In late August 1864, 12,000 Confederate cavalrymen in three divisions styled the “Army of Missouri“ departed from Pocahontas, Arkansas to invade the state of Missouri. The following campaign that became known as “Price's Missouri Expedition“ or simply “Price's Raid“ thanks to its leader, Major-General Sterling Price, is a mainly neglected chapter of American Civil War historiography as are many of the military operations in the Trans-Mississippi Theater.
Though little remembered today, Price's endeavor resulted in heavy fighting throughout central and northwestern Missouri as well as along the border to Kansas. Despite winning several early engagements, Price was ultimately defeated at the Battle of Westport by Union forces under Major-General Samuel R. Curtis near the end of October. He suffered further reverses at the hands of Union cavalry under Major-General Alfred Pleasonton at the Battle of Mine Creek, Kansas, and was forced to retreat back into Arkansas. The expedition's failure significantly bolstered civilian confidence in an ultimate Union victory in the war and therefore contributed to President Abraham Lincoln's re-election in November, 1864.
Price was unable to effectively pursue his original goal of liberating the state of Missouri with the means available to him. This was due to the fact that the commander of the department, Edmund Kirby Smith, ultimately did not provide the infantry units originally promised to him. Without the opportunity to take over larger parts of the state and holding them for a protracted period of time, Price's mission degenerated from an full-fledged invasion into a simple cavalry raid. Although the men were underequipped and outgunned and the army did not win a single major victory, over 6,000 volunteers joined Price's ranks during his endeavor. This fact impressively demonstrates the level of Confederate sympathy and the remaining recruitment opportunities within the state.
Ironic and at the same time symbolic for the Trans-Mississippi Theater was the circumstance that due to logistical difficulties the restrained infantry forces were not, as originally intended, led east across the Mississippi River, but remained idle in their positions until the end of the year. The department's large land mass housed, on paper, an impressive number of forces throughout the whole war. At no point in time, however, were these actually used in a holistic and concentrated manner in order to achieve offensive goals. The existing potential was thus wasted in a situation in which every man in the western and eastern theaters of the war capable of bearing arms was sent to the front lines.
Price's raid is an intriguing study because of the wasted potential to bring about a late turn in the fortunes of the Civil War. The following work will explore the question of what would have happened if, instead of a few disorganized cavalry brigades, the entire military strength of the Trans-Mississippi Department had been thrown into the balance to secure the state of Missouri for the Confederates in an unparalleled effort and therefore to produce a serious setback for Abraham Lincoln's chances of re-election.
This TL is a redux of my thread This May Seem A Wild Plan, because I got my hands on new literature and reports, which changed my perspective on the matter and it would not satisfy me to continue on the basis of a, in my eyes, flawed premise. So please enjoy the ride!
Literature:
Blessington, Joseph P., The campaigns of Walker's Texas Division
Winters, John D., The Civil War in Louisiana
Warner, Ezra J., Generals in Gray
Forsyth, Michael J., The Camden Expedition of 1864 and the Opportunity lost by the Confederacy
Hewitt, Lawrence L., Confederate Generals in the Trans-Mississippi, Volumes I - III
Castel, Albert E., General Sterling Price and the Civil War in the West
Sinisi, Kyle S., The Last Hurrah: Sterling Price's Missouri Expedition of 1864
Cutrer, Thomas W., Theater of a Seperate War: The Civil War West of the Mississippi River
Foote, Shelby, The Civil War
Lowe, Richard G., Walker's Texas Division, C.S.A., Greyhounds of the Trans-Mississippi
Thomas, David Y., Arkansas in War and Reconstruction
O'Flaherty, Daniel, General Jo Shelby: Undefeated Rebel
Edwards, John N., Shelby and his men or The War in the West
Davis, Dale E., Guerilla Operations in the Civil War: Assessing Compound Warfare during Price's Raid
Rea, Ralph R., Sterling Price: The Lee of the West
Jones, Terry L., Louisiana in the Civil War
Taylor, Ethel C., Dust in the Wind: The Civil War in Indian Territory
Chapter I: Jenkins' Ferry and the conclusion of the Camden Expedition
In September 1863, Major General Frederick Steele conquered Little Rock with 20,000 men, whereupon the Confederate state government of Arkansas fled to the southwestern part of the state and established a provisional seat of government in Washington. On March 23, 1864, Steele left Little Rock to join General Nathaniel Banks' march on Texas. The latter operated from the lower Red River region of Louisiana while the former's Union forces crossed the Ouachita River at Rockport and pressed on in a southwestern direction towards Shreveport.
Steele's army for the first time encountered serious resistance while crossing the Little Missouri River. In a bloody struggle, his leading division met 3,000 dismounted Confederate cavalrymen. Further south on Prairie De Ann, near Prescott, the Confederate force dug in. It took almost two days of hard fighting to push the outnumbered Rebels out of their positions.
The fight at Prairie De Ann as well as the onset of spring rain slowed Steele down. The roads were slowly but surely turning into mud swamps. After two weeks of marching, Steele had traveled only 70 miles and the Confederate resistance under the command of Major General Sterling Price increased. Steele then decided to change his plan and turned east towards Camden. The Federals entered the city without great difficulty on April 13, 1864.
Steele's army at that time consisted of some 11,500 men, 9,000 horses and mules, 800 wagons and 30 guns. The supply situation was critical and food supplies in particular were almost exhausted. The reduced rations ensured that many soldiers left their units to gather food in all possible ways and by all means.
On April 17, a procession of nearly 200 wagons, that was on a procurement mission and was only accompanied by less than 1,000 men and four cannons, fell victim to an attack. Sterling Price had dispatched some 3,100 cavalrymen and eight guns under the command of Brigadier Generals Maxey and Marmaduke to intercept the Union force. At Poison Spring, about 14 miles west of Camden, Maxey's Confederates blocked the route while Marmaduke attacked the southern flank of the column. The Federals were pushed back several times and ultimately fled, whereupon the Confederates conquered the four cannons and 170 of the wagons. Almost simultaneously with this victory, General Edmund Kirby Smith, the department commander, and three infantry divisions, which had previously decisively beaten Banks in Louisiana, merged with Price and his riders.
After six days later another isolated Union detachment had been defeated by four Confederate cavalry brigades under General Fagan and another 240 wagons, 1,500 horses and four guns had been lost, General Steele in Camden had to decide what was to be done before his command was fully immobilized and decimated. The only way out seemed an immediate retreat to Little Rock.
By April 30, the now retreating Union forces had already suffered more than 2,000 casualties during their campaign, reducing their strength to less than 9,500 soldiers. In contrast, Price's 4,000 horse soldiers had now been reinforced with over 8,000 troops, most of whom were infantrymen. In addition to the human losses, Steele had additionally forfeited over 2,500 animals and 635 supply wagons. His men were demoralized due to the failures on the battlefield, the agonizing retreat and the poor supply situation. The bad weather did the rest to further weaken the fighting power of the Union Army. Everything was ready for a true catastrophe to occur.
After Confederate cavalry under Colonel Greene had been able to get in touch with the rear guard of the Federals the day before, Kirby Smith and Price did everything they could to catch up with the enemy. At 1 a.m. the long column began its forced night march down a completely muddy and almost impassable road towards Jenkins' Ferry, where Steele and his men were working feverishly to complete a pontoon bridge over the swollen Saline River.
The rain pattered endlessly on the Confederates pounding through the mud. Thanks to the darkness, exhausted infantrymen were ridden over by couriers or mounted officers several times when those tried to get past them. Churchill's Arkansas division led the order of march, followed by two Missouri brigades under Mosby Parsons. The rear was brought up by Walker's Texas division. The Texans had to face the toughest challenge, since Steele's entire army and the rest of Price's command had already moved along one and the same road and the path now looked more familiar to a swamp. Deprivation of sleep and the circumstances of the march caused dozens of men all along the column to leave their ranks due to exhaustion, which significantly affected the Rebel army's effectiveness in the engagement to come.
The Federals, however, had not remained idle throughout the night. While Steele examined the progress of the pontoon bridge at the ferry and, after its completion, had transferred his cavalry division under Eugene Carr immediately to the other side of the river to prevent Fagan's rebel riders from blocking the way towards Little Rock, the Union infantry used their nightly breathing room to improve their defenses. Their lines stretched from Cox Creek in the north, parallel to the main road, to an extensive swamp in the south. The ground was heavily forested and covered by thick undergrowth. In front of the main combat line, Groom's Field, an open but partially fenced area, was located. Salomon's division, brigades under Engelmann and Rice, formed the right wing of the position together with a section of two guns. Located to their left was Adam's brigade from Thayer's frontier division, while the last part until the swamp began was covered by some dismounted cavalrymen under Bassett. Along this line, secured on both flanks, almost 4,000 Federals had formed and lay waiting.
The leading Rebel division, Churchill's, reached a ridge from which one was able to overlook the Saline River valley around 7:30 a.m. While their division commander gave the men a chance to rest, Kirby Smith and Price arrived to consult with him near a local farm house. Since Smith was convinced that his opportunity to smash Steele with the latter's back to the river was slipping away, Price was ordered to put his men immediately into action as soon as they arrived. In doing so, Smith transferred the tactical command completely to his direct subordinate and assigned a high degree of responsibility to him, but at the same time massively restricted his decision-making options via the unmistakable order to attack.
Churchill formed his battered division around 8 a.m. by placing it in a single line of brigades. From left to right, Dockery's, Gause's, Tappan's and Hawthorne's Arkansas brigades , all together nearly 3,200 men, took up positions. Price was determined to send the division forward as a unit to keep the Union defenders busy until he had brought up Parsons' brigades to flank them [1].
The Arkansas men advanced cautiously against lashing rain and howling wind. When they entered Groom's Field from the west, they were greeted by an unexpected sight: A crowded line of blue-clad infantry stood out from the stubble field. It was Colonel Adolph Engelmann's 3rd brigade from Salomon's division. These men had been given the task of intercepting the Confederate advance in front of the main line and thereby shielding the newly erected breastworks manned by Rice's 1st Brigade. They had heard the sounds of heavy skirmishing to their front and the men were prepared to receive the forward elements of the Rebel force. Three of Colonel Lucien C. Gause's four regiments in the left center of Churchill's line, the 36th, 26th and 32nd Arkansas, met Engelmann's brigade, consisting of the 40th Iowa, 43rd Illinois and 27th Wisconsin, out in the open. They were hailed by a firestorm coming from the skillfully deployed Yankees. The afflicted Confederates, several dozens of whom fell victim to the first fierce volley, temporarily sought shelter in a hollow that ran through the middle of the field and found themselves held down by heavy fire. Partly kneeling, partly lying in foot-high mud, the Rebels returned the favor and unloaded into their opponents. Colonel James M. Davie of the 36th Arkansas later succinctly noted: 'There was nothing of the romance of war'. The Federals behind their fence, however, could not be happy for a long time that they had stopped Gause's main push in its tracks. On the extreme left of the Confederate line, Dockery's brigade of about 550 men was moving forward. While the 12th Arkansas sharpshooter battalion engaged in a brief duel with the section of the Springfield 2nd Light Artillery, the 19th Arkansas Mounted Infantry and 20th Arkansas encircled the right flank of the 40th Iowa. Their intense flanking fire meant that Engelmann had to refuse the right side of the regiment, which significantly reduced the volume of its fire. On the other flank of the brigade, the 27nd Wisconsin faced a bypassing attempt of Gause's last remaining regiment, the 39th Arkansas, which methodically attempted to feel out the end of Engelmann's line while moving through the undergrowth. As the fire to their front slackened, Lucien Gause called to his men to rise up and follow him. The colonel waved his sword over his head and stormed ahead of the roaring and yelling Rebel infantry. Pressed from three sides, Engelmann's line collapsed. While the 40th Iowa and 27th Wisconsin were mostly able to detach themselves from the enemy, the 43rd Illinois in the center of the line was less fortunate. 150 of its men had to surrender and were captured while the rest of the brigade disorderly streamed past Rice's main line towards the ferry.
