Pacific War - A more direct route. What if the US invaded Japan from the north?

This might belong in ASB, but I'm putting in post-1900 just in case.

After some time fiddling with maps, I noticed that looking down from the North Pole, Japan and North America aren't very distant from one another. One can draw a rather straight and direct line from Seattle to Sendai that hovers over the coastline of Alaska and Kamchatka. So this gave me an idea.

What if US leaders decided that they wanted to go directly for Japan by using a Northern Route, bypassing all the islands of the Pacific?

I know that this would be a much worse strategy than the one taken in OTL.

OTL, the southern route went through Micronesia to the Philippines, cutting off Japan's resource extraction from their industry, strangling their economy and war production. This was very cost effective in terms of the lives of Allied soldiers. Therefore, even in defeat, Japan's sudden surrender allowed it to avoid being invaded and conquered.

What if the US approached Japan like how the Soviets approached Germany? Instead of relying on blockade and strategic bombing, what if US leaders were convinced that the most effective strategy would be through the use of American elan in a frontal assault?

Using Seattle and Anchorage as major supply ports, an invasion force could easily snatch up the Kuril islands and make island bases there. After that, Hokkaido would be the East Asian equivalent of Sicily. Once secured, the Japanese mainland is only a skip away. Eventually, the US would make landings to the north of Tokyo, where the Decisive Battle would occur. The US would win, and the Japanese, having lost the final pitched battle they planned and seeing their capital occupied, would agree to surrender.

What does the AH.com community make of this?

Map of the world at time of V-J day
DBN_1945-late.png

DBN_1945-late.png
 
Unfortunately the US public has a nasty aversion to high casualty rates. Look at how fiercely the Japanese fought for the islands it had already conquered. Think about how they'd fight on their home turf. Not to mention that Hokkaido is full of mountains and volcanic plateaus.
 
Unfortunately the US public has a nasty aversion to high casualty rates. Look at how fiercely the Japanese fought for the islands it had already conquered. Think about how they'd fight on their home turf. Not to mention that Hokkaido is full of mountains and volcanic plateaus.

Yes, this is an incredibly bad strategy. Maybe I should put it in ASB and have the US military not care about public opinion on casualty rates?
 
An interesting idea, although I'm not sure that would be logistically better than invading from the south.

It's far closer to home and more direct. This would make the supply chain shorter and easier to handle, allowing for a faster and thicker flow. Plus it'd be safer for transports since it's distant from IJN operation areas, which are directed towards the south Pacific, not the North.
 
It's far closer to home and more direct. This would make the supply chain shorter and easier to handle, allowing for a thicker flow. Plus it'd be safer for transports since its distant from IJN operation areas, which are directed towards the south Pacific, not the North.

The question then would be why this was not pursued - I'm thinking the fear of Australia falling to Japan and MacArthur's egoistic demands to make sure he ensures his "promises" to the Philippine people. Maybe the US supports Australia primarily through supplies and forming a defensive perimeter in the south while MacArthur gets sent somewhere else?
 
The question then would be why this was not pursued - I'm thinking the fear of Australia falling to Japan and MacArthur's egoistic demands to make sure he ensures his "promises" to the Philippine people. Maybe the US supports Australia primarily through supplies and forming a defensive perimeter in the south while MacArthur gets sent somewhere else?

This was not pursued because starving out Japan was seen as easier than conquering it.

In my scenario, the Allies assume that Australia is outside the reach of Japan's supply lines, and go for a much more passive defense - no battles of Guadalcanal or Coral Sea. This allows the US to ignore the South completely where in OTL they wasted a lot of time mopping up Japan's forces on the extremes of their defense perimeter in Oceania and New Guinea.

Material support would be fine.

Yes and good point about MacArthur. Get him and/or his obsession with the Philippines out of the way and it makes it easier to ignore the southern islands.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Sure - horrible flying weather; terrible winter weather

Well I mean, there'd also be no dysentery and malaria in the north. I'm sure going north has its advantages.

