Ottomans in Italy

[LordKalvan]

This is a key question. In the 1494-95 French campaign I have read that one reason for his success was that he had a new siege train, which was much more mobile and powerful than before. That he managed to take a number of fortresses very quickly, including one that had recently withstood a 7 years siege. [Although checking the Wiki entry this seems to suggest a shortage of sieges].

I do know that in 1453 the Ottomans had to build their siege cannons in situ for the final capture of Constantinople. Also that this in turn depended on renegade Hungarian gun-makers.

I have asked this question when I have seen previous threads on this issue and never received any answer. Do the Ottomans have a mobile siege train capable of doing what the French could. If so they probably can take most of S Italy, in a similar way to the French. If they don't and would have to rely on storming, starving or building guns at each location, then they are unlikely to make deep or lasting progress in Italy. [In one way the relatively small area of S Italy, coupled with the rough terrain makes conquest more difficult than the broad plains of Hungary as there are bottlenecks.

I would say that if they could do it then the shock from this could well mobilise a coalition against them as its a significant increase in the threat to the Christian states of the western Med. That is a totally different question.

Steve

You are correct in saying that the Ottomans' standard practice in the second half of the 15th century was to cast siege bombards in place, and to break them up after the conclusion of the siege to recover the metal. The siege of Scutari is another example.

This probably was somehow changing towards the end of the century: at the siege of Lepanto in 1499 the siege guns were transported by the Ottoman fleet: this does not mean that the Ottomans had an easily movable train siege, and probably in the case of sieges far from the coastline they were still casting bombards in place.

At the first siege of Vienna (two generations after Otranto) the Ottomans brought up the siege guns from Belgrade, and it was a very slow going (IIRC it took 2 and half months to cover the 600 km from Belgrade to Vienna).

Charles VIII had a train siege which he took in his Italian campaign. However this happened 15 years after Otranto, and the late 1400s were an age of fast development in gunnery, both on land and at sea. However Chales VIII had allies in Italy, and a fleet providing support along the Thyrrenian coast, which might also be used to transport heavy guns.
You are also right when saying that there were just a few sieges in his campaign. OTOH, I'd point out that it was much more likely that invested cities would negotiate with a French king rather than with an Ottoman army and the Anjou party in Italy has also to be taken into account.

The attempted invasion of southern Italy was overall a very half-assed attempt: the Ottomans took easily Otranto, a small port at the very tip of the heel of the boot which was not defended. However the few probes toward Brindisi (which is a bigger city and port, but walled and defended) were easily repulsed by Neapolitan troops. A limited number of Ottoman troops was kept in Otranto for some time (and allegedly the Venetians were bringing them provisions), but the sultan lost interest very soon and decided (or was made to decide: there is this wild legend that the sultan did whatever he liked, but the influence of the different departments of the Ottoman government should not be underrated, as well as the fact that these different centres of power had also different interests and were riddled with jealousies) and went on the the unsuccessful siege of Rhodes.
The threat of an Ottoman invasion was taken seriously at the time, and the pope tried to put together a league including Aragon, Portugal and Naples, but the threat never materialised.

The choice of Otranto as the gateway for invasion was pretty poor in any case: the town was small as was the harbor, and its location was extremely periferic. The population also left en masse, after the massacre and all supplies had to be ferried across the sea.

There is also the small problem that Ottoman armies at the time relied on cavalry, and ferrying thousands of horse across the straits would have been a huge undertaking (and one made theoretically possible only by the peace recently signed with Venice in 1479). The logistics of supplying and feeding men and horses would IMHO be daunting, to say the least.

I also made the same point as you did about the difficult terrain: if an invasion has to succeed, the Ottoman troops have to negotiate the Appennines, and there was just a single road suitable: the via Trajana, from Brindisi to Benevento

 

[LordKalvan]

Ottoman rule in Italy would be as long-lasting and successful as rule of the ERE was. That would be the far end of Ottoman power projection and at the limits of where they can realistically hope to rule with some degree of permanence. This is because the Ottomans share a lot of the same geographic weaknesses with that kind of power production that the ERE did, and also because here the French kings, their major dynastic allies, might decide their interests are better served by extorting concessions from the papacy in exchange for curbstomping the Turks.