On Gause's right, Tappan's regiments had mixed experiences. While advancing, the brigade made frequent halts as Tappan worked feverishly to realign his skirmishers. Finding his line too long to functionally control, Tappan detached one of his regiments, the 33rd Arkansas, and assigned it as the brigade's reserve. He then led the remaining units forward through the forest against a solid line of earthworks manned by Adams' Brigade from Thayer's frontier division. A few well directed volleys forced the Rebels to halt their forward movement and to engage the bluecoats with their own musketry. Over a distance of more than 200 yards, shots were traded for about twenty minutes until Tappan decided to force his hand. He ordered Colonel Grinstead and his 33rd Arkansas to come forward and assist the brigade in continuing the assault. The freezing and drenched Confederates were greeted in the same fashion as their compatriots before. The 33rd, however, mad it farther, moving to within two dozen yards of the Union line before their attack stalled and the survivors had to make their way back to the rear. On an improvised stretcher they carried their revered regimental commander Hiram Grinstead, who had been shot through the lungs. Nearly 100 of the enlisted men had shared his destiny and were killed or wounded.
Next and last in the line of advance was Hawthorn's brigade. It fared marginally better than Tappan's although becoming entangled with the latter's right. Hawthorn's own southern flank made some progress in temporarily pushing back Bassett's dismounted cavalry troopers. For a moment it seemed that Hawthorn on his own would unhinge the whole Federal defence. Adams and Bassett, however, denied the Confederate success by delivering a sharp counterattack executed with fixed bayonets. For the next nearly two hours, Churchill's division engaged in a vicious firefight with Salomon's and Thayer's brigades from a distance of less than 150 yards. Apart from mounting losses, neither side was able to gain a sustainable advantage. Finally, after what felt like an eternity, Mosby Parsons arrived on the field with his two brigades under Colonels Clark and Burns as well as two batteries of Missouri artillery commanded by Captains Leseur and Ruffner. The tables of success were about to be decisively altered.
Because of his strong ties to his home state, Sterling Price did not miss the opportunity to personally instruct and position the Missourians. While ordering Churchill to keep the Yankees before him in place and giving him command over the artillery, he led Parsons' Division south towards the right flank of the Confederates. They passed Hawthorn's brigade and stopped in close proximity to the large swamp where the left flank of the Union army ended. The two brigades of Parsons' division were formed in a row. The spearhead was John B. Clark's brigade, consisting of the 8th and 9th Missouri, followed by Simon P. Burns' brigade, the 10th, 11th, 12th and 16th Missouri and the 9th Missouri sharpshooter battalion.
As the Confederate advance began, Brigadier General John B. Clark again and again sent word down the line to 'Hold your fire, keep low'. The order was carried out to the letter. Clark' men waited until they got within forty paces of the Federals. Then a sheet of fire blazed into the Yankee flank, although many troops had raised their muskets without seeing their targets. The enemy line of battle, Bassett's dismounted cavalry, was caught fully unprepared for this new attack and ran towards the rear in great confusion. General Price himself showed poise as he directed volley after volley into the Federal ranks directly from the front. A special benefit of the successfull assault was captured weapons. While the Missourians collected many of the precious carbines left behind, Clark and his staff rode down the line and complimented the men on their performance.
Only a few instances later, Parsons brought up Burns' brigade. As it emerged from the trees, the troops were able to see where the Federals had been routed, the dead lying on the field. Some of the men stopped and gave water to wounded bluecoats who were begging for something to drink. While the Confederates maneuvered and readied themselves for the next assault, Thayer and Adams feverishly tried to establish a new line at right angles to counter the threat. Although the men worked busy, well directed fire from Ruffner's and Leseur's batteries threw case shot and shells into the packed ranks. When Burns finally advanced, he struck the Federals like a hammer. What appeared to be hordes of infantry swarmed over their works, coming in unbroken lines and howling the Rebel yell. From south to north, Churchill's brigades en echelon joined the charge and unhinged the whole Union line. On the Rebel's far left, Dockery's men dashed forward, withstood a last round of canister and overran both guns of the Springfield 2nd Light Artillery. Rice's and Adam's brigades were roughly handled and abandoned at least 350 men that were captured. Many more were killed and wounded as the Federals double timed towards Jenkin's Ferry in disorder, leaving most of their equipment behind. Albeit having sustained heavy casualties themselves, the Confederats had broken the best that Frederick Steele had been able to throw against them. Kirby Smith met Price, who had taken a flesh wound on the right upper arm, halfway through Groom's Field and congratulated him on his success.
Churchill's and Parsons' troops were in no condition to start the pursuit, so this task was entrusted to the recently arrived Texas division under Major General John G. Walker. Their strength, however, had melted thanks to the circumstances of the march to about 3,100 effectives. After they had been informed of the situation by their commander, mounted on his iron-gray stallion, the troops, although broken down with fatigue, became fired with new life and energy, and redoubled their efforts to overhaul the flying Federals. About midday, Walker made contact with Steele's remaining men who were in the act of crossing the Saline River at Jenkins' Ferry. In order to protect the last wagons during their crossing, Steele formed a new line of battle with his formerly beaten troops in the form of a crescent around his pontoon bridge. His position was strong and further strengthened by logs. The location was in a thickly-timbered bottom, and the ground was covered with water, precluding the use of artillery. Within a few minutes, Walker's brigades under Brigadier Generals Waul, Randall and Scully went into action. For the next hours the tide of battle ebbed and flowed, but at not time did the front lines traverse for more than 250 yards. Owing to the dense fog and clouds of smoke which hung in the thick woods, in several insances opposing lines could only be discovered by the flash of their muskets. In the midst of the fighting General Walker galloped along the lines, cheering his men forward. Near 4 p.m. the Federals endeavored to turn the Texans' right flank by extending their lines. This required a corresponding extension of the Confederate lines to prevent this maneuver, which weakened the whole line of battle, that finally extended over a space of three miles. Walker dispatched orders to General Kirby Smith for reinforcements while staying on the alert in watching the action unfold. In the meantime, all commanding brigadiers of the division had been wounded. A few minutes before the battle was over, Parsons' division led by Sterling Price himself once again went into position on the army's right flank. For a second time they dashed against Steele's left with loud shouts and in good order, and for the second time they drove the Federals from their positions. They commenced to retreat, first in goof order, and finally in much confusion. Before finishing their crossing of the river, the Union army destroyed everything in the shape of transportation. The remaining wagons were driven into the Saline River and the dead and wounded were left on the field. Having crossed the river, Steele ordered the destruction of the pontoon bridge, rendering further pursuit on the Confederate part impossible. A few minutes after the battle was over, General Fagan's cavalry, composed of Arkansians and Missourians, arrived on the battlefield, having taken a wrong detour and therefore depriving Kirby Smith and Price of the option to deny Steele the road towards Little Rock. The Federal casualties were heavy, nearly 1,000 men killed or wounded and more than 500 taken prisoner. The Rebels' loss was severe as well. Slightly less than 1,000 men killed or wounded, including the mortally wounded Generals Scurry and Randall, who died a few days later, and minorly wounded Generals Waul and Price.
[1] This is the POD. In OTL the Arkansas Division went into action piecemeal and suffered heavily without any gains, leading to heavy criticism from Kirby Smith directed against Price and his leadership capabilities. In this TL the (although limited) success of Price strengthens Smith's opinion of the former and therefore warms him to the thought of entrusting him with a much higher degree of responsibility in the future.
While Frederick Steele and his battered host headed north to lick their wounds in Little Rock, closely monitored by eager Confederate scouts, a war council between Edmund Kirby Smith and Sterling Price took place west of the Saline River. After having reviewed the weather conditions, the decision was quickly made to move most of the infantry back to Camden and to give the men a well-deserved rest there, the current situation had to be discussed and new plans to be made. Judged from the outsidem the Rebels in the Trans-Mississippi theater had achieved great feats. Within a few weeks, 30,000 seasoned veterans under Nathaniel Banks in Louisiana had been frightened to death and put to flight by 12,000 hastily assembled troops under Richard Taylor. Shortly afterwards, a also numerically superior Union army had been driven out of the Arkansas heartland. However, these successes on the battlefield were not enough to resolve the conflicts in the Confederate leadership.
To accomplish what had been done around Camden, Kirby Smith, under the vociferous protest of Richard Taylor, had stripped the latter of a significant portion of his forces in Louisiana. Taylor, a Louisianan, had failed to convince Kirby Smith of the need to press the advantage in his home state. Although being influenced by personal issues, Kirby Smith's decision was a military sound one. Many an officer in Louisiana suggested, that had Kirby Smith not turned north to Arkansas but pressed the advantage along the Red River, the Confederates could have effectively destroyed Banks and his fleet. This assumption, however, appears to be strongly erroneous. From the beginning on Kirby Smith and Taylor had maintained a relationship strained to the breaking point. The commander of the Army of Western Louisiana was convinced,that aggressive action against Banks was the only way towards victory. Kirby Smith, on the other hand, pursued a 'Fabian' policy of defence by using interior lines to mass the limited resources and manpower of the theater at threatened points, then quickly move to counter additional threats elsewhere. This was mainly used to minimize risk for the overstretched Rebel forces and to prepare powerful counterstrikes. After Banks had been put to flight, Taylor wanted to pursue him in order to drive him into the river. Kirby Smith disagreed. Despite the impressive victory at Mansfield and the violent exchange of blows at Pleasant Hill, Banks' army continued to outnumber the Confederates by more than two to one. An additional, probably even more important factor was the existence of the Federal fleet. With their heavy guns, it would be even more difficult to carry out an effective and decisive attack. Kirby Smith was not only worried about Steele's parralel thrust, but, given the balance of power in Louisiana, did not believe in the possibility of a victory against Banks, which in the worst case would have been able to wipe out his own army as well.
However, Taylor not only remained inconsistent with the assessment of the strategical and tactical situation, but also became increasingly insolent. He claimed that the decision to move against Steele was 'a hideous failure' and that by depriving him of the means of carrying to fruition his success on the Red River, Kirby Smith had turned the fruits of Mansfield into 'dust and ashes'. Angry and scornful comments were telegraphed back and forth in the days following the fight at Jenkins' Ferry until the department commander had enough. In a neutral tone, he calmly asked Taylor to send him Polignac's infantry division and three cavalry brigades under James P. Major. Taylor literally exploded and furiously sent Kirby Smith his formal resignation request, which was happily accepted. A few weeks later, Richard Taylor set out to take over the Department of Alabama, Mississippi and East Louisiana. Harry T. Hays, who had previously commanded the Louisiana Tigers Brigade and had been badly wounded during the Battle in the Wilderness, was appointed as the new commander of the District of West Louisiana.
But this argument was not the only one that Kirby Smith had to wage. The department commander had fought various controversies with Sterling Price, who had been under his control since crossing the Mississippi River in 1862. One of the reasons for these squabbles was the fact that the exile governor of Missouri, Thomas C. Reynolds, who had a deep aversion to Price, tried various means to discredit him. He had been afraid that Price would rise to become Missouri's military dictator due to his popularity among the troops and would thus push him off of the political stage. Price's reputation fell in Kirby Smith's eyes when the former evacuated Little Rock in October 1863 and withdrew from Frederick Steele's advancing army. While Kirby Smith had to acknowledge that, by judging the balance of power, this had been the only strategically valid option, the operation still caused significant territorial losses and the blame was placed on Price. Regardless of these events, the latter began to lobby even more for a return to Missouri during the winter of 1863 to 1864. As a basis for discussion, he sent various letters and news from the state to Reynolds and Kirby Smith. According to these documents, the sympathy for the Confederate cause was still strong and tens of thousands of volunteers were ready to gather under the banners of the south. A certain frustrated undertone was still prevalent with Price, however, because he simply could not understand why large masses had not yet risen against the Union's occupying forces. He had to admit bitterly that many Missouri men were waiting for his arrival before they would raise their arms against the perceived tyranny. These marginal disappointments did not, however, result in deferring the goal of succesfully liberating Missouri. Additionally, the reactions of his superior to Price's propositions grew much more positive in the wake of the Camden Expedition.
