Overlord and Pacific commands - swapping around

This is inspired by the thread of swapping commands.


First things first: could early Pacific Campaign invasions ‘inspire’ Overlord? Or the other way round?


Admittedly, USN ran the Pacific campaign invasions and these were rather elaborate affairs.


Ramsey had a bit of expertise with amphibious warfare.


Could Overlord have benefitted by having Nimitz in charge of the landings (Neptune)?

How would Overlord have changed if there were a massive influence of USN experience?


How much similarity did we really see between pacific invasions an Overlord?


Who could take Tedder’s place? And would it be a good thing?


And of course: who could be supreme commander (please leave MacArthur alone)?


Could anyone from Europe take Nimitz place?


A bit lose, but is it a good idea to look at?


Ivan
 
In our time line, the techniques used in Anglo-American amphibious operations in both the Pacific and European theaters were remarkably similar. One reason for this was a pre-existing set of approaches and assumptions, one that stemmed from the predominance of Leavenworth-trained staff officers and the work done in the 1930s at Quantico, Newport, and at the US Army War College in Washington, DC. (By the way, Nimitz was involved in the work at the Army War College.) Another reason was the exchange of information between the theaters. A third is the use of a single set of landing ships and landing craft.

The chief differences between the two theaters seem to lie in two areas. Europe had the "Funnies" of Hobart's 79th Armoured Division. The Pacific had Marine close air support.
 
Pertaining just Europe. The naval side of Op OVERLORD, or more accurately Op NEPTUNE, was heavily influenced by the seven or eight corps & army size amphib or littoral operations in the Mediterranean. The half dozen admirals commanding the amphib fleets for Op NEPTUNE had all multiple ops under their belt, in the MTO. Double for their staff.

Conversely the US 1st Army had thinner experience. Mark Clark who had extensive experience in amphib ops since 1939, was left in Italy pondering mountain warfare. Bradley, who had just one such under his belt was picked for the big one. His corps commanders, Gerow and Collins had experience fighting Japanese in tropical jungles. Go figure.

There were a number of Junior officers from the PTO among the US army staff for Op NEPTUNE, but their influence is not clear to me.

The Army Air Force could have looked to the Brits for improving CAS doctrine. They were much more advanced in 1943 than the Yanks in the MTO.

LVT for the assault waves onto Normandy would have been a good idea. Even four or five hundred would help. To make serious difference as many as 1000 would be better.
 
Great responses.

Overlord has always come across as overly complicated and elaborate comparing to Pacific campaigns (to me at least).

I didn’t know about the exchange of experiences (thanks for that heads-up).

The design and manufacture of LSTs and all the other landing craft look late in the day. It also looks as though Husky was the test bed rather than Pacific.

The major difference between attacking across the channel and attacking a set of islands would obviously be the amount of reinforcements which can be applied. Germany had a hinterland which an Island would not have (although Guadalcanal had reinforcements arriving these were not in the size of several divisions after all).

I looked at the numbers of landed troops (day one and immediately thereafter)

Guadalcanal:60,000
Tarawa: 53,000
Overlord: 160,000

What I don’t really get is how soon the invasions of islands became a daily routine in Pacific. After all, it must have been about logistics.

Pacific required floating cities whereas Overlord had only to go to the store to gt parts if someone had forgot something.

It leads into the central question: How much could Turner/Nimitz/USMC add to Overlord and would it even have been smart to swap them into the planning?

How much would a Ramsey et al have added to Pacific campaign (imagining the King would even allow a pomey on the planning staff) after overlord?

PS: I do not subscribe to the USSR notion that the channel was like a broad river and therefore no problem.

Ivan
 
... I looked at the numbers of landed troops (day one and immediately thereafter)

Guadalcanal:60,000
Tarawa: 53,000
Overlord: 160,000
...

The number for OVERLORD represents the first days discharge across the beach. The number for the first day onto Guadalcanal was between 10,000-15,000. 60k represents the rough number for the five month campaign. The Tarawa number is for two divisions & a large corps support group landed across the atoll over 3-4 days.

Op TORCH was the proof of concept for the Med/Europe theatre.
 
Thanks Carl,

It is my understanding that Torch was not supposed to involve a lot fighting. Not saying it was regarded as a peace-time dress rehearsal.

Was Torch then intensively studied for lessons learned for both Pacific and Husky/Overlord? Salerno was in-between together with Anzio.

How much was MacArthur taken into confidence?

If Ramsey was the recognized expert after Overlord, he could just be allocated to Pacific (unified command to use a newer term).

True that Pacific command with its split into USN and US Army (who seemed to be very occupied fighting each other). Could Ramsey go to MacArthur (horror!).

Would it improve anything or best left alone after all.

The numbers are deceptive - agree

Ivan
 
Thanks Carl,

It is my understanding that Torch was not supposed to involve a lot fighting. Not saying it was regarded as a peace-time dress rehearsal.

