Valamyr
Banned
I'm interested to picture a world where the USSR loses superpower status but doesnt collapse so completely as to break what traditionally was Russia.
So lets say that a slightly earlier (late 70s?) and more successful perestroika brings increased prosperity in Russia itself and the adjacant lands that were traditionally Russian. Eastern Europe gets only fringe benefits however, and things begin to take a different shape than OTL. Under Gobatchev, the Soviet bloc slowly opens up markets in the 80s, ala China. Eastern Europe feels increasingly rebellious however, and in 1990, Moscow makes a drastic move by withdrawing from all countries west of its core lands. Its military leaves rapidly. The wall is shattered within hours.
Gorbatchev encourages moderate, socialist regimes favorable to Moscow in Eastern europe, and offer economic pacts, while accepting that eastern europe withdraws from the Warsaw pact and its military provisions. Simultaneously, the old USSR, with the borders of 1940, including the baltic states, Moldavia, Ukraine, the Caucasus and the central asian republics, holds together. Threats of force, and in some places, force, is employed to break those who'd wish to follow up with independence. The recent rise in quality of life in these regions help quell problems.
Rapidly, changes are seen from OTL. Eastern european governments are more socialist and walk a thin line between freeing themselves from a 50 year domination and accepting the help of a much more friendly giant wishing to cooperate with them. Yugoslavia, always distant from Moscow, is one country that benefits from this change. Moscow's newfound willingness to cooperate rather than dominate brings the two countries closer and prevent the collapse of the country.
In the middle east, butterflies rapidly change the situation we've seen. Trying to exploit the collapse of much of the soviet empire, the US push on with its strategy to strengthen its foothold in the region, leading to the Gulf war in 1991. The Soviet Union morally backs Saddam, a traditional ally, but doesnt wish to test its muscles directly. Quite the opposite, as Gorbatchev is making progress negociating serious nuclear cuts, and he doesnt want to endanger the detente.
However, Soviet mediation shortens the war, Saddam accepts to quit Koweit for good and to pay indemnities to the small country. In exchange, he retains control of his country's airspace and suffers a much lessened embargo, which ends in 1996. Relative stability returns to the region. Meanwhile, the USSR liberalize much of its economy and soften up its communist rethoric, looking like much less of a threat to the world.
The European Union doesnt spread east as easily as in OTL. By 2004, Poland will join it, but not the Balkan countries, which prefers retaining closer ties to the Soviets. Like China, Soviet economy knows substantial growth in the 1994-2004 period.
In parrallel, the continued existance of the US rival changes US policy substantially. It's largely Soviet influence that prevents the US from pursuing a more agressive policy in the middle east; in many ways the 1991 conflict looks like a diplomatic soviet victory in retrospect. The US also never gets engaged in Yugoslavia, where the communist regime holds the country together and grows closer to Moscow.
The nuclear deals signed in 1995 lessen the threat of a nuclear war greatly. Both sides substantially cut their arsenals. The conciliant attitude of the USSR allows it to make gains on the world markets and through trade.
The Taliban regime is still there in Afganhisthan but a shorter and less humiliating Iraqi war lessens slightly the anti US anger that is growing in the middle east. More importantly, though, with the soviet giant still present on the borders of Afganisthan, radical muslims still have an old foe to worry about and dont really need a new one. Several men which supported the 9-11 attacks in OTL are more concerned with strengthening Taliban rule and defenses over Afganisthan and stirring up troubles into the muslim areas of the Soviet Stans. This means that by 2000, the USSR is the country that faces the threat of terrorism the most, in a battle over the southern half of its country.
On the other hand, Moscow remains on good terms with the governments of most muslim countries, and on rather poor terms with their traditional foe, Israel. This leads to further isloation of the radicals, which ultimately prevents altogether the 9-11 attacks. Al-Qaeda's ressources are simply elsewhere. The problems for the USSR are not major; they are also much less mediatized than OTL's Chechenya because the stronger country is obviously not bullied as much as Russia, and its "right" to crush dissidence is not under particular scrutiny. Therefore, aside from a few bombings of buildings in some big cities, noting too big happens. The soviet army is rather effective in punishing the acts while avoiding too much bad press.