After Steele's crossing of the Saline River, there were two enemy armies in the Trans-Mississippi theater on the retreat. While an attack on Banks did not seem expedient for the reasons already discussed and in the light of the open hostility between Kirby Smith and Richard Taylor, a march on Little Rock followed up with an invasion of Missouri enjoyed increasing popularity within the Confederate command structure. Compared to the Louisiana marshes, reclaiming the capital of Arkansas offered significantly more prestige and a far greater blow to the fighting morale of the northern states in an important election year. In addition, the forces of the southerners already outnumbered Steele's at the time, which increased the chances of success. In a presentation of ideas that he enunciated repeatedly over the days following the conclusion of the Battle of Jenkins Ferry, Price suggested that Kirby Smith devote his efforts to raising an army of thirty thousand men in Arkansas that could then eject Steele from Little Rock. With the Federals out of the way, Missouri would be open to Confederate recruiting officers and a subsequent reconquest of the state. Due to the convincing performance in the past campaign, Kirby Smith was won over by this train of thought. He had seen with his own eyes how Price neglected his own physical integrity in favor of the cause and that had impressed him deeply. Especially because Reynolds had always characterized him as a show-off. The three pillars of the upcoming operation were quickly defined. First, the movement would be predicated on controlling the Arkansas River valley, which would then serve as a springboard for the invasion into Missouri. Second, Kirby Smith would hold nothing bac, using all of his available infantry and cavalry in the offensive. Third, Kirby Smith wanted to move quickly. Therefore he ordered the infantry divisions of Thomas J. Churchill, Mosby Parsons, John G. Walker and Camille A. J. M. Prince de Polignac to assemble at Camden preparatory to an expedition. These were to be joined by the cavalry divisions of James F. Fagan, John S. Marmaduke, Joseph O. Shelby and James P. Major, and it was envisaged that two of these four divisions would subsequently be used as infantry. This measure was to be implemented because there was a serious shortage of well-maintained mounts in Arkansas and the Trans-Mississippi theater as a whole.
The question of who had to lead this army was answered in a very short time period. Price had offered Kirby Smith to take command of the combined forces, but it was clear to everyone involved that the offer was of purely rhetorical nature. The structure of the department was far too centralized and the lines of communication into Missouri were too limited to allow Kirby Smith to combine both tasks. Because of the goal of the campaign, there was only one real option left: Major-General Sterling Price himself.
Sterling Price, born in Prince Edward County, Virginia in 1809, was a lawyer, planter, politician, brigadier general of volunteers in the Mexican-American War and governor of Missouri from 1853 to 1857. He began the war opposed to secession but reversed himself after Federal militia seized Camp Jackson, where pro-Confederate militia had gathered. At the beginning of the war, Price commanded the Missouri State Guard and led his forces to two early victories at Wilson's Creek and Lexington. At Wilson's Creek he was largely responsible for the Confederate success as his troops bore the brunt of the heaviest fighting and at Lexington he developed the creative, ultimately battle-winning tactic. Both actions were widely reported across the south and made him a public hero. At Pea Ridge he drove the Union forces on his front back only to watch the rest of the army fail on the second day of the fighting. In the Battle of Corinth, Price and his men were the furthest on the field and were the only ones to seize the works in their front. At Helena, Price again was the only southern commander to temporarily achieve his objectives until his forces were cut down by flanking fire because the rest of the army did not advance as expected. His military decisions during the Little Rock campaign as well as at Prairie de Ann and Jenkins Ferry were well considered and personally inspiring. After his appointment, Price wasted little time and called for a series of meetings with several high-ranking officers to structure his army. Concerning the condition of the troops, the cavaly was in a deplorable state, because there was a severe shortage of horses and mules. Despite a windfall of captured animals from the Red River campaign, hundreds of men in the nominally four divisions had no horses, and thousands more rode mules. Just as problematical, the overall quality of many animals could only be described as marginal. Active campaigning and hard riding lay behind them and scores of animals were worn down and needed rest. This led Price to a fateful decision: Fagan's and Marmaduke's divisions were to dismount and enter the campaign as infantry, while only Shelby's and Major's men would form the army's mounted wing. This not only freed up thousands of animals for the wagon train, but provided the infantry with a larger mass of experienced troops to deliver a real punch in battle. Based on this decision, Price formed his troops into two corps of infantry and one cavalry corps.
Command of the First Corps was given to Mosby Monroe Parsons simultaneously with a promotion to Major-General. Parsons was born at Charlottesville, Virginia, May 21, 1822. He moved as a young man to Cole County, Missouri, where he studied law, and was admitted to the bar. During the war with Mexico he commanded a company of mounted volunteers. From 1853 to 1857 he was attorney general of Missouri, and subsequently was elected to the state senate. Parsons was actively allied with Governor Claiborne Jackson in an effort to hold Missouri to the Confederate cause. He commanded the 6th Division of the Missouri State Guard from the outbreak of war until he was commissioned brigadier in the Confederate service on November 5, 1862. He fought at Carthage, Springfield, and Pea Ridge, and in the Arkansas campaigns of 1862 and 1863. The following year he was sent to reinforce Richard Taylor during the Red River campaign. Although he was in command of a division only since March 24, 1864, when Brigadier-General Thomas Drayton was relieved of command, and his brigade together with Parsons' formed an all Missouri division, he had subsequently shown solid leadership qualities and the ability to extraordinarily motivate his troops. Price cited that 'by his tact, good sense, skill, and military ability he has always kept his men in the highest state of discipline and efficiency'. At Pleasant Hill, Parsons' division formed the extreme right of the Confederate battle line. Facing the Vicksburg veterans of Major-General Andrew J. Smith's XVI. Corps, Parsons ordered the whole line to charge throwing his two brigades with impetuosity and the wildest enthusiasm down a slope into a giant killing field. They overran a brigade of New Yorkers and took a battery of six pieces, but were forced back later due to a counterattack against their right flank. The division only retreated after vicious hand-to-hand fighting. At Jenkins Ferry Parsons and his men charged through a swamp and repeatedly routed Frederick Steele's left flank, causing the Federal position to falter.
Parsons' first division was given to Brigadier-General William Lewis Cabell. He was born at Danville, Virginia, January 1, 1827, and was graduated from West Point in 1850. His United States service was principally in the quartermaster's department. Upon his resignation in 1861, he was promptly assigned by the Confederate War Department as major and chief quartermaster to General Beauregard at Manassas. He later served on the staff of General Joseph E. Johnston, at which time he assisted these two officers in designing the Confederate battle flag. Transferred to the Trans-Mississippi under General Van Dorn, Cabell was of great service after the Battle of Pea Ridge, when he ferried the latter's entire command to the eastern bank of the Mississippi River. Later, he was appointed brigadier-general to rank from January 20, 1863. He was to command Fagan's former cavalry division, now dismounted, together about 6,200 men.
Cabell's first brigade was commanded by Colonel Anderson Gordon. He had been born on February 13, 1820 in Maury County, Tennessee and moved to Arkansas in 1839 with his family. He worked as a store clrek, grocer and farmer and became the postmaster of Lewisburg in 1846. Gordon served two terms in the Arkansas House of Representatives and became a wealthy landowner. He did not enlist in the Confederate army at the beginning of the war but raised a cavalry company in 1862. Promoted to colonel in December 15, 1863, he took command of the 4th Arkansas Cavalry and led it during the Camden expedition until Cabell rose to division command and Gordon was given his old unit. The brigade of 2,700 men included his own regiment as well as Monroe's and Morgan's Arkansas Cavalry Regiments and Gunter's. Harrell's. Hill's and Witherspoon's Arkansas Cavalry Battalions.
Colonel Archibald Stephenson Dobbins commanded the second brigade in the division. Dobbins was born in 1827 in Maury County, Tennessee and moved to Arkansas in the early 1850s to establish himself as a planter. He did not serve in the military during the first year of the war but rather continued his occupation. In 1862, Dobbins crossed the Mississippi River and joined the Confederate army near Corinth, Mississippi, as a staff officer. He raised a unit to serve under his command in 1863 and led his regiment at the Battle of Helena. During the Little Rock Campaign later that year he was promoted to command a brigade. During the Camden Expedition Dobbins served in eastern Arkansas but returned to the main force soon thereafter. His brigade fielded 800 men in his old unit, McGhee's, Witt's and Lyle's Arkansas Cavalry Regiments and Anderson's Arkansas Cavalry Battalion.
The third brigade was led by Colonel William Ferguson Slemons. He was born on March 15, 1830 near Dresden, Tennessee to a family with scottish origins. Slemons attended Bethel College in McKenzie and moved to Arkansas in 1852, worked briefly as a teacher and studied law. Admitted to the state bar in 1855, Slemons served as a supportive delegate at the Arkansas Secession Convention in 1861 and soon thereafter joined the Confederate army. As a leader of the original 2nd Arkansas Cavalry Regiment, his service included being under the command of General Nathan B. Forrest while serving in the western theater. In addition to his old regiment, the brigade included Carlton's, Crawford's, Rogan's and Wright's Arkansas Cavalry Regiments, 1,000 men all in all.
Cabell's last brigade followed the orders of Colonel Thomas Hamilton McCray. He was born in 1828 near Jonesborough, Tennessee and farmed there until he moved to Arkansas and later to Texas to operate mills. Just before the beginning of the war, he returned to Arkansas, settling in Wittsburg, Cross County. In late 1861 he raised troops and was elected major, then colonel of the 31st Arkansas Infantry Regiment. During the 1862 Kentucky Campaign he led a brigade of Texas and Arkansas infantry and distinguished himself at the Battle of Richmond. Dissatisfied at not being promoted to brigadier-general, McCray requested transfer to the Trans-Mississippi Department where he helped raising several regiments of Arkansas cavalry and was again put in brigade command. His 1,700 men strong brigade incorporated the 15th Missouri Cavalry Regiment as well as the 45th and 47th Arkansas Mounted Infantry Regiments.
Rounding up the division were two batteries of six guns each under Captains William D. Blocher and William M. Hughey.
The second division of Parsons' corps was commanded by Brigadier-General John Sappington Marmaduke. He was born near Arrow Rock, Missouri, March 14, 1833, and studied both at Yale and Harvard before being graduated from West Point in 1857. Resigning his United States commission in 1861, he was first a colonel in the Missouri militia, then lieutenant colonel of the 1st Arkansas Battalion, and colonel of the 3rd Confederate Infantry. Highly commended for his conduct at Shiloh and Prairie Grove, he was promoted brigadier-general to rank from November 15, 1862. Marmaduke twice raided into Missouri in 1863, and took part in the attack on Helena, Arkansas, in July of that year. During Price's defense of Little Rock in September, Marmaduke was in command of the former's cavalry. He there fought a duel with General L. M. Walker which resulted in the latter's death. His now dismounted cavalry division fielded about 3,900 men.
Marmaduke's first brigade was commanded by Colonel Colton Greene. He was born in South Carolina on July 7, 1833, and moved to Missouri after killimg a man in a duel. By 1857 he was living in St. Louis, where he was involved in politics with the state's Democratic Party and became a partner in a local business. Choosing to support the Confederate cause, Greene saw his first combat during the Battle of Wilson's Creek. In October, 1861, he was appointed colonel in the Missouri State Guard and later led the Confederate 7th District in Missouri after reforming it into a brigade. He participated in the Confederate defeat during the Battle of Pea Ridge and afterwards re-entered Missouri to collect and train a mounted force named the 3rd Missouri Cavalry. After being appointed colonel in the Confederate army in late 1862, Greene fought at Helena, along the Red River and in the Camden Expedition. His brigade of 1,200 men included his own regiment as well as the 4th, 7th, 8th and 10th Missouri Cavalry Regiments and the 14th Missouri Cavalry Battalion.
