Do you approve or disapprove of the way that Douglas MacArthur is handling his job as president?

  • Approve

    Votes: 199 72.6%
  • Disapprove

    Votes: 75 27.4%

  • Total voters
    274
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Thank you for the feedback on Patton and black soldiers. I did read about the 761st Tank Battalion. It was very interesting. I have learned a lot from this site.

I am also wondering if there was any attempt to rebuild the American Combat Units by adding South Korean soldiers to their ranks. I understand that language is a problem but I would assume that the Koreans soldiers could be taught basic commands and told to do what the American counter part did.

Regards
 
Thank you for the feedback on Patton and black soldiers. I did read about the 761st Tank Battalion. It was very interesting. I have learned a lot from this site.

I am also wondering if there was any attempt to rebuild the American Combat Units by adding South Korean soldiers to their ranks. I understand that language is a problem but I would assume that the Koreans soldiers could be taught basic commands and told to do what the American counter part did.

Regards
There was, and continues to be, a program known as Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA), which integrated personnel of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) into the US Army. It was originally intended to be a stop-gap measure during the war, and was introduced to combat the manpower shortage. Although not considered a great success during the war, the policy continues to this day.
 
I do not know if this has been discussed. How far along was the Army on integration and what did George Patton think about integration?

"Executive Order 9981 was issued on July 26, 1948, by President Harry S. Truman. It abolished discrimination "on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin" in the United States Armed Forces. The executive order led to the end of segregation in the services during the Korean War (1950–1953).[1]"
Patton was Old Army, he understood what the Buffalo Soldiers had done and knew that they were good troops. He stood up for his people if they deserved it in his mind. His orderly Sgt. Meeks was one of the persons he confided in at times and trusted to keep those confidences.

As long as the troops would fight he would use them and stand up for them.
 
Perhaps he might try to get the Nationalist Chinese involved? If he wanted to revive the german army against Stalin,, The Gitmo is an angel compared to the Wehrmacht!
 
Can I ask what, where and how 'd be seen action the 65th ('The Borinqueneers') on TTL?
OTL they arrived in Korea on September 23. That's a bit far ahead to be deciding what specific regiments are doing yet :)

Perhaps he might try to get the Nationalist Chinese involved? If he wanted to revive the german army against Stalin,, The Gitmo is an angel compared to the Wehrmacht!
That's not up to Patton. It's not even up to MacArthur, despite what His Majesty would like to think. Also Patton was given explicit orders not to say anything political that might expand the war.
So sure, he'd like the troops, but he won't get them unless Truman decides to give them to him.

I’m wondering how this tineline’s MASH would turn out?
I haven't watched much of MASH, but a look at Wikipedia suggests that there aren't any really high ranking folks in the show, so it probably wouldn't be all that different. An exception might be if they call in George C Scott for a special episode.
More generally, I find it hard to believe that Korea ITTL would become a "forgotten war" as it did IOTL... popular memory tends to be driven by exciting characters more than anything, and with Patton AND MacArthur there, there's a lot of material for people to make shows and stuff about.

- BNC
 
Truman said in 1961 of Chiang's troops that they wouldn't have been any good.

And how would he know that? Truman often made baseless statements, that historians shouldn't take at face value. He based that guess on the fact they lost the war in mainland China. Chiang had saved his best troops, and had been training new ones. Chances are good that he had a number of good divisions, and with the USN guarding the waters around Formosa he could risk sending 4 of them to Korea.
 
I agree.
The first M26 deployed in Europe was knocked out by a Tiger.
Haven't heard the same about Jumbos.

The M-46 was an M-26 with a new more powerful engine, and improved drive train. The overall armored protection was better then the Jumbos, except in the front hull. The 90mm gun was far better then the 76mm.
 
