Our Treaty of Versailles

Andrei said:
I'm also against the independence of Bavaria. One of the reasons which led to WWII was that the Germans were forced to live in two states that wanted to unite ( Austria really wanted to unite with Germany in 1919 ) and that large German territories were given to other countries ( West Prussia , Sudetenland ).
That's how Hitler gained popular support , by getting back German territories.

This is one of the great historical myth of the 20th century (another one is that the Weimar republic went down because of the unrealistic war reparations imposed by the victors). Both Austria-Hungary and Germany were in a state of shock after WW1, and the first imperative was to survive. there was a strong political polarization in all the three countries (Germany, Austria and Hungary), which resulted into rightist coups (Kapp in Berlin), red insurrections (Spartacist revolt in Berlin and the Ruhr, Bavaria republic, Bela Kun's soviet in Hungary), generally repressed by the conservatives, with the support of Frei Korps and what remained of the armies.
It is true that the first austrian constitution in november 1918 called for "a union with Germany", but at the elections in February 1919 the pan-Germans got just 15% of the popular vote, with the rest more or less equally divided between the socialists and the conservatives (Vienna was staunchly socialist, while most of the farmlands were conservative). However, the main issue in Austria and Hungary (and in lesser measure in Germany) in the winter 1918-1919 was how to survive the scarcity of food.
Even when the situation improved, the socialist majority was never in favor of the Anschluss (and even the conservatives turned against it). The aborted attempt to stage a nazi coup in 1934, and the real Anschluss in 1938, were hardly supported by a majority of Austrians.
The situation improved in Germany too, but once again the main weakness of the Weimar republic was the incapacity of producing a centrist majority, and the need of getting support either from the extreme right or the extreme left.

A major fallacy of the post-WW1 Germans was the incapacity to accept the defeat: this disbelief turned into the myth of the "back-stabbing": Jews, Socialists and Anarchists betraying the winning German army by stubbing it in the back [once again, just like after WW2, the German generals proved to be better as apologists of themselves than as strategists :D ). Hitler played on this mostly, as well as on the difficult economical conditions created by the wall Street crack in 1929.

I do not believe that a partitioning of Germany would have made thing worse.
IMHO, what the situation wouldhave been much better if the french were not so stubborn and vindictive in their behaviour (see the french occupation of Frankfurt and the Ruhr, the bloody repression of the Spartacist strike in the west, the insistence on receiving livestock from germany in a moment when the country could not feed herself. Even the refusal of the French government to invite the Germans at the Sanremo conference); the main fault of both the British and the Italians was to accept this behavior, and not to force France to be more realistic.
 

Glen

Moderator
LordKalvan said:
IMHO, what the situation would have been much better if the french were not so stubborn and vindictive in their behaviour (see the french occupation of Frankfurt and the Ruhr, the bloody repression of the Spartacist strike in the west, the insistence on receiving livestock from germany in a moment when the country could not feed herself. Even the refusal of the French government to invite the Germans at the Sanremo conference); the main fault of both the British and the Italians was to accept this behavior, and not to force France to be more realistic.

There is much sense in what you say here, I think. Of course, trying to get the French to curb this behavior is a different matter, and indeed most of it happened after the Paris Peace Conference. Of course, that conference and the League gave them essentially carte blanche to do that.
 
LordKalvan said:
This is one of the great historical myth of the 20th century (another one is that the Weimar republic went down because of the unrealistic war reparations imposed by the victors). Both Austria-Hungary and Germany were in a state of shock after WW1, and the first imperative was to survive. there was a strong political polarization in all the three countries (Germany, Austria and Hungary), which resulted into rightist coups (Kapp in Berlin), red insurrections (Spartacist revolt in Berlin and the Ruhr, Bavaria republic, Bela Kun's soviet in Hungary), generally repressed by the conservatives, with the support of Frei Korps and what remained of the armies.
It is true that the first austrian constitution in november 1918 called for "a union with Germany", but at the elections in February 1919 the pan-Germans got just 15% of the popular vote, with the rest more or less equally divided between the socialists and the conservatives (Vienna was staunchly socialist, while most of the farmlands were conservative). However, the main issue in Austria and Hungary (and in lesser measure in Germany) in the winter 1918-1919 was how to survive the scarcity of food.
Even when the situation improved, the socialist majority was never in favor of the Anschluss (and even the conservatives turned against it). The aborted attempt to stage a nazi coup in 1934, and the real Anschluss in 1938, were hardly supported by a majority of Austrians.
The situation improved in Germany too, but once again the main weakness of the Weimar republic was the incapacity of producing a centrist majority, and the need of getting support either from the extreme right or the extreme left.