Colonel Thomas Roe Freeman commanded the second brigade in the division. Freeman was born in Benton, Scott County, Missouri on February 22, 1829 and entered Confederate service as a lieutenant in 1861. He was captured during a skirmish on February 14, 1862 and became a prisoner of war for eight months before being exchanged. In January, 1864, he organized Freeman's Cavalry Regiment with about 800 officers and men before receiving promotion to brigade command. His brigade fielded 2,700 men in his old unit , Fristoe's Missouri Cavalry Regiment and Ford's Missouri Cavalry Battalion.
Accompanying the division was a battery of six guns under Captain Samuel S. Harris.
The final division of Parsons' corps was led by Brigadier-General John Bullock Clark junior. He was born in Fayette, Missouri, January 14, 1831. Clark attended Fayette Academy and the University of Missouri, and after spending two years in California, was graduated from Harvard Law School in 1854. He engaged in the practice of law in Fayette until 1861, when he entered the Confederate army as a lieutenant. Soon made a captain of one of the companies of the 6th Missouri Infantry, he was a major at the battles of Carthage and Springfield, and with rank of colonel, commanded a brigade at Pea Ridge. Thereafter he served for some time under General Hindman, until his services in Missouri and Arkansas were at length rewarded by a commission as brigadier-general, to rank from March 6, 1864. His division counted 2,200 troops after the fighting at Pleasant Hill and Jenkins Ferry.
Clark's old brigade was commanded by Colonel Charles S. Mitchell. He was born in Franklin County, Virginia, on February 25, 1840. His family moved to Saline County, Missouri, in 1850, where he resided at the beginning of the war. Mitchell attended the Kemper Military Academy in Booneville and studied law in St. Louis until he returned home, where he enlisted in the Saline Jackson Guards as part of the Missouri State Guard. On August 8, 1862, he was elected colonel of that would become the 8th Missouri Infantry. He fought with his unit at Prairie Grove, Pleasant Hill and Jenkins Ferry and had recently married the daughter of Arkansas governor H. M. Rector when he was promoted to brigade command. His 800 men strong brigade incorporated the 8th and 9th Missouri Infantry Regiment and Ruffner's Missouri Infantry Battalion.
Colonel Simon Pierce Burns commanded the second brigade in the division. He was born in Logan County, Ohio, on January 1, 1834 and resided in Collin County, Texasm until shortly before the war. In 1861, he entered the Confederate army as a private soldier and was elected lieutenant of Company A, 11th Missouri Infantry, upon the reorganization of his command after the Battle of Oak Hill. Burns was elected lieutenant colonel of the regiment a few days after the Battle of Lexington and was made colonel in 1862. From the time of the Battle of Jenkins Ferry onwards he commanded a brigade of 1,400 men including his own regiment and the 10th , 12th and 16th Missouri Infantry Regiment as well as the 9th Missouri Infantry Battalion.
Clark's infantry was joined by a six-gun-battery under command of Captain Alexander A. Lesueur.
Command of the Second Corps was assigned to Major-General John George Walker. He was born in Cole County, Missouri, July 22, 1822. He received his early education at the Jesuit College in St. Louis. Commissioned directly into the United States Army in 1846, he served during the war with Mexico and had attained the rank of captain by the time he resigned, on July 31, 1861, to enter Confederate service. He was immediately commissioned major of cavalry in the regular army, and after being appointed lieutenant colonel of the 8th Texas Cavalry, was made brigadier-general on January 9, 1862. He distinguished himself with the Army of Northern Virginia through the Maryland campaign, and was promoted major-general on November 8, 1862. His division of two brigades took possession of Loudoun Heights in the operations against Harpers Ferry in September of that year, and subesquently rendered gallant ervice during the Battle of Sharpsburg. At this juncture he was transferred to the Trans-Mississippi Department, where he assumed command of the Texas infantry division.
Walker's Texas division was given to Brigadier-General Thomas Neville Waul's. He was born on January 5, 1813, in Sumter District, South Carolina and attended South Carolina College until his junior year. After techting school for a time in Florence, Alabama, he studied law in Vicksburg, Mississippi, and was admitted to the bar in 1835. Soon after, he moved to Gonzales County, Texas, where he established a plantation and also practiced his profession. An unsuccessful Democratic candidate for the United States Congress in 1859, he was elected to the Provisional Congress of the Confederacy in 1861 and served until the erection of the permanent government. He recruited Waul's Texas Legion in 1862, and was commissioned its colonel on May 17. Waul was surrendered with his command at Vicksburg in July 1863, and was promoted after his exchange to brigadier-general from September 18, 1863. In the Red River campaign of 1864, he commanded a brigade in Walker's division at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill. Later he was transferred to Arkansas to oppose Steele and fought at Jenkins Ferry. His division counted 4,000 men.
Waul's first brigade was commanded by Colonel Overton Stephen Young. He was born on September 26, 1826 in Lawrenceville, Georgia and first attended Amherst College in Massachusetts before returning to his home state to study law. He moved to Texas in 1851 and began practicing in Fort Bend County. After his marriage, Young changed his occupation to planting and established himself in Brazoria County. On December 12, 1861, he was commissioned as colonel of the 12th Texas Infantry and joined what would be known as McCulloch's and later Walker's Texas division. Young was for a brief period appointed brigade commander until he reverted to the command of his former regiment in April 1863. In that capacity he participated with great distinction in the battles of the Red River campaign and the Battle of Jenkins Ferry, where he was slightly wounded in the wrist. In his official report, Waul took pains to „especially commend“ his behavior on the field. As at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, he behaved courageously and cooly, managing his men with great skill and exhibiting much fitness for command. The brigade of 1,300 men included the 8th, 18th and 22nd Texas Infantry Regiments as well as the 13th Texas Cavalry Regiment.
Colonel Philip Noland Luckett commanded the second brigade in the division. Luckett was born in 1823 in Virginia, where he was educated as a physician, and later moved to Ohio and Texas in 1847. Through the late 1840s he served as a surgeon of a company of Texas Rangers and he took part in the 1861 Texas Secession Convention. During the fall of 1861, Luckett was elected colonel of the 3rd Texas Infantry, whose men had been recruited in Austin and San Antonin August 8, 1863, he was promoted to the command of the Western Subdistrict of Texas until his reassignment to Scurry's brigade of Walker's Texas division in April 1964. Luckett's men took part in the Red River campaign and the campaign in Arkansas, which culminated in the repulse of Frederick Steele at Jenkins Ferry. Scurry was killed there, and Luckett took command of the brigade. His outfit fielded 1,600 men in his old unit, the 16th, 17th and 19th Texas Infantry Regiments and the 16th Texas Cavalry Regiment.
Waul's last brigade was led by Colonel Oran Milo Roberts. He was born on July 9, 1815, in Laurens District, South Carolina. Roberts was educated at home until he entered the University of Alabama in 1832, graduated four years later and was admitted to the bar in 1837. After serving a term in the Alabama legislature, he moved in 1841 to San Augustine, Texas where he was appointed a district attorney in 1844 and got elected to the Texas Supreme Court in 1856. As president of the Secession Convention in Austin, Roberts led the passage of the ordinance removing Texas from the Union. In 1862 he returned to East Texas, where he helped raise the 11th Texas Infantry of Walker's Texas division. He succeeded brigade commander Horace Randal after the latter's deadly wound at Jenkins Ferry. In addition to his old regiment, the brigade included the 14th Texas Infantry Regiment, the 28th Texas Cavalry Regiment and Gould's Texas Infantry Battalion, 1,100 men all in all.
Rounding up the division were two batteries of six guns each under Captains James M. Daniel and William Edgar.
The second division of Walker's corps was commanded by Brigadier-General Thomas James Churchill. He was born in Jefferson County, Kentucky, on March 10, 1824, and was educated at St. Mary's College and Transylvania University, where he studied law. After the Mexican War, in which he participated as a 1st lieutenand of the 1st Kentucky Rifles, he settled near Little Rock, Arkansas, of which city he was postmaster in 1861. He recruited the 1st Arkansas Mounted Rifles and rendered notable service with this regiment at Wilson's Creek. He was commissioned brigadier-general to rank from March 4, 1862. After fighting at Richmond, Kentucky, under Kirby Smith, Churchill in January 1863 made a gallant defense at Arkansas Post, which he finally was forced to surrender in the face of overwhelming odds. He later participated in the Red River campaign and in the attack on Steele at Jenkins Ferry. His division fielded about 4,900 men.
Churchill's first brigade was commanded by Brigadier-General James Camp Tappan. He was born in Franklin, Tennessee, September 9, 1825. Educated at Exeter Academy in New Hampshire and at Yale, from which he was graduated in 1845, Tappan studied law in Vicksburg, Mississippi, and was admitted to the bar in 1846. Moving to Helena, Arkansas, he served two terms in the legislature of that state, the last as speaker. He was also elected a circuit court speaker. His New England antecedents notwithstanding, Tappan promptly offered his services to the Confederate cause, and in May 1861 was commissioned colonel of the 13th Arkansas. He was commended by General Leonidas Polk for his dispositions at the Battle of Belmont , and led his regiment at Shiloh where it participated in repeated charges on the famous Hornet's Nest. Colonel Tappan then took part in Bragg's invasion of Kentucky and fought at Richmond and Perryville. Appointed brigadier-general on November 5, 1862, he was transferred to the Trans-Mississippi Department and commanded a brigade under Sterling Price in 1863. He fought with great credit at Pleasant Hill in the Red River campaign and was thereafter sent against Steele. His brigade of 1,600 men included the 24th, 27th, 33rd, 38th and Hardy's Arkansas Infantry Regiments.
Colonel Lucien Coatsworth Gause commanded the second brigade in the division. Gause was born near Wilmington, North Carolina, on December 25, 1836. He attended the University of Virginia and Cumberland University to study law and was admitted to the Arkansas state bar in 1859. At the outbreak of the war, he entered the Confederate army as a lieutenant and was later promoted to colonel. His brigade fielded 1,000 men in the 26th, 32nd and 36th Arkansas Infantry Regiments.
The third brigade was led by Brigadier-General Alexander Travis Hawthorn, who was born near Evergreen, in Conecuh County, Alabama, January 10, 1825. He was educated at Evergreen Academy and Mercer University and the studied law at Yale University for two years from 1846 to 1847, and located to Camden, Arkansas, where he commenced his practice. When the 6th Arkansas Infantry was organized in 1861, he was elected first its lieutenant colonel and then, the following spring, was appointed its colonel. He was present at the Battle of Shiloh and took a gallant part in the assault on Fort Hindman, in 1863, during the attack on Helena, Arkansas. In 1864 he led a brigade in General Churchill's division, during the joint campaign of the Federal Generals Banks and Steele and shortly beforehand had been promoted brigadier from February 18, 1864. His 1,300 men strong brigade incorporated the 34th, 35th, 37th and Cocke's Arkansas Infantry Regiments.
Churchill's last brigade followed the orders of Brigadier-General Thomas Pleasant Dockery, who was born in Montgomery County, North Carolina, on December 18, 1833. His father soon moved to Tennessee, and subsequently to Arkansas, where he established a large plantation in Columbia County, and where he was instrumental in constructing the first railroad in the state. The younger Dockery went into the Confederate army as colonel of the 5th Arkansas State Troops, later becoming colonel of the 19th Arkansas Infantry, which he commanded at the Battle of Wilson's Creek. He participated in the Battle of Corinth, and recrossing the Mississippi River with Sterlin Price, was for a time in command of a subdistrict in Arkansas. He commanded the 2nd brigade of Bowen'S division at Vicksburg, where he was captured and paroled; and was commissioned brigadier-general on August 10, 1863. In 1864, directing a brigade of Arkansas regiments, he took part in the battles at Jenkins Ferry and Marks' Mills. His 1,000 men strong brigade included the 18th, 19th and 20th Arkansas Infantry Regiments and the 12th Arkansas Infantry Battalion.
Accompanying the division were two batteries of six guns each under Captains John G. Marshall and Chambers B. Etter.
