Palmerston's vision for the Crimean War

Skallagrim

Banned
Regardless of all other matters, "why not go for broke" is a very valid question. The plan, as outlined in the OP, is just completely bonkers. It's clear that Palmerston just jotted down a British wish-list fantasy here, and when regarded as just that it makes far more sense-- but surely he must have understood that when shooting a bear, you have to make damn sure that you kill it? If you wound it, then it'll just get really angry. Maybe it'll have to lick its wouds and recover, but after that... you're not getting out of the woods in one piece, buddy! With a plan this outlandish, why indeed not go for broke? This could help both in getting others on board (by offering them more spoils) and reduce the chances of Russia ever becoming a revanchist threat.

-- You need to get Estonia, Ingria, St. Pertersburg (and probably Arkhangelsk) added to the Swedish land-grab, thus essentially cutting Russia off from any meaningful sea access.

-- You need to expand the Prussian and the Austrian land-grabs to create a bigger buffer zone.

-- The plan for independent Poland makes no sense. It will only ensure that Prussia and Austria balk at your plan. Propose instead to divide Congress Poland along the old partition lines (but with the old Russian share of the Polish partitions being likewise divided between Prussia and Austria). This would make Prussia and Austria more willing, and the extra Austrian gains would make the cession of Austrian lands in Italy more realistic.

-- Finally, instead of an independent Poland, carve out an independent Ukraine, to be placed under joint protection (and control) of the allied powers. This would make the Ukrainian ports openly available to Western interests. Moreover, it would also cut the fertile agriculural areas that supply those ports off from Russia, ensuring that Britain and France can get their claws on Ukrainian grain under free trade terms.

The end result would look a bit like this (with my apologies for the extra-crude map I jotted up in a minute):

partition__a.jpg


To be clear: it's still totally unrealistic and insane, but if you're going to propose insane wa-plans anyway, you might as well go all-out and aim to acually cripple the enemy beyond any realistic recovery.
 
Western Ukraine is larger that just Galicia, it could be everything west of the Bug or Dneiper and include Bessarabia, it depends on how far one wants to take the carving of Russia.

“Geography is not a science suitable for a noble: you just have to tell your coachman where you want to go.” Russian comedy of the XVIII century. :)

“Western Ukraine” can’t be “everything” you want it to be. It is a geographic/ethnic definition, which is quite modern and which applies to the former Galicia/territory held by the 2nd Republic until 1939 with its center being Lemberg/Lwov/Lviv. Odessa in the mid-XIX was not in “Ukraine” (Малороссия): relevant territory was called “Novorossia”. Bessarabia definitely was not/is not a part of “Ukraine”.
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What you are seemingly talking about is “Right bank Ukraine”, term that AFAIK came into existence during the Cossack Wars of the mid-XVII to designate the border between the PLC and Tsardom and lost its meaning during the Partitions or even earlier.

As for going for broke, there already was an earlier experience of virtually every big and small power going against Russia and it did not end quite well for the invaders even if they had been much better led and had, at least initially, something like 2:1 numeric advantage. In 1856 Russian army had over 1M (even if with the obsolete weapons) and, AFAIK, there was a noticeable shortage of the military geniuses on the Allied side.
 
I don't think that Palmerston's plans were feasible for a post war situation personally. The idea that you could just roll back the Russian Empire was laughable on the face of it. The best he could hope for was to nip some of their future ambitions in the bud, maybe decrease their ability to act in the Baltic and give the Ottoman's some breathing room.

Objectively, he did open the Russians eyes to the fact they were well behind the curve militarily and organization wise. This seemed to pay off in 1877-78, but their gains were largely undone by the Great Powers realising that Palmerston had a bit of a point that they should be paranoid about Russia running amok in the Balkans and the Straits.

In 1856 Russian army had over 1M (even if with the obsolete weapons) and, AFAIK, there was a noticeable shortage of the military geniuses on the Allied side.

In total fairness, the war failed to produce any real military geniuses of note... did give us some good Tolstoy though!
 
If this scenario would be a success, then is a small, but still, a chance of earlier realpolitiks. Prussia in this TL has a small chance to actually ally with independent Poland and support it's independence, just to annoy Austria and give them reason to get in fight with Austrians later on, also, why not propose on peace conference independent states of Lithuania and Livonia ? One century later, and we have early Mitteleuropa in European Union style (if alliances survive 19th century and Prusso-Polish-Lithuanian-Livonic good relationship isn't strained, which very unlikely at this time).

