Paper Tiger: the '39 war with no Manstein.

Paper Tiger: No Von Manstein and a short European War.

Inspired by reading the Wages of Destruction and a grudging feeling Neville Chamberlain has always been horribly mistreated by history I've been working on a new time line, hope to have a sizeable chunk up by the weekend.
In November 1914 Lieutenant Erich von Manstein was wounded on the eastern front. If things had gone slightly differently...
 
From Propoganda: Media and Government in 20th Century Europe

It is very easy with hindsight to underestimate the fear which the Nazi regime managed to install in the rest of Europe, at the time the German propaganda machine was unmatched in the west, images in such films as Triumph of the Will showed the regime as one of unbridled strength, and the use of radio was equally masterful. Post war a group of those involved in the production of pro-Nazi propoganda found refuge in Mussolinis Italy, and their presence is clear in some of the films to emerge from the mid-40s on. This led to fierce debate on Europe's far right at the time, in some circles Italy was percieved to have betrayed Hitler over it's neutrality, but as the 40's faded the Nazi regime was more and more portrayed as a communist infiltrated perversion of true facism. The popular new Doctor Mabuse cycle of the early 50's, filmed in Germany but funded through Italian studios made this idea explicit to a german audience, and continued to reinforce the facist line that Germany had fought the wrong war agains the wrong enemies.
 

Archibald

Banned
No Von Manstein... now that's interesting. Without Manstein, German attack of France is nothing more than a crappy rehash of the Shlieffen plan.
Bad for Germany...
 
Extracts from Ironsides: a history of the British tank.


"Fullers position in the late 30's was was very difficult, as a theorist he may have had a place but his association with Mosley and attendence of parades in Hitlers Germany made him persona non gratta once war seemed inevitable. It now appears clear that after Churchill's return to the cabinet an approach was made in regard to the use of armour, and parts of the success of the 1941 breakout may be laid at his feet. He may have been an awkward, brittle man tainted with his flirtation with facism but his patriotism and influence on the '41 campaign perhaps redeems him. It is a personal tragedy for him that this did not become public knowledge until long after his death."

"The Char B1 Ter was supplied both to the French and British armies, after the Prime Ministers death it recieved the name the Chamberlain when in British use. The tank complimented the British Halifax and Cromwell tanks, and its use in 1940 allowed development time on both which would have been rushed if domestic product was required from the start. They were gradually phased out by UK forces but remained in French colonial use until the early 1950s"

"The prevalent view of the German army as supreme in mechanized warfare in the late 1930's is often lumped in with the idea that "the bomber always gets through" an understandabel conclusion to come to at the time but in hindsight a myth. The german forces tried to repeatedly project themselves as the masters of mechanized warfare but the breakdown rates of the early panzer models, the lack of raw materials and fuel and the armies reliance on the horse - particularly in comparison with the much more mechanized BEF- shows this to be a conjuring trick of Hitlers regime rather than having any real truth behind it. A famous
Daily Express cartoon in late 1940 showing a horse disguised as a cardboard tank has for many summed up the reality of the Nazi war machine, but there were genuine innovators within the German military, men like Guderian showed a clear understanding of how mechanized forces could be used, and for a time he was hailed as the German O'conner. He is a particularly popular figure in alternate history literature, and his writings perhaps point to what he could have achieved with the right resources.
 
It has long been a cause of deabte why the German western campaign was so predictable when compared to the lightning thrusts in Poland and Norway. It is easy to forget that before the offensive the German forces had enjoyed a series of victories. The Winter wars effect on Allied public opinion re the USSR and the victory against Poland - despite demonstrating tactical shortcomings at times- had seemingly secured the East, with the Soviets poor performance a good omen if the pact somehow failed. The medetranian was firmly in Allied hands however concrens over possible Italian action had forced more resources to be squandered here than if Italy was clearly a neutral force. True the Allied supplly situation was vastly superior as was their ability to raise loans and their foriegn exchange reserves. The US was broadly pro-allied, particularly the Roosevelt adminstraion however there was little chance of direct militray intervention from that quarter.
A short war greatly favoured Germany they had begun rearmament first and the confidence and experience of the armed forces greatly outnumbered that of the Allies, however in the medium to long term the alles greter economic and manpower potential would vastly outway Germanys, and the supply relliance on the USSR for both war material and basic foodstuffs was worrying. The Norway invasion was intended to guarantee steel supply however the Allies were holding out in Naarvik and the North and a resistance movement was leading to more and more resources being required to garrison the South and finish resistance in the North.
So when the German forces smashed headlong through Belgium to exactly where the Allies had predicted the whole war seemed to hinge on a massive gamble, perhaps at this point the Nazi regime had disasterously swallowed their own lies about racial and moral superiority.
 
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