Overestimated historical states

That's the problem with centralized states, they are overrated as hell.Same thing occurred in China. In the North-South Dynasty period of China where the aristocracy still exist, Chinese armies were able to resist barbarians well and even periodically reconquered parts of Northern China. The Song and Ming Dynasty by contrast,where the aristocracy was replaced by the bureaucracy, no such thing occurred and both Dynasties saw little effective resistance despite their size and economy. In a centralized state,there was no obligation on the part of local elites to defend the state because they can just switch a master and still pay taxes. In a feudal state where obligations and duties are stressed between the ruler and the local elite, the local elite are obliged to defend the state either out of a sense of honour or to protect such rights which may not be honored by a new conqueror.

In the case of Chinese states, they tended to be a bit more successful in conquests ultra-China. There was also an undeniable notion within China regarding the divine mandate and how it related to the rejection of unjust and tyrannical rule of the bureaucracy. Byzantium on the otherhand, had no such conception. Rather, they had all of these competing factions who brought little positive benefits, yet were able to implement every negative policy and condition that their faction represented.

Bureaucracy: The only major positive I can see, was that the Byzantine policy regarding the movement of peoples to and fro in Anatolia and Europe, tended to be effective in quelling revolt and populating various areas of interest. Other than this, we have only negatives. Bureaucratic states or statist elements can have the effect of preferring either; standing armies of less than adequately trained warrior who were operatives of the state or mercenary armies who were bought and sold as pleased, but posed little threat to the ruling class. In the case of Byzantium, we find that this is consistently a common theme when not under extremely skilled militarist emperors. Some scholars, such as John Julius Norwich, have described the bureaucracy as having an unbridled hatred and fear of all things military, especially the nobles of Anatolia. They were paranoid of the Iconoclast militarist schemes and feared too that fetish of military would allow constant change of the guard. The bureaucracy also constantly flowed toward centrality of imperial custom and attempted to defang any local rule or powerbase and wished to displace said peoples and move them across the empire in haphazard ways. Their issue too, was focusing on how to centralize power fully in what they owned currently and attempting to apply notions of state that worked in Constantinople to rural areas; the ivory tower of Constantinople as some have termed it.

Military: In contrast to the Bureaucracy, who wished to rule from Constantinople and effectively manage the populace, we have a military that viewed the empire from the frontlines of war. This is most exhibited in the Iconoclast heresy and the militarist emperors who viewed the empire entirely different. They wished to expand the empire and recreate it into something that could run in a changing world. They however, in their methods became infamous. Completely alienating the population of Greece, by destroying monasteries, relics, raising taxes for war constantly and challenging the Papacy, was a losing proposition. These emperors found their beginning in images such as Heraclius, supposed heroic figures to whom they regarded as figures of divine kingship. Who wished at all costs to both increase imperial power, military strength and to compromise with the southern and eastern elements of the empire, even at the cost of its western base (Anatolia-Greece-Sicily-etc). Meanwhile, as the militarist emperors attempted to expand the empire, the bureaucracy behind the lines attempted to apply Constantinople and their policies and hampered existing systems, while the militarist emperors did the same, disallowing positives of bureaucratic empires.

In later times we have the aristocratic land lords of Anatolia who become prominent and are part of the general discontent. Unwilling to submit to either force despite their creation at the behest of one of these sorts of agencies.

Frankly, there was a centralism, but of the worst kind, where factions aspire to total centralism but achieve complete hierarchical disunity except when a stellar emperor is on the throne.
 