Sure - horrible flying weather; terrible winter weather at sea and on land; no eastern Pacific base (unlike the Central Pacific drive, which was based on Oahu, which is convenient both to California and the Pacific side of the Canal; Dutch Harbor is neither); no land bases close enough to the initial targets (Kuriles in the North Pacific; unlike the Ellices for the Gilberts operation); the US had been planning a Central Pacific offensive for 20 years for a reason.

Did I mention lousy weather?;)

Best,
 
North Pacific:

images


Central Pacific:

images


South Pacific:

images


I sense a slight difference...;)

Best,

Well I mean, there'd also be no dysentery and malaria in the north. I'm sure going north has its advantages.

Romanticism aside, I'm sure the North Pacific must have had some seasonal good weather for amphibious assaults. If a rag-tag Soviet invasion fleet could be thrown together to threaten Hokkaido, I'm sure the might of American industry could easily accomplish it.

So long as they bring proper winter gear this time!
 

TFSmith121

Banned
You'd be surprised...

Romanticism aside, I'm sure the North Pacific has seasons of good weather for amphibious assaults. If a rag-tag Soviet invasion fleet could be thrown together to threaten Hokkaido, I'm sure the might of American industry could easily accomplish it.

So long as they bring proper winter gear this time!

You'd be surprised...

The US had been studying a Pacific counteroffensive for two decades by 1940 (longer, really, but let's stick to an era where air power is significant); no one in the USN saw the North Pacific as a rational approach, and the Central Pacific was the obvious choice.

The South Pacific/Southwest Pacific offensives were not based on the strategy of "how do we defeat the Japanese quickly and efficiently."

The North Pacific approach for a war against Japan makes about as much sense as trying to liberate Europe by crawling up the Italian boot.

Best,
 
Romanticism aside, I'm sure the North Pacific must have had some seasonal good weather for amphibious assaults. If a rag-tag Soviet invasion fleet could be thrown together to threaten Hokkaido, I'm sure the might of American industry could easily accomplish it.

So long as they bring proper winter gear this time!
However you should note that the Soviet invasion of Hokkaido was going up against a basically defeated enemy with the majority of their resources focused in Kyushu. So it's kind of like saying "If Germany can get to the gates of Moscow within a year in 1941 then America can do it in 1946."
 
You'd be surprised...

The US had been studying a Pacific counteroffensive for two decades by 1940 (longer, really, but let's stick to an era where air power is significant); no one in the USN saw the North Pacific as a rational approach, and the Central Pacific was the obvious choice.

The South Pacific/Southwest Pacific offensives were not based on the strategy of "how do we defeat the Japanese quickly and efficiently."

The North Pacific approach for a war against Japan makes about as much sense as trying to liberate Europe by crawling up the Italian boot.

Best,

How about this?

In 1918, the American intervention in the Russian Revolution and subsequent Red Scare in the 20's prompts the building of supply bases in Alaska designed for reaching the Russian Far East.

Some time down the line when Japan rises as a potential competitor, an American Schlieffen comes up with a bright strategy of a "lightning strike" using those northern bases to the heart of Japan to quickly crush their desire to make war.

This plan, like the OTL schlieffen plan, is more to serve as a thought exercise in why the US should improve their amphibious capabilities and as a diplomatic tool to threaten the Japanese mainland directly in case of conflict. Unfortunately it ends up being taken seriously as the go-to plan for a counter-strike in the case of war against Japan.

OTL, the US came up with a war plan that basically saw the abandonment of the Philippines as necessary as it was indefensible. Perhaps deliberately ignoring all far-flung islands isn't that implausible?

As for the "crawling up the boot" Two major landings are planned. The First from Hokkaido to the top of Honshu (The geographic reverse of Olympic in Kyushu), and the second near Tokyo (Basically Coronet). This basic frame of operations was approved in OTL for the plans on the invasion of Japan if they didn't surrender by the end of 1945.

However you should note that the Soviet invasion of Hokkaido was going up against a basically defeated enemy with the majority of their resources focused in Kyushu. So it's kind of like saying "If Germany can get to the gates of Moscow within a year in 1941 then America can do it in 1946."

That is a very good point. However, American resources for amphibious assaults far outweigh those available for the tentative Soviet one that was planned. This is more like operation Torch and then Avalanche for Japan instead of Italy. Perhaps even an Overlord.