The M-46 was an M-26 with a new more powerful engine, and improved drive train. The overall armored protection was better then the Jumbos, except in the front hull. The 90mm gun was far better then the 76mm.
I still stand by the Jumbo as a better tank.
US should have made a 76mm version and kept it in production until the M46 appeared in sufficient numbers.
 

marathag

Banned
The M-46 was an M-26 with a new more powerful engine, and improved drive train. The overall armored protection was better then the Jumbos, except in the front hull. The 90mm gun was far better then the 76mm.
Turret as well, with 6" front/side/rear, with a 7" mantlet It weighed 10.25 tons, to the T26 turret that weighed 10 tons, and the 90mm weighed around 1000 pounds more than the 75mm in the Jumbo
 
It's Patton. He can say it in both at the same time. Mostly I just meant it as an expression of shock.


I'm going to start off by saying that Walton Walker wasn't a terribly good general. MacArthur didn't think very highly of him (and Walker wasn't a glory hound, so that had nothing to do with it), and Mac didn't have very high expectations judging from his own staff picks. Patton repeatedly had to order him to "stop fooling around and take [the objective in question]" in Europe (per War as I Knew It, p152, for one example.). It took him something like a week to break out of the Pusan perimeter AFTER Inchon had happened, despite outnumbering the NKPA by a considerable margin (NK at that time was ~70k IIRC, UN had 180k but that might be including the units at Inchon), and having every advantage in equipment possible.
More to the point, Walker's first reaction in any situation where he wasn't advancing (which he seems to have been quite reckless when he did so), was to drop and run with everything he had. Most notably he did this after the Chinese Thanksgiving offensive, when his troops weren't even in contact with the Chinese but they felt the need to run all the way past Seoul (for a good month after the offensive began) - a lot of people like to bring up the "hold the line at Wonsan-Pyongyang" strategy: this is something that would have been quite achieveable had Walker had enough guts to actually stay and fight. I get that after a surprise attack, a force might retreat a little bit to regroup and gather its bearings, but units don't need to retreat 100+ miles to do so. He did the same sort of thing all the way to between Osan and the Naktong: as soon as the North Koreans showed up in any sort of strength, he'd get spooked and run to the next position. At OTL's Taejon battle, he ordered Dean to hold the city until the 20th so he could set up the next position further back. He wasn't thinking about anything except retreat.

As for TTL, I'm not saying Patton holds the Kum line. From memory that was lost by the 16th of July, a couple days before I have Patton take command in-theatre. Instead I am having Patton fight an urban battle in Taejon itself, and then once that is won, advances on the Kum and establishes a new line just across the river (at which point his offensive momentum has burned out and stalls) around the beginning of August. It is also not just the 24th Division, but the 1st Cavalry as well that is committed to the battle.
How that comes about is fairly straightforward: the NKPA knew that it needed Taejon if it was going to get any further in the western half of SK. Basically every major road and rail in that part of the country runs through the city, which meant supplies would, by and large, have to go through there as well. There are other routes, but these require smaller roads (or the single railroad going through Chonan, all the way along the west coast, to get to Kunsan). We also see that it wasn't until Taejon fell that the NK 6th Division really began its drive along the west coast (eventually leading to Masan) in earnest. If Patton is holding it, they're going to fight him there because it is an important strategic position - without it, there's no way they're getting anywhere near Pusan on this axis of advance. Here's a 1951 map for reference (red lines are major roads, black are smaller ones)

View attachment 598711

The only other route to Taegu runs through Sangju, which was defended by the 25th Division at the time. OTL they held that until long after Taejon and surrounds had fallen.