You propably see what I am getting at: Prussia have two options, first being still going with Metternich's mindset or going full on Realpolitik.
 
I don't think that Palmerston's plans were feasible for a post war situation personally. The idea that you could just roll back the Russian Empire was laughable on the face of it. The best he could hope for was to nip some of their future ambitions in the bud, maybe decrease their ability to act in the Baltic and give the Ottoman's some breathing room.

Objectively, he did open the Russians eyes to the fact they were well behind the curve militarily and organization wise. This seemed to pay off in 1877-78, but their gains were largely undone by the Great Powers realising that Palmerston had a bit of a point that they should be paranoid about Russia running amok in the Balkans and the Straits.



In total fairness, the war failed to produce any real military geniuses of note... did give us some good Tolstoy though!

Russian Victory in 1878 was also a close one, which could have easily been an Ottoman defensive victory. The Russian advantage was unity in command and numerical, which the Ottomans lacked the same war (Huseyin Avni Pasha's untimely death, Mehmed Ali Pasha (not of Egypt) and Suleyman Pasha hating each other, C in C in Bulgaria being a total nitwit on the defense of Bulgaria).

In the end, Russian Influence in the Balkans was indirectly saved as Greater Bulgaria was reduced to a smaller Bulgaria. The existing Bulgaria was already a pain in the ass while a bigger Bulgaria is pretty much off limits for desired influence there.
 
I don't think that Palmerston's plans were feasible for a post war situation personally. The idea that you could just roll back the Russian Empire was laughable on the face of it. The best he could hope for was to nip some of their future ambitions in the bud, maybe decrease their ability to act in the Baltic and give the Ottoman's some breathing room.

Objectively, he did open the Russians eyes to the fact they were well behind the curve militarily and organization wise. This seemed to pay off in 1877-78, but their gains were largely undone by the Great Powers realising that Palmerston had a bit of a point that they should be paranoid about Russia running amok in the Balkans and the Straits.


In total fairness, the war failed to produce any real military geniuses of note... did give us some good Tolstoy though!

Palmerstonian plan was impractical but, to be fair, it involved some logic (however faulty): the intention was too peel off some non-Russian (or at least not predominantly Russian) border regions. Some of the proposals in this thread are making it completely “geographic” (based upon the rivers, etc.) in a complete disregard to the demographic realities which even Palmerston was taking into a consideration.

Quite agree about the CW being a wake up call: under Nicholas I the Russian military had been forced to live in a mythological word of the all-powerful bayonet charges and parade ground drill.

Of course, no military genius emerged from that war but Totleben got international acknowledgement as the most capable military engineer on both sides.
 
The war was an idiocy to start with, it was grossly mishandled (Alexander and his brother almost managed to wrestle a defeat from the jaws of victory) and the peace was a final touch in a picture of the gross incompetence of Alexander’s regime. Probably the only good result (besides some tactical lessons) was a strong aversion to a war acquired to the Grand Duke Alexander.
Really? Allowing for my obvious bias, not taking up a golden opportunity to weaken the Ottoman Empire and increase Russian influence without British interference would seem to be a far more idiotic move than what happened OTL.
 
Really? Allowing for my obvious bias, not taking up a golden opportunity to weaken the Ottoman Empire and increase Russian influence without British interference would seem to be a far more idiotic move than what happened OTL.

If anything, Russian international influence decreased after Congress of Berlin. Weakening the Ottoman Empire did not make too much sense because, unlike the XVIII century, it was not in a position to attack Russia. Of course, providing autonomy for Bulgaria was a noble goal but why was it Russian duty and why did it worth a loss of more than 100,000 Russian soldiers being killed or dead from the disease, not to mention a mounting state debt? What did Russia gain in the practical terms? A small piece of a land on the Caucasus, bad relations with Germany, and loss of government's popularity in Russia. And in both world wars Bulgaria was fighting on a side of the Russian opponents. Speaking of which, one of the pre-war conditions was agreement to the Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which eventually led to the infamous crisis (one more idiocy of the Russian diplomacy) and was one of the step stones toward the WWI.

Militarily, as I said, it was grossly mishandled due to the "political considerations", incompetence of Alexander's brother as commander in chief and Alexander's own meddling. What could be a relatively easy campaign turned into a bloody mess.