In the case of Chinese states, they tended to be a bit more successful in conquests ultra-China. There was also an undeniable notion within China regarding the divine mandate and how it related to the rejection of unjust and tyrannical rule of the bureaucracy. Byzantium on the otherhand, had no such conception. Rather, they had all of these competing factions who brought little positive benefits, yet were able to implement every negative policy and condition that their faction represented.
It should be noted that in periods of conquest ultra-China, the empire wasn't run by bureaucrats,but an aristocracy schooled in military arts, civil administration and Confucian classics--much like the Roman aristocracy of the Republican era. The problem with the Song and Ming Dynasty was that you no longer have a class that is skilled in all three aspects and that most of the elite who replaced the previous one was primarily obsessed with being trained in Confucian classics--neglecting the former two aspects.Same type of factionalism you mentioned happened with these bureaucrats as well.Even if a Confucian bureaucrat is skilled in all three aspects, he would be limited by divisions of power that would limit his ability to rebel--as well as his ability to mobilize the resources of a particular area to defend the state successfully. Under normal circumstances within the Northern Song Dynasty for example, there was no single governor in the provincial level--there was a guy in charge of carrying out justice,a guy in charge of finance and one more bloke in charge of the army. Provincial governors were only appointed in times of disaster--in which case it would be hard for the governor to build up a power-base, but at the same time meant that he wouldn't have enough time to cultivate relationships and mobilize local resources against the enemy either.Simply put,prior to the industrial era, an elite that's detached from the military is basically utter insanity.The same in regards to over centralization.It was simply too advanced for a country's well being.
 
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It should be noted that in periods of conquest ultra-China, the empire wasn't run by bureaucrats,but an aristocracy schooled in military arts, civil administration and Confucian classics--much like the Roman aristocracy of the Republican era. The problem with the Song and Ming Dynasty was that you no longer have a class that is skilled in all three aspects and that most of the elite who replaced the previous one was primarily obsessed with being trained in Confucian classics--neglecting the former two aspects.Same type of factionalism you mentioned happened with these bureaucrats as well.Even if a Confucian bureaucrat is skilled in all three aspects, he would be limited by divisions of power that would limit his ability to rebel--as well as his ability to mobilize the resources of a particular area to defend the state successfully. Under normal circumstances within the Northern Song Dynasty for example, there was no single governor in the provincial level--there was a guy in charge of carrying out justice,a guy in charge of finance and one more bloke in charge of the army. Provincial governors were only appointed in times of disaster--in which case it would be hard for the governor to build up a power-base, but at the same time meant that he wouldn't have enough time to cultivate relationships and mobilize local resources against the enemy either.Simply put,prior to the industrial era, an elite that's detached from the military is basically utter insanity.It was simply too advanced for a country's well being.

Perhaps this is some of the great success of the Neo-Assyrian imperial system. Namely, bureaucrat was meant to signify simply a eunuch who was involved in military affairs and had a role that was less on battle but in some sort of militaristic build-up or some duty related to military affairs or religion (also military affairs, considering the importance of omens and symbolism). In other words, you did not have bureaucrats who ruled lands just for the sake of administration as in Byzantium, where these bureaucrats seemed to wish to rule the country for no purpose other than perhaps tax collection(?). In other words, administration with vision, is what was practiced by Assyria and I am sure is the ideal situation for any state that wishes to perpetuate itself most efficiently.
 
Ancient source: "The Persians invaded Greece with 500,000 soldiers"

Chinaboo: Nah, impossible.

Ancient source: "Chinese armies with over 700,000 elite soldiers. Battles fought by millions."

Chinaboo: China stronk.
 
Ancient source: "The Persians invaded Greece with 500,000 soldiers"

Chinaboo: Nah, impossible.

Ancient source: "Chinese armies with over 700,000 elite soldiers. Battles fought by millions."

Chinaboo: China stronk.
I personally never seen this, though I do think that it's pretty weird that we trust primary sources about army sizes at all, they make no sense most of the times.
 
Never said they were superior in courage, they were superior in discipline and training and Vercingetorix realized this by constantly avoiding open battle against the Romans.
You're missing the emphasis. The point is that the Celts didn't see themselves as inferior in open battle, but in siege warfare.




The Romans didn’t have a standing army by this time, but those men by 52 had been fighting for the good part of 9 years, that’s bound to make you a professional.