Now yes, the NK did try to outflank Taejon. Twice. Once from the north towards Yongdong (presumably following the road from Poun), which OTL resulted in the Battle of Yongdong. This didn't happen until after Walker had already pulled out of Taejon (the battle was to cover the retreat), but 1st Cavalry still inflicted heavy losses on the NKPA. If Patton has decided to hold Taejon itself, it's easy enough to see the NK forces there being thrown back. The other flanking move was made around Chinsan from the west. All the roads of consequence there lead straight back into the city of Taejon, excepting a circuitous manoeuvre that would make them horribly exposed (or I suppose, they could head south, but that doesn't help them take Taejon). Merely remaining in Chinsan or Kumsan doesn't help either - all of the UN supplies ran along the railroad and road from Taegu-Kumchon-Yongdong-Taejon.
As for the battle itself, Patton has experience from WWII in fighting in urban locations, Metz being one example. He has experience fighting from the defensive, the Germans launched plenty of attacks against Third Army units (he mentions an attack of two SS divisions being the largest he faced, this being an action on Dec 30, '44, and that was a success - NK's attack on Taejon was of similar size to that battle). He may not prefer to fight that way, but he knows how to well enough. The NKPA wasn't dramatically better than SS units were in 1944, so I think comparisons to what happened in Europe are fair enough.
24th Division was still 10000+ men. 1st Cav at least doubles that. Plus any Korean troops that were attached to it. It doesn't really matter if we call them understrength or not. Indeed, they were about the same size as an average NK division was in July (just that US divisions are normally expected to be larger). In August around the Pusan perimeter, UN troops proved more than capable of holding off NK attacks, and there weren't any great amounts of reinforcements on either side between mid-July and mid-August. Equipment shortages, for all that they have been discussed, weren't restricting UN capabilities too much (not to mention, a T-34 isn't going to be terribly useful in a city battle). OTL the US suffered more losses to heatstroke than to enemy action during the summer of 1950. If they were determined to hold something, and could get a couple of divisions there, it was well within their capabilities to do so.
Patton would only need one look at the map to tell him that Taejon had to be held. The NKs can't easily outflank it, and they wouldn't get through the defences, so it can be held. Walker just gave it to them because he rathered fight at the Naktong.

- BNC

You've clearly studied the Battle of Taejon, and I don't disagree with your assessment of Walker, but I have to disagree with your criticism of his handling of the battle. First let me say I'm not a general, I only play one online, and this is your ATL, but this is my assessment. I don't think your seeing the bigger picture that Walker was looking at. At the end of July the line across Korea was collapsing. 8th Army's supply base was the Port of Pusan, all reinforcements had to come though it. If Patton commits I Corps, 24th &1st Cav to an all out fight to hold Taejon, and restore the Cum River Line, while the front held by the ROK's to the East is collapsing the NKPA will cut them off from Pusan.

By this point the NKPA had 13 Divisions in South Korea, if I Corps is enveloped from the East it doesn't matter if they win their battle, the Corps would be destroyed. Fighting to hold Taejon, no matter how important it is, is an unsound strategy. Walker, or Patton would have no choice but to trade space for time, and retreat. The Naktong River is the place to make the final stand, not the Cum River. The Pusan Perimeter was the place for the ROK's to regroup, and for IX Corps to deploy. It also has the advantage of being close to your vital air bases, and naval support. At the Naktong the NKPA is near the end of it's supply line's, while the UN is near it's main base. At the time MacArthur, the JCS, along with modern military historians, and staff colleges overwhelmingly agree that Walker followed the correct strategy.

After the defeat in NK, Walker wanted to out pace the Chinese, so he could regroup his forces. 8th Army was facing 24 Chinese Divisions, that had just cut his army to pieces. 2nd ID needed to be almost completely rebuilt, the Turkish Brigade had been destroyed, and the ROK had been routed. The ROK's were intimidated by the Chinese, and needed to regroup, and have their confidence restored. 8th Army was also at the end of it's supply lines, that went all the way back to Pusan. Defending Pyongyang would've put 8th Army at great risk. A second defeat could have been catastrophic. Walker decided to retreat on his own authority, and no one, not MacArthur, or the JCS countermanded the order. At the time of his death 8th Army was still North of Seoul.