BTW, the Brits did interfere: their threat of entering the war (which probably could be ignored) stopped Russian troops at Sen Stefano and the Brits got Cyprus from the Ottomans.
 
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This is very far from being true. Of course, due to the stupidity of Alexander III they squandered much of that gratitude.

Alexander III was the only Russian monarch of the XIX century who successfully promoted Russian interests abroad and managed to put Russian economy on the right track. Getting into the mess on the Balkans was not his duty as a ruler and, anyway, expected ROI would be zero or less.
 
If anything, Russian international influence decreased after Congress of Berlin. Weakening the Ottoman Empire did not make too much sense because, unlike the XVIII century, it was not in a position to attack Russia. Of course, providing autonomy for Bulgaria was a noble goal but why was it Russian duty and why did it worth a loss of more than 100,000 Russian soldiers being killed or dead from the disease, not to mention a mounting state debt? What did Russia gain in the practical terms? A small piece of a land on the Caucasus, bad relations with Germany, and loss of government's popularity in Russia. And in both world wars Bulgaria was fighting on a side of the Russian opponents. Speaking of which, one of the pre-war conditions was agreement to the Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which eventually led to the infamous crisis (one more idiocy of the Russian diplomacy) and was one of the step stones toward the WWI.
The Ottoman Empire was still fundamentally hostile to Russia and could at the very least be used by another power in case of conflict as happened in WWI. Weakening it certainly made sense on this point alone. Of course, there were also Russian ambitions to expand towards the straits, either directly or indirectly, as well as replacing the Ottomans with at the very least more Russian friendly Eastern Orthodox countries. The 1877-78 was certainly a step in this direction and it doesn't detract from the war if later incompetence squandered the advantages gained during the war.
As for Bulgaria, it was to a significant extent Russian mistakes that led the country to join the Central Powers in WWI. So it's not as if Bulgaria was destined to be anti-Russian from the beginning. Also Bulgaria while joining the Axis (largely under duress) in WWII, did not send troops against the Soviets because such a move would be extremely unpopular due to Bulgarians feeling indebted to Russia for the liberation. And if such retrospective arguments are to be the main criteria for judging the wisdom of liberating Bulgaria, would it have really benefited Russia/USSR in any potential world war to have a large and likely hostile Ottoman Empire or Turkey just across the Danube river?

Militarily, as I said, it was grossly mishandled due to the "political considerations", incompetence of Alexander's brother as commander in chief and Alexander's own meddling. What could be a relatively easy campaign turned into a bloody mess.
Certainly, but there's a difference between whether it was a good idea to start a war

BTW, the Brits did interfere: their threat of entering the war (which probably could be ignored) stopped Russian troops at Sen Stefano and the Brits got Cyprus from the Ottomans.
But they did not declare war and send troops, as during the Crimean war and even their intervention only came after the war was won.

Alexander III was the only Russian monarch of the XIX century who successfully promoted Russian interests abroad and managed to put Russian economy on the right track. Getting into the mess on the Balkans was not his duty as a ruler and, anyway, expected ROI would be zero or less.
You are quite right about that. The problem is that Alexander III didn't see it this way and due to his efforts to first remove Prince Alexander and then to impose a regime subservient to Russia resulted in considerable decline of pro-Russian feeling and Russian influence in Bulgaria. And of course Ferdinand - who was chiefly responsible for Bulgaria joining the Central powers in WWI - coming to power.
 
The Ottoman Empire was still fundamentally hostile to Russia and could at the very least be used by another power in case of conflict as happened in WWI. Weakening it certainly made sense on this point alone. Of course, there were also Russian ambitions to expand towards the straits, either directly or indirectly, as well as replacing the Ottomans with at the very least more Russian friendly Eastern Orthodox countries. The 1877-78 was certainly a step in this direction and it doesn't detract from the war if later incompetence squandered the advantages gained during the war.


Certainly, but there's a difference between whether it was a good idea to start a war


But they did not declare war and send troops, as during the Crimean war and even their intervention only came after the war was won.
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IMO, this is a wrong line of a reasoning (at least with a benefit of a hindsight). Russia got practically “natural” border with the Ottomans in Europe and the main reason for the hostile attitudes was Ottoman treatment of the Orthodox Christians on the Balkans. The European Powers were blaming the Ottomans for the atrocities but did not stick their necks as AII did under the pressure of the hysterical Russian Slavophils. Everybody else was looking for their national advantages but Alexander made himself a laughingstock by declaring that Russia was going to war exclusively for honor and, to guarantee neutrality of the AH, agreeing to their occupation of Bosnia Herzegovina.

