Ottomans join Entente, Potential German Lawrence?

Fair point @Aghasverov tho I do think if his Persian campaign does prove successful enough, he'll go a bit further into Mesopatamia (he really enjoyed the region, the desert, and the culture), which could have interesting effects of their own (a multi-ethnic persian army with some Assyrian and maybe Arab units led by a German to liberate mesopatamia from the Turks, who are a technically everything but a puppet of the British). From there, who knows what'll happen. Also, I just realized that the Germans would aid the Bulgarians in an attempt to take Constantinople and would likely buy Greece off (if this happens before the brits join) by promising them the agean islands and some of Asia minor. With Armenia, the Germans will have a field day, especially when the things they'll be able to say, such as 'They remain quiet as their allies kill off the Armenians, how civilized are the british truly?'
Only thing is, the situation for the Armenians may be quite a bit different too, if the Ottomans are cajoled/coerced into an alignment with Russia. While Talaat and Enver hated the Armenians and wanted to "come to a reckoning" with them, it took Sarikamish, where Enver decided to blame his own strategic failure on the disloyal Armenians, to provide the spark for Enver and Talaat to set it ablaze. Of course it didn't help that the Russian propagandists had been quite busy in Ottoman Armenia for years, and that there were Armenian volunteer detachments fighting alongside the Russian Army. A Russo-Turkish "entente" could've given the Armenians at least a temporary reprieve, unless/until as in OTL Enver goes rogue and makes a play for the Caucasus, double-crossing the Russians in this ATL the same way he did the Germans in 1918 in OTL...
 
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Why would the Armenian Genocide take place in a timeline where Russia is allied to the Turks? The decision to carry out the genocide was bound up with that that imperial paranoia I mentioned- that the Armenians would help the Russian invaders.

And why would a rag-tag multi-ethnic army led by a German (unlikely, by the way- there's a reason Lawrence was never anything like the leader of an Arab army) do any better in Mesopotamia than the well-equipped and formidably trained Indian army that encountered disaster there?
 

KeplersStar

Banned
I'm not sure if most people realize just how much of a "wild card" the Ottomans were in August/September 1914, too.

Do you have a source for that?

I am struggling to think of any possible advantage the Ottomans could have gained from siding with the Allies in WWI.
 
Would Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck be effective at leading an Arab uprising in the Ottoman Empire? Obviously, we'd need butterflied to keep him out of German East Africa at the start of the hypothetical war.

He was very good at doing a guerrilla warfare against larger opponents on a shoe-string budget, kept himself going for four years without assistance from the fatherland, and never had to surrender.

If you want your perfect German Arab Revolt commander, he seems to be your man.
 
Do you have a source for that?

I am struggling to think of any possible advantage the Ottomans could have gained from siding with the Allies in WWI.
Just various things I've read. They delayed entry until late October while they were weighing their options. The Germans essentially had to bribe the Pashas into entry, with the Goeben and Breslau and LOTS of gold - matter of fact they doubled the amount of gold they had originally requested, waited until they received all of it, before authorizing Souchon's Black Sea raid.
Really the best course for the Ottomans in 1914 would have been neutrality. After the Balkan Wars the Empire was in no shape at all to fight a war even with one of its weaker neighbors, much less a world power, much MUCH less three of them at once. The Germans knew that the main usefulness of the Ottoman Empire would be as a giant sinkhole for Entente troops and expenses - and it served that purpose fairly well for four years.
The advantages to siding with the Entente seem fairly obvious to me - not having the nation with the world's largest army, with which you share a difficult-to-defend border, as your enemy; not having the nation with the world's largest navy, and important trade, commercial and strategic interests (and military bases) on or near the rest of your borders; having a great deal of German-financed infrastructure and investments to seize should the Entente come out on top.
Also, should the Entente win with the Ottomans as an ally, the Ottomans would be able to negotiate from a position of strength, not weakness, when it comes to issues like control of the Straits, Palestine, the oilfields of Kirkuk, etc... Allies don't typically pick apart or demand territorial concessions of a fellow ally at the conclusion of a conflict.
 
