Pacific War 10 years earlier

Henry Stimson, Hoover's secretary of state, wanted economic sanctions placed on Japan for its invasion of Manchuria. Hoover prevented that from happening, fearing (rightly so) that it could lead to war.

What if Hoover decided to go along with it? Stimson knew that Japan was reliant on American oil so that would definitely be cut off. Would Japan have went to war with the US over sanctions in 1931-1932 and if so, how would Hoover have reacted? Can Hoover be reelected!?
 
Could the Japanese last very long in a war without the aircraft carriers they would have a decade later? The carriers were the key to the whole war, so how would it play out without them?
 
While the Steel and other Metal Embargo would hurt, I don't think it would efrect Japan's Oil Supply which mostly come from the DEI.
And without the Spur of WW2 and Lend-Lease, I doubt if Holland, France & the UK will go along with a US embargo.

Re the Carriers;
A early '30's War would be much more a Battleship War. With All the 1922 Washington restrictions, in the days leading up to it.
 
What if Hoover decided to go along with it? Stimson knew that Japan was reliant on American oil so that would definitely be cut off. Would Japan have went to war with the US over sanctions in 1931-1932 and if so, how would Hoover have reacted? Can Hoover be reelected!?
If you can manage it to start a Pacific war in the 1930's rather than 1940's, production power would boost the economy, but the economy would already be slipping right on schedule so I don't think Hoover would see positive effects soon enough or drastic enough to win reelection. On the one hand you have the "Don't change horses in the middle of the stream" mentality of war. On the other, you have the economy diving headlong into the ground under Hoover, not to mention the period of the 1920's saw many markets depressed years before the Depression took total hold, which I think would outweigh the former mentality.
Similarly, following the war even if Hoover is reelected, you could well see the same recession (at least I believe there was a recession) as followed the Second World War where military production switched over to civilian production and the economy had to deal with a stop on that mass military production. Not to mention I don't see Hoover establishing civilian work programs like FDR.
 
Well, how quickly are we talking here? The Japanese response that is. Is it quite short or over a longer period of time? The longer or earlier it is, then that changes things as the US starts to prepare for a possible confrontation (certainly spending increases for the Navy which could led to a massive boost for the nations shipyards, or in the case of a selective draft for the army, increase in production of supplies and things like food for the services [which would help out farmers struggling with low prices and large surpluses]).

Probably very much a 'Pacific Jutland' scenario appears, with the fate of the Philippeans the answer to that question.
 

MrP

Banned
There is an FH tome on a Pacific War between Japan and America during the '30s. I cannot atm recall the name - but no doubt someone will have done before I next post! I recall being informed that it's more battleship-based, with aircraft acting more in a scouting role. I also recall that poison gas is employed by the IJN. The author might have been a Henry or a Herbert. I'm uncertain.
 
Around 1930, both the USN and IJN are about equal in numbers of both battleships and carriers, at least in the Pacific, since the USN actually has more due to commitments in the Atlantic as well. The point in 1930 is that the USN is quite unballanced, compared to the IJN, namely a focus on capital ships only with a poor supporting fleet of medium sized combatants.

The IJN in 1930 outnuimbers the USN in the cruiser cathegory, since the USN only has its first two 8 inch cruisers in service, and another six or so on stocks, while the IJN already possesses twelve of them. In the light cruiser group, the USN has only the ten Onaha class ships, compared to the IJN with some 20 or so such light cruisers, which were deployed mainly as destroyerleaders in Japan and not scouting for the Fleet as in the USN.

In destroyers, the IJN had teh upperhand in quality, as the new Special Type Fibuki Class was already in service, as were some follow ups, as well as the numereous post WW1 period vessels of Kamikaze, Minekaze and Mutsuki class, plus several older ones still retained, pending on replacement by more modern types. The USN only had in 1930 the 200+ strong Flushdecker Four funneled type, plus a few older ones, all of an ancient and oldfashioned model, with limmited fightingpower in general. The only advantage of these vessels was their heavy load of torpedoes, comensating the poor quality of the USN torpedo iun this period.