Straits were not an official goal of that war and, anyway, the issue did not make sense due to the absence of the Black Sea fleet (after repudiation Treaty of Paris in 1870, Russian government did nothing to avoid displeasing Britain even if Bismark was 1uite sympathetic to the idea).

Now, the issue of replacing the Ottomans with the Ortodox states is just a sound bite: these states were practically useless in pretty much sense and friendship of the Serbs proved to be quite expensive.

Not to mention that Russia could ill afford a serious war.

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The following has nothing to do with the Bulgarian perspective.

To clarify my point, a traditional anti-Ottoman Russian policy was initially dictated by the realities of the XVIII but after annexation of the Crimea and the Northern coast of the Black Sea continuation of that policy was mostly expansionism for sake of expansionism. If in the case of Britain colonialism was closely linked to the economy (growing manufacturing, need of the raw materials, need to sell the produced goods) for Russian Empire these factors were pretty much non-existent (CA and Far East were different but it has nothing to do with the issue). France had traditional trade interests in Levant but Russia by the mid-XIX was producing almost nothing but the raw materials. The same goes for the beaten to death issue of the Straits: sustainable annexation of the area was hardly practical and from the economic perspective the issue was moot because even by the early XX an overwhelming percentage of the imports and exports on the Black Sea had been carried by the foreign ships. What’s worse, Russia was lacking capital and a powerful merchant class capable of changing this situation.a

Which leaves just mysterious issue of “protection of the Christians”. To start with, why would Russia need to bother (to a degree requiring military intervention) and, to be consistent, how would Russian Empire react if the 3rd party would claim a right to protect its Muslim or Catholic subjects? And what real advantage would Russia get from changing political map of the Balkans? The Ottomans were cruel but they kept region in peace and immediately after regaining their independence all these new states turned the Balkans into a bloody mess in which Russia was forced to take sides. Not to mention the inevitably souring relations with AH.
 
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IMO, this is a wrong line of a reasoning (at least with a benefit of a hindsight). Russia got practically “natural” border with the Ottomans in Europe and the main reason for the hostile attitudes was Ottoman treatment of the Orthodox Christians on the Balkans. The European Powers were blaming the Ottomans for the atrocities but did not stick their necks as AII did under the pressure of the hysterical Russian Slavophils. Everybody else was looking for their national advantages but Alexander made himself a laughingstock by declaring that Russia was going to war exclusively for honor and, to guarantee neutrality of the AH, agreeing to their occupation of Bosnia Herzegovina.
I have to say that is a surprising view of the 1877-78. In Bulgaria at least it's widely accepted (even among many who are Russophile in their views) that Russia began the war not due to any sentiment, but only due to their national interests.

Now, the issue of replacing the Ottomans with the Ortodox states is just a sound bite: these states were practically useless in pretty much sense and friendship of the Serbs proved to be quite expensive.
Again, they're better than a stronger Ottoman Empire. Of course they would be more useful with a more competent Russian Empire, but this doesn't change this fact.
Also WWI would have likely broken for another reason due to the competition between the Great Powers. Serbia's involvement with the assassination in Sarajevo was just a pretext.


To clarify my point, a traditional anti-Ottoman Russian policy was initially dictated by the realities of the XVIII but after annexation of the Crimea and the Northern coast of the Black Sea continuation of that policy was mostly expansionism for sake of expansionism. If in the case of Britain colonialism was closely linked to the economy (growing manufacturing, need of the raw materials, need to sell the produced goods) for Russian Empire these factors were pretty much non-existent (CA and Far East were different but it has nothing to do with the issue). France had traditional trade interests in Levant but Russia by the mid-XIX was producing almost nothing but the raw materials. The same goes for the beaten to death issue of the Straits: sustainable annexation of the area was hardly practical and from the economic perspective the issue was moot because even by the early XX an overwhelming percentage of the imports and exports on the Black Sea had been carried by the foreign ships. What’s worse, Russia was lacking capital and a powerful merchant class capable of changing this situation.a
There is still the advantage conferred by not being dependent on the Ottomans for the trade route passing through the Bosporus. WWI demonstrated well how important that advantage was.