A major fallacy of the post-WW1 Germans was the incapacity to accept the defeat: this disbelief turned into the myth of the "back-stabbing": Jews, Socialists and Anarchists betraying the winning German army by stubbing it in the back [once again, just like after WW2, the German generals proved to be better as apologists of themselves than as strategists :D ). Hitler played on this mostly, as well as on the difficult economical conditions created by the wall Street crack in 1929.

I do not believe that a partitioning of Germany would have made thing worse.
IMHO, what the situation wouldhave been much better if the french were not so stubborn and vindictive in their behaviour (see the french occupation of Frankfurt and the Ruhr, the bloody repression of the Spartacist strike in the west, the insistence on receiving livestock from germany in a moment when the country could not feed herself. Even the refusal of the French government to invite the Germans at the Sanremo conference); the main fault of both the British and the Italians was to accept this behavior, and not to force France to be more realistic.

I agree that France should have been reasonable towards Germnay.

The British and the Americans hadn't opposed Hitler at first because they belived that the Versailles treaty was wrong . They let him annex Austria and Sudetenland because these territories were German speaking.

OTOH , if the Allies would had let Germany unite with Austria and Sudetenland , and to keep West Prussia , Hitler wouldn't have had "free shots". Hitler said during the 30's that he wanted to unite the Germans in a single state. If the Germans had been united in a single state before he came to power , he couldn't have justified his aggresive policy like he did in OTL.

Also , if the Germans had gained Austria and Sudetenland after WWI , would they have felt defeated and still have blamed the Jews for the disaster?

IMO Germany became Nazi because of the humiliating restrictions she was forced to accept ( no union with Austria , Polish Corridor , no troops in the Rhineland ) and because of the impoverishing economical sanctions that were imposed ( those led Germany to bankruptcy ).

Then Hitler came in , promised to get the German speaking lands back ( Austria might not have wanted to unite at this time ) , to restore Germany's status as a great power , and to provide jobs. And he actually did what he promised , that's why he was popular in the late 30's ( the German economy might have collapsed if WWII hadn't begun , but most Germans were not aware of that back then ).
 

Glen

Moderator
Andrei said:
I agree that France should have been reasonable towards Germnay.

That would have helped. But I'll take 'less capricious'....

The British and the Americans hadn't opposed Hitler at first because they belived that the Versailles treaty was wrong .

Well, that was part of it. The other part being that they were both still suffering the effects of the Depression and neither wanted to get into a World War, which intervention in Europe theatened to become.

They let him annex Austria and Sudetenland because these territories were German speaking.

That was part of it, another was the above. Certainly this was part of the policy of appeasement...

OTOH , if the Allies would had let Germany unite with Austria and Sudetenland , and to keep West Prussia , Hitler wouldn't have had "free shots". Hitler said during the 30's that he wanted to unite the Germans in a single state. If the Germans had been united in a single state before he came to power , he couldn't have justified his aggresive policy like he did in OTL.

Except for that whole 'lebensraum' thing. But yeah, he would have had less to be a demagogue about. Then again, if they were looking for a scapegoat for their woes, Hitler would have found them something.

I think, rather than allowing these lands to unite with Germany immediately, offering hope (like having the ban on such votes be only 25 years or so) would also diffuse a lot of this. And then if the timetable were moved up due to changing political considerations, it wouldn't have been as big a thing. Moving up a timetable is less of a coup than getting whole sections of international law overthrown.

Also , if the Germans had gained Austria and Sudetenland after WWI , would they have felt defeated and still have blamed the Jews for the disaster?

Hitler would have....and if you still have French high-handedness and high reparations, the territorial issues wouldn't be as helpful.

IMO Germany became Nazi because of the humiliating restrictions she was forced to accept ( no union with Austria , Polish Corridor , no troops in the Rhineland ) and because of the impoverishing economical sanctions that were imposed ( those led Germany to bankruptcy ).

This would have been true if the Nazis had come to power in the 1920s. By the early 1930s, other issues were predominant. Reparations had basically been reduced or outright abolished. It was the Great Depression and the economic chaos that it sowed that gave the Nazis their window of opportunity. But, once in power, they were able to use the memories of those humiliations to whip up more support for their regime. While Versailles perhaps didn't directly lead to the rise of the Nazis to power, once in power it gave them the ammunition to win over large portions of the population to their regime.