Would Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck be effective at leading an Arab uprising in the Ottoman Empire? Obviously, we'd need butterflied to keep him out of German East Africa at the start of the hypothetical war.

He was very good at doing a guerrilla warfare against larger opponents on a shoe-string budget, kept himself going for four years without assistance from the fatherland, and never had to surrender.

If you want your perfect German Arab Revolt commander, he seems to be your man.
Lettow-Vorbeck would seem ideal. He also seems to have been capable of inspiring a great deal of loyalty among his "Askari" native troops. Maybe if the UK (and Portugal) were to stay neutral, or at least if the UK were to delay entry, he would have less to do in Tanganyika and be sent to the Middle East. As history turned out, the Hejaz, Hussein and his sons could've used a more faithful ally than the Brits anyway...
 

KeplersStar

Banned
Just various things I've read.
Where? I want to read them.
They delayed entry until late October while they were weighing their options. The Germans essentially had to bribe the Pashas into entry, with the Goeben and Breslau and LOTS of gold - matter of fact they doubled the amount of gold they had originally requested, waited until they received all of it, before authorizing Souchon's Black Sea raid.
Really the best course for the Ottomans in 1914 would have been neutrality.
I agree.

The advantages to siding with the Entente seem fairly obvious to me - not having the nation with the world's largest army, with which you share a difficult-to-defend border, as your enemy;
And instead having the nation with the world's BEST army, with easy access to an even more difficult-to-defend border, as your enemy.

Also, should the Entente win with the Ottomans as an ally, the Ottomans would be able to negotiate from a position of strength, not weakness, when it comes to issues like control of the Straits, Palestine, the oilfields of Kirkuk, etc... Allies don't typically pick apart or demand territorial concessions of a fellow ally at the conclusion of a conflict.
I fail to see how the Ottomans international postition would have been anything but weakened with a victorious Russia, even if they had been on the same side.

Turkey joining World War I on the Allied side in 1914 seems pretty implausible to me.
 
I think the suggestion of von Lettow-Vorbeck is another example of how this thread seems to be based around the idea of Lawrence and the Arab Revolt, not the reality.

Lawrence was an advisor.

That's all.

He was a gifted and charismatic advisor, who rose to prominence in the councils of the rebel leadership. But he was still just an advisor.

The reason the Arab Revolt enjoyed the success it did was that it had able local leadership, an effective Imperial patron who could keep the rebels supplied, and large and effective traditional allied army that forced the Ottomans to split their attentions. It can't be stressed enough how important the presence of Allenby's army was to the Revolt's fortunes. Even when the Arabs were racing Allenby (and later the French) to key objectives, it must not be forgotten that they had been on the same side, for however fleeting a moment.

In this scenario, a German sponsored revolt has literally none of these things. And sending Letttow-Vorbeck will not help. Lettow-Vorbeck did not speak Arabic. He had not spent any time in the Middle East. He had, and let's stress this, no relevant experience whatsoever to the task at hand. He was an able colonial officer- but the East Africa campaign was fundamentally different to the Arab revolt, because the Germans were the existing power in the region. His army was small, but it was the best trained in the theater and was fighting on its own ground, that he had studied extensively. He had, in fact, more experience putting down guerrillas like the Arabs than he had fighting with them- first fighting against the Boxers, then doing his part in the German genocide of the Hereros in Southwest Africa.* He had the tremendous respect of his men- great. So did Lawrence. Lettow-Vorbeck was, let us remember, a general. And a good one! But this is not the skill set or resume of someone who could effectively travel into Iran or Arabia, liase with local leaders, help them build up an army and act as an intermediary with his own government.

Again, I'm not saying it's not interesting to speculate what the consequences of a German sponsored revolt would be. But it's important to understand that absolutely none of the factors that made it successful in our timeline are present in this one, and switching out Heroic White Officers isn't going to change that.




