Ottomans in Italy

MAlexMatt

Banned
I dislike accepting extreme pessimism ("can't be done even though it was never seriously attempted OTL") or optimism ("can be done even though all attempts failed OTL") about empires.

Thing is, ain't nobody arguing that former premise.

In fact, the only arguments I see in this topic are against the latter premise.

People arguing that the Ottomans can't do it even though they managed campaigns at a greater distance on the grounds that the logistics are problematic is...assuming that solutions cannot be found rather than were not sought. "Obviously, there's no difficulty supplying an army in Egypt, since we all know Egypt is close by and undefended, but southern Italy would make invading China look practical." (exaggeration for illustration of why I'm being "contrary").

Again, nobody made this argument. You made the entire thing up in your head!

This is called a strawman fallacy, and I'd accuse you of logical inconsistency if I was at all convinced you were being logical, rather than just knee-jerking towards whichever side you've arbitrarily decided is better to argue for.

If that's the same as being contrary for the sake of it, we must be using two different languages.

Considering how completely you've misconstrued an entire side of the argument, with seemingly no actual basis for that misconstruction, I can only assume that, yes, that's being contrary.

Then again, you did associate support for the British government's policies towards the colonies with being a fascist. I'm fairly sure the only thing we agree on is that carnage isn't spelled with a K.

Fascist, authoritarian, whatever. If you're going to nit-pick words then that just further proves you're a contrarian.

Of course, there's nothing wrong with being contrarian. Some of the greatest thinkers in history have been contrarian.

Your problem is you're a contrarian that doesn't know shit. I can't count the times you've begun participation in a topic with, "I don't know much, but...", or, "I'm not expert, but...", etc etc.

You need a hefty dose of humble kid.
 
Thing is, ain't nobody arguing that former premise.

In fact, the only arguments I see in this topic are against the latter premise.

Thing is, someone is very much arguing closer to the former premise than anyone is to the latter. And the point is that my reason for being "contrary" is opposition to either treating something as impossible that was doable or vice-versa, not that its a contest between "easy as pie" and "undoable under any circumstances".

Someone else - Admiral Matt I think - presented a possibility in a general sort of way. I happen to agree that its possible.

Again, nobody made this argument. You made the entire thing up in your head!

This is called a strawman fallacy, and I'd accuse you of logical inconsistency if I was at all convinced you were being logical, rather than just knee-jerking towards whichever side you've arbitrarily decided is better to argue for.
No, people are making the argument that the logistics would get in the way despite the fact the Ottomans accomplished more difficult feats elsewhere.

LordKalvan said:
Even disregarding the possibly unsurmontable difficulties of landing an army in southern Italy and keeping them fed and provisioned over the Adriatic (which is plainly not possible in the winter, by the way), the sultan has to take care of the Balkan front, the eastern Anatolian front (Safavids) and the Mamelukes in Syria (who as Stevep mentions, fought him to a standstill in 1485), the Polish commonwealth in Moldavia. Not to mention the fact that the bulk of the Ottoman armies is made up of timars, and these guys cannot simply go to war and stay there: they need to go back to their holds and manage them.

Sea-borne logistics are nice and easy, provided they come with a complete naval superiority. I don't remember the Ottomans ever trying to blockade the mouth of the Adriatic, which would be a major undertaking (OTOH, I do remember at least 4 or 5 instances of Venice blockading the Dardanelles).
The most the Ottomans ever did boils down to a couple of sieges on Corfu, and one of them was quite a poor thing.
...
By this time the harvest is in, so the army must bring his own provisions along. How big an army, btw? 100,000 men, out of which 25-30 k cavalry, 10 k auxiliaries and the rest infantry? Add another 30 k for camp followers and servants. This means 130 k overall, and on average a man need 5 pounds of bread per day. Then the supply route must be guarded against raids. I'd say that most of the cavalry will be needed for that, and at least 10-15 k of infantry to garrison towns and casles along the route.
And if you're really thinking I'm just "knee-jerking towards whichever side (I)'ve arbitrarily decided is better to argue for", I really want to know what Elfwine you're arguing with.

Considering how completely you've misconstrued an entire side of the argument, with seemingly no actual basis for that misconstruction, I can only assume that, yes, that's being contrary.
Considering how the logistical issue of supplying an invading army is the better part (in both senses) of the point LordKalvan appears to be making, I wouldn't.

Fascist, authoritarian, whatever. If you're going to nit-pick words then that just further proves you're a contrarian.
No, it proves that you don't recognize I am not a fascist/authoritarian/whatever.

