Overestimated Germany 1939?

This is something that just reached my ears.
Apperantly, Germany of 1939 was really overestimated.

Military Divisions of WWII =

France - Mobilized 110 of which 65 could fight battle offensive direct. Of these 65, 5 was cavallery, 2 mechanized and one tank division ( or Char du Combat ).300 Bombers

Poland -
30 'Good' divisions, 10 reserves, 12 BIG cavallery divs ( well, almost useless but still ). One of these twelve cavs motorized.

United Kingdom - 26 Divs. Planned to train up to 55 ( ! )

600 Bombers

Germany -
98 mobilized of which 52 was ready for battle offensive direct. Of the 46 divisions not IB, 36 was practically useless since they were old divisions from WWI. Ten of the 46 was actually useable...

Althought, Germany had some of these divisions motorized, which would prove to be more valuable than all the rest.

1400-1500 Bombers

There were some problems to the allied powers and strenghts to Germany -

UK overestimated Polands ( they thought it was bigger and more effective than the soviet :eek: ) and Frances forces. Although not the french as much as the polish.
UK was "afraid" to force the french military high command to change strategy into a new fast strategy with use of tanks. After all, France had all the time in history been the great tacticans and strategs in land battles. Now in the WWII, they were so far behind they could be. Every battle needed to be started with artillery fire, and than great infantry forces carved the enemy out etc etc.
And if France were behind in strategy than we shouldn't even discuss the polish situation ( they have been described to be 80 years after or something like that ( :eek: ! ) ). They were so sure of victory they didn't take the good defensive positions in the swamps and by the rivers.

In France, except for the brits ( who didn't dare say something to the 'experts' of France ) Charles de Gaulle par example wanted to change the strategy into a strategy counting of speed and encirclements and not a war of numbers.

Another grave mistake was to let Germany occupy Czechoslovakia. They had 25 good trained divisions and a superior defensive line in the Sudet and Moravia. Their army were of the same if not better quality than the germans. Letting Germany get Sudet was the biggest mistake they could do.

Another mistake done by the allies, UK did as they had done in the first world war blockading german ports from getting anything from the outside. They thought this would have direct effect striking out the war will of the germans and making them starve in masses. This didn't happen ( at least not in such a full-scale as planned ) and the Brits fought on happily unaware of the german ability to gain supplies.

BTW, France and Belgium could better have used the plans they got during the Mechelen Incident, acting like they didn't knew anything in a better way than they did.

They thought ( particulary France ) that Germany had a much bigger resource income than they had. Germany badly missed oil income and could only be saved by occupaying the Ploësti fields intact or the Caucasus oil fields ( and how possible is that ? ). France and UK also missed some resources but thought they were in a much more terrible situation than Germany.

To finally end all these mistakes, the allied powers DECLINED a soviet invitation to an anti-German coaliation.

Germany on the other side had discovered the usefullness of speed during war and bombers. They had more mechanized divisions at the beginning of the war than all the allies together.

To add is that France and UK actually had more tanks than Germany but they used them ( after french tactics ) as scout forces for infantry and not using their superior speed.

( If someone feels like something I've written is wrong than please post about it here :) )

Although these bad signs and estimates, Germany was incredlible short in usefull divisions compared to allies. Anyone else than I feeling that Germany is overestimated or France/UK underestimated. War together with Czeckoslovakia, attack during the polish campaign or moving forces into Belgium after Mechelen Incident were all possible ways stopping the cathastrophe 1940.

( Mechelen Incident - If Germany hadn't known that France got their hands on it, they had tried to smash towards France with their tanks straight into large Anglo-French tank forces, superior to german tanks in armor and firepower. This would probably cripple the german Blitzkrieg so they couldn't defeat France in six weeks or probably never. )
 
I don't think the UK so much underestimated Poland's military as forced them to delay mobilization so that it wasn't available when needed.

Also, France was weakened by internal division, which left it vulnerable.