Then again, if they hadn't been weakened by the restrictions of the 1920s, the Weimar Republic might have been better able to weather the Great Depression as well (though actually, they were doing pretty well just before Hitler came to power, but their is always a lag in the political perception of such things).

Then Hitler came in , promised to get the German speaking lands back ( Austria might not have wanted to unite at this time ) , to restore Germany's status as a great power , and to provide jobs. And he actually did what he promised , that's why he was popular in the late 30's ( the German economy might have collapsed if WWII hadn't begun , but most Germans were not aware of that back then ).

True. Of course, then he wanted to get lebensraum to the East....
 
I don't think uniting Austria with Germany and adding Sudetenland but doing nothing else would prevent the rise of a dictator in Germany. Note that there still are territorial issues we can not realistically control- that is, Alsace-Lorraine- and something needs to be done about reparations to prevent hyperinflation. In addition, finding some way to stop the depression would do miles more than giving territory to a nation which lost a war.
 
Imajin said:
I don't think uniting Austria with Germany and adding Sudetenland but doing nothing else would prevent the rise of a dictator in Germany. Note that there still are territorial issues we can not realistically control- that is, Alsace-Lorraine- and something needs to be done about reparations to prevent hyperinflation. In addition, finding some way to stop the depression would do miles more than giving territory to a nation which lost a war.

I agree. Blaming the French for being "unreasonable" or "capricious" avoids the fundamental responsibilities of other powers. If the US had accepted the link between war debt and reparations, some of the economic damage and hyperinflation of the 1920's could have been avoided, and maybe also the occupation of the Rhur (which started after Germany defaulted on reparations). If the US had committed to the collective security of Europe, the French may not have felt the need to maintain Germany in such a straitjacket, with the limits on army size, the demilitarization of the Rhineland, and the Eastern alliances. If Britain had shown a ounce of lucidity in 1936 or 1938 and encouraged French resolve instead of undermining it, the disaster could still have been avoided. Or if Hoover's administration had followed more sensible monetary policies after the 1929 Krach.

By the time Hitler came to power, France had pretty much agreed to reintegrate Germany in the international concern, with the Locarno treaty and the Briand-Stresemann agreements. France's policy was very rational, given the situation in which it had been put, and it would not have taken that big of a butterfly for it to work.

In the end, as LordKavlan pointed out, much found root in the disbelief of the Germans in their defeat. Maybe a more immediate, shorter but harsher occupation would have helped them understand. After all, WWII taught them a much more thorough lesson.
 
Germany almost certainly wouldn't get Hitler or fight a major war with the west in this time line.

Why would they need to? With Austria, the Sudetenland and whatever they get in the east Germany shall probably close to having twice the population and a far larger economy than any continental rival say for example France. If you basically want to grant Germany hegemony of the continent, then this is how to do it. Sure true-Mittleeuropa hasn't quite been reached, but a Germany of such size should be more than capable of coming close by informal empire rather than outright annexation. The baltic states shall depend on Germany for survival, the Balkans are perfectly open for economic domination and France shall have the unfortunate dillema of knowing full well there is absolutely nothing that can be done if Germany so much as twitches towards rearmament.

True, its probably the best way to get a politically stable Germany. The result however will probably a far less stable Britain and France. Both right and left media will have a field day on how the Treaty of Versailles was a betrayal of the British and French dead.

It is generally considered that the Treaty of Versailles, or the Kaiser's Treaty as it was commonly known by derisive populist media was the high water mark of the west attempting a humane treaty on an unready world. It is generally considered the root of the socialist revolt in France and the constant political turmoil which saw the Empire lost in Britain.
 
Earling said:
Germany almost certainly wouldn't get Hitler or fight a major war with the west in this time line.

Why would they need to? With Austria, the Sudetenland and whatever they get in the east Germany shall probably close to having twice the population and a far larger economy than any continental rival say for example France. If you basically want to grant Germany hegemony of the continent, then this is how to do it. Sure true-Mittleeuropa hasn't quite been reached, but a Germany of such size should be more than capable of coming close by informal empire rather than outright annexation. The baltic states shall depend on Germany for survival, the Balkans are perfectly open for economic domination and France shall have the unfortunate dillema of knowing full well there is absolutely nothing that can be done if Germany so much as twitches towards rearmament.

True, its probably the best way to get a politically stable Germany. The result however will probably a far less stable Britain and France. Both right and left media will have a field day on how the Treaty of Versailles was a betrayal of the British and French dead.

It is generally considered that the Treaty of Versailles, or the Kaiser's Treaty as it was commonly known by derisive populist media was the high water mark of the west attempting a humane treaty on an unready world. It is generally considered the root of the socialist revolt in France and the constant political turmoil which saw the Empire lost in Britain.