Even when Matthew Ridgeway, a truly great general took command, it took till February to rebuild 8th Army into a winning team, that could defeat the Chinese. Ridgeway was the real American Hero of the Korean War. I would rate Ridgeway a better general then Patton. Both were brilliant men, with visionary minds, were inspiring leaders, though with radically different command styles, and both were aggressive commanders. Ridgeway had greater attention to detail, was more even tempered, was a better team player, was less prone to unrealistic planning, and not subject to bombast. His diplomatic record, and temperament made Ridgeway a far better choice to lead a coalition command. At the time of the Korean War Ridgeway was at the height of his powers, while Patton would be far past his prime.

Patton's erratic behavior, and tendency to seek glory on the battlefield, at the expense of his men lowered his appraisal in the eyes of his friends, such as George Marshall, and Omar Bradley. In fact Bradley wanted Lucian Truscott to command 3rd Army. It was Eisenhower who wanted Patton, but on a short leash. By the end of the war Ike's forbearance had reached it's end. Patton was a colorful figure, idolized by many, but I think there were better American generals in WWII.

Saying all that I'm still enjoying your TL, and am looking forward to what's next. I'm Sorry for being the skunk at the garden party. Take care, and good luck.
 
You've clearly studied the Battle of Taejon, and I don't disagree with your assessment of Walker, but I have to disagree with your criticism of his handling of the battle. First let me say I'm not a general, I only play one online, and this is your ATL, but this is my assessment. I don't think your seeing the bigger picture that Walker was looking at. At the end of July the line across Korea was collapsing. 8th Army's supply base was the Port of Pusan, all reinforcements had to come though it. If Patton commits I Corps, 24th &1st Cav to an all out fight to hold Taejon, and restore the Cum River Line, while the front held by the ROK's to the East is collapsing the NKPA will cut them off from Pusan.

By this point the NKPA had 13 Divisions in South Korea, if I Corps is enveloped from the East it doesn't matter if they win their battle, the Corps would be destroyed. Fighting to hold Taejon, no matter how important it is, is an unsound strategy. Walker, or Patton would have no choice but to trade space for time, and retreat. The Naktong River is the place to make the final stand, not the Cum River. The Pusan Perimeter was the place for the ROK's to regroup, and for IX Corps to deploy. It also has the advantage of being close to your vital air bases, and naval support. At the Naktong the NKPA is near the end of it's supply line's, while the UN is near it's main base. At the time MacArthur, the JCS, along with modern military historians, and staff colleges overwhelmingly agree that Walker followed the correct strategy.

After the defeat in NK, Walker wanted to out pace the Chinese, so he could regroup his forces. 8th Army was facing 24 Chinese Divisions, that had just cut his army to pieces. 2nd ID needed to be almost completely rebuilt, the Turkish Brigade had been destroyed, and the ROK had been routed. The ROK's were intimidated by the Chinese, and needed to regroup, and have their confidence restored. 8th Army was also at the end of it's supply lines, that went all the way back to Pusan. Defending Pyongyang would've put 8th Army at great risk. A second defeat could have been catastrophic. Walker decided to retreat on his own authority, and no one, not MacArthur, or the JCS countermanded the order. At the time of his death 8th Army was still North of Seoul.

Even when Matthew Ridgeway, a truly great general took command, it took till February to rebuild 8th Army into a winning team, that could defeat the Chinese. Ridgeway was the real American Hero of the Korean War. I would rate Ridgeway a better general then Patton. Both were brilliant men, with visionary minds, were inspiring leaders, though with radically different command styles, and both were aggressive commanders. Ridgeway had greater attention to detail, was more even tempered, was a better team player, was less prone to unrealistic planning, and not subject to bombast. His diplomatic record, and temperament made Ridgeway a far better choice to lead a coalition command. At the time of the Korean War Ridgeway was at the height of his powers, while Patton would be far past his prime.