This changes the post 2001 world tremendously. There is no invasion of Afganisthan and no second Iraq war. The Bush administration remains more secluded from world affairs, and pursues OTL's policies of economic protectionism and general conservatism. A strong desire to forge a Casus Belli to get a second shot at Iraq exists amongst the hawks, but it is much more difficult, since Iraq has grown much closer to a stronger USSR. Having first effectively killed the embargo in Iraq, the Soviets followed up by establishing military cooperation with Saddam's regime, one of the less religious and moderate in the region. Far from cooperating with terrorists, Saddam was arguably always very wary of these groups and in this TL, he shows largely. In 2004, Saddam looks very close to a nuclear bomb, with heavy soviet backup. Iran-Iraq relations are okish, but the latter is definitely the soviet favorite.
Western goods are starting to largely penetrate the USSR by 2004, like China in OTL, but state control remains over medias and the internet, both heavily monitored to maintain control. Despite this, Moscow makes regular small steps towards more individual freedom.
ITTL, Israel is rather different from OTL's. For one, its missing a million Russian jews which never leave the USSR. After that, it has to keep into account the soviet factor in several things. A stronger Iraq leaves it with less of a free hand in the middle east, and its worsening demographic situation forces it to compromise more. No peace gets concluded nontheless, but a two-state solution on something close to the 1967 borders begins to seem increasingly likely by 2004.
The USA remains a sleeping dragon longer, and without the burning Reichstag that was 911, its much harder for its administration to pursue wars or civil rights restrictions. Though a latent fear/hatred of communism lasts longer, its increasingly difficult to use it to justify huge military expenditures, thanks to a much more relaxed West-Soviet relationship.
In fact, European Union-Soviet relations improves alot by the early 2000s, (A bit like EU-China in OTL) making NATO look increasingly obselete as a defense against the east. With a more peaceful east and a quiet America, Europe seems to regain more of a world-leader status. A shift between American and European views seems to indicate that the world is headed for a three power situation between Europe, America and the USSR. China remains a player on the rise, as well.
What do you think of this scenario? Seems likely? Would you rather live in it than in ours? Is it possible that a surviving USSR can prevent the rise of the form of US militarism that we've withnessed the last few years, or would the US simply adapt to find other targets to show it is the winning superpower?
Also, is it too much of a stretch to assume that a soviet threat to the north would have kept Al-Qaeda and its croonies from turning on the US? If so, what would happen in 2001 if a stroner USSR had no intent of letting the US establish a foothold on its southern border in Afganisthan, terrorism or not?
So lets say that a slightly earlier (late 70s?) and more successful perestroika brings increased prosperity in Russia itself and the adjacant lands that were traditionally Russian. Eastern Europe gets only fringe benefits however, and things begin to take a different shape than OTL. Under Gobatchev, the Soviet bloc slowly opens up markets in the 80s, ala China. Eastern Europe feels increasingly rebellious however, and in 1990, Moscow makes a drastic move by withdrawing from all countries west of its core lands. Its military leaves rapidly. The wall is shattered within hours.
Gorbatchev encourages moderate, socialist regimes favorable to Moscow in Eastern europe, and offer economic pacts, while accepting that eastern europe withdraws from the Warsaw pact and its military provisions. Simultaneously, the old USSR, with the borders of 1940, including the baltic states, Moldavia, Ukraine, the Caucasus and the central asian republics, holds together. Threats of force, and in some places, force, is employed to break those who'd wish to follow up with independence. The recent rise in quality of life in these regions help quell problems.
Rapidly, changes are seen from OTL. Eastern european governments are more socialist and walk a thin line between freeing themselves from a 50 year domination and accepting the help of a much more friendly giant wishing to cooperate with them. Yugoslavia, always distant from Moscow, is one country that benefits from this change. Moscow's newfound willingness to cooperate rather than dominate brings the two countries closer and prevent the collapse of the country.
In the middle east, butterflies rapidly change the situation we've seen. Trying to exploit the collapse of much of the soviet empire, the US push on with its strategy to strengthen its foothold in the region, leading to the Gulf war in 1991. The Soviet Union morally backs Saddam, a traditional ally, but doesnt wish to test its muscles directly. Quite the opposite, as Gorbatchev is making progress negociating serious nuclear cuts, and he doesnt want to endanger the detente.
However, Soviet mediation shortens the war, Saddam accepts to quit Koweit for good and to pay indemnities to the small country. In exchange, he retains control of his country's airspace and suffers a much lessened embargo, which ends in 1996. Relative stability returns to the region. Meanwhile, the USSR liberalize much of its economy and soften up its communist rethoric, looking like much less of a threat to the world.