Britain would get the German colonies as in OTL and France would also get Alsace-Lorraine as in OTL. Germany would still have to pay some reparations , though not as harsh as in OTL. So I don't think the British and French people would feel betrayed by the ones who signed the peace treaty.
I think Glen Finney's ideea with a plebiscite in 25 years in Austria is good , if you don't want to give the Germans land , just after they have lost a war.

While it is true that Germany would be stronger than France , it would be weaker than France and Britain combined.
Also , the USSR would be stronger than Germany .
With the US isolationist , the British , French and Germans would have to put their differences aside and work togather to prevent the spread of communism , or risk being defeated by the SU.
And without Hitler and WWII , the British and French could keep their colonies , rather than being forced to let them go . IMO most of the African colonies were not ready for independence , and the results can be seen even today ( famine , civil wars , disease , poverty , dictatorships ) .
 
The main problem of OTL Versailles treaty is that it is a 19th centuy treaty unable to solve the issues of the first global war.
There was too much greed in Paris, on all the sides. And the war ended too late, and in a very unsatisfactorily matter (compare the outcome of WW2, when the defeated countries are completely occupied).
Wilson took a very high moral stance, but failed to address the real issues (which effectively would have required a Marshall plan ante-litteram, and some kind of practical ways to deal with the issues, in Europe). It is quite likely that a real involvment of the USA in the global theatre would have been unpossible in 1919; but just washing his hands is not an answer.
As I pointed out earlier, the Germans did not recognise the defeat: once again it is quite unlikely that anything less than an occupation of german soil might have hammered the message home.
The Entente powers were completely exhausted, and failed to take any measure to ensure that the Russian chaos be contained: again, I don't have an answer, maybe some kind of international professional army (the "Entente Foreign Legion", if you want a name) might have been cobbled together (dunno who might have footed the bill, however).
Generally, everyone was just anxious to go back to business as usual, and failed to recognise that the years between 1914 and 1918 had create a tremendous havoc in Europe, with the demise of four empires (3 of which had lasted for many centuries). and that a disaster of such magnitude requested stupendous and visionary ways to be coped with.
 
Earling said:
Germany almost certainly wouldn't get Hitler or fight a major war with the west in this time line.

Why would they need to? With Austria, the Sudetenland and whatever they get in the east Germany shall probably close to having twice the population and a far larger economy than any continental rival say for example France. If you basically want to grant Germany hegemony of the continent, then this is how to do it. Sure true-Mittleeuropa hasn't quite been reached, but a Germany of such size should be more than capable of coming close by informal empire rather than outright annexation. The baltic states shall depend on Germany for survival, the Balkans are perfectly open for economic domination and France shall have the unfortunate dillema of knowing full well there is absolutely nothing that can be done if Germany so much as twitches towards rearmament.

True, its probably the best way to get a politically stable Germany. The result however will probably a far less stable Britain and France. Both right and left media will have a field day on how the Treaty of Versailles was a betrayal of the British and French dead.

It is generally considered that the Treaty of Versailles, or the Kaiser's Treaty as it was commonly known by derisive populist media was the high water mark of the west attempting a humane treaty on an unready world. It is generally considered the root of the socialist revolt in France and the constant political turmoil which saw the Empire lost in Britain.

I don't see why so many people prefer an imperialistic peace to war. I've noticed this trend in other threads as well. A unipolar Europe would eventually get itself into an alternate WWII. I can already see the French reviving the Russian alliance. This would be followed by Germany and the Franco-Russians playing a Great Game in the Balkans, Italy, and the cordon sannitaire by using national rivalries. I think you can guess what comes next.
 
There is one point which cannot be forgotten: Germany lost the war, but - possibly with the single exception of Silesia - they were not deprived of "core" provinces (Alsace-Lorraine is a case in itself: IMHO, there was not a german who might think to retain it after the armistice. Saar was a temporary situation). This means that Germany will raise again, much sooner than later.
Now look at the new political map of Europe: let's assume that Germany's western and southern border are safeguarded by France and Italy (even in the case of a later Anschluss of Austria). The real problem is eastward, and in the Balkans, where the new nations created at Versailles (in particular Poland and Tchecoslovakia) are expected to act as a barrier toward German revanchism (please note that Russia is not a viable option in this moment: in 1919, Russia is in the throes of the civil war, and I doubt very much that there was someone in the chancelleries of Europe who was looking forward to see Russia as a superpower - or even a major power - in a generation time. If any, the Russians are perceived as a danger: teaching by example, and promoting red insurrections in western Europe. Among the winners, France and Italy are clearly the nations most in danger from this perspective; among the losers, the political appraisal in 1919 cannot but be bleak).
Northward, the Baltic states are quite likely to be brought under the influence of a revived German expansionism.
From this POV (which I readily admit is quite biased by analysing the events after almost 90 years), OTL Versailles was a failed attempt to find a solution, and just delayed the unavoidable second round of the great European war.
OTOH, even with the benefit of knowing future events, it is very hard to engineer a viable solution.
 
