Ottomans join Entente

For a general background, let's say the Goeben and Brealau get intercepted and sunk, the British don't sieze the Ottoman battleships and no secret treaties between Germany and the Ottoman Empire get signed. Later, the Entente offers basic concessions to the Ottomans and they jump in around 1915.

Presumably the Entente wins the war. But does Imperial Russia survive? Does the USA come out of isolation? What is the ultimate fate of the continuing Ottoman Empire?
 
Even just with a neutral Ottoman Empire, the Entente would be likely able to give Russia reinforcements, material and goods while they couldn't OTL due to blockaded Bosphorus.

It would certainly have consequences on Russia, but I don't see why Turkey would join the Entente instead of being neutral there. There's just any reason to do that.
 
I wonder, if the ottoman empire had fought for the entente would they have been given great power status along with France, the uk, the us, Italy, and Japan?
 
I imagine the war would end quicker, and Russia would have a better chance of survival (no caucases front, more supplies via dardanelles, more troops to throw away in the west) though Russia's survival longterme will probably rely a fair deal on wether political reform happens or not. A constitutional monarchy could survive.

The Ottomans, I reckon, have a much better chance of longterm survival. If the Triumvirate loses power (they supported Germany), Turkish Supremacism doesn't become too prevalent, Multiculturalism is allowed as it was for the past 500 years for the most part, and a third constitutional era happens, I imagine the Ottoman Empire could stabilise, and survive to modern times. Even if it did manage to stabilise, though, it does have a very large portion of the world's oil, which could aide it, but also make it tempting fir others to invade it.
 

Cook

Banned
For a general background, let's say the Goeben and Brealau get intercepted and sunk, the British don't sieze the Ottoman battleships and no secret treaties between Germany and the Ottoman Empire get signed. Later, the Entente offers basic concessions to the Ottomans and they jump in around 1915.
The major problem is that the Entente powers did not take Turkey seriously. For the Turks the English had been a regular ally in the past and had the most common interests. The Young Turks tried four times to form an alliance with Great Britain; the first time in 1908, then in 1909, then in 1911 during their war with Italy and finally in January 1913, each time with no success. The problem was that for the British the Ottoman Empire was seen as weak, unstable, likely to draw them into conflict (most probably with their new Entente partners) and at the same time not likely to be able to assist in British security needs; a liability, not an asset.

They also approached the French, at the 1914 Bastille Day celebrations in Toulon Jamal Pasha proposed an alliance to a member of the French Foreign Ministry. The proposal was that in exchange for support for Turkey’s claim to Rhodes and the Dodecanese (captured by Italy, then a Central Power, two years before), the Turks would sign a formal alliance with Britain, France and Russia. They did not receive a reply; it is possible that because his offer was made to a low ranking member of the French Foreign Office it was overlooked in the excitement of the subsequent crisis.

Their most surprising approach to the Entente Powers was in May 1914 when Mehmet Talaat contacted Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov with the offer of a Russo-Turkish Alliance. Again, the Ottoman Empire was not seen as a potentially useful ally, in fact, more likely a potential rival in the Caucasus rather than potential ally. That the Russian government would not even consider negotiations to secure the loyalty of the nation controlling the sea route through which 50% of Russia’s foreign trade and fully 90% of Russia’s wheat exports travelled is just one more example of its incompetence; incompetence and mismanagement that would turn an incident in the Balkans into a Europe-wide war.

If the Ottoman Empire had shown any value as an ally perhaps the British or French may have taken them up, but their performance against Italy in 1911-12 and then in the two Balkans Wars ruled that out.

Turkey automatically joining the Central Powers, even after being rebuked by the Entente, was not certain. The German Ambassador in Constantinople advised Berlin against such an alliance for the same reasons that the British had rejected it, but was overruled by none other than the Kaiser in July 1914. Had Wilhelm II accepted the advice of his agent in Turkey the Ottoman Empire would have been left sitting against the wall with no-one to dance with when the rest of Europe tore itself apart in 1914.

A bidding war between the Entente and Central Powers on the steps of the Sublime Porte in early 1915 would then become a certainty. The Germans could offer the Turks new provinces in the Caucasus at the expense of the Tsar’s Empire, while Enver Pasha had even greater dreams: not just all of the Caucasus and Persia, but a new Ottoman Empire encompassing Russia’s Turkic provinces of central Asia. The problem then becomes: What can the Entente possibly offer?

Concerning the two battleships that Turkey had had built in British shipyards and were only days away from taking possession of: they did not push Turkey into signing an alliance with the Central Powers; the alliance was signed on the 2nd of August after several days of frantic negotiations and before the news arrived from England that the British had requisitioned the Resadiye and Sultan Osman I. In an incredible coincidence they’d been due to be handed over in a ceremony on the 2nd of August. The seizing of the ships by Churchill, rather than being precipitous, was in fact an incredibly prescient decision; the Goeben was a battlecruiser armed with 11 inch guns while the Breslau was a light cruiser with only 4 inch guns and their arrival in Constantinople swung the balance of maritime power in the Black Sea in favour of Turkey and required a large squadron of British and French warships to be stationed at the mouth of the Dardanelles to prevent them wreaking havoc in the Eastern Mediterranean; Resadiye and Sultan Osman I were two Orion class Battleships, the (in August 1914) most powerful and modern ships in the world and each armed with 12 inch guns. Such far more powerful ships would have demanded a much more powerful British and French squadron in the Aegean (at a time when no British Battleships could be spared from the threat of the German High Seas Fleet in the North Sea) and their effect in the Black Sea would have been devastating. Just how long the Turks could have kept the battleships operating is another question; they were armed with 12 inch guns which the Turks did not manufacture ammunition for and prior to Serbia’s collapse they had no way of getting supplies from Germany, the German 305mm was in any case not compatible.