That you think its nitpicking words...well, I suppose someone who apparently thinks the American colonists were being treated as the next thing above slaves would be incapable of accepting that any reasonable-minded person could disagree.

Of course, there's nothing wrong with being contrarian. Some of the greatest thinkers in history have been contrarian.
There was some French pest hanging around Frederick's court, whose name escapes me, for instance.

Your problem is you're a contrarian that doesn't know shit. I can't count the times you've begun participation in a topic with, "I don't know much, but...", or, "I'm not expert, but...", etc etc.

You need a hefty dose of humble kid.
I do know "shit". "I don't know much" is not "I know virtually nothing.", it means I have a basic idea of the general situation but not the specifics.

As LordKalvan put it on his knowledge:
LordKalvan said:
It's easy to say that the Ottomans are gorgeous and can kick ass, without substantiating the argument. My knowledge (albeit limited) of early Renaissance warfare on land and sea gives the lie to it.
And please do not invoke Mohacs, which was a nice example of Hungarian suicide :D I think that the wars with Safavid Persia are more to the point: there is a limit beyond which no state in this age can afford to project power.

But of course, the issue of how the Ottomans are limited in southern Italy but not Mesopotamia or Egypt is left unexplained.

And not being an expert is not the same as being utterly unfamiliar with the situation - I'm not an expert on the Union cavalry in the American Civil War, but I have a passable understanding of its performance in the Eastern theater.

I'm not suffering from a lack of humility (or a surplus). I am, however, fairly sure that you have a bone to pick with me and that we don't agree on something you seem to regard as an obvious case of Right vs. Wrong might not have helped.

I don't expect this post to accomplish much, but I would like to see you acknowledge that supporting the British in the American Revolution and being an authoritarian/fascist/whatever is not the same thing for the sake of civil disagreement.
 
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I don't know very much about the period, correct. But I do know enough to say that an empire which has accomplished conquests further away against stronger enemies is likely to be able to face the difficulties in the way of success in southern Italy.

There aren't "very long supply routes" by comparison to taking Egypt, for instance - a conquest the Ottomans actually accomplished. The logistical difficulties for a power that controls the sea - which the power that has defeated Venice is capable of doing if it commits the resources to do so - are less than for campaigning into Hungary.
The first attempt of invading Syria ended up in a failure. The second one - 30 years later - was successful. Obviously something happened inbetween these two events: I'll give you a tip, there were two major changes that tipped the scales in Ottoman favor.
The other thing you fail - repeatedly - to understand is that the Ottomans marched to the conquest of Egypt, same as they marched in the campaign to conquer Hungary. During both Egyptian wars the Ottoman fleet was used to support the army, but their role was limited to logistical support along the coast.
The invasion of southern Italy requires ferrying an army across the straits of Otranto, and keeping it supplied. I'm sure that even you would agree that it is quite a different undertaking.
As far as the Hungary campaign is concerned, I'll be very happy to hear why you consider it such a momentous undertaking: I'm sure you have plenty of good reasons to share with us.

And your assertion that the Ottomans can't do it all in one season therefore it can't be done is treating it as if there is no way they can plan a war that would take longer. How long did it take Castile and Aragon to take out Granada? Was that beyond the campaigning of "the early Renaissance" because it took more than one year?

I am fairly sure we can find other examples without much searching, but as Aragon and Castile are weaker than the Ottoman Empire, and yet they managed to launch such a war in roughly the time period we seem to be looking at specifically, the question of "so why can't the Ottomans?" needs an answer.
What has Granada to do with an invasion of southern Italy? Granada was comfortably withing the power projection limit of Aragona and Castille, and could scarcely be relieved by a friendly power.

Other people have conquered and held southern Italy. With less resources and a less developed state. Them coming down from the north doesn't change the issue of resources and roads that run north-south also do as well south-north.
You truly don't know what you are talking about: moving from north to south or viceversa is relatively easy, one marches along the coast. Crossing the Appennines - as the Ottomans would have to do since they come from the east is a horse of a different color. There was only one suitable road, the old via Trajana from Brindisi to Benevento, where it joined the via Appia, and it crossed the mountains and the narrows were defended by strong castles (and Benevento itself was a strong fortified city).

Speaking as someone with a "minimum knowledge of history and the expansion of the Ottoman empire", I didn't know whether they ever accomplished it or not (as doing so for some period of time would not assist their wars in other theaters), and I certainly don't know why you're acting as if the Ottomans are incapable of doing it if they attempt the kind of invasion we're looking at.

One would think the Ottomans were barely holding on to what they have by the tone of your posts.

