Pacific War of 1940: fizzle

Is OP plausible?

  • Yes

    Votes: 5 22.7%
  • Yes, with some alterations

    Votes: 15 68.2%
  • No

    Votes: 2 9.1%

  • Total voters
    22

trurle

Banned
Not quite null. There were two combined arms brigades of Marines, one on each coast. And, a half dozen Base Defense Battalions.
I think the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was untouchable at moment (losing it mean losing all the tutors in amphibious warfare), and 2nd Marine brigade in Pacific contained in October 1940 only 8th marine regiment, formed in April 1940 (and containing only 2 battalions in the moment). These 2 battalions were the only force US had in the moment in Pacific to try to counter-attack on ground. For the rest of fighting, US forces in Philippines and Guam had to rely on naval interception and static defenses.

Of course, infantry carried on transport ships and destroyers can be instructed and thrown to battle, with high likelihood of been massacred in any opposed landing. US was not that desperate in 1940, am i right?
 
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Of course, infantry carried on transport ships and destroyers can be instructed and thrown to battle, with high likelihood of been massacred in any opposed landing. US was not that desperate in 1940, am i right?

Well, I don't know where this TL is going so I won't say there wont be a emergency, or perception of emergency.

I think the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was untouchable at moment (losing it mean losing all the tutors in amphibious warfare), and 2nd Marine brigade in Pacific contained in October 1940 only 8th marine regiment, formed in April 1940 (and containing only 2 battalions in the moment). These 2 battalions were the only force US had in the moment in Pacific to try to counter-attack on ground. For the rest of fighting, US forces in Philippines and Guam had to rely on naval interception and static defenses. ...

These Brigades were not set infantry organizations like the brigades of most armies of the era. The were supposed to be task organized combined arms organizations. The brigade staff trained for operations as part of a naval task group. The brigades nominally included a light artillery battalion, a armored company, engineer group, automotive transport unit, signals unit, and a composite air group, all in addition to the rifle regiment. In theory a base defense battalion could be included in the brigade if needed, tho I don't know if that was ever done in any training exercises. These brigades pretty much reflected the TF nature of the corps size amphibious forces deployed in the Pacific during the 1940s. Reduced size models in a sense. The deployment of a brigade to Shanghai in 1927 & the standing up of a combined arms group in Nicaragua for several years was done by mix and matching components. Or creating them as required. ie: The pack mule herd used by the Quartermaster company in Nicaragua.

The s acrosancisity of the east coast brigade had to do with the perception of priority within the Navy. The developing war in the Atlantic and necessity to prepare for operations there meant the Marine units on the east coast, in or outside the brigade were strengthened at the expense of the west coast units. If the US is actually at war with Japan the priority is going to shift the other direction.

I may have missed the status of the USN reservists in the previous TL posts. The War Powers Acts passed after France collapsed allowed the activation of the entire USN reservist component, including the Marines. That activation was a assumption within WP ORANGE so its likely to occur swiftly if a Pacific war occurs.

Bottom line here is the Navy was in much better shape in its small USMC component being combat ready, than the US Army & its field forces. That probably had more to do with Congressional budget decisions since 1929 than any thing else. Funds for training and readiness were effectively eliminated for the infantry, artillery, and cavalry corps in the 1930s.
 
The key here is not the the US Navy did not want to sail to the Philippines, but that it could not do so under war conditions. Underway refueling was barely past the experimental level in 1940 & oilers capable of at sea refueling were to thin on the water. In practical terms getting a fleet to PI under war conditions required a protected refueling site partway there. Preferably multiple sites. Those were all under the thumb of the Japanese.

No, the Navy could sail for the Phillippines. It would just be suicidal to do so and they knew it. The protected refueling site might seem like a non-issue to an amateur, since the fleet can simply sail to the Philippines and refuel there. The range on US vessels after all is more then enough to do that. The things is that the Navy, being professionals, will understand that the problem is that the Philippine's bases are vulnerable to being isolated thanks to the Japanese bases located along their SLOCs but the Army will be disagreeing with them (no thanks to MacArthur). Whether the civilian decision makers ultimately side with the Navy or the Army is a uncertain question, particularly since the Navy would put up one hell of a political battle to prevent it, but the possibility is there for a clever enemy to try and exploit. Fortunately, the Japanese proved not to be so clever.
 
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.. Army will be disagreeing with them (no thanks to MacArthur). ...

Macs opinion won't be a issue in 1940. Other than the Philippine Scouts and some coast artillery theres nothing like the embryonic US/PI army that Mac bet on in late 1941. Assuming the fleet arrives, then what? They are reinforcing a half strength division & a group of training aircraft. Theres precious little to rescue in military terms. The US Army had nothing to send in 1940, & the Navy just a brigade of Marines. Whats the point?

What the rest of the Army thought in 1940 was not optimistic. Stimson who was actually the key in all this seems to have been persuaded over time, & that was based on the existence of a actual armed force in the PI. It may also have been based on the idea the war would not start until late winter or spring 1942, after a series of large material deliveries were complete. It appears that no one in War Plans Division of the Army placed any attention to defending PI. Including Eisenhower who had served on Macs staff for several years. The RAINBOW plans left out any serious attention to PI as a long term position. Lacking anything like the relatively last minute reinforcement of PI in 1941 I can't see anyone, including Stimson thinking a rescue effort can accomplish anything.
 
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