Patton's erratic behavior, and tendency to seek glory on the battlefield, at the expense of his men lowered his appraisal in the eyes of his friends, such as George Marshall, and Omar Bradley. In fact Bradley wanted Lucian Truscott to command 3rd Army. It was Eisenhower who wanted Patton, but on a short leash. By the end of the war Ike's forbearance had reached it's end. Patton was a colorful figure, idolized by many, but I think there were better American generals in WWII.

Saying all that I'm still enjoying your TL, and am looking forward to what's next. I'm Sorry for being the skunk at the garden party. Take care, and good luck.
All great points! Maybe I've been reading so much of Patton this year I've started thinking like him haha :) And Walker's strategy at Pusan did work so I guess we can't be too harsh on him.
Patton was a risk taker, and had a excellent instinct for what an enemy's capabilities were... it is certainly in his character to go all in for Taejon, even if it may not be the move most other generals would recommend.
As for Ridgway... he doesn't make TLs as exciting ;)

- BNC
 
Part I, Chapter 6
CHAPTER 6

I cannot name my battles
For the visions are not clear,
Yet, I see the twisted faces
And I feel the rending spear.

August 6, 1950


Douglas MacArthur considered his trip to Taejon, just his second to Korea since hostilities began, to have been a great success. Reporters and cameras from Life magazine, from the NBC and other radio and television networks, journalists from a couple dozen countries, had all captured the moments he walked through the largest city to be liberated from North Korean control so far. Every one of those reports would have General of the Army Douglas MacArthur front and centre. He was here. He was winning the war. The streets of Taejon, battered as they were, were entirely free again. All because of his leadership.
Though he would never admit it, not even to Jean, he knew that he wouldn’t be striding through Taejon today if not for Patton. The day that Patton had showed up in Korea, Eighth Army was in retreat basically everywhere, and the troops in Taejon had thought they would be fighting a holding action for just a few days to give the rest of the army time to set up a position in front of Pusan. Patton had done seemingly done it by kicking butts harder and more often than anyone else had dared. It had worked: communications between the units were not perfect, but certainly a lot better than they were. Discipline and troop confidence was also greatly improved. Equipment and manpower remained a problem, but the only way those were being solved was by ships coming from the other side of the Pacific.
Patton had kicked butts a little too hard though. That was why, as the press folks were leaving and the Bataan waited on a newly recaptured airstrip, he was sitting down with the general in what had once been a bank, and now was merely a building that was missing a good third or more of its south-facing walls. He hated confronting subordinate officers, but Patton wasn’t going to listen to Whitney and had refused to speak with Almond at all. So, after a brief exchange of greetings and congratulations, he decided to get straight to the point.
“Now George,” MacArthur said. “we have an issue of political sensitivity, and a serious one at that. President Rhee is brewing up a storm with Washington over this order to clear the roads.”
“Mr Rhee? I already told the ambassador that he doesn’t know anything about fighting a war and should let me do the job properly.” Patton said, already angry.
“I understand that, indeed I agree with your motivations. Yet the fact remains that Mr Rhee is our ally, and his concerns must be considered. Our mission out here is to help the Korean people after all.” MacArthur said.
“The orders have to stay. I don’t know how many goddamn times I got held up in France because nobody had a damn clue how to run our logistics. If they’d listened to me I’d have been over the Siegfried Line in two days and a tenth the casualties.” Patton said.
MacArthur decided to just let Patton rant about what could have been in Europe. He couldn’t afford to sack him: Truman had sent him not three weeks ago, and Washington had already involved itself far too much in the affairs in Asia. They’d already objected to his attempt to get Chinese troops to help hold the line, even though it was clear those troops were desperately needed. Finally, when Patton began claiming that he could have taken Berlin by the Christmas of 1944…
MacArthur held up his hand once he decided Patton had ranted for long enough. “Don't worry yourself about that, George. I will deal with the refugee problem if the issue comes up again. Your order to keep the roads clear may remain in place. If someone around here had thought of them earlier I might have given it myself.” He didn’t need to mention that had he given that order, it wouldn’t have been by shooting a mule in front of three hundred Koreans. “I’ll explain to Mr Rhee the military necessity of those orders, so as to keep them from further interfering with our operations. I can’t say the same for the fifty thousand Koreans serving in units under your command, and he’s demanding they be placed under someone – anyone – but you. He simply will not tolerate his countrymen to be placed under an Eighth Army that you lead.”
“You’re splitting the command?” Patton asked angrily.
“For the sake of cordial relations with our allies, I must.” MacArthur explained. “And as you’re much too valuable to send back to California, I’m going to have to restrict your command to American troops only.” As of yet, Americans and South Koreans were the only troops manning the UN lines, but London had already promised a force to arrive before the end of the month and other countries were preparing contingents of their own. MacArthur doubted any of them wanted to be associated with Patton’s inability to be diplomatic. "The Koreans will of course remain on the lines, under the control of another commander who I shall appoint on my return to Tokyo. Although they will not be formally under Eighth Army's jurisdiction, I will ensure that General Coulter understands your authority."
“How do you expect me to man the lines if you’re taking half my troops away?” Patton demanded.
“I’ve already given you the Marine brigade, and Willoughby assures me there are no North Koreans remaining along the west coast. The two regiments there and the Marines will make up for most of the Koreans being removed from your command. And of course, more reinforcements are on the way from the States.” MacArthur explained. “Willoughby is also certain that the North Koreans west of the mountains are greatly weakened after the battle here.”
“Willoughby is…” Patton caught himself. “No, I’ll keep my mouth shut. But last week Hickey said you’d be taking the Marines away for ‘Chromite’, as well as a division that hasn’t even arrived yet. How am I to advance then?”
“As things stand, there is little need for further offensives at present. As long as the present positions can be held, ‘Chromite’ will allow us to trap the enemy and we shall win the war there.”
Although MacArthur had ordered everyone away from the building, a second lieutenant now stood at the doorway. “Urgent message for General Patton, sirs.” he said, announcing his arrival.
“What is it?” Patton asked.
“Andong has fallen, sir. Colonel Landrum thinks the communists have launched another big offensive.”
MacArthur dismissed Patton without a word. Andong was – no, had been – defended by an ROK unit. It hadn’t been implemented yet and already the decision to separate Korean units was looking like a bad one. If only the politicians would let the Army actually fight the war without interfering all the time.