They don’t actually ever describe how equipped they were themselves, all
mentions are made in passing distractedly, but it’s a fact that at the time of Cannae some Roman soldiers didn’t even have decent armor. If some Romans at the time could’t afford armor before, how could the Nervii, or the Venetii?
Then that's the product of a very specific set of circumstances, not a general attribute of Roman armies.

Why should we assume Roman militias were better armored than Gauls? It was a rich country, and Caesar writes than large scale iron working was highly developed in Gaul, after all. Moreover, when was this actually become an appreciable tactical advantage? Especially considering the fact that the tall shields of the Gauls would have protected them perfectly adequately; torso armor is usually the last priority for warriors armoring themselves, indicating its marginal importance.

The one time I remember Caesar saying Celts and Germans employing a phalanx was in the battle against Ariovistus, and the Romans immediately ripped their shields off of them and routed them. In a proper phalanx, you’d never be able to do that.

You misread that battle. Caesar led the attack on the weaker wing of the Germans and routed it, but the stronger wing pushed the Romans back despite their attempts to leap on their shields. It was the intervention of fresh reserves that tipped the scales, not the attempt to pull away their shields. The Helvetii also advanced in phalanxes, supposedly overlapping their shields to the point that Roman pila could pin two together.

In ancient warfare usually two sides moved against one another after several skirmishes and the battle turned out to be a pushing contest between the two armies. The one who would break first would lose. Usually, a well planned flanking manouver by a cavalry unit decided the day. Aside from Caesar’s battles, and the ones right before the Second Punic War, we don’t have much detail about battles between Romans and Celts or Germans. From what little we can see, the Romans often lost because they were overwhelmed by the Celts’ numbers, or because they were caught by surprise. For that reason, Marius expressively ordered his soldiers to stand their ground and not ever move from the vantage point he had picked at Aquae Sextiae, because he knew the Teutons would just be inconsiderate and try to overwhelm them. When the Romans did charge, it was always in good order, after throwing their pila, when the Celts charged, they always tried to smash through the Romans and overwhelm them by sheer numbers. All the Romans had to do to avoid that was pick a good position and tire them out until they could rout them.
Again, this is just caricature. Caesar constantly describes continental Celts fighting in good order; most people get their image of Gallic warfare from the Britons, who are far more wild than the Gauls. Moreover, we have instances where the Romans catch barbarians by surprise and still lose, for example in the earlier battles of the Cimbri-Teutone War. Of course the Celts try to smash through while charging, that's what charging is. This is substituting prose for analysis.

No Roman general in antiquity ever used that excuse, no account of that has ever come to us anyway. The Celts did defeat the Romans several times, by overwhelming them, it has never happened that a small number of Celts managed to defeat in open battle a large number of Romans. The reverse however was often the case, of course not on the grand scale suggested by the Romans themselves. Caesar constantly won because he was a general with few equals, and because he was commanding the best army of the time.
We hardly have enough evidence to say whether the Romans were usually outnumbered against the Celts; of course they're going to blame overwhelming numbers when defeated. Considering their much lower urbanization, population density, and less developed public finance, there's good reason to believe they would have struggled to match Roman numbers, who raised more than a quarter million men in arms from Italy alone in 225 BC; it was by their numerical superiority that they defeated the Celts in that war. That said, the Romans quite often did blame the quality of their soldiers for their defeats, as Nathan Rosenstein has analyzed at length. The Romans rarely held defeated commanders accountable, instead shifting the blame onto religious technicalities, ill disciplined soldiers, or else reframing even the worst defeats as stepping stones to victory, rather than debacles for which the state had to account. The aristocracy's ability to blame others for their defeats was actually one of the Republic's great strengths, as it deescalated intra-elite competition and preserved the legitimacy of the state in the face of defeat.
 