Yes, you don't know. And again you mix up naval battles with limited objectives in the Egean sea and around Morea with gaining lasting naval superiority in open sea, quite farther away from the heart of the Ottoman empire.
Reading the tone of your posts, one would believe that the Ottomans could have conquered the world. There was a sultan who swore to ride his horse into the Baltic sea. He ended up bogged in the winter siege of an obscure fortress in southern Poland, and lost two thirds of his army to cold and sickness. Then when he went back to Costantinople he was deposed by a mutiny of the janissaries and strangled.
 

MAlexMatt

Banned
LordKalvan, do you believe, if they were sufficiently willing to dedicate the resources necessary, that the Ottomans would be capable of conquering Southern Italy?
 
But of course, the issue of how the Ottomans are limited in southern Italy but not Mesopotamia or Egypt is left unexplained.

Maybe you should tell us why Mesopotamia and Egypt were successful Ottoman enterprises (mind, not on the first try, which is somehow surprising since it is well known that the Ottomans kick ass), while there was just the Otranto half-hearted attempt in southern Italy.

This would do wonders to convince everyone that you know what you are talking about rather than being a contrary nitpicker.
 
The first attempt of invading Syria ended up in a failure. The second one - 30 years later - was successful. Obviously something happened inbetween these two events: I'll give you a tip, there were two major changes that tipped the scales in Ottoman favor.
The other thing you fail - repeatedly - to understand is that the Ottomans marched to the conquest of Egypt, same as they marched in the campaign to conquer Hungary. During both Egyptian wars the Ottoman fleet was used to support the army, but their role was limited to logistical support along the coast.
The invasion of southern Italy requires ferrying an army across the straits of Otranto, and keeping it supplied. I'm sure that even you would agree that it is quite a different undertaking.
As far as the Hungary campaign is concerned, I'll be very happy to hear why you consider it such a momentous undertaking: I'm sure you have plenty of good reasons to share with us.

I'm sure that even you are capable of understanding that "I'm sure that even you' statements are a great way to provoke hostility rather than discussion.

And supplying an army by water is easier than by land, and southern Italy is closer than Egypt.

If they can ferry over an army to begin with (and they do seem to have managed a fair sized starting force plus supplies in the OTL quickly dropped operation), then they have the benefit of the ease of travel by water - and doing so with a larger force would obviously mean that their command of the sea is sufficiently secure to have a supply line in place, or the force being landed to begin with is not happening.

What has Granada to do with an invasion of southern Italy? Granada was comfortably withing the power projection limit of Aragona and Castille, and could scarcely be relieved by a friendly power.
As stated, an example of a multiyear war in this period. And southern Italy is a lot closer to the Ottoman state than Mesopotamia.

You truly don't know what you are talking about: moving from north to south or viceversa is relatively easy, one marches along the coast. Crossing the Appennines - as the Ottomans would have to do since they come from the east is a horse of a different color. There was only one suitable road, the old via Trajana from Brindisi to Benevento, where it joined the via Appia, and it crossed the mountains and the narrows were defended by strong castles (and Benevento itself was a strong fortified city).

No, I am responding to your point about invaders coming from the North.

And how strong are these castles in the days of artillery? Are they any better than any other castles taken out by Ottoman guns?

This is a query on specifics. The amount I know on Italian castles in particular could fit in a a thimble with room left over for the amount I know about the Sultan's harem and his birthmarks.

I do know that even early artillery did a pretty good job of rendering castles increasingly less dominant, and the Ottomans are known for having a good artillery train.

Yes, you don't know. And again you mix up naval battles with limited objectives in the Egean sea and around Morea with gaining lasting naval superiority in open sea, quite farther away from the heart of the Ottoman empire.

Naval superiority in the Adriatic is not exactly the same as trying to control the middle of the Atlantic ocean, nor is the Adriatic out of reach of the Ottoman navy.

If it can go as far as Egypt, it can go as far as southern Italy.

Reading the tone of your posts, one would believe that the Ottomans could have conquered the world. There was a sultan who swore to ride his horse into the Baltic sea. He ended up bogged in the winter siege of an obscure fortress in southern Poland, and lost two thirds of his army to cold and sickness. Then when he went back to Costantinople he was deposed by a mutiny of the janissaries and strangled.

Quoting myself from earlier. The important parts put in bold:

Elfwine said:
So while I think (taking southern Italy) is possible, I think it is also getting to the point of maxing out the Empire's disposable resources.

Elfwine said:
Is there a limit? Yes. No one is disputing that - until Eurofed decides that the Ottomans are Roman heirs and he adds them to his hegemon-fantasy scenarios - butis southern Italy outside that limit? That's harder to accept.