The Ottomans can no more hold parts of Italy by this point than the Empire of Justinian could hold the Ostrogothic Kingdom of Italy.

I have been trying to make this points for a long time, but no one wants to listen
Mind, the alliance of convenience between France and the Ottomans is still a couple of generations away, and no one would dream of it in 1480.

There are primarily two reasons why Ottoman conquest of Italy (in 1480s) would've been pretty fast.

1) Venice was just recently crushed ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman–Venetian_War_(1463–1479) ). This factor has seemed to always escaped everyone's radar here somehow....

2) Ottoman resources were order of magnitude larger than Aragon's.

Now what's left is to figure out the exact size of both Ottoman and Aragonese military at the time mobilizable to the theater, especially navy, to determine whether there will be pretty much zero naval obstacle to Ottoman efforts....

The peace of 1479 was certainly favourable to the Ottomans (Venice lost Lesbos and Negroponte), but I would not go as far as saying that "Venice was crushed". After the initial onslaught and the loss of Negroponte, the fight was much more on equal basis.

When the Ottomans took Otranto, there was a general scare of a major invasion attempt and the pope started to negotiate a league of Christian states, including Portugal, Aragon, Genoa and Naples. Nothing came out of it because the invasion did not materialise; however if the sultan had been so crazy as to go on with it, a league would have certainly been formed and pressure put on Venice too to join. Which means that the logistics across the Adriatic would suddenly become very very hairy

 

[stevep]

They did have a effective siege train but in terms of the Battle of Vienna several mishaps lead to it being in poor shape for that campaign.

King of Malta

I presume you mean 1529 rather than 1683?

Steve

 

[stevep]

LordKalvan

Many thanks for the information. I thought I remember reading somewhere that the force that attacked Otranto was the survivors from a failed siege of Malta but from what you say I've got it wrong and they went to Malta instead of staying in Italy?

Sounds like it would be a pretty tough campaign for the Ottomans presuming the various Italian groups resisted. A lot of sieges and difficult terrain. Could go it if they made a major effort for several years and no serious help arrived for the defenders but could be a read drain on resources. As you say technology was advancing rapidly at this period so, coupled with the lack of internal allies or collaborators I think it would be a slow process.

I know that in the early period the Ottomans were heavily dependent on cavalry forces and that would be a serious problem in southern Italy. However weren't the Janissaries pretty much at their peak at this point? I presume that would be the best unit to use but it could be difficult to replace losses in that elite force.

Steve

You are correct in saying that the Ottomans' standard practice in the second half of the 15th century was to cast siege bombards in place, and to break them up after the conclusion of the siege to recover the metal. The siege of Scutari is another example.

This probably was somehow changing towards the end of the century: at the siege of Lepanto in 1499 the siege guns were transported by the Ottoman fleet: this does not mean that the Ottomans had an easily movable train siege, and probably in the case of sieges far from the coastline they were still casting bombards in place.

At the first siege of Vienna (two generations after Otranto) the Ottomans brought up the siege guns from Belgrade, and it was a very slow going (IIRC it took 2 and half months to cover the 600 km from Belgrade to Vienna).

Charles VIII had a train siege which he took in his Italian campaign. However this happened 15 years after Otranto, and the late 1400s were an age of fast development in gunnery, both on land and at sea. However Chales VIII had allies in Italy, and a fleet providing support along the Thyrrenian coast, which might also be used to transport heavy guns.
You are also right when saying that there were just a few sieges in his campaign. OTOH, I'd point out that it was much more likely that invested cities would negotiate with a French king rather than with an Ottoman army and the Anjou party in Italy has also to be taken into account.

The attempted invasion of southern Italy was overall a very half-assed attempt: the Ottomans took easily Otranto, a small port at the very tip of the heel of the boot which was not defended. However the few probes toward Brindisi (which is a bigger city and port, but walled and defended) were easily repulsed by Neapolitan troops. A limited number of Ottoman troops was kept in Otranto for some time (and allegedly the Venetians were bringing them provisions), but the sultan lost interest very soon and decided (or was made to decide: there is this wild legend that the sultan did whatever he liked, but the influence of the different departments of the Ottoman government should not be underrated, as well as the fact that these different centres of power had also different interests and were riddled with jealousies) and went on the the unsuccessful siege of Rhodes.
The threat of an Ottoman invasion was taken seriously at the time, and the pope tried to put together a league including Aragon, Portugal and Naples, but the threat never materialised.