The final division of Walker's corps was led by Major-General Camille Armand Jules Marie, Prince de Polignac. He was born at Millemont, Seine-et-Oise, France, February 16, 1832 and was the son of the president of King Charles X#s council of ministers and an English mother. Educated at the College of Stanislaus in Paris, he entered the 3rd Regiment of Chasseurs in 1853, served with the 4th Hussars in the Crimea, and then with rank of lieutenant transferred to the 4th Chasseurs. Polignac secured his discharge in 1859, and was in Central America at the outbreak of the war. He immediately offered himself to the Confederate cause , was commissioned lieutenant colonel and served on General Beauregard's and General Bragg's staffs in the spring and summer of 1862. He was promoted brigadier-general on January 10, 1863, and major-general from April 8, 1864, after having distinguished himself in the battles of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill. His consolidated division counted 4,400 troops.
Polignac's first brigade was commanded by Colonel Michael Looscan. He was born in Caher, County Mayo, Ireland, on September 25, 1838 and moved with his parents to the United States in 1855. Looscan worked briefly in Utica, New York, and Mobile, Alabama, before moving to Texas, settling in Earpville, and working as a schoolteacher. He also studied law and passed his bar examination in the spring of 1861. In the beginning of the war he served as adjutant and secretary to military governor of New Mexico and Arizona, John R. Baylor, and joined the Arizona Brigade. During the fall and winter of 1863 and early 1864, Looscan was stationed aliong the Texas-Arkansas border until being reassigned to Polignac's old unit. His brigade of 1,600 men included the 15th, 17th, 22nd, 31st and 34th Texas Cavalry Regiments.
Colonel Henry Gray commanded the second brigade in the division. Gray was born in Laurens District, South Carolina, January 19, 1816, and was graduated from South Carolina College in 1834. Admitted to the bar, he shortly settled in Mississippi, where he was for some years district attorney of Winston County. After serving a term in the legislature, he ran unsuccessfully for Congress on the Whig ticket. He moved to Louisiana in 1851, and was a Buchanan Elector in 1856. While a member of the Louisiana legislature in 1860, he was defeated for a seat in the United States senate by but one vote; his opponent was Judah P. Benjamin. Upon the secession of Mississippi, Gray enlisted as a private in a regiment from that state; however, President Davis recalled him from this duty, and he was elected colonel of the 28th Louisiana Infantry, which he had organized at Davis' request. Gray led his regiment at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill during the Red River campaign, and afterwards was put in brigade command. His unit fielded 900 men in the 18th Consolidated, 28th and Consolidated Crescent Louisiana Infantry Regiments.
The third brigade was led by Brigadier-General Daniel Weisinger Adams. He was born in Francfort, Kentucky, probably in May or June of 1821. After reading law, he was admitted to the Mississippi bar and subsequently practiced in Louisiana. Meanwhile he had killed in a duel an editor who had criticized in the columns of his paper Adams' father, a Federal judge. In 1861 he was appointed by Governor Moore of Louisiana one of three members of a board to place the state on a war's footing. His first army service was a lieutenant colonel of the 1st Louisiana Regulars, of which he was later promoted colonel. Present at Pensacola, his regiment greatly distinguished itself at the Battle of Shiloh, where Adams lost his right eye. He was promoted brigadier-general on May 23, 1862, and commanded the Louisiana Brigade at Perryville, Murfreesboro, and at Chickamauga, where he was wounded and captured. After his recovery and exchange, he was briefly given command of a cavalry brigade in North Alabama until he returned to Louisiana. His brigade included the 2nd, 7th, 8th and 9th Louisiana State Guard, 1,900 men all in all.
Rounding up the division was a battery of six guns under Captain Florian O. Cornay.
Commander of Price's cavalry corps was Major-General James Fleming Fagan. He was born in Clark County, Kentucky, March 1, 1828, and the family moved to Arkansas when he was ten. He served as a lieutenant in the Mexican War, and one term in the Arkansas legislature thereafter. Among the first in his state to recruit men for the Confederate cause in 1861, he became colonel of the 1st Arkansas Infantry, which he led at the Battle of Shiloh. Commissioned brigadier-general to rank from September 12, 1862, Fagan was transferred to the Trans-Mississippi Department and took part in the Battle of Prairie Grove and the repulse of Steele's Camden Expedition and promoted major-general to rank from April 25, 1864.
Fagan's first division was given to Brigadier-General Joseph Orville Shelby, who was born in Lexington, Kentucky, December 12, 1830. He was educated by his step-father and at Transylvania University. Shelby engaged in the manufacture of rope, first at Lexington and Waverly, Missouri, and eventually became one of the wealthiest and most influencial citizens of the state. He led a band of pro-slavery Kentuckians in the Missouri-Kansas conflict of the late 1850s. At the outbreak of the war, he organized a cavalry company and enlisted under the banner of the Confederacy. Usually attached to the forces of Sterling Price, Shelby was active in almost every campaign of the war west of the Mississippi River. He fought at Carthage, Wilson's Creek, Pea Ridge, Helena and Camden as well as in scores of minor actions. His reputation west of the river compared favorably with that of Bedford Forrest in the east, and earned him contemporary renown in the area. Shelby was appointed brigadier-general to rank from December 15, 1863. His division counted 3,100 men.
Shelby's famous Iron Brigade was commanded by Colonel David Shanks. The native Kentuckian enlisted in the Confederate army in 1861 and became captain in the 2nd Missouri Cavalry and later lieutenant colonel of the consolidated 2nd/12th Missouri Cavalry. Shanks was promoted to colonel on August 20, 1863. His brigade of 1,400 men included the 5th, 11th, 12th and Elliott's Missouri Cavalry Regiments and Crisp's Missouri Cavalry Battalion.
Colonel Sidney Drake Jackman commanded the second brigade in the division. He was born on March 21, 1828, in Jessamine County, Kentucky and moved with his family to Howard County, Missouri in 1830. In the late 1840s, Jackman worked as a schoolteacher and farmer and organized local militias to deal with Jayhawkers in 1855. He chose to follow the Confederate cause in 1861 and entered the Missouri State Guard. Jackman would serve in the Trans-Mississippi Theater, mainly participating in irregular guerilla style tactics and regularly recruited men in Missouri. His brigade fielded 1,700 men in his own and Hunter's Missouri Cavalry Regiment as well as Schnable's and Williams' Missouri Cavalry Battalions and the 46th Arkansas Mounted Infantry.
Rounding uo the division was a battery of six guns under Captain Richard A. Collins.
The second division of Fagan's cavalry corps was commanded by Brigadier-General James Patrick Major, a native of Fayette, Missouri, who was born May 14, 1836. He won an appointment to West Point in 1852, and was graduated four years later. After a year at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, he served on the Texas Frontier where he killed three Indians during a skirmish. He resigned from the U.S. Army on March 21, 1861 and served on the staffs of Generals Van Dorn and Twiggs until he participated in the Battle of Wilson's Creek as lieutenant colonel of a Missouri State Guard regiment. As acting chief of artillery to Van Dorn he aided in repulsing the Federal fleet at Vicksburg in 1862. Thereafter, in common with many of the capable officers in the Trans-Mississippi Department, his service was mainly distinguished by participation in the Red River campaign, during which he fought commendably at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill. Upon the recommendation of General Richard Taylor, he had meanwhile been appointed brigadier-general to rank from July 21, 1863. His division fielded about 2,500 men.
Major's first brigade was commanded by Colonel Walter Paye Lane, a native of Ireland, who was born in County Cork, February 18, 1817, and emigrated to the United States with his parents in 1821. The family first settled in Guernsey County, Ohio. At the age of eighteen Lane went to Louisville and then to Texas, where he fought in the Battle of San Jacinto. His subsequent antebellum occupations ranged from cruising the Gulf of Mexico to fighting Indians and teaching school, and included service in the Mexican War as captain of a ranger company. He spent time mining in California, Nevada, Arizona and Peru and was elected lieutenant colonel of the 3rd Texas Cavalry in 1861, with which he fought at Wilson's Creek and Pea Ridge. Lane was later active in Louisiana in 1863, and in the Red River campaign the following year. During the Battle of Mansfield he was wounded. His brigade of 900 men included the 1st and 2nd Texas Partisan Rangers as well as the 2nd and 3rd Arizona Cavalry Regiments.
Colonel Arthur Pendleton Bagby junior commanded the second brigade in the division. Bagby was born in Claiborne, Alabama on May 17, 1833 as a son of Alabama Governor Arthur P. Bagby. He was graduated from West Point in 1852 and studied law until he was admitted to the bar in Alabama in 1855. On october 12, 1861, Bagby joined the Confederate army, serving as a major in the 7th Regiment of Texas Mounted Volunteers. He served in the New Mexico campaign and was promoted to lieutenant colonel on April 4, 1862 and to colonel on November 15, 1862. His brigade fielded 900 men in the 4th, 5th and 7th Texas Cavalry Regiments and the 13th Texas Cavalry Battalion.
The third brigade was led by Colonel George Washington Carter. He was born in January, 1826, in Fauquier County, Virginia and became a minister in the Methodist Church when he was twenty-one years old. In January 1860 the Texas Methodist Conference invited him to become president of Soule University at Chappell Hill, Texas. After the outbreak of the war he raised three regiments and went to Arkansas with his force in 1862. Carter led his men into Missouri with John Marmaduke in 1863 and fought along the Red River in 1864. His brigade included the 12th, 19th and 21st Texas Cavalry Regiments, 700 men altogether.
Accompanying the division were two batteries of four guns each under Captains Martin V. B. McMahan and William E. Gibson.
Although Kirby Smith and Price were planning a sensational and demanding campaign that could have a decisive impact on the war, the head of the Trans-Mississippi Department, in particular, was not ready to put everything on one card. Specifically, this meant that enough forces had to remain in the different military districts to maintain their defensive capabilities.
The largest district in terms of area was the District of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona under the command of Major-General John Bankhead Magruder, who was born at Port Royal, Virginia, May 1, 1807, and was graduated from West Point in the class of 1830. He was three times brevetted for gallant and meritorious conduct in Mexico as an artillery officer. At the time of his resignation from the old army, April 20, 1861, he was exercising command at his brevet rank of lieutenant colonel, rather than his regular rank of captain. Appointed brigadier-general in the provisional Confederate army on June 17, 1861, and major-general on October 7, he distinguished himself in the early part of the Peninsula campaign, completely deceiving General McClellan as to the size of his forces at Yorktown. He was less successful during the Seven Days battles, where it was alleged he failed to take advantage of several golden opportunities. He was later assigned to command the District of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona. Here he was signally successful for a time in the recapture of Galveston and the dispersal of the Federal blockading fleet. Spread over the geographical area, there were a total of 9,800 men. The camp at San Bernad had 1,700 men in the 2nd, 35th and 36th Texas Cavalry Regiments. There were 1,800 men in Cedar Lake with the 2nd Texas Infantry Regiment, Brown's Regiment and Hughes'. Jones' and Moseley's Texas Batteries. The 400 men from Waul's Texas Legion were near Perry's Landing. In Velasco were the 3rd and 13th Texas Infantry Regiments and Wilke's Texas Battery, 1,000 men. Galveston's 2,100-men garrison included parts of the 8th and 20th Texas Infantry Regiments, the 1st Texas Heavy Artillery and Dege's and Greer's Texas Batteries as well as several Engineer troops. At Victoria were the 33rd Texas Cavalry Regiment, a battalion of Texas cadets and Dashiell's Texas Battery, 500 men. At Sabine Pass, 1,200 men were spread across the remainder of the 8th Texas Infantry Regiment, the 21st Texas Infantry Battalion, Spaight's Texas Infantry Battalion, Daly's Texas Cavalry Battalion and Nichol's Texas Battery. The 200 men from Baird's Texas Cavalry Regiment and Christmas' Texas Battery were stationed in San Antonio. At Bonham were the 1st Texas State Troops Battalion, the 2nd Texas State Troops Cavalry Regiment and Hopkins' and Hart's companies, 500 men. Camp Whartin ultimately included 400 men in the 2nd Texas State Troops Infantry Regiment and the 2nd Texas State Troops Infantry Battalion.