Finally, Germany probably benefited from the dissolution of its general staff structure, which left German commanders more able to utilize innovation.

It's way more complicated than that, but I'm in a hurry and too hungry to think.

This is something that just reached my ears.
Apperantly, Germany of 1939 was really overestimated.

Military Divisions of WWII =

France - Mobilized 110 of which 65 could fight battle offensive direct. Of these 65, 5 was cavallery, 2 mechanized and one tank division ( or Char du Combat ).300 Bombers

Poland -
30 'Good' divisions, 10 reserves, 12 BIG cavallery divs ( well, almost useless but still ). One of these twelve cavs motorized.

United Kingdom - 26 Divs. Planned to train up to 55 ( ! )

600 Bombers

Germany -
98 mobilized of which 52 was ready for battle offensive direct. Of the 46 divisions not IB, 36 was practically useless since they were old divisions from WWI. Ten of the 46 was actually useable...

Althought, Germany had some of these divisions motorized, which would prove to be more valuable than all the rest.

1400-1500 Bombers

There were some problems to the allied powers and strenghts to Germany -

UK overestimated Polands ( they thought it was bigger and more effective than the soviet :eek: ) and Frances forces. Although not the french as much as the polish.
UK was "afraid" to force the french military high command to change strategy into a new fast strategy with use of tanks. After all, France had all the time in history been the great tacticans and strategs in land battles. Now in the WWII, they were so far behind they could be. Every battle needed to be started with artillery fire, and than great infantry forces carved the enemy out etc etc.
And if France were behind in strategy than we shouldn't even discuss the polish situation ( they have been described to be 80 years after or something like that ( :eek: ! ) ). They were so sure of victory they didn't take the good defensive positions in the swamps and by the rivers.

In France, except for the brits ( who didn't dare say something to the 'experts' of France ) Charles de Gaulle par example wanted to change the strategy into a strategy counting of speed and encirclements and not a war of numbers.

Another grave mistake was to let Germany occupy Czechoslovakia. They had 25 good trained divisions and a superior defensive line in the Sudet and Moravia. Their army were of the same if not better quality than the germans. Letting Germany get Sudet was the biggest mistake they could do.

Another mistake done by the allies, UK did as they had done in the first world war blockading german ports from getting anything from the outside. They thought this would have direct effect striking out the war will of the germans and making them starve in masses. This didn't happen ( at least not in such a full-scale as planned ) and the Brits fought on happily unaware of the german ability to gain supplies.

BTW, France and Belgium could better have used the plans they got during the Mechelen Incident, acting like they didn't knew anything in a better way than they did.

They thought ( particulary France ) that Germany had a much bigger resource income than they had. Germany badly missed oil income and could only be saved by occupaying the Ploësti fields intact or the Caucasus oil fields ( and how possible is that ? ). France and UK also missed some resources but thought they were in a much more terrible situation than Germany.

To finally end all these mistakes, the allied powers DECLINED a soviet invitation to an anti-German coaliation.

Germany on the other side had discovered the usefullness of speed during war and bombers. They had more mechanized divisions at the beginning of the war than all the allies together.

To add is that France and UK actually had more tanks than Germany but they used them ( after french tactics ) as scout forces for infantry and not using their superior speed.

( If someone feels like something I've written is wrong than please post about it here :) )

Although these bad signs and estimates, Germany was incredlible short in usefull divisions compared to allies. Anyone else than I feeling that Germany is overestimated or France/UK underestimated. War together with Czeckoslovakia, attack during the polish campaign or moving forces into Belgium after Mechelen Incident were all possible ways stopping the cathastrophe 1940.

( Mechelen Incident - If Germany hadn't known that France got their hands on it, they had tried to smash towards France with their tanks straight into large Anglo-French tank forces, superior to german tanks in armor and firepower. This would probably cripple the german Blitzkrieg so they couldn't defeat France in six weeks or probably never. )
 
As I recall Poland ordered mobilization, was forced to cancel by the Anglo-French, then had to order a new mobilization while hundreds of thousands of reservists were all over the country returning home from the first mobilization.