Presumably the Entente wins the war. But does Imperial Russia survive? Does the USA come out of isolation? What is the ultimate fate of the continuing Ottoman Empire?

Half of Russia’s foreign pre-war trade went via the Bosporus, including fully 90% of Russia’s wheat exports, vital for the foreign capital necessary to maintain the war and wider economy. If Russia’s vital trade is not interrupted the revolution in February 1917 is at the very least postponed, possibly indefinitely.
 
except from the argument that the Entente powers did not consider OE as a useful potential ally, IMHO there are also the following reasons why OE souldn't join the Entente:

  • The empire had very strong ties with Germany for the past decade or so. The Constantinople-Baghdad railway was an occasion which proved that OE chose to align with Germany in order to counter-balance the extended influence and hideous economic exploitation of the empire by the British and the French. At the same time, Germany, as a late starter in the race, was more lenient, giving more to OE and taking less for the expansion of her influence in the empire.
  • The national debt of the OE had evolved from a burden to gallows for the country, and the French who held most of it, were not in a mood to permit a significant "haircut", even if OE joined the Entente. On the contrary, if CP won, OE could avoid paying for most of her debt.
  • The British, especially after the building of Suez canal, desired to extend their position in Egypt, but also to develop a buffer area north and east of Sinai. Also, having in mind the fast development of diesel engines and the consequent rise in oil demand, they desired direct control over some of the oil producing areas of the Persian Gulf.
  • The Russians had nothing more than claims against the OE, and they were dreaming of aquiring Constantinople itself. Since they thought they could win the war against Germany and A-H, they did not want the OE to be a part of the alliance, since then they could not easily launch an attack on her. Ironicaly, Constantinople was one of the reasons of the Russian meltdown.
  • The Entente considered Italy as a necessary ally, since the Italians could open a front right next to Austrian heartland, and they courted her from the beggining of the war. But the Italians wanted to keep their gains from the war with the OE in 1911 (Libya-Dodecanese), but also dreamed for a piece of the influence inside the OE, somewhat equivalent of what the other powers had.
 

rohala

Banned
Concerning the two battleships that Turkey had had built in British shipyards and were only days away from taking possession of: they did not push Turkey into signing an alliance with the Central Powers; the alliance was signed on the 2nd of August after several days of frantic negotiations and before the news arrived from England that the British had requisitioned the Resadiye and Sultan Osman I. In an incredible coincidence they’d been due to be handed over in a ceremony on the 2nd of August. The seizing of the ships by Churchill, rather than being precipitous, was in fact an incredibly prescient decision; the Goeben was a battlecruiser armed with 11 inch guns while the Breslau was a light cruiser with only 4 inch guns and their arrival in Constantinople swung the balance of maritime power in the Black Sea in favour of Turkey and required a large squadron of British and French warships to be stationed at the mouth of the Dardanelles to prevent them wreaking havoc in the Eastern Mediterranean; Resadiye and Sultan Osman I were two Orion class Battleships, the (in August 1914) most powerful and modern ships in the world and each armed with 12 inch guns. Such far more powerful ships would have demanded a much more powerful British and French squadron in the Aegean (at a time when no British Battleships could be spared from the threat of the German High Seas Fleet in the North Sea) and their effect in the Black Sea would have been devastating. Just how long the Turks could have kept the battleships operating is another question; they were armed with 12 inch guns which the Turks did not manufacture ammunition for and prior to Serbia’s collapse they had no way of getting supplies from Germany, the German 305mm was in any case not compatible.
I don't know how it fits in the grand scheme of things, but Greece was in a naval arms race with Turkey and was determined to not let Turkey receive the new battleships. For that purpose Greece had been planning a preempitve strike on Gallipoli.
 
Their most surprising approach to the Entente Powers was in May 1914 when Mehmet Talaat contacted Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov with the offer of a Russo-Turkish Alliance. Again, the Ottoman Empire was not seen as a potentially useful ally, in fact, more likely a potential rival in the Caucasus rather than potential ally.That the Russian government would not even consider negotiations to secure the loyalty of the nation controlling the sea route through which 50% of Russia’s foreign trade and fully 90% of Russia’s wheat exports travelled is just one more example of its incompetence; incompetence and mismanagement that would turn an incident in the Balkans into a Europe-wide war.


Half of Russia’s foreign pre-war trade went via the Bosporus, including fully 90% of Russia’s wheat exports, vital for the foreign capital necessary to maintain the war and wider economy. If Russia’s vital trade is not interrupted the revolution in February 1917 is at the very least postponed, possibly indefinitely.

I am astounded that the Russian Empire did not accept the terms offered by the Ottoman Empire. Particularly as the Germans regarded the Netherlands as their windpipe for economic trade in the event of blockade. It boggles the mind that no one in the Russian General Staff was able to arrive at that conclusion or that they were unable to convince their superiors.
 
Top