The choice of Otranto as the gateway for invasion was pretty poor in any case: the town was small as was the harbor, and its location was extremely periferic. The population also left en masse, after the massacre and all supplies had to be ferried across the sea.

There is also the small problem that Ottoman armies at the time relied on cavalry, and ferrying thousands of horse across the straits would have been a huge undertaking (and one made theoretically possible only by the peace recently signed with Venice in 1479). The logistics of supplying and feeding men and horses would IMHO be daunting, to say the least.

I also made the same point as you did about the difficult terrain: if an invasion has to succeed, the Ottoman troops have to negotiate the Appennines, and there was just a single road suitable: the via Trajana, from Brindisi to Benevento

 

[Snake Featherston]

I have been trying to make this points for a long time, but no one wants to listen
Mind, the alliance of convenience between France and the Ottomans is still a couple of generations away, and no one would dream of it in 1480.

True. I might note that the circumstances involved are for their time actually quite similar: the Ottomans and ERE were the greatest military powers of their day, in fact the only ones with armies properly deserving the term. They invade Italy, a mountainous territory that is not easy even to conquer with modern technology (see: Italian campaign in WWII), in this case also a peninsula divided into a variety of city-states for the Ottomans and under rule of a successor state for the ERE and they overstretch their logistics too badly for it to be worthwhile. This doesn't make either less the most formidable powers of their day that this is so, it's simply logistics and reality dictating limits to their own power that at least the Ottomans were smart enough to see were there.

 

[LordKalvan]

LordKalvan

Many thanks for the information. I thought I remember reading somewhere that the force that attacked Otranto was the survivors from a failed siege of Malta but from what you say I've got it wrong and they went to Malta instead of staying in Italy?

It is the first time I hear that: we are talking of 1480, and the Ottomans are still moving slowly - and a bit shyly - around the Peloponnese. There are not even well connected enough with the muslim rulers of Tunis and Algiers (IIRC, the first significant contact with western muslims occurred during the 1st Mamluk war, when the amir of Tunis tried to mediate between Mamluks and Ottomans).

When the conquest of Otranto occurred, the Ottomans had just completed the conquest of Albania and signed a peace with Venice. The sultan was engaged in one of the recurring wars with the White Sheep Turks, in south-west Anatolia, and a previous attempt to conquer Baghdad had ended up in a disaster. This makes me thing that Otranto was conceived more as a raid, to punish the Neapolitans for the support given to Skanderbeg during the Albanian war, rather than as a full fledged invasion attempt. The choice of Otranto, the low numbers involved and the fact that no attempt was made to reinforce the Ottoman garrison in Otranto also support the raid hypothesis.
Certainly the pope considered this a serious attempt, and went into a flurry of activity to organise a christian league.
Anyway, in a few months the issue became moot, since the sultan launched a major attack against Rhodes (failed too).

Sounds like it would be a pretty tough campaign for the Ottomans presuming the various Italian groups resisted. A lot of sieges and difficult terrain. Could go it if they made a major effort for several years and no serious help arrived for the defenders but could be a read drain on resources. As you say technology was advancing rapidly at this period so, coupled with the lack of internal allies or collaborators I think it would be a slow process.

In 1480 Ferrante, an illegittimate son of the former king of Aragon, is king of Naples. IOTL he reacted quickly to the fall of Otranto, and stopped cold all Ottoman attempts to move against Brindisi. Ferrante is also a cousin of the king of Aragon, and Aragonese support from Sicily would be available quickly. The pope tried to form a christian league, involving also Genoa and Portugal, but since there was no invasion no league was formed.
Funnily enough a full scale invasion would be very good news for Venice, which could auction her services (or destroy any hope of victory, by harassing the Ottoman transports from Epyrus to Puglia).