* Lettow-Vorbeck was one of the better colonial officers, but let's not buy into the bullshit memery about him being unquestionably heroic.
 
Where? I want to read them.

I agree.


And instead having the nation with the world's BEST army, with easy access to an even more difficult-to-defend border, as your enemy.


I fail to see how the Ottomans international postition would have been anything but weakened with a victorious Russia, even if they had been on the same side.

Turkey joining World War I on the Allied side in 1914 seems pretty implausible to me.
This isn't it :) but it's easier to c&p from Wikipedia than from a book, especially if it's a book I read in college 20 years ago and don't remember the title.


Gives a fairly good summary of the rather chaotic foreign policy of the Ottomans in August and September. Of particular interest to me are Enver's actions on or about August 9. It appears to me that even after the secret protocol with the Germans was signed, the Pashas and the Grand Vizier were casting about for other potential options. The 2001 book by Erikson that's referenced in the Wiki article appears to cover this period in pretty good detail, but I doubt that was the one I (barely) remember.

And true, the Germans were arguably the best Army in the world in 1914... I'd concur with that. But affairs in the Balkans were by no means settled in 1914 - the Austro-Hungarians were struggling in Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece were still neutral. It wasn't like the German Army could just board the Orient Express and be at the gates of Adrianople.
The Ottoman European land border is a short one, and the Ottomans could've concentrated a large amount of forces there - could they have stopped a German Army or 2? Of course not... but again it would've been a matter of the Germans getting there. Also, their hands were already full with a two-front war - dealing with an unfaithful Ottoman Empire would've definitely been on the back burner, no matter how miffed the Kaiser may have been about having 2 ships and a ton of gold stolen from him.
For the Russians, not having a Caucasus front to deal with would mean being able to send more men west - and though I doubt the Russians would have given up their dream of "Tsargrad on the Straits", they may have been willing to put it off for a while - especially if a friendly or at least neutral OE pledged to keep the Straits open to Entente shipping and the Black Sea Fleet.
The really interesting situation though would've been if Germany had turned east, abandoned Aufmarsch West and foregone the Belgian crossing, and the UK didn't enter in Aug 1914. I'd imagine with no UK involvement, at least at 1st, the French and the Russians would've offered some MAJOR concessions to the Ottomans to keep them from joining the CP side...
 
I think the suggestion of von Lettow-Vorbeck is another example of how this thread seems to be based around the idea of Lawrence and the Arab Revolt, not the reality.

Lawrence was an advisor.

That's all.

He was a gifted and charismatic advisor, who rose to prominence in the councils of the rebel leadership. But he was still just an advisor.

The reason the Arab Revolt enjoyed the success it did was that it had able local leadership, an effective Imperial patron who could keep the rebels supplied, and large and effective traditional allied army that forced the Ottomans to split their attentions. It can't be stressed enough how important the presence of Allenby's army was to the Revolt's fortunes. Even when the Arabs were racing Allenby (and later the French) to key objectives, it must not be forgotten that they had been on the same side, for however fleeting a moment.

In this scenario, a German sponsored revolt has literally none of these things. And sending Letttow-Vorbeck will not help. Lettow-Vorbeck did not speak Arabic. He had not spent any time in the Middle East. He had, and let's stress this, no relevant experience whatsoever to the task at hand. He was an able colonial officer- but the East Africa campaign was fundamentally different to the Arab revolt, because the Germans were the existing power in the region. His army was small, but it was the best trained in the theater and was fighting on its own ground, that he had studied extensively. He had, in fact, more experience putting down guerrillas like the Arabs than he had fighting with them- first fighting against the Boxers, then doing his part in the German genocide of the Hereros in Southwest Africa.* He had the tremendous respect of his men- great. So did Lawrence. Lettow-Vorbeck was, let us remember, a general. And a good one! But this is not the skill set or resume of someone who could effectively travel into Iran or Arabia, liase with local leaders, help them build up an army and act as an intermediary with his own government.