Which leaves just mysterious issue of “protection of the Christians”. To start with, why would Russia need to bother (to a degree requiring military intervention) and, to be consistent, how would Russian Empire react if the 3rd party would claim a right to protect its Muslim or Catholic subjects? And what real advantage would Russia get from changing political map of the Balkans? The Ottomans were cruel but they kept region in peace and immediately after regaining their independence all these new states turned the Balkans into a bloody mess in which Russia was forced to take sides. Not to mention the inevitably souring relations with AH.
The Ottoman Empire did something like that in WWI, which is retrospectively another reason for reducing their power.
As for keeping the peace, Ottoman oppression and general incompetence provoked frequent rebellions, so the Pax Ottomanica should not be exaggerated. And if Russia did not intervene, it's quite possible others would, as happened during the Greek rebellion.
 
I have to say that is a surprising view of the 1877-78. In Bulgaria at least it's widely accepted (even among many who are Russophile in their views) that Russia began the war not due to any sentiment, but only due to their national interests.

What is widely accepted in Bulgaria probably is not as important as an official declaration that Russia is considering that war as "a matter of honor" and does not look for any territorial gains. There were no meaningful "national interests" to be achieved but the huge expenses (which are clearly counting as the national interests) Russia could ill afford. And agreement to the AH annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina proved to be a time bomb.


Again, they're better than a stronger Ottoman Empire. Of course they would be more useful with a more competent Russian Empire, but this doesn't change this fact.

The Ottoman Empire ceased to be military threat to Russia well before the CW so this argument is pretty much bogus. OTOH, the newly-created Balkan state almost immediately started quarreling with each other forcing Russia to get involved and generating conflicts with the major powers.

Also WWI would have likely broken for another reason due to the competition between the Great Powers. Serbia's involvement with the assassination in Sarajevo was just a pretext.

The WWI may or may not happen but it was triggered by an explosive situation on the Balkans and Russian desire to defend its client state. The only area of competition between Russia and AH were the Balkans and the Ottomans, however bad they were to the locals, provided an useful geopolitical buffer.

There is still the advantage conferred by not being dependent on the Ottomans for the trade route passing through the Bosporus. WWI demonstrated well how important that advantage was.

I'm afraid that you are seriously confused on that subject. The trade through the Straits had been conducted predominantly by the foreign merchant ships even in 1914 so the Ottomans would not close them unless there was anti-Russian British-French-Ottoman coalition as in CW or if the Ottoman Empire is at war with Russia as a part of anti-British, etc. coalition. The question was not about the trade traffic but about letting the warships through the Straits and the Russians insisted on the Ottomans closing the Straits in the case of a war with the 3rd party because Russia did not have any navy on the Black Sea and did not even try to develop it during the period between the Franco-Prussian War (after which the Paris treaty was formally denounced) and 1877. WWI demonstrated absolutely nothing except the fact that by 1914 Russian Black Sea fleet was weaker than the Ottoman. Well, it also demonstrated that a traditional policy of alienating the Ottoman Empire and creating the small Balkan states was wrong: a neutral Ottoman Empire would allow a commerce traffic through the Straits. Anyway, an idea of the Russian Straits was a complete fantasy so it is not even clear what you are arguing about.

The Ottoman Empire did something like that in WWI, which is retrospectively another reason for reducing their power.
As for keeping the peace, Ottoman oppression and general incompetence provoked frequent rebellions, so the Pax Ottomanica should not be exaggerated. And if Russia did not intervene, it's quite possible others would, as happened during the Greek rebellion.

In the case of Greece there was a wide anti-Ottoman coalition in which Russia participated. In 1877 there was none and the Brits were supporting the Ottomans. Now, getting back to your point, the rebellions could eventually result in disintegration of the Ottoman Empire but why was it Russian obligation of interest to get involved in that process? Economic interest was zero, territorial gains were insignificant, political advantages negative: during the rebellions the Ottomans were internationally acknowledged as the bad guys even if nobody wanted to get directly involved but by 1878 Russia became a bad guy with GB threatening a war over a perceived (as opposite to the realistic) Russian threat to the Straits. Not to mention huge losses, high cost and loss of prestige inside Russia. All that for providing Bulgaria with autonomy?
 
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