***

August 8, 1950

“Sir, without the Koreans, we simply don’t have enough troops in the sector to do all that you ask.”
Nineteen words that summed up everything that was wrong with Eighth Army. As soon as they were out of his mouth, Colonel Creighton Abrams knew that his commander would not be happy. Patton never liked being told no, especially when he wanted to launch an offensive. He thought back to his days in Third Army, when Patton would repeat the phrase ‘never take counsel of your fears’, find some supplies that he later found out had come from other US armies, and then order the offensive go ahead anyway. In Korea, there were no other armies to take supplies from (the ROK troops didn’t have anything worth taking).
For a wonder, Patton didn’t curse him out. Half the headquarters staff it seemed had already experienced that. An hour after Patton called you a son of a bitch, he would be praising you as a fine officer again, but it wasn’t an experience Abrams looked forward to. The exception was Charles Willoughby in Tokyo, who he had decided was incompetent and refused to speak to at all. But instead, Patton listened. Maybe today he was in a good mood.
“What do we have the troops for?” he asked.
“You want to train troops up in the rear. You want to attack north from our bridgehead over the Kum River. You want to retake Kunsan. I can give you one of those today without jeopardising our positions, and a second once the 5th and 19th Regiments secure the southwest and turn it over to ROK police. That’s likely to take another three or four days, and they’d need another two to redeploy.” Abrams explained. He didn’t need to explain that those two regiments had taken far longer than expected to defeat the North Korean force still active around Kwangju. None of the battles there had been in any way decisive: heavy fire and the support of some tanks had made the Koreans retreat time and time again, but very few had been killed or taken prisoner. What was really needed down there was artillery, but every spare gun had been needed at Taejon. Kwangju had only been surrounded the previous day, and there was still something like half a division holed up in there.
“Priorities, then?” Patton said. “Training has to be first. Most of the troops are still green, and don’t know anything about holding a flank or proper patrols.”
Abrams made a note on a scrap of paper to make sure the commanders assigned to training duties were told to focus on making the troops watch their flanks. “What then, sir?”
“Seoul.” Patton said. “I expect local attacks to go in that direction even if the rest of the line can’t move forward. We have the enemy by the balls. Time to kick him in the ass.”
“I’ll have the orders ready.” Abrams said.
Seoul? That was a long way away. Even counting the two regiments in the south, Eighth Army still only had three divisions, and at least one of those would be combat ineffective for a while yet. Abrams wasn’t confident of getting near Seoul any time soon. He was feeling lucky that the NKPA had decided to strike further east.