It was hoped the French leaders would agree to a cease fire before the Allies landed, or shortly after. That could not be counted on the & planned for full combat operations were included. Some Allied leaders were overly optimistic about the French attitude & professed surprise when they did resist. The battle lasted three days, killed over 300 Allied soldiers and wounded approximately 1000 more. Theres a tendency for many hack histories to look into Op TORCH no further than the press releases or a few other overused items. Tactically and operationally the plans for a full on amphibious invasion were executed. The state of the art, for Nov 1942, equipment and doctrine were used. Lack of experience & over optimism caused a number of lower and intermediate level commanders to make mistakes. Others did much better.

Was Torch then intensively studied for lessons learned for both Pacific and Husky/Overlord? Salerno was in-between together with Anzio.

Yes. The same naval staffs of the amphib fleet planned TORCH and the subsequent operations. On the navy side there was a fair amount continuity of command. Individuals rotating in & out of staff or command positions occurred, but there was a accumulation of experience. Ramsey ensured that experience was transferred from the Mediteranean to the UK for the last six months of preparing for NEPTUNE/OVERLORD. On the Army side there was somewhat less continuity. Anderson's 1st Army HQ was returned to the UK & only a few staff participated in subsequent ops in the Med. 8th Army HQ accumulated some experience in Ops HUSKY & BAYTOWN & Monty made sure some staff with this experience went to the UK at the end of 1943. The Brit infantry divisions that remained in the Med accumulated experience in Ops HUSKY, BAYTOWN, AVALANCHE, & SHINGLE, as did the US Army divisions, corps, and army staff. Note that Mark Clark was deeply involved in planning Op TORCH, HUSKY, AVALANCHE, BRIMSTONE, FIREBRAND first as Eisenhowers deputy, then as the 5th Army commander. A number of key staff officers were shifted between Ikes HQ, 7th Army, and then 5th Army specifically for planning the amphib portion of the operations. None of this was perfect but it worked.

A break did occur in the US Army between the Med and preparation for Op NEPTUNE. As I pointed out earlier few experienced staff or commanders were transferred to Britain. Clark with the largest experience remained in the Med. Bradly with little was placed in charge of US 1st Army, while Patton with more experience was given a follow up role.

There were reports and analysis passed back and forth between the PTO & ETO/MTO. HQ AGF was responsible for that on the Army side & the information was filtered in many cases by school staffs with no direct experience. PTO experience was narrower as the battles or campaigns were smaller through 1942-44. In the MTO/ETO staffs were planing army or army group size ops and were less able to focus on the assault phase. In that there was a tendency to pay less attention to PTO lessons as those were limited to brief beach head or lodgment battles.

How much was MacArthur taken into confidence?

I heard one Army officer describe the reports coming from Macs command as "garbage". I've not read them, so I don't know. That individual had studied Army ops in the PTO as part of his Command and Staff schooling so maybe his opinion meant something. Eichelberger & Kruger planned and executed a lot of amphib ops. But, their reports were filtered through Macs HQ staff. Also their larger operations were in the PI, after the amphib ops in Europe were wound down.

If Ramsey was the recognized expert after Overlord, he could just be allocated to Pacific (unified command to use a newer term).

Technically he was. IIRC he went to India to supervise Commonwealth ops relating to Sumatra, Mtaylasia, the Adaman Islands. ect... Beyond that Turner & his peers had direct experience in the conditions of the PTO. Which Ramsey did not.

True that Pacific command with its split into USN and US Army (who seemed to be very occupied fighting each other). Could Ramsey go to MacArthur (horror!).

The only significant split in the PTO was between the South Pacific and Central Pacific regions. Mac and Nimitz. The Army/Navy disagreements beyond that were in detail. As anticipated in War Plan ORANGE the bulk of the ground forces for the Pacific War were to be Army, and the Army ground forces used would be subordinate to the Navy in those operations. Little changed in the Central Pacific there. The number of Marines deployed was far more than anticipated. Perhaps three times the proportion originally envisioned. That had to do with manpower allocations reaching as far back as the 1940 mobilization, the Europe first policy, and reductions in the planned size of Army ground forces. King formed additional Marine units out of the overall manpower allocation for the Navy, to make up for Army units that were either diverted to Macs S PAC command, or that were never mobilized.

This brings up one item of lessons learned imperfectly. 1943-45 the Navy strengthens the Marine units on a ongoing basis. Redoing the TE/TO frequently to increase firepower or combat power. AGF sent their standard organization infantry divisions to the PTO with relatively few modifications. Additional specialized support units were included for the corps or army level support pool, but this was not the same as the Navy approach with the Marine divisions. This may be because the Marines doctrine was driven from the bottom up,rather than from the top down. This included a very large rotation of veteran officers & NCOs from the Pacific back to training units in the US. This went all the way to the top with the commandant being the veteran division commander on Guadalcanal. It was not until 1945 the Army actively modified its infantry divisions for battle in Japan.