I know that in the early period the Ottomans were heavily dependent on cavalry forces and that would be a serious problem in southern Italy. However weren't the Janissaries pretty much at their peak at this point? I presume that would be the best unit to use but it could be difficult to replace losses in that elite force.

Steve

The Janissaries are already an elite corps, but their number are still quite limited (IIRC around 6,000 in 1475). The main strength of the Ottoman armies is represented by the Timar cavalry and the problem with these cavalrymen is that they cannot be kept away from their feuds for too long a time (and again: how do you transport tens of thousands of horses across the Otranto straits?).
By the way, it would be interesting to see how the Neapolitan and Aragones gendarmes perform against the Timar cavalry. No such a battle ever happened in the 15th century, IIRC. Mohacs is almost 50 years in the future, and the advance in ordinance changes completely the rules of the game (one year before Mohacs the French gendarmes were broken by the pike-and-shot arrangement of the Imperial armies).

 

[TyranicusMaximus]

Out of curiousity, how much do you know about the Ottoman army of the 15th-16th centuries? Seems like a great deal, as I've been really unable to find anything of note.

 

[LordKalvan]

Not as much as I would like. However my main field of interest is Venice, and it comes as natural to learn also about her major enemy (and partner ).
I can certainly recommend two books in the History of Warfare series:

• Galleon and Galleys by John Guilmartin jr.
• The Renaissance at War by Thomas Arnold

War at Sea in the Age of Sail by Andrew Lambert is also interesting, but much more focussed on English navy.

Galleon and Galleys is certainly a book I did like a lot.

 

[Byzantine]

Anyway, in a few months the issue became moot, since the sultan launched a major attack against Rhodes (failed too).

The Ottoman forces arrived at Otranto on 28 July, 1480. The Siege of Rhodes started on 23 May, 1480 and was still ongoing until 17 August, 1480.

In 1480 Ferrante, an illegittimate son of the former king of Aragon, is king of Naples. IOTL he reacted quickly to the fall of Otranto, and stopped cold all Ottoman attempts to move against Brindisi.

Ferdinand I had been ruling the Kingdom of Naples since 1458. He was not exactly a novice. Ferdinand was by that time father-in-law to Ercole I d'Este, Duke of Ferrara (reigned 1471-1505) and Matthias Corvinus, King of Hungary (reigned 1458-1490). If the war turned serious, he could probably request military assistance from the first (they remained firmly allied for years) and convince the latter to harass the Ottomans at his borders.

In the original timeline, Ferrara failed to react. But Corvinus sent one of his generals with 500 foot soldiers and 300 horsemen to assist the Neapolitans. Otranto is another one in the conflicts between Ottomans and Hungarians.

Ferrante is also a cousin of the king of Aragon, and Aragonese support from Sicily would be available quickly.

The King of Aragon at the time is novice Ferdinand II the Catholic (reigned 1479-1516). He was also King of Sicily and King consort in Castile. Ferdinand II was allied to Naples and probably willing to help. But this early in his reign, his hold on the Aragonese throne might not be secure enough for long campaigns. His hold in Castile was also hardly secure, as he and his wife Isabella had to fight a civil war to gain its throne. A war which had only ended in 1478. There was also bad blood with Portugal which had assisted the other side in said civil war.

The pope tried to form a christian league, involving also Genoa and Portugal, but since there was no invasion no league was formed.

The Popes had another reason to be particularly interested in the fate of Ferdinand I and Naples in general. They had long claimed overlordship over the kings of Naples. Ferdinand I, early in his reign, accepted the Popes as his overlords in exchange for their support against rival claimants to the throne.

By 1480, Ferdinand I and Pope Sixtus IV (reigned 1471-1484) were still allied. their alliance would only brake with the War of Ferrara (1482-1484). The War started with a conmbined invasion of Ferrara by the Papal States and the Republic of Venice. Ferdinand was at the time allied with both the Papal States and Ferrara. He chose to maintain the alliance with Ferrara and invaded the Papal States from the south.

Funnily enough a full scale invasion would be very good news for Venice, which could auction her services (or destroy any hope of victory, by harassing the Ottoman transports from Epyrus to Puglia).