Contrary to Richard Taylor's predictions of doom, Kirby Smith had not left the District of Western Louisiana vulnerable, either. A total of three cavalry brigades and two infantry brigades continued to form the Army of Western Louisiana, 4,700 men strong, which, like the district, was to be led by Harry Hays in the future. Harry Thompson Hays was born in Wilson County, Tennessee, April 14, 1820. He was brought up by an uncle in Wilkinson County, Misssissippi, because of the early death of both of his parents. He was graduated from St. Mary's College in Baltimore and studied law in that city. He began the practise of his profession in New Orleans, where he soon became prominent as an advocate and politician. After distinguished service in the Mexican War, he was active in the Whig party during the 1850s and was a Presidential Elector on the Scott ticket in 1852. Entering the Confederate army as colonel of the 7th Louisiana Infantry, he fought at First Manassas and in Jackson's Valley campaign of 1862. He was severely wounded at Port Republic. Returning to duty, he was commissioned brigadier-general on July 25, 1862. Hays rendered outstanding service at Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg before his transfer to the Trans-Mississippi, where he was assigned to duty as a major-general by Kirby Smith. His troops were distributed as follows. Colonel A. J. Dukas' brigade fielded 2,100 men in the 3rd, 4th, 11th and 12th Louisiana State Guard. Brigadier-General Henry W. Allen contributed 400 men with his 1st and 2nd Louisisana State Militia Battalions. Brigadier-General Xavier B. Debray led 700 riders in the 23rd, 26th and 32nd Texas Cavalry Regiments. Brigadier-General Hamilton P. Bee's brigade consisted of 900 men in the 1st, 35th and Terrell's Texas Cavalry Regiments, while Colonel William G. Vincent commanded 600 men in the 2nd and 4th Louisiana Cavalry Regiments.
Under Major-General Samuel Bell Maxey's command, there were nearly 3,000 men in the Indian Territory. He was born at Tompkinsville, Kentucky, March 30, 1825, graduated from West Point in the class of 1846, and was brevetted for gallantry in the war with Mexico. In 1849 he resigned his commission to study law. In 1857 he and his father, who was also an attorney, moved to Texas, where they practised in partnership until the outbreak of the war. Resigning a seat in the Texas senate, the younger Maxey organized the 9th Texas Infantry, and with the rank of colonel joined the forces of General Albert Sidney Johnston in Kentucky. He was promoted brigadier-general to rank from March 4, 1862. He served in East Tennessee, at Port Hudson, and in the Vicksburg campaign, under General Joseph E. Johnston. In December 1863, Maxey was placed in command of the Indian Territory, and for his effective reorganization of the troops there, with which he participated in the Camden Expedition, he was assigned to duty as a major-general by General Kirby Smith on April 18, 1864. Colonel (and by May 10 Brigadier-General) Stand Watie commanded 1,100 men in the 1st and 2nd Cherokee Regiments, the Cherokee Battalion, the 1st and 2nd Creek Regiments, the Creek Squadron, the Osage Battalion and the Seminole Battalion. Colonel Tandy Walker led 700 men in the 1st Chickasaw Battalion, the 1st Choctaw Battalion, the 1st Chickasaw/Choctaw Regiment, 2nd Choctaw Regiment and the Caddo Reserve Squadron. Brigadier-General Richard M. Gano's brigade included 1,800 men in the 29th, 30th, and 31st Texas Cavalry Regiments as well as Howell's Texas Battery of six guns.
In addition to Little Rock, where Frederick Steele and his Union army had withdrawn after the defeat in the Camden Expedition, there were two other notable garrisons in northern Arkansas that were occupied by Federal troops. Besides Helena in the east, which had already been the scene of heavy fighting in 1863 and where Confederate attempts to capture the city had been beaten back with heavy casualties, Fort Smith on the border with the Indian Territory was another important military outpost.
The original fort was established on December 25, 1817 by Major William Bradford in order to maintain harmony between the local Osage Indians, who had long been dominant in this territory, and a band of Cherokee who had migrated west, under pressure from European Americans, from their traditional territory in the Southeast. This time would later be historically referenced as the "First Fort." It ended in 1824 when the US Army abandoned Fort Smith after constructing Fort Gibson further west.
As a result of the increased tensions with local Indians following the Indian Removal Act of 1830 and local white settlers who encroached on their territory, the U.S. Army created a second Fort Smith in 1838 near the original's ruins. This is the beginning of the historical "Second Fort" period. During General Zachary Taylor's command of the fort in the 1840s, it became a supply depot for other forts within the Indian Territory.
Following its seizure by forces of the state of Arkansas in April of 1861, Fort Smith became an important post for the Confederate army. Along with the arsenal in Little Rock, Fort Smith was one of only two significant U.S. military installations in Arkansas and as such played a vital role in Confederate plans to defend the state. The facilities of the fort provided housing for troops and mountain barriers to the north would help stall Union attempts to retake the post for two years. Troops from the fort took part in the Battle of Wilson's Creek in 1861 as well as the disastrous Confederate defeat at the Battle of Pea Ridge in 1862. Following the latter battle, General Earl Van Dorn led his Southern army out of Arkansas and the handful of troops left at Fort Smith provided virtually the only defense for the entire western half of the state. General Thomas Hindman was assigned to built a new army for what soon became the Trans-Mississippi Department and Fort Smith became the centerpiece of his efforts. Massive camps grew in the surrounding prairies and the storehouses of the fort provided uniforms, arms and provisions to Hindman's army. Sadly, such supplies were often depleted and many men suffered and died from hunger, cold and disease. Hindman's army returned to Fort Smith after a tactical stalemate at the Battle of Prairie Grove and soon evacuated the area and marched to Little Rock. A smaller Confederate force held the fort until August of 1863, when it was abandoned without the firing of a shot as a large Union command approached from the west. The retreating Confederates ambushed part of the Federal army at the Battle of Devil's Backbone while the main body moved to occupy the now evacuated fort.
In early 1864, Fort Smith was the scene of a bureaucratic conflict of powers after the original Federal District of the Frontier had been split up. The Indian Territory and Fort Smith, although belonging to Arkansas, were designated the District of the Frontier in the Department of Kansas and placed under the command of Colonel William R. Judson. The areas in Arkansas were designated the District of the Frontier in the Department of Arkansas and placed under the command of General John Milton Thayer. Thayer's troops were attached to the VII Corps during the Camden Expedition as the "Frontier Division".
On February 23, 1864 Blunt replaced Judson in command of the District of the Frontier, Department of Kansas. Blunt commanded until April 17 when his district was discontinued. Fort Smith was transferred to Thayer's district and the rest of the Indian Territory was divided among other districts.
The confused hierarchy was only one of the reasons that made the outpost a target for a Confederate attack in late May 1864. Sterling Price's approach was to confuse Frederick Steele in his run-up to moving against Little Rock and to delude him about his true intentions. Since Fort Smith also possessed an impressive weapon store, he ordered Brigadier-General Joseph O. Shelby to ride west with his Iron Brigade and an artillery battery, join two brigades from the Indian Territory, and take the fort. When the support brigades would subsequently transfer the captured handweapons, ammunition and equipment to the Indian Territory, Shelby would cross the Arkansas River and disseminate information that he, as the vanguard of Price's army, would clear the way to Missouri. This should convince Steele, at least temporarily, that Price was not planning a direct attack on him, but would pass by him and his garrison. Following a later successful battle against Steele, the capture of Fort Smith would also mean that the remains of the Union forces would have to retreat eastwards to the Mississippi River and would therefore no longer be able to intervene in Price's real invasion.
Shelby, the Iron Brigade and Collins' battery left Camden on the morning of May 14, 1864. On late May 18, they merged with Stand Watie's and Tandy Walker's brigades as well as Howell's battery at Bonanza, Sebastian County, Arkansas, 12 miles south of Fort Smith. The combined forces under Shelby's command included 3,200 men and 12 guns. Opposing them in the vicinity of the fort were 1,800 men in the 1st Arkansas and 18th Iowa Infantry Regiments, the 2nd Kansas Cavalry Regiment and two howitzers with the 2nd Indiana Battery led by Colonel John Edwards.
After he had been informed about the nearing Rebel host and its strength, Edwards was in a dilemma, because he knew he could not hope to sufficiently man the fortifications of the outpost with the forces available to him. He therefore made the tactically sound decision to make a stand on ground of his own choosing in front of the town before Shelby could invest Fort Smith's breastworks. It was a bold initiative to face Shelby in the open in the face of overwhelming odds and it would not be expected by the Confederate commander.
It was early on May 19, 1864. Shelby's 3,200 cavalry neared Fort Smith by two roads, the Fort Towson Road and the Line Road, from the south. Edwards had with him his infantry and cavalry, leaving his two howitzers behind in the safety of the fortifications. He anchored his left wing, consisting of the 1st Arkansas Infantry of Lieutenant Colonel Elkanon J. Searle, on high ground overlooking the prairie. He placed Lieutenant Colonel Hugh J. Campbell's 18th Iowa Infantry in the center. The right flank was protected by some swampy ground around a tight bend in Poteau River, a tributary of the Arkansas River. Edwards placed his weakest unit, Major Julius G. Fisk's 2nd Kansas Cavalry, on his right flank.
Shelby's Iron Brigade under Colonel David Shanks engaged Edwards' defences first. They approached by the Fort Towson Road with the 5th Missouri Cavalry in the advance. Shanks threw the regiment out to the left of the road and ordered them to advance on foot against the Federal right. One account said this probing attack was promptly repelled. Another Confederate account said the attack overwhelmed the Union defences. Whatever happened Shanks wisely followed immediately with a furious cavalry attack on Edwards' right wing which was defended by the Kansas cavalrymen. The 5th Missouri broke through the green Kansans on the Federal right and threatened to flank the blue line. Edwards boldly counterattacked with his personal escort supported by some other mounted cavalry and there was some brutal hand to hand combat. The Federals were heavily outnumbered. By the end of the melee Edwards and his horse ended up covered in blood and his counterattack was repulsed. By this time Watie's Indian Brigade had arrived by the other road. Colonel William P. Adair, who commanded the advance regiment (the 2nd Cherokee) heard the sound of battle at a distance of three miles and rode his men hard towards the sound of the guns. He deployed his men to the right of the road and his men advanced dismounted. The outgunned Federals put up a fight but in a short time they were pushed back.
The engagement only lasted a little over an hour but in that time the issue was decided. Edwards' desperate counter attack had been repulsed and his right flank had been turned. He had no choice but to withdraw. The brief battle had degenerated into a confused retreat with the hopelessly outnumbered Union men in flight, trying to reach the safety of the fort. In the end Edwards' retreat was made in good order back to Fort Smith, but there was no doubt he had been beaten by Shelby.
After entering the fort, the wounded Edwards met with former district commander William R. Judson and quickly informed him of the situation and, knowing that the town would probably fall, advised him to leave the defence of the outpost to him. The longer he could keep the Rebels out the more time there would be to evacuate by river or destroy the valuable war materiel present in the stores. Edwards also advised Judson to leave the garrison before it became surrounded. Judson immediately handed over command to Edwards and, taking his advice, left immediately.
There was no way to know for sure where along the defences Shelby would attack, so Edwards was obliged to spread his men thin over the whole length of the outer defences. This meant he had enough men to place one every four or five feet. Because the distance was large from one point in the walls to another, it would also be difficult to adequately reinforce positions that were under heavy attack in time.
Shelby appeared south of the city about 2 PM with two brigades of cavalry and two batteries of artillery totalling about 2,500 men. When he saw the fortifications it was as he had expected. As usual, Shelby did not underestimate his opponent by wasting any time. The Iron Brigade backed by one battery of artillery approached by the Line Road which entered Fort Smith from the south east Stand Watie's brigade supported by Howell's battery approached by the Fort Towson Road which entered Fort Smith from the south. Shelby ordered his two brigades to deploy in line of battle across their respective avenues of approach. The battle opened with an exchange of artillery fire. Some of the Confederate projectiles fell short of the fortifications and struck buildings in the city, including some private houses. Cannonballs were later found embedded in the walls of a number of civilian homes.