Certainly, if Olympic and Coronet had occurred, they both would have been the largest amphibious assaults ever in history. If the US has such capabilities, then no matter how well-defended, no territory can resist forever.
 
Given that pretty much all the ground work to pull off a successful US invasion of Hokkaido that would have to be done would end with the US preparing for a invasion of Kyushu instead anyways, I don't see it happening. The island hopping campaign across the Central-South Pacific was about more then just securing bases... it was also about bringing the Japanese naval and air forces to battle so that they could be defeated as a necessary perquisite to the invasion of Japan. Additionally, unless the Soviets allow the Americans access, there are no airbases in range to stage the proposed initial invasion of the Kuriles from. The US was quite unwilling to cover their naval landings exclusively with carrier aircraft.
 
Given that pretty much all the ground work to pull off a successful US invasion of Hokkaido that would have to be done would end with the US preparing for a invasion of Kyushu instead anyways, I don't see it happening. The island hopping campaign across the Central-South Pacific was about more then just securing bases... it was also about bringing the Japanese naval and air forces to battle so that they could be defeated as a necessary perquisite to the invasion of Japan. Additionally, unless the Soviets allow the Americans access, there are no airbases in range to stage the proposed initial invasion of the Kuriles from. The US was quite unwilling to cover their naval landings exclusively with carrier aircraft.

The Aleutian Islands are right next door. Attu island to paramushir (Japanese kurils at the time) is 700 miles.

Hawaii to Guam in 4000. Guam to Okinawa another 1400 miles. Okinawa to Kyushu 600 miles.
 
This was not pursued because starving out Japan was seen as easier than conquering it.

In my scenario, the Allies assume that Australia is outside the reach of Japan's supply lines, and go for a much more passive defense - no battles of Guadalcanal or Coral Sea. This allows the US to ignore the South completely where in OTL they wasted a lot of time mopping up Japan's forces on the extremes of their defense perimeter in Oceania and New Guinea.

Material support would be fine.

Yes and good point about MacArthur. Get him and/or his obsession with the Philippines out of the way and it makes it easier to ignore the southern islands.

I thought this was decided by Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Does MacArthurs powers overrule the CCS?
 
In my scenario, the Allies assume that Australia is outside the reach of Japan's supply lines, and go for a much more passive defense - no battles of Guadalcanal or Coral Sea. This allows the US to ignore the South completely where in OTL they wasted a lot of time mopping up Japan's forces on the extremes of their defense perimeter in Oceania and New Guinea.
I see a couple of issues with this:
1) Darwin was bombed in February 1942, so they were clearly inside the Japanese limit (and remember, Oahu was considered to by outside their capabilities too, until 7/12/1941).
2) If you don't fight Coral Sea, you end up with Midway being 6 Japanese carriers vs. 4 American, rather than 4 vs. 3.
 
The Aleutian Islands are right next door. Attu island to paramushir (Japanese kurils at the time) is 700 miles.

It LOOKS lovely on paper. But... Weather. Really, weather.

I could imagine a situation where an AlCan highway - and railway - are built before the war, probably as part of a joint US-Canada 'public works' effort during the Depression, and more bases are built in Alaska.

You then need to get rid of the US aircraft carriers - maybe they're in port at Pearl when the Japanese strike.

You probably need to build up aviation and the army, too.

Then, maybe, just maybe, the US could view an advance down the Aleutians and Komandorskis as only way to hit back at Japan on anything like a reasonable schedule.

You'd also NEED radar, and lots of it. (Air intercept, air to sea, etc.) You'd need instrument landing (including electronic guide paths, etc.) because the visibility of those islands is low and horribly variable.

The combination of required pre-war preparedness (especially for Alaskan infrastructure, and zero-visibility flying/landing); and LACK of preparedness (no or few aircraft carriers); plus a massive political demand for IMMEDIATE action against Japan, especially the Home Islands; is really tough to pull off. But is probably doable.

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You'd STILL have more men lost by aircraft crashing, not finding their way home, exposure, supply vessels sunk by the weather, etc., than you would have military casualties. Attu and Shemya would be an aircraft graveyard, with hundreds of crashed B17s and fighters.
 
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