Which did wonders for military readiness.
 

Poland -
30 'Good' divisions, 10 reserves, 12 BIG cavallery divs ( well, almost useless but still ). One of these twelve cavs motorized.

First, big cavalry brigades and not divisions. Second, they weren't useless since they were equiped and fought as infantry.


And if France were behind in strategy than we shouldn't even discuss the polish situation ( they have been described to be 80 years after or something like that ( :eek: ! ) ). They were so sure of victory they didn't take the good defensive positions in the swamps and by the rivers.
Poles didn't take the "good defensive positions" not because they were sure of victory, because they were afraid that
1) Hitler would take undefended claimed territories and try to force a new Munich
2) Doing this would leave most of the industry, manpower and ethnically Polish areas in German hands.
On the subject of British, my reading seems to suggest that NONE of this 26 divisions was actually combat ready by September 1939. I also have no idea hat do you mean by some German divisions being "old WW1 ones" :confused:
Seriously, I doubt the reliabness of your sources.
 
First, big cavalry brigades and not divisions. Second, they weren't useless since they were equiped and fought as infantry.
Maybe to much to call them useless, and ok, brigades :)

Poles didn't take the "good defensive positions" not because they were sure of victory, because they were afraid that
1) Hitler would take undefended claimed territories and try to force a new Munich
2) Doing this would leave most of the industry, manpower and ethnically Polish areas in German hands.
The poles were if not sure of victory on the offensive. They was ready to attack and thought they could win that way with the western allies putting presure in the west.
Although the decision to defend western Poland was the only right they could do, I do not think another Munich Aggreement would come to real. UK and France had guaranteed the poles from everything that could threaten Polish Independence, and the poles just wouldn't accept such an aggreement. They would either way fight for their sake and than the other allies will intervane ( hopefully ).
And even if Silesia is a high populated area, at least 50-60 % were german speakers and did not even want to belong to Poland. I've seen numbers of 75 % before WWI but that's another thing. Many might have emigrated after the poles first got the region.

On the subject of British, my reading seems to suggest that NONE of this 26 divisions was actually combat ready by September 1939.
But 5 sent to France as an expeditionary force ( do not know if they were counted in to these 26 )

I also have no idea hat do you mean by some German divisions being "old WW1 ones" :confused:
Divisions fighting in the WWI for Germany. 40 year olds who didn't know how to fight a modern war in 1939.

Seriously, I doubt the reliabness of your sources.
My source are 'History of WWII' swedish version ( "Andra Världskrigets Historia" ) by Lidell Hart if you wondered :)
Some things ( including some myth stuff ) about him you can read here :p
Of course I belive you if you think he might have written some wrong things. But if nothing is proved aginst it I still belive the book ;)
And I do not say that it's right to take the facts from only one book but because he is famous and so I think he wrote atleast some things right.
As history tells, Poland fell after just more than a month ( and THAT is fact ) so I do not doubt that the polish forces thought they could go on the offensive AND win.
 

Markus

Banned
Acc. to my sources France had 80+ division mobilized in Sept/Oct 1939, almost all class-A. Poland had app. 45, but their mobilisation was half finished at best by Sept.1st. Germany had 10 active and ten good reserve divisons in the west, plus ten very bad ones. Most of the Luftwaffe and allmost all armour was on Poland.

IIRC the RAF had 500 Spitfires and Hurricanes each, the French had several hundred MS 406 and less Curtiss H-75 A-1. Both planes were not ideal, but good enough to deal with even a Me109D. IIRC most Me109 were not the D-version in 1939, but B and C.

Last but not least Germany lacked the fuel and ammo to fight a two front war.

So IF the Allies had known the true state of the Wehrmacht and attacked they would have won. Either right away or once Germany ran out of war materials(which it largely did after the Polish Campaign).
 
Top