Following Watie's suggestion, Shelby had ordered about three hundered of Watie's Indians in the 1st and 2nd Cherokee Regiments to stand by, waiting for dark, so they could cross a swampy area to the west of the Fort Towson Road and seize the opposing earth works in order to roll up th enemy's right flank. When this was accomplished the plan was for the two brigades to launch a general assault all along the line joining the two roads. Colonel Shanks was waiting for the signal to attack but soon grew impatient. Under his own initiative, he decided not to wait, but rather to launch an attack of his own in order to force the issue.
Supported by an intense barrage from Collins' Missouri battery, Shanks' men advanced first on horseback along the Line Road and then dismounted, attacking as infantry, firing their rifles as they moved forward. In line of battle Elliott's Missouri Cavalry were on the right and, from right to left, were marching the 12th, 11th and 5th Missouri Cavalry as well as Crisp's Missouri Cavalry, four regiments and a battalion in all consisting of 1,400 officers and men. They had to advance over several dozen yards of open field to reach the earthworks and the advance was slowed somewhat on the flanks by a ravine and some boggy ground. They were exposed to a combination of musket and artillery fire and the casualties were high. Opposing them from behind the fortifications were men from Searle's 1st Arkansas Infantry who were thought to be the best of Edwards' men in Fort Smith. They in turn were subjected to a murderous hail of bullets from the massed rifles and shotguns coming at them. The thin line of Federals returned small arms fire as best as they could. Their artillery fired round shot at the advancing Union troops when cannister would have inflicted more damage. Even so, the Confederate troops suffered a fair number of dead and wounded before they mounted the fortress' dirt ramparts. When the Rebels reached the earthworks the fire fight turned into a brawl with the Federals wielding their muskets as clubs and the Rebels using their rifle butts to crack heads. In the end the outgunned defenders were overwhelmed. It took less than 30 minutes for that part of the Union earthworks defending the Line Road to be taken.
The Federals fell back to a half finished inner work of defences close to the edge of the town, where the wounded and tired Colonel Edwards gave the men encouragement to stand their ground.
General Shelby arived on the south east part of the battlefield just as Shanks' men took the Line Road earthworks. When he saw the Confederate battle flags flying over the Union line he became excited and sent word to Watie of the success, suggesting an attack from the south in a similar fashion west of the Fort Towson Road. He also ordered Shanks to press home the attack on the inner works. Shelby's blood was up. He personally led the 11th Missouri Cavalry in a gallant mounted charge. The rallied Federals, however, stopped the charge with a well directed outpouring of musketry. Shelby himself was briefly unhorsed when his favorite horse was wounded. It was now dark but the 11th Missouri Cavalry quickly reformed and joined the 5th and 12th Missouri Cavalry in a dismounted assault, which after some desperate fighting carried the field.
When Stand Watie saw what Shanks had accomplished he decided to copy him. He ordered his brigade forward across a swamp to the west of the Fort Towson Road that was deemed to be impassable by the enemy. Watie's men only encountered light resistance from poorly equipped and trained Kansas Cavalry. They were easily pushed back from the outer works.
Confederate battle flags were now seen all along the outer works between the two roads and Rebel troops started pouring into Fort Smith itself. House to house fighting broke out, as did a fire which spread among some of the houses.
The Federals made another stand at the depot where the fighting became intense. By 7 PM the Rebels were able to use their advantage in numbers to flank the Federals again thanks to the arrival of Tandy Walker's brigade of 700 men, forcing them to retreat. The battle was over and for the Federals it was every man for himself. Edwards and some other officers and about half the men escaped to the other side of the Arkansas River. He literally had to cut his way out of Fort Smith and he and his men were pursued by Shelby's cavalry till well after midnight.
Shanks' command lost 10 dead and 90 wounded. Total Confederate losses were 128 dead and wounded. This imbalance in casualties was hardly unexpected. Shanks' men suffered the worst casualties because they had engaged the 1st Arkansas, the only large body of troops Edwards had that were a real match for Shelby's cavalry.
Nobody knows how many Federals were killed and wounded. Nearly 1,200 were taken prisoners while hundreds more escaped with Edwards over the river.
The railroad, and its strategic value in moving men and supplies, was another of the innovations of the war between the states. This was even true in Arkansas, with its less than 50 miles of track. The port of DeValls Bluff was the eastern terminus of the unfinished Little Rock and Memphis Railroad, the only in the state. Supply boats would steam up the White River, depositing provisions at DeValls Bluff that would then be transported by train to Little Rock and freighted to the outlying posts. The track between the Bluff and Huntersville, as the depot opposite Little Rock was called, was a lifeline to the posts at Little Rock and farther west. Protecting this lifeline was full-time work for the Union soldiers in central Arkansas. The supply situation seriously hampered field operations for the Union army in Arkansas.
After the capture of Little Rock in 1863, the Federal soldiers were kept busy working on the fortifications while the timber and brush in front of the works was kept cleared. The constant arrival of transport boats kept them busy unloading stores and loading rail cars for shipment to the state capital. The troops performed boring picket duty or manned the forts surrounding the post. The drudgery of post duty was broken by patrols into the countryside or along the supply line. These routine patrols were occasionally interrupted by contact with enemy troops who had not retreated when Price's army evacuated Little Rock. These stay-behind Rebels would cut telegraph wire, tear up railroad tracks and ambush lone picket outposts, generally making life miserable for the Union troops and the few loyalist citizens alike.
One of the Rebel bands grew to be a real nuissance in early 1864, as Confederate Brigadier General Dandridge McRae was recruiting troops in the area between the White and Mississippi rivers. Aided by around fifty commissioned officers who were left without commands because of the flood of Confederate desertions that followed the fall of Little Rock in September 1863, McRae sought to bring the former soldiers back into the Rebel ranks for attacks against such Yankee targets as the Memphis to Little Rock Railroad.
Colonel Christopher C. Andrews, led men of the 3rd Minnesota from Little Rock and troopers of the 8th Missouri Cavalry to Woodruff County on March 30, 1864, to disrupt McRae’s operations. The Yankee troops aboard the steamer Dove arrived at Gregory’s Landing on the White River at dusk and advanced toward a reported Confederate camp site which they found deserted.
On the morning of April 1, the Federal troops arrived at Augusta in Woodruff County and learned that McRae’s main camp was said to be at Antony’s plantation, seven miles north of Augusta. Andrews left a small detachment to guard the Dove and headed north with slightly more than 150 men. His column soon encountered some resistance from Confederate cavalry, but Union troops nearly captured McRae himself as he watered his horse at a stream near Antony’s. However, the general and his companions managed to outrun his pursuers.
After marching about twelve miles north of Augusta, Andrews decided to turn back toward the town. While pausing at the Fitzhugh Plantation for lunch, the Federal troops were attacked by Confederate cavalrymen under Colonel Thomas W. Freeman and Captain John Bland, with a mixed force of about 400 troopers. Repelling this attack, the Yankee troops hurried south on the road to Augusta but were soon hit again south of the plantation at a forested area known as Fitzhugh’s Woods.
The attacking Confederates included the commands of Freeman and Bland and fielded a combined force of about 550 Rebel cavalrymen. The Southern riders struck Andrews’s men from the front, left, and rear, but the Federal soldiers stood their ground and fended off their attackers in a lengthy firefight that left both forces low on ammunition.
Perceiving a Rebel attempt to cut his retreat route south across a cypress bayou, Andrews ordered his men to fall back to a cluster of log huts and fences near the bayou. The Confederates moved into Fitzhugh’s Woods but did not seriously challenge the new Union line. The Federal troops returned to Augusta without opposition.
Andrews’s command suffered around 30 killed, missing or wounded. McRae listed his losses of all causes as 80.
This little skirmish showed, that the Union troops along the river banks, that were not part of Steele's main strike force, were by no means amateurs or second-tier men, but veterans of the conflict with the guerillas.
The strategic role of DeValls Bluff in supplying Little Rock made it another worthwhile target for Sterling Price before the latter and his entire army would strike against Steele and his corps.
To carry out a decisive attack against the Union troops' supply lines, Price ordered Colonel Sidney D. Jackman of Shelby's division and his brigade to the northeast. Jackman and his 1,700 men left Camden on May 16, 1864 and reached the southern vicinity of DeValls Bluff in the evening of May 19.
The terrain and fortifications around DeValls Bluff could be divided into two sectors, east and west, conveniently bisected by a railroad cut. The eastern sector rose sharply from the cut to a hill. Atop this hill was a house that served as the headquarters for the 8th Missouri (US), one of the regiments stationed there. A spur of the hill extended north, paralleling the railroad and the cut. To the east, the hill descended into a gentle saddle. A solid road bisected the saddle below and continued north. Past the saddle, the ground again rose gently to the summit of another hill. The draw north of the saddle and between the two hills was sharp and long. The change in elevation between the two hilltops was minor, but the slopes of the hill itself were quite steep. The grade to the north was uphill, to be sure, but manageable. However, the slopes to the east and south were steep and, at points, quite precipitous. The land fell quickly in these areas into the valley of White River.
The fortifications in this sector of the garrison were focused on the easternmost hilltop. There, the Federals had constructed a strong earthen fort, about 65 feet long and 50 feet wide. It had walls twelve feet thick and was surrounded by a ditch six feet deep. As a practical matter, this made the wall of the fort twelve feet tall, and it could only be climbed with scaling ladders. It was accurately, if unimaginatively, dubbed the Eastern Redoubt. Along the northern slope, starting near the redoubt, the men built a line of earthworks stretching all the way to the main road. Another U-shaped half-fort was built along the northern slope of the spur next to the cut. There were no works at the saddle, but soldiers firing from the trenches near the main road and the spur could support one another, covering the gap. Rifle pits that could fit one to three soldiers were built farther out in all directions. Abatis were constructed and placed around and in front of each fortification and trench. These were made by felling trees and brush and laying them out so that the branches pointed toward the enemy. Any force that attacked the entrenchments would have to stop, or would at least be slowed down, due to the entanglements. This pause would often give the defenders time to fire a few more shots at the stalled enemy, a few more shots that could make all the difference in breaking and halting an assault.
In the western sector, the cut rose to a hill directly west of the railroad and opposite the hill on which stood the 8th Missouri's headquarters building. On this hill, the Union men built another strong earthen fort. It had six sides and was roughly hexagonal in shape. It was about 75 feet long and 60 feet wide and was constructed with interlocking railroad ties. As with the Eastern Redoubt, the walls were twelve feet thick and twelve feet tall from the bottom of the six-foot ditch surrounding the structure. This fort was named the Star Fort. Artillery fire, and to a lesser extent small arms, from the two main redoubts interlocked and covered the depot and village to the south, as well as approaches from the north.
A spur branched off from the hilltop and extended north. It paralleled the railroad; in fact, it paralleled the spur on the eastern side. A small trench covered the northern approach along this spur, and men stationed along these spurs could shoot over the railroad cut and cover one another with rifle fire. There was a small house about thirty yards north of the Star Fort. West of the Star Fort, the hill sloped down into a long ridge. A smaller ran north from the village, cut into the steep hillside and then turned west and followed this ridge. About four hundred yards west of the fort, the ridge rose slightly, and a house occupied the rise. A steep ravine ran to the north of this rise, between the northern spur and the house. The ridge and road continued west and rose to another gentle height two hundred yards farther. Past this elevation, the ridge immediately narrowed to a point only about ten yards wide, the width of the road, with steep ravines running to the north and south. To cover this narrow point, the men built another line of works on the slight rise. They extended north of the road, crossed it and then angled back almost due east to cover the southern approaches to the position. It was a naturally strong redoubt. There was a bastion, complete with opening for artillery, where the redoubt crossed the road, and a traverse built at right angles to the earthworks provided protection in case they were outflanked from the north. The slopes to the west and south were steep, and the only easy avenue of approach was along the road, which narrowed just in front of the redoubt. More abatis and entanglements were placed out front to further delay an approaching enemy.