Again, I'm not saying it's not interesting to speculate what the consequences of a German sponsored revolt would be. But it's important to understand that absolutely none of the factors that made it successful in our timeline are present in this one, and switching out Heroic White Officers isn't going to change that.




* Lettow-Vorbeck was one of the better colonial officers, but let's not buy into the bullshit memery about him being unquestionably heroic.
Fair points, both, regarding Lawrence and von Lettow-Vorbeck. Now, on the other hand, if you were to get Wassmuss and von Lettow-Vorbeck together somehow....
 
I should also note that in two pages of discussion, for all the talk about which German officer would be most magically effective, no one's yet specified who the equivalent of Sharif Hussein is going to be.

The Arabs were the most important factor in the Arab Revolt, after all.
 
Wasn't the Arab revolt more or less dragged across the finish line by the British Army? Without the equivalent of Allenby and co. pushing into the Levant I doubt whatever German formented Arab rebellion is going to end up being anything more than a minor annoyance in the allied side.
 
Then it still does nothing to address the lack of supplies, troops, cash, reinforcements and strategic distractions.
That's true. A neutral UK would make those issues a bit easier, but a UK firmly in the Entente Camp would make it nearly impossible. Having Italy on the CP side would help, with Eritrea and Somalia in close proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, but then there's Aden and effective British control of the Red Sea... and the Indian Ocean... and the Gulf...
 
I should also note that in two pages of discussion, for all the talk about which German officer would be most magically effective, no one's yet specified who the equivalent of Sharif Hussein is going to be.

The Arabs were the most important factor in the Arab Revolt, after all.
Well, since the premise of the OP is an Ottoman Empire on the Entente side, I was thinking that Sharif Hussein would be the equivalent of Sharif Hussein - although the Germans might not be willing (and were certainly unable) to offer as much support as the UK - which wound up being sort of a moot point after the war anyway as the UK had made too many conflicting promises to honor them all, and the Hashemites wound up getting screwed. If Hussein was not a possibility, then perhaps a Mesopotamian tribal or religious leader? With Wassmuss operating out of Persia, this would seem likely, although it would doubtless lead to having to fight the Ottomans and the UK simultaneously...
 

Germaniac

Donor
Do you have a source for that?

I am struggling to think of any possible advantage the Ottomans could have gained from siding with the Allies in WWI.
Feroz Ahmad's The Young Turks does a fair job detailing the Entente leaning wing of the YT. Basically the most important thing the Turks wanted was an alliance with Britain to secure the territorial integrity of what was left of the Empire, they wanted their dreadnoughts, they wanted recognition of the abrogation of capitulations, and they wanted investments and loans.

Germany was really only an option after the Entente turned their backs to them.
 
Feroz Ahmad's The Young Turks does a fair job detailing the Entente leaning wing of the YT. Basically the most important thing the Turks wanted was an alliance with Britain to secure the territorial integrity of what was left of the Empire, they wanted their dreadnoughts, they wanted recognition of the abrogation of capitulations, and they wanted investments and loans.

Germany was really only an option after the Entente turned their backs to them.
Glad you mentioned the "investments and loans" part... one thing that I read re: the Pasha's eventual siding with the CP was that of all the major powers who had invested in the Empire, that they owed the Germans the LEAST. Thus, in the event of a CP victory, they would no longer be on the hook to their major creditors, the UK and France. Money changes everything :)
Yeah, Djemal was very pro-French until the French started ignoring him; Talaat was rather pro-British, at least for a time. The strongest pro-CP sentiment was from Enver, and he was holding his cards very close to his chest. Also I read *somewhere* (don't ask me for references, it's lost somewhere in the fog of memory) that Enver and Churchill had a fairly amicable relationship prior to 1914, and that Churchill had made a last-ditch effort to try to coerce Enver into remaining neutral before the Baltic Sea raid.
With a different scenario unfolding though in Aug/Sept 1914 in this conjectural ATL, I think pretty much anything would've been fair game once the cards were laid on the table...
 
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