I doubt Venice would be particularly eager to face the Ottomans again. An Ottoman-venetian War lasting from 1463 to 1479 had ended with a Venetian defeat. They had been forced to cede land to the Ottomans and agreed to an annual tribute of 10,000 ducats a year in exchange for trading privileges. Why risk everything to once again challenge their seemingly invincible foe? The next Ottoman-Venician War started in 1499.

 

[LordKalvan]

The Ottoman forces arrived at Otranto on 28 July, 1480. The Siege of Rhodes started on 23 May, 1480 and was still ongoing until 17 August, 1480.

Yes, my bad. Should have checked the dates myself. However it does not affect my assumption: Otranto was a two-bits side show, and no invasion of southern Italy was in the plans.

The other informations are correct, thanks for them.

I doubt Venice would be particularly eager to face the Ottomans again. An Ottoman-venetian War lasting from 1463 to 1479 had ended with a Venetian defeat. They had been forced to cede land to the Ottomans and agreed to an annual tribute of 10,000 ducats a year in exchange for trading privileges. Why risk everything to once again challenge their seemingly invincible foe? The next Ottoman-Venician War started in 1499.

The 1463-1479 war ended certainly with a Venetian defeat, but it was less one sided than one might think. In the end Venice the true loss was Negroponte, as well as the disruption to commerce that 16 years of war brought (and the expenses to carry on the war, of course).
I'm pretty sure however that Venice would not be too shy if a window of opportunity opened, and the Ottomans on the sea had become a major foe, but maybe "invincible" is a bit too much.

As a matter of fact, I said that Venice would be in a position to auction her services (and her fleet). To keep a war galley in the water costs a bundle (they were very man-power intensive), and a galley in the water degrades pretty fast. If the pope and his choir boys want a Venetian fleet to sweep down the Adriatic and attack the Ottomans transports, they'll have to fork up a stiff price, be it in money, commercial concessions or land concessions.
By the same token, if the Sultan is interested to keep Venice out of the fray(and I'm sure he is - or at least his vazir is), commercial concessions would be very much to the point, starting with the abolition of the annual tribute.
And a stiff price will be paid if Venice has to participate in the supply chain of the Ottoman army (as is said they supplied Otranto).

 

[Tocomocho]

The King of Aragon at the time is novice Ferdinand II the Catholic (reigned 1479-1516). He was also King of Sicily and King consort in Castile. Ferdinand II was allied to Naples and probably willing to help. But this early in his reign, his hold on the Aragonese throne might not be secure enough for long campaigns.

Hogwash. He is the only surviving son of his father and there is no other possible claimant. He is a long experienced general despite his age, and for all real purposes he has conquered Castile from Aragon in four years. Why would he have the lesser problem to assist Naples, which is an Aragonese vassal in all but name and a long time target of Aragonese interest?

And the thing is, Naples did ask Aragon for help IOTL. Aragon did send an army to help it. The only reason full war did not erupt between Castile&Aragon and the Ottomans then was because the Ottomans pulled out first.

His hold in Castile was also hardly secure, as he and his wife Isabella had to fight a civil war to gain its throne. A war which had only ended in 1478. There was also bad blood with Portugal which had assisted the other side in said civil war.

Peace was signed in 1479 that already gave Portugal everything it wanted to but the dynastic union with Castile (namely, monopoly of the waters south of the Canaries and exclusive rights to expand on the Kingdom of Fez) plus the first daughter of the Catholic Monarchs and second in line to the throne was married to the Portuguese heir. It would be very assinine and why not, fairly stupid for Portugal to try anything while Castile & Aragon are fighting the biggest Muslim power on the Mediterranean under the blessing of the Pope (who already called Crusade IOTL, or was in the point to).

And within Castile itself, they've already moped the floor with the partidaries of La Beltraneja and they have accepted Isabella as queen, grudgely or not. If anything, this war against the Turks is the perfect time for these remaining suspicious Castilian nobles to prove their allegiance (or to be conveniently shipped to, depending of your take) the way they were used during the Granada War IOTL. If there is something that unites Iberians like glue is calling them to kill Muslims.