I personally never seen this, though I do think that it's pretty weird that we trust primary sources about army sizes at all, they make no sense most of the times.
It depends on the source. Polybios is very familiar with the Roman army, and describes its order of battle in detail referencing the history of Fabius Pictor. For Hannibal's army, he had the benefit of the bronze tablets Hannibal had left behind when he departed Italy. Generally, when the source breaks down armies and numbers individual contingents, that's a good indication that it's being reasonably accurate with army sizes.
 
@dandan_noodles

In the prior post, you mentioned that the Celts would have struggled to match Rome in army size composition. Though my knowledge of the Gauls is limited, I would like to clarify a point. Is your opinion, that in the pre-industrial world, large sedentary state entities could achieve large numbers of troops in single campaigns than 'less advanced' armies of same periods, in pitched battles. If so, it would be not entirely the case, often armies of steppe nomads or otherwise intensely rural and 'wild' peoples could form larger armies of soldiers than organized sedentary states, especially men with skills in battle. The toils of life in more warlike lands, could create larger quantities of men with skills with weapons, especially bows, javelin and so forth and thus have a more ready number of warriors for pitched battles. Sedentary farming folk, would have little in the way of know-how regarding warfare and would have to either be taught or be slaughtered by more trained enemies in the field. Even supposed trained standing armies could find themselves dispersed across wide fronts and or poorly attuned for coming conflicts and due to poor leadership-planning or simple failure, could be overwhelmed by peoples with fewer civilian population but momentarily larger armies. When the standing Sassanid armies protected the east, the Sassanid standing army was dispersed across vast terrain and due to this combined with poor training, were viciously mauled by the Celestial Turks who needed to not worry of logistics of losing territory and focus their campaign in tight zones of import. Ultimately, it was the nobility who had the prowess, to defeat the Turks and turn the tide, while the conventional wisdom standing army of mass infantry was the inferior quality who hid behind walls and garrisoned cities and were raised from free cities or farming communities who possessed little in the way of military training.
 
It depends on the source. Polybios is very familiar with the Roman army, and describes its order of battle in detail referencing the history of Fabius Pictor. For Hannibal's army, he had the benefit of the bronze tablets Hannibal had left behind when he departed Italy. Generally, when the source breaks down armies and numbers individual contingents, that's a good indication that it's being reasonably accurate with army sizes.
I still don't see a reason to believe those numbers as they are generally ridiculously high, especially when you match them with general population estimations. I'm pretty sure Herodotus also break down individual contigents when he explained how the Persians totally sent 1-2 million men to Greece.
They imply modern war level of mobilization, even if we assume the numbers referenced mention non-combatants too.
 
I personally never seen this, though I do think that it's pretty weird that we trust primary sources about army sizes at all, they make no sense most of the times.

I see it more in Quora and Youtube discussions, here in AH.com we don't even have that many threads about China to begin with.
 
I still don't see a reason to believe those numbers as they are generally ridiculously high, especially when you match them with general population estimations. I'm pretty sure Herodotus also break down individual contigents when he explained how the Persians totally sent 1-2 million men to Greece.
They imply modern war level of mobilization, even if we assume the numbers referenced mention non-combatants too.

It is most certainly ridiculous the idea of the Achaemenids sending an army of over 1 million into war. The Neo-Assyrian empire in the reign of Ashurbanipal had a standing army of around 85-90k soldiers (100 years in the past, the number was approximately 75-80k, during the reign of Sargon II) spread across the empire. There was additional nobility and armies that could be garnered from these lands. Considering noble levies or other emergency levies, I would assume no greater than 120k and less than 110k as likely. These would never be expanded into a single battle or campaign.