About 400 yards farther west of this redoubt, the road turned sharply south. Two small redoubts covered the approaches to this area. The men occupied the redoubts and dug a line of rifle pits in this area to give an early warning of any attack from that direction. In many places between this location and the Star Fort, the road dug into slopes and formed natural cuts and shelters for concealing infantry. In addition, the entire hillside, from the valley of White River to the east to the rifle pits at the curve on the small road to the west, was clear-cut of all trees. This provided an open field of fire for all the entrenched positions in all directions.
However, by May, the hillsides had become covered in low underbrush. Combined with natural folds in the terrain, not to mention the hundreds of tree stumps, this left plenty of cover and concealment to a foe willing to go to ground.
The railroad cut was an imposing physical barrier between the two sectors. The Federals constructed a bridge to facilitate traffic across the gorge and eliminate the need to walk down one slope and back up the other. About 75 feet north of the Star Fort, two pine trees were felled and laid across the cut, about 95 feet above the tracks. Planks were then nailed to the trunks and handrails added. The tents of the garrison dotted the hillsides. They took up most of the flat spaces along the rides, such as the area north and northwest of the Star Fort, along the crest of the ridge near the 8th Missouri's headquarters building and in front of the Eastern Redoubt.
The Confederates formed early on May 20 under the warm morning sun into two lines of battle. In the forefront, two regiments lined up for the task ahead. Hunter's Missouri Cavalry were on the right, followed on the left by Jackman's old unit. The majority of the brigade was centered on the ridge, with skirmishers deployed ahead to lead the advance and screen the main force. Officers told the men to throw off everything but their cartridge and cap boxes, and the command “load at will” echoed down the line. To add to the tension, Lieutenant Colonel C. H. Nichols of Jackman's Missouri Cavalry walked among the men and passed along the order to take no prisoners. The upcoming assault promised to be grim indeed. Behind them and aligned slightly to the left, John A. Schnable's and D. A. Williams' Battalions of Missouri Cavalry formed up to support, if necessary. Colonel Jackman looked at his watch. It was almost 10:00 a.m., and there was still no large volume of musketry from the south indicating that Colonel W. O. Coleman and the 46th Arkansas Mounted Infantry had started their attack. Knowing that time was critical, he sent orders to his regimental commanders to advance. By the time the Rebels moved forward, it was 10:20 a.m.
The opposing skirmish lines made contact first. It wasn’t much of a fight. The skirmishers from the 3rd Minnesota fired a few rounds and then immediately retreated in the face of the gray tide. The Confederates were right behind them. The Minnesotans were “driven back on a tangent,” according to one survivor, and fell back on their main line, where they continued to fire into the advancing butternuts.
The Missourians’ main line came up to the rifle pits and halted. Once there, they re-formed and dressed their ranks. After a short rest, the advance resumed. With their skirmishers out of the way, the 3rd Minnesota opened fire. A hailstorm of bullets was rapidly and accurately poured into the ranks of the Confederates as they recklessly advanced. They had been made to believe that they were to have an easy and speedy victory…And yet, notwithstanding their fearful losses at every step, they still advanced, faster and faster, until their whole force, west of the railroad cut, burst into an impetuous charge. The spectacle was sublime.
The Missourians were hindered by the terrain as much as the shower of lead raining down on them. The ridge was so narrow that the outlying regiments had to struggle through three hundred yards of downed brush and trees. After fighting its way through this jungle, the left wing of the brigade descended into the ravine then up the opposing slope. The right likewise swung around and up to confront the 3rd Minnesota head on. Both wings halted at the abatis. This fatal pause gave the Federals even more time to rake the line with deadly fire. Lieutenant Colonel Nichols of Jackman's regiment described the adrenaline-fueled scene: “Our first trouble was in scrambling through and over the abatis, which was, I think, thickly laced with telegraph wire, where we lost many men.” The Confederate line was in shambles. “When we reached the abatis,” wrote Colonel DeWitt C. Hunter, “our advance was momentarily checked. By the time our line had made its way through the network of fallen timber all organization was gone. Companies and regiments were thoroughly mixed up.” Exhausted, the Missourians halted about twenty yards from the earthworks and threw themselves to the ground. From there, they traded volleys with the Federals above them.
To the south, the 46th Arkansas Mounted Infantry finally gained a position above the pass. As the firing intensified at the redoubt, the regiment stepped off. It, too, had to contend with several hundred yards of underbrush and felled trees. As Jackman's main force approached the Federals from the west, Coleman was poised to fall on their left and rear from the south.
The fighting continued unabated in front of the redoubt. The two sides traded shots at each other from close range—the Federals behind their earthworks and the Missourians only twenty yards away behind whatever cover they could find. Several hundred yards behind them, the men of Schnable's and Williams' Battalions halted at the first line of rifle pits. There, Colonel Jackman addressed them. With a short inspirational speech, he told the men what was expected of them and where they were to charge the enemy’s works. With a yell, they surged forward. Over and through the trees and obstacles they struggled. The Union men saw them coming and directed their fire into the approaching onslaught. Men fell with every step. Down into the ravine and back up they rushed, until within forty feet of the redoubt. They, along with the rest of the brigade, reached their prone compatriots, and the two lines merged. Schnable ordered his men to the ground, where they rested and reloaded. After about five minutes, he ordered them to charge. Independently, officers along the line did likewise. The four units, hopelessly intermingled, leapt to their feet and scrambled over the parapet in front of them. What followed was one of the longest and most vicious hand-to-hand struggles west of the Mississippi River. “As our boys swarmed over the parapet,” wrote D. A. Williams, “the bayonet was freely used by both sides, officers firing their pistols, and many throwing sticks and stones.” Another officer agreed: “Here sabers clashed, bayonets crossed, and clubs and rocks hurled back and forth in the desperate struggle.” Sergeant Earnest Davis, carrying the colors of the Jackman's regiment, cried, “Come ahead, boys!” and bound forward. He was almost immediately wounded and fell. The flag had barely touched the ground when Lieutenant Elliott Cole, leading Company C, scooped it up. With Cole yelling, “Come on, my brave boys!” the flag caught the breeze as he ran toward the Yankees. They shot him dead before he went fifteen feet. Sergeant Daniel Hawker then took up the colors, sprinted the last few steps to the breastwork and planted the flag on the parapet. There a Federal shot him in the face. The Minnesotans were giving as good as they got. Fighting swirled around the regimental flags of both sides. Lieutenant Colonel C. H. Nichols, leading Jackman's old unit, was shot down on the parapet while waving the regiment’s flag he just picked up.
Colonel Christopher Andrews was doing his best to inspire the Minnesotans under his charge. He was just to the right of the road when he was shot in the arm. He continued exhorting his men to stand by the colors to the last, only to have another round shatter his leg. Falling, he managed to pull himself upright when a bullet finally pierced his heart. Other officers fell inspiring their men. The stubborn defense of the redoubt was sublime horror. One Missourian described it as the “only bayonet fight we were in during the war—God grant that we may never witness another scene like that.” Indeed, the defenders refused to give up. The only way to dislodge one of them was to knock him down and pull him out of his place.The pressure was greatest where the road bisected the works.
The Arkansians broke the deadlock. Coming from the south, they filtered up the ravines and draws to the left. They began firing into the flank of the redoubt. At the Star Fort, Colonel Washington F. Geiger from the 8th Missouri Cavalry saw them coming, but there wasn’t much he could do about it. The overall Federal commander ran to the two companies on the north spur and encouraged them to hold on, but it was no use. The Arkansians swept over them, and they and Geiger had to beat a hasty retreat to the main fort. It was too much for the defenders. After almost thirty minutes of ferocious face-to-face combat, those who could turned and fled. Many indeed surrendered, but just as many turned and fought as they retired. For all those racing for safety, the Star Fort became the beacon of their salvation, and all ran for its protection.
The mass of Confederates pursued. It was not an organized pursuit—more of a follow-up to the successful capture of the redoubt. Units were intermingled, and there was little organization at this point. Officers and NCOs attempted to restore order, shouting orders and getting their men into some sort of formation as quickly as possible. Two or three regiments began re-forming in the shelter of the road where it cut into the hillside.
The first Confederates coming up against the main foritfications were from the 46th Arkansas. The enemy fire was heavy, but they finally struggled through the obstacles and abatis. Moving up the ravine southwest of the Star Fort, they made their way to a small shelf on the edge of the slope that offered some protection from the incoming fire. Over the lip of the shelf was a flat area on which lay some of the tents of the garrison; the Star Fort loomed beyond. The companies were hopelessly intermingled. The officers did the best they could to re-form, and then someone called out, “Forward!” Somebody else bellowed, “The 46th goes forward!” and the line surged ahead. With a wild yell, about thirty of them dashed through the tents toward the fort. A hailstorm of lead greeted them. When within a few yards of the fort, Colonel Coleman, commanding the 46th, took the regimental colors and waved them aloft to encourage his men. He was soon shot down. The Confederates had been stopped short of the Star Fort, but it was a temporary reprieve. The struggle for the fort was rapidly becoming the focus of the entire battle.
The next charge for the fort occurred when Hunter's and Williams' men rushed forward in a desperate attempt to overrun the stronghold. Some occupied the village on the east side of the tracks. Others rushed the fort. According to a lieutenant of the 61st Illinois, the Confederates launched four separate assaults against the Star Fort in the hour between 11 a.m. and noon. The defenders, men from the 61st Illinois and 8th Missouri Cavalry, were formed several ranks deep. Three men often worked together. One man stood at the parapet and fired the rifles, while the other two loaded. That way, the shooter could merely hand his spent rifle back and receive a charged one immediately. Coleman continued his attack from the south. Unfortunately, the fire from the 8th Missouri Cavalry stymied any attempt of a coordinated and determined assault. At 12:30 p.m., the acting commander of the 46th Arkansas sent a message to Jackman:
„Our men are fighting bravely. Will get up a grand charge as soon as the men rest a little. We will take this work, if possible. Men are greatly fatigued. We are in enemy's works, but have not the fort yet. The yells of your men do us great good.“
Unfortunately, the 46th Arkansas Mounted Infantry's new attack was no more successful than the previous ones. The men attempted to use a ravine as a covered avenue of approacg, but the determined fire from the loyalist Missourians' repeaters brought their charge to a halt. Those who weren't killed or able to get away had to find shelter at the bottom of the draw. There was no way out.
The fighting at the Star Fort had turned into a stalemate. One Federal described it as „the Confederates still clinging to ever hillside and every knoll and every ravine, and every house and outbuilding, and every other place that afforded the least protection from our fire, maintained the battle with wonderful pertinacity... they kept the air, over the forts and rifle pits, literally full of bullets all the time.“ Concealed behind stumps, logs and depressions in the ground, the Confederates fired at any man who dared raise himself over the parapet. Still, when a Rebel showed himself, they returned the favor as best they could.
At about 1 p.m., Colonel Jackman went to the front himself. He was completely baffled by the carnage and intensity of the melee. When he saw the pityful remains of his old regiment, he openly began to weep. Hundreds of wounded Confederates littered the groudn between the rdoubt and the Star Fort, and the Star Spangled Banner still waved proudly and unbroken over the main bastion. Jackman had seen enough to realize, that any further attacks would do no more good than to raise the butcher's bill. He called for a general retreat.
The Confederates, however, did not withdraw entirely without achieving anything. While the Unionists continued to entrench themselves in their fort, Jackman put the harbor and all available river barges to the torch. With the help of former German engineer turned Confederate battalion commander John A. Schnable, the Rebels destroyed several miles of railroad before moving southwest. This serious impairment of Steele's supply lines was bought with 500 dead and wounded out of 1,700 Confederates engaged. The Union troops lost 400 out of 1,200 men of all causes, more of a hundred of them were taken prisoner.
n August 8, 1863, he was promoted to the command of the Western Subdistrict of Texas until his reassignment to Scurry's brigade of Walker's Texas division in April 1964. Luckett's men took part in the Red River campaign and the campaign in Arkansas, which culminated in the repulse of Frederick Steele at Jenkins Ferry. Scurry was killed there, and Luckett took command of the brigade. His outfit fielded 1,600 men in his old unit, the 16th, 17th and 19th Texas Infantry Regiments and the 16th Texas Cavalry Regiment.