I'd note that much of the experience in the PTO of 1943 & early1944 would not have applied to the ETO. Most of the amphib ops we think of, like Op FORAGER, occured to late or after the same in the ETO wound down. From the perspective of November 1943 the battle on Betio island seemed a anomaly, so its not surprising its lessons did not transfer to the ETO. The main lesson, that infantry losses would be larger than anticipated was not grasped. The heavy losses of the infantry regiments in the PTO 1942-43 were not understood, often dismissed as due to local conditions, or as incompetent command. That one bit the US Army in the ass after larger ops in the MTO or PTO ramped up in late 1943.
 
As stated earlier, assigning LVT's to D-Day could have had a major positive effect especially if there had been time to plan specifically to use their particular strengths.
 
As stated earlier, assigning LVT's to D-Day could have had a major positive effect especially if there had been time to plan specifically to use their particular strengths.
Or they might just have been launched too far out & suffered the same problems as the DD tanks.
 
Not something the British did OTL! and on the British sector having a couple of hundred LVTs on the western end around Ousterham could IMVHO been a major advantage.
 
As stated earlier, assigning LVT's to D-Day could have had a major positive effect especially if there had been time to plan specifically to use their particular strengths.

I disagree; the main strength of the LVT was its ability to move troops through long stretches of shallow water, such as those covering coral reefs of atolls in the PTO or mudbanks in the Scheldt Estuary in the ETO. These conditions were not really present in Normandy, and as such LVTs could do little that more traditional landing craft could not. The LVT(A) 4 could have been useful, but it did little that the DD Sherman could not.
 
In the PTO both the US Marines and Army found the armored versions of the LVT superior to foot for getting the fist assault waves across the beach to the first cover. The first use, at Betio Island of the LVT in the assault saw the first wave carried across 700+ meters of shallow water under fire. The lead battalions were landed intact at the seawall with realatively low casualties. Subsequent waves that waded across the reef took heavy losses and we're badly disorganized.

Crossing a 300 meter beach, like JUNO or OMAHA beaches @ Normandy with full combat load takes 2-4 minutes on foot. In. LVT it takes less than a minute, and there is shielding from small arms fire with 2-3 MG to return fire. When dismounting the sections and squads are still together, vs dispersed from advancing on foot. Which sounds better?

To use another Normandy example, the US 4th Division was limited to advancing along off UTAH beach on four causeways. With LVT a broader and swifter crossing of the flooded zone could have been made.
 
I disagree; the main strength of the LVT was its ability to move troops through long stretches of shallow water, such as those covering coral reefs of atolls in the PTO or mudbanks in the Scheldt Estuary in the ETO. These conditions were not really present in Normandy, and as such LVTs could do little that more traditional landing craft could not. The LVT(A) 4 could have been useful, but it did little that the DD Sherman could not.

Your right, and the use would probably have killed the assault waves long before they reached the beach.


There are several major issue with the LVT in europe.

1. the means of loading at sea requires lengthy transpositions from ship, to Landing craft to LVT at night on a deadline.

2. Nonoe had a problem with running LCM to shore and unloading proper tanks onto the beaches direct.

3 Once in the LVT you move at about half the speed of the boats, so the whole landing waits on them or you are in the beaten zone for twice as long or its a follow on wave. The beach crossing ( assuming someone else has dealt with the beach obstacles) is not the issue its the ship to shore distance

4 The Pacific sea conditions are generally either totally impossible or dead calm, The Channel is really hard, all the time. There is chop, current, countercurrent, tide, riptide and winds. Total bastard for small boat handling. Small slow, wet badly steering boats, even worse.

5 LVTs, whether armored or unarmored, are very vulnerable to hostile fire since the armor does not provide protection against concentrated fire.( from Amphib Doctrine US pacific fleet sept 1944) One wonders how much more effective a barely bullet proof vehicle would have been on Omaha compared with the whole of the 743rd Tank Bn.

6. You have no freeboard.

The last is probable the kicker The freeboard on a LVT is generally listed as low, not much, very low or less than a foot. What seems to happened with 741st was not the distance ( which was execessive) but that they were launched in the wrong place, drove parallel to shore fine, turned inshore, and all of them sank during the turn

7. They wont be in the Pacific, where they are useful lifting one company at a time of the assault units and then being a ship-shore gopher.

8. Look at a picture of Omaha from the german positions, the only armour you need is top armour.

9. More generally for the war in Europe, D Day last - 24 hours the Army, Army Group Designates job is not that 24 Hours, it the next 6 months. He has lot of other people to deal with, not even overture, unlocking the doors to the theatre.
 
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