The Achaemenids did not rule a populace that much more populous than that of the Assyrian Empire, and likely had a smaller population than the Assyrian empire in key sectors, primarily in Mesopotamia, wherein we know of great population drops in areas such as Assyria, Sumeria and Babylonia and corresponding declines in Urartu and Egypt. Further, it is not even assured in my view, that the Achaemenid empire had a larger military force than Assyria in 630 BCE... Assyria was far more skilled in the art of levy than the Elamo-Persians and waged war more frequently. I would tend to be of the opinion, that the Achaemenids had much smaller armies than we take for granted.
 
Without knowing the nuances of a particular people, their culture and world position, it's not hard to say that 'all of them' is an accurate answer when regarding overestimated polities (and underestimated ones too but that's something else).
 
It is most certainly ridiculous the idea of the Achaemenids sending an army of over 1 million into war. The Neo-Assyrian empire in the reign of Ashurbanipal had a standing army of around 85-90k soldiers (100 years in the past, the number was approximately 75-80k, during the reign of Sargon II) spread across the empire. There was additional nobility and armies that could be garnered from these lands. Considering noble levies or other emergency levies, I would assume no greater than 120k and less than 110k as likely. These would never be expanded into a single battle or campaign.

The Achaemenids did not rule a populace that much more populous than that of the Assyrian Empire, and likely had a smaller population than the Assyrian empire in key sectors, primarily in Mesopotamia, wherein we know of great population drops in areas such as Assyria, Sumeria and Babylonia and corresponding declines in Urartu and Egypt. Further, it is not even assured in my view, that the Achaemenid empire had a larger military force than Assyria in 630 BCE... Assyria was far more skilled in the art of levy than the Elamo-Persians and waged war more frequently. I would tend to be of the opinion, that the Achaemenids had much smaller armies than we take for granted.
The 1 million figure is just a example of how a contemporary historian could "logic" his way into ridiculous figure while making sound arguments, building on premises he personally found solid.

But at the same time if the Achaemenids could levy less than 120k people, what would this mean in terms of what could be sent to peninsular Greece?
 
That wasn’t a pitch battle man, some legionaries were ambushed when dispersed, their commander panicked and didn’t have the stones to wait for reinforcements. I’m talking about battles when one army stands against the other.
"Bah, that was only an ambush, nothing to worry about."
-Marc Antony after losing two legions and most of his siege engines

Indeed, that’s why the Romans could never expand in the Parthian’s territory, but the Parthian strategy mainly consisted in avoiding field battle with the Romans and draw them on wide terrain to employ their cavalry.
So the Parthians were weak because their superior mobility allowed them to initiate battles on terms that favoured them and generally dictate the course of the war? If the Romans are too slow to force engagements then that's their problem, not Parthia's.
 
US of A is one of the most overestimated, the Americans helped Aguinaldo so that he can help them destroy the Philippine rebel states just before they rolled the ball on the treaty of Paris, America tends to have the most trickster accomplices to do their bidding especially during late 19th and early 20th century.
 
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The 1 million figure is just a example of how a contemporary historian could "logic" his way into ridiculous figure while making sound arguments, building on premises he personally found solid.

But at the same time if the Achaemenids could levy less than 120k people, what would this mean in terms of what could be sent to peninsular Greece?

My opinion would be the Achaemenid empire had no more than 250k soldiers across the entire empire. Though, my suspect is that it was far, far less and possibly in general times only residing around 100k or less frankly. The Sassanid empire, possessed at its height of centralism in terms of the later failed experiment of standing armies, could muster around 70k soldiers from Iraq, Iran, Armenia and the oriental sectors of the empire. The Achaemenids will have more than this number, but likely not much more than this number, if we consider that their armies were most likely an ensemble of Elamo-Persians and Medes and at times, Mesopotamians and Phoenicians. In other words, though the Achaemenids ruled a vast land, not all of it can be seen as areas that the Achaemenids can effectively levy troops or even that there were such numbers of men to be levied. Assyria is one example, traditionally the most productive in terms of troop numbers in the Ancient Near East, was wholly devoid of levy potential.