In any case, a battle around 1930, or so would be fought with carriers as the primary weapon of choice, as the USN Lexingtons werer better suited in their original form, than the lesser Akagi and Kaga, who were not optimally reconstructed adn lacked a suitable sized airgroup, before their late 1930's refit. Only the smaller and instable IJN Riyuho and the even smaller IJN Hosho were available, as the USN only had the experimental USS Langley, which was of little fightingvalue, but could act as a supportship to replennish the airgroups of the Lexingtons.
 
Guys

While I'm not sure carriers and a/c would have the necessary capabilities [or prestige] to play the major role in a ~1930 conflict the rest of Warspite's analysis sounds similar to what I've heard from some pretty knowledgeable naval buffs. Also there is the fact that the Japanese had put a lot of work into training for night combat, which can't be countered by radar in this time period.

As such while if the Americans right to the bitter end and are willing to spend several years building overwhelming strength, they could suffer some pretty nasty defeats in the early encounters. Especially if they follow what was their planned policy at the time of advancing westward to relief the Philippines. The question might be whether there would be the public support for a long war if heavy losses were suffered early on, or whether such defeats might motivate solidility. [This is a situation where the US is technically the aggressor in a dow on Japan so won't have the same circumstances as a sneak Japanese attack].

Whatever happened this would have a dramatic effect elsewhere. The Washington Treaty is dead so would see some naval construction elsewhere, especially in Britain. This could be economically beneficial by circulating money and hence moderating the depression. However the other effects could go either way for the rest of the world. Loss of the US and Japan as markets, although the depression was doing much of that anyway. Loss of competition from them would help others and if the US is sucking in money due to going onto a war footing that could ease some of the imbalance due to debts by the US.

Either way could be good for China. No matter how short or long the war will be I expect that the Japanese will be too busy and possibly to exhausted to hassle China for a while.

Steve
 
Sounds like quite the cripple fight.
Would be interesting though- an actual modern battleship war between two naval powers.
 
Strategicly, the IJN would probably have the advantage being War Plan Orange was still the governing phillosophy towards a war with Japan.

How many submarines do you think will be taking potshots at the US fleet as it sorties towards the Phillipines along a very predictable route?
 

CalBear

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The really critical question here is WHEN we are talking about. If we are going back exactly 10 years (12/7/31), it makes a significant difference than if we are talking 10 year before 9/1/39 (generally recognized start of WW II), 4/6/37 (1st China Incident) or 9/18/31 (the Manchuria Incident)

If we take the date as 12/7/31 the tale of the tape runs like this

IJN

3 CV 164 aircraft
7 BB available (three IJN ships are not available with Hiei & Yamashiro in the yard for upgrade and Hyuga demilitarized under terms of the Washington Treaty)
8 CA
16 CL (although 6 of these are actually less capable than the U.S. Clemson flush deck DD)
86 DD (including 16 of the Fubuki Class)
30 SS (ocean going)


The IJN aircraft are, at this point, seriously deficient. The fighter is the A1N, which is a license built variant of the Glouster Gamecock, and bomber aircraft is the B1M, both aircraft are just about at the end of their life cycle. Both aircraft were replaced in 1932 by somewhat superior biplane designs.


USN

3 CV 237 aircraft
14 BB available (all three New Mexico ships are not available since they are in the yard for upgrade) This number does include the Florida & Utah neither of which are likely to be taken out of service with a war on the horizon
6 CA
10 CL
291 DD
48 SS (all "S" boats)


USN aircraft of the era are an interesting mix. The Navy was running through a number of different designs, especially in fighters, where four different designs were in use (F6C, F7C, F2B, F3B). The torpedo planes were also interesting, with the first twin engine carrier capable aircraft in in U.S. service DT-2 being of particular note.

The biggest wild card here is the what would have been built if there was an actual war possible. The fleets were limited by the Washington & London Treaties, but both treaties had escape clauses built in in case of war. With that in the game, it is really hard to say what would have happened.
 
There is another interesting effect. The stimulous might well have greatly reduced the effects of the Depression in the US.

Now I wonder if that re-elects Hoover. Of course there would be lots of American oppostion to such a war. I think the war might be a major issue in the 1932 election (unless the US had clearly won - or I suppose clearly lost but that to me is ASB)
 
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