The European Union doesnt spread east as easily as in OTL. By 2004, Poland will join it, but not the Balkan countries, which prefers retaining closer ties to the Soviets. Like China, Soviet economy knows substantial growth in the 1994-2004 period.
In parrallel, the continued existance of the US rival changes US policy substantially. It's largely Soviet influence that prevents the US from pursuing a more agressive policy in the middle east; in many ways the 1991 conflict looks like a diplomatic soviet victory in retrospect. The US also never gets engaged in Yugoslavia, where the communist regime holds the country together and grows closer to Moscow.
The nuclear deals signed in 1995 lessen the threat of a nuclear war greatly. Both sides substantially cut their arsenals. The conciliant attitude of the USSR allows it to make gains on the world markets and through trade.
The Taliban regime is still there in Afganhisthan but a shorter and less humiliating Iraqi war lessens slightly the anti US anger that is growing in the middle east. More importantly, though, with the soviet giant still present on the borders of Afganisthan, radical muslims still have an old foe to worry about and dont really need a new one. Several men which supported the 9-11 attacks in OTL are more concerned with strengthening Taliban rule and defenses over Afganisthan and stirring up troubles into the muslim areas of the Soviet Stans. This means that by 2000, the USSR is the country that faces the threat of terrorism the most, in a battle over the southern half of its country.
On the other hand, Moscow remains on good terms with the governments of most muslim countries, and on rather poor terms with their traditional foe, Israel. This leads to further isloation of the radicals, which ultimately prevents altogether the 9-11 attacks. Al-Qaeda's ressources are simply elsewhere. The problems for the USSR are not major; they are also much less mediatized than OTL's Chechenya because the stronger country is obviously not bullied as much as Russia, and its "right" to crush dissidence is not under particular scrutiny. Therefore, aside from a few bombings of buildings in some big cities, noting too big happens. The soviet army is rather effective in punishing the acts while avoiding too much bad press.
This changes the post 2001 world tremendously. There is no invasion of Afganisthan and no second Iraq war. The Bush administration remains more secluded from world affairs, and pursues OTL's policies of economic protectionism and general conservatism. A strong desire to forge a Casus Belli to get a second shot at Iraq exists amongst the hawks, but it is much more difficult, since Iraq has grown much closer to a stronger USSR. Having first effectively killed the embargo in Iraq, the Soviets followed up by establishing military cooperation with Saddam's regime, one of the less religious and moderate in the region. Far from cooperating with terrorists, Saddam was arguably always very wary of these groups and in this TL, he shows largely. In 2004, Saddam looks very close to a nuclear bomb, with heavy soviet backup. Iran-Iraq relations are okish, but the latter is definitely the soviet favorite.
Western goods are starting to largely penetrate the USSR by 2004, like China in OTL, but state control remains over medias and the internet, both heavily monitored to maintain control. Despite this, Moscow makes regular small steps towards more individual freedom.
ITTL, Israel is rather different from OTL's. For one, its missing a million Russian jews which never leave the USSR. After that, it has to keep into account the soviet factor in several things. A stronger Iraq leaves it with less of a free hand in the middle east, and its worsening demographic situation forces it to compromise more. No peace gets concluded nontheless, but a two-state solution on something close to the 1967 borders begins to seem increasingly likely by 2004.
The USA remains a sleeping dragon longer, and without the burning Reichstag that was 911, its much harder for its administration to pursue wars or civil rights restrictions. Though a latent fear/hatred of communism lasts longer, its increasingly difficult to use it to justify huge military expenditures, thanks to a much more relaxed West-Soviet relationship.
In fact, European Union-Soviet relations improves alot by the early 2000s, (A bit like EU-China in OTL) making NATO look increasingly obselete as a defense against the east. With a more peaceful east and a quiet America, Europe seems to regain more of a world-leader status. A shift between American and European views seems to indicate that the world is headed for a three power situation between Europe, America and the USSR. China remains a player on the rise, as well.
What do you think of this scenario? Seems likely? Would you rather live in it than in ours? Is it possible that a surviving USSR can prevent the rise of the form of US militarism that we've withnessed the last few years, or would the US simply adapt to find other targets to show it is the winning superpower?
Also, is it too much of a stretch to assume that a soviet threat to the north would have kept Al-Qaeda and its croonies from turning on the US? If so, what would happen in 2001 if a stroner USSR had no intent of letting the US establish a foothold on its southern border in Afganisthan, terrorism or not?