Regarding the numbers of troops sent to Peninsular Greece, considering what Assyria would send on campaigns, I would see something around 15-50k. Though, my expertise is outside of this realm entirely, regarding Achaemenid relations to Greece. MY knowledge tends to hover around Mesopotamia in this period...
 
I personally never seen this, though I do think that it's pretty weird that we trust primary sources about army sizes at all, they make no sense most of the times.

They're generally not too bad when enumerating troops from their own side. When it comes to enemy armies they're usually pretty worthless, because the writer wouldn't have access to enemy records and most people are pretty bad at estimating the size of crowds (especially when afraid, as soldiers about to go into battle tend to be).

I still don't see a reason to believe those numbers as they are generally ridiculously high, especially when you match them with general population estimations. I'm pretty sure Herodotus also break down individual contigents when he explained how the Persians totally sent 1-2 million men to Greece.

I don't think he does, actually -- he breaks down the individual contingents who were (supposedly) present in the army, but when giving numbers he just gives the overall figures, rather than trying to break them down by nation.

The Achaemenids did not rule a populace that much more populous than that of the Assyrian Empire, and likely had a smaller population than the Assyrian empire in key sectors, primarily in Mesopotamia, wherein we know of great population drops in areas such as Assyria, Sumeria and Babylonia and corresponding declines in Urartu and Egypt. Further, it is not even assured in my view, that the Achaemenid empire had a larger military force than Assyria in 630 BCE... Assyria was far more skilled in the art of levy than the Elamo-Persians and waged war more frequently. I would tend to be of the opinion, that the Achaemenids had much smaller armies than we take for granted.

Odd, I've heard the complete opposite -- that the Achaemenid Empire was the most populous state in the world at the time. Indeed, I've even seen it claimed that, in terms of percentage of world population under its control, the Achaemenid Empire was the most populous ever; although since I can't remember the source for that, I'd take it with a healthy grain of salt.

Regarding the numbers of troops sent to Peninsular Greece, considering what Assyria would send on campaigns, I would see something around 15-50k. Though, my expertise is outside of this realm entirely, regarding Achaemenid relations to Greece. MY knowledge tends to hover around Mesopotamia in this period...

Fifteen thousand is certainly far too small, and even fifty thousand probably is as well. The Greek reaction to the Persian invasion indicates that the Greek victory was a startling upset, which would make far more sense if Xerxes' army was large than if it was only a couple of tens of thousands.
 
On the note of historical sources for army sizes, how the heck were Athens and Sparta levying such massive fleets and armies durring the Peloponnesian wars?
 
@Fabius Maximus

The Achaemenid empire was certainly populous and the most so perhaps for the period. However, my point, was the population in Assyria-Babylonia had been higher in earlier times, especially, in say 705 BCE. This is a known quantity regarding the population decline of Akkadian populaces under the Achaemenid empire and the continued growth of the Aramaic-West Semtic contingent of the land. Assyria in this period, becomes increasingly less urbanized and less-sedentary in this period and some cities show enormous population declines, especially Ninevah, Assur, Kalhu, Dur-Sharrukin, Arrapha etc.. Some cities in Mesopotamia were completely made uninhabited in this period or only lightly so, such as Dur-Kurigalzu (the old capitol of the Kassite period of Babylonia and a major city under the late Assyrian empire). Borsippa another example, would remain in ruins under the Achaemenid empire and would only find respite under Selucid and later Arsacid empires, despite being the cult centre of the high god Naboo/Nabu.

The number of 50k, is not small in my estimation. You would have to assume that the Achaemenids could produce an army of larger number than Assyria in the excess of double. Assyria had clearly, 75-90k in its late stage empire, of standing and up to 120k in emergency. Considering this, Achaemenid imperial total armies would have exceeded the Assyrian ones possibly, if we assume that, it is doubtful in an empire with less than 300k troops definitely, would expend 70k+ in one campaign, especially when they have vast regions to garrison and only levy from portions of their populace.
 
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