***

August 12, 1950

Sergeant Carl Dodd crouched in a hastily-dug foxhole on the outskirts of Kwangju. The book in his pocket said not to dig foxholes, as they were bad for morale and didn’t do much to keep you alive. That might have been good advice if you were charging across the plains of France limited only by the horsepower of the engine of a Sherman tank. He hadn’t been a part of Third Army’s great charge, having served in a training role then. Now he was laying siege to God knew how many North Koreans. The front hadn’t moved much in five days, and no-one was keen to storm the town. Taejon had been an expensive battle for both sides. Word was that Taejon was located somewhere important. Kwangju wasn’t. A siege would do. The gooks had to be low on supplies anyway: every road on the west coast of Korea had been bombed to hell, and Navy Corsairs were a common sight over first Sunchon and then Kwangju itself.
He peered over the top of his foxhole, rifle at the ready. There was a North Korean coming out towards them. He was about to fire when he saw the white flag. Faint yellow really – whatever that rag he was holding was supposed to be, it clearly hadn’t been washed in a while. The intent couldn’t have been clearer.
“Hold your fire!” he yelled out, just in case his buddies didn’t see the fellow’s makeshift flag.
All there was left to do was wait. None of the Americans in his unit spoke Korean, but there were a few ROK troops nearby to take the man back to the command tent. The colonel would make a decision, presumably having already received orders from Patton.
The wait was long and tense, but Dodd still preferred it to being shot at, or worse, being under mortar fire. Eventually, word came out that the entire North Korean 6th Division was surrendering. He never saw that one North Korean soldier again, but others came out of the town with hands above their heads, so word was correct. Most of them looked starved half to death.
Later that night, one of the privates in his unit asked him a question that was on everyone’s minds. “Sarge, what are we supposed to do with four thousand prisoners?”
He thought about it, and then gave the best answer he could. “I don’t know. That’s for the generals to decide.” Had someone told him that not even the generals knew what to do, he wouldn’t have been too surprised.

- BNC
 
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So will there be any of the OTL stupidity of "we don't need more troops really" by Dugout Doug? The Greeks in OTL for example had prepared to send an infantry brigade, then it was reduced to an reinforced battalion.
 
I haven't watched much of MASH, but a look at Wikipedia suggests that there aren't any really high ranking folks in the show, so it probably wouldn't be all that different. An exception might be if they call in George C Scott for a special episode
I recall there was an episode where MacArthur was visiting the 4077th, but all we saw was a guy in khakis being driven to the hospital, they having spent no end of time making the place look acceptable.

But no, I doubt they would have an episode with Patton, with or without Scott. On the other hand, the original novel, by "Richard Hooker" [Richard Hornberger] might have something. It was different in some ways from the movie and the show.
 
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