ridgeway was at the height of his powers, while Patton would be far past his prime.
Patton's erratic behavior, and tendency to seek glory on the battlefield, at the expense of his men lowered his appraisal in the eyes of his friends, such as George Marshall, and Omar Bradley. In fact Bradley wanted Lucian Truscott to command 3rd Army. It was Eisenhower who wanted Patton, but on a short leash. By the end of the war Ike's forbearance had reached it's end. Patton was a colorful figure, idolized by many, but I think there were better American generals in WWII.
Saying all that I'm still enjoying your TL, and am looking forward to what's next. I'm Sorry for being the skunk at the garden party. Take care, and good luck.
I recall there was an episode where MacArthur was visiting the 4077th, but all we saw was a guy in khakis being driven to the hospital, they having spent no end of time making the place look acceptable.I haven't watched much of MASH, but a look at Wikipedia suggests that there aren't any really high ranking folks in the show, so it probably wouldn't be all that different. An exception might be if they call in George C Scott for a special episode