Andrei said:
Britain would get the German colonies as in OTL and France would also get Alsace-Lorraine as in OTL. Germany would still have to pay some reparations , though not as harsh as in OTL. So I don't think the British and French people would feel betrayed by the ones who signed the peace treaty.
I think Glen Finney's ideea with a plebiscite in 25 years in Austria is good , if you don't want to give the Germans land , just after they have lost a war.

While it is true that Germany would be stronger than France , it would be weaker than France and Britain combined.
Also , the USSR would be stronger than Germany .
With the US isolationist , the British , French and Germans would have to put their differences aside and work togather to prevent the spread of communism , or risk being defeated by the SU.
And without Hitler and WWII , the British and French could keep their colonies , rather than being forced to let them go . IMO most of the African colonies were not ready for independence , and the results can be seen even today ( famine , civil wars , disease , poverty , dictatorships ) .
France gained most of Cameroon and most of prewar Togoland as a result of the war.
 
LordKalvan said:
There is one point which cannot be forgotten: Germany lost the war, but - possibly with the single exception of Silesia - they were not deprived of "core" provinces (Alsace-Lorraine is a case in itself: IMHO, there was not a german who might think to retain it after the armistice. Saar was a temporary situation). This means that Germany will raise again, much sooner than later.
Now look at the new political map of Europe: let's assume that Germany's western and southern border are safeguarded by France and Italy (even in the case of a later Anschluss of Austria). The real problem is eastward, and in the Balkans, where the new nations created at Versailles (in particular Poland and Tchecoslovakia) are expected to act as a barrier toward German revanchism (please note that Russia is not a viable option in this moment: in 1919, Russia is in the throes of the civil war, and I doubt very much that there was someone in the chancelleries of Europe who was looking forward to see Russia as a superpower - or even a major power - in a generation time. If any, the Russians are perceived as a danger: teaching by example, and promoting red insurrections in western Europe. Among the winners, France and Italy are clearly the nations most in danger from this perspective; among the losers, the political appraisal in 1919 cannot but be bleak).
Northward, the Baltic states are quite likely to be brought under the influence of a revived German expansionism.
From this POV (which I readily admit is quite biased by analysing the events after almost 90 years), OTL Versailles was a failed attempt to find a solution, and just delayed the unavoidable second round of the great European war.
OTOH, even with the benefit of knowing future events, it is very hard to engineer a viable solution.

I agree overall with your analysis. The borders drawn in Versailles are not in themselves the cause of WWII. Note that France and Italy had even agreed to guarantee Germany's Western borders in the treaty of Locarno! To avoid the rise of Nazism and ultimately WWII, you need: a more sensible deal on the twin issues of reparations and war debt, or a non-deflationary monetary policy by the US administration after the 1929 Krach, or British support for the French to intervene in the Rhineland in 1936, or a lucid Chamberlain in Munich (if the French lacked courage, at least Daladier had no illusion about what he was doing).
 
A communist Bavaria would not be tolerated, the risk of spreading the red plague would be too high..
There would be either an Entente intervention (see the French repression of the Spartacist revolt in the Rhine lands; and italian troops are still in Tyrol) or a right wing counter-coup, supported by the Frei Korps and either spontaneous or Entente-engineered.
 

Glen

Moderator
The one thing I learned in this exercise.....

The messed up map by and large wasn't the fault of the negotiators, with the one exception of the Danzig corridor which was mostly Wilson's fault.

The reparations and other stuff is a different matter....
 
It would have been better if the treaty hadn't blamed Germany for causing WWI, and hadn't punished her like it did.

I can understand the European Allies in seaking reperations, they were just trying to pay their heavy war debts.

It does seem like a vicious cycle. WWI ends with a treaty that in many ways sows the seeds of WWII.
 
I think we can all agree that it would have been fine if the entire world had been terribly balkanised, as Straha so helpfully points out.
 
How about uniting Bavaria and Austria ? I believe there were parties looking for some sort of Holy Catholic German state.

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
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