The ultimate limit of Empire and the specific impossibility of conquest in southern Italy, which may or may not be pursued as an "instead of" rather than an "in addition to" expansion (the original post gives no indication one way or the other on what he's asking about) are entirely different matters.

This being said, I think it would be difficult for the Ottomans to achieve such a level of superiority as to render (conquest of southern Italy) inevitable short of significant sacrifices elsewhere.


Where, pray tell, am I arguing anything along the lines of the Ottomans being able to conquer anything and everything they aim for without limit? If you can find me saying so in any of my posts in this thread, I will concede the argument and apologize for the waste of time.

I'm stating specifically that I think southern Italy is possible, possibly in addition to their OTL conquests.
 
Maybe you should tell us why Mesopotamia and Egypt were successful Ottoman enterprises (mind, not on the first try, which is somehow surprising since it is well known that the Ottomans kick ass), while there was just the Otranto half-hearted attempt in southern Italy.

This would do wonders to convince everyone that you know what you are talking about rather than being a contrary nitpicker.

Maybe you should tell us why you think that an empire capable of succeeding in those areas is not capable of similarly surmounting the problems of conquering southern Italy which is much closer to home. Not merely what those problems are. But feeding 100,000 men takes as much bread in one campaign as another.

That the Ottomans are successful is not the same thing as invincible, but it is a sign that the Ottomans actually committing to an invasion here has at least the potential to be successful, if it is pursued instead of abandoned by sultans with other interests.

I am not Abdul and I do not agree with him that the Ottomans are the unchallenged military giants in a world of military dwarves - but their record is good enough to suggest that they can overcome logistical issues and raising the number of troops needed and the tactical/strategic challenge of the campaign itself across a wider area than who they would be facing in the late 15th century.
 
LordKalvan, do you believe, if they were sufficiently willing to dedicate the resources necessary, that the Ottomans would be capable of conquering Southern Italy?

Not pre-1500, which is the period we are considering.
It might become theoretically feasible after a reverse Lepanto, where the Ottoman fleets would gain control of the mouth of the Adriatic, but it would still be a very daunting task for limited gains and I doubt it would be attempted.

Mind, Lepanto's outcome was never really in doubt once the fleets engaged and the Ottoman fleet should have refused the engagement.
 
Maybe you should tell us why you think that an empire capable of succeeding in those areas is not capable of similarly surmounting the problems of conquering southern Italy which is much closer to home. Not merely what those problems are. But feeding 100,000 men takes as much bread in one campaign as another.

That the Ottomans are successful is not the same thing as invincible, but it is a sign that the Ottomans actually committing to an invasion here has at least the potential to be successful, if it is pursued instead of abandoned by sultans with other interests.

I am not Abdul and I do not agree with him that the Ottomans are the unchallenged military giants in a world of military dwarves - but their record is good enough to suggest that they can overcome logistical issues and raising the number of troops needed and the tactical/strategic challenge of the campaign itself across a wider area than who they would be facing in the late 15th century.

I really believe there is no more to be said, is there?
It takes two to have a constructive discussion, and neither of them must be a contrary guy.
 
I really believe there is no more to be said, is there?
It takes two to have a constructive discussion, and neither of them must be a contrary guy.

There isn't much of a constructive discussion when one person is taking something the other person has specifically said they do not believe as their argument, with or without contrary guys.

You haven't offered any reasons that the Ottomans can't, should they remain interested, continue what they started in 1480.

http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~fisher/bosnia/readings/sugar3.html

Doesn't sound as if the Ottomans are so challenged as to be unable to do more, simply that Bayezid is not as aggressive as Mehmed.

Searching for a good description of the Ottoman forces at Otranto, and not of Eight Hundred Martyrs, because that really doesn't explain much of anything even if they were martyred.

Why can't Bayezid further this expedition? What is he facing? Hungary? Venice? Who is posing a threat?

It seems unlikely to put it mildly that a power that was able to ferry over and supply the number of troops that occupied Otranto for a year was almost-inevitably unable to supply or move troops to southern Italy for further campaigning in the 1480s.

http://www.uni-mannheim.de/mateo/camenaref/cmh/cmh103.html#081

No mention of any defeat preventing the Ottomans from coming with quite sufficient force, just Mehmed's death ending the plans.

So...what is the basis for suggesting its impossibility?
 
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Ottoman rule in Italy would be as long-lasting and successful as rule of the ERE was. That would be the far end of Ottoman power projection and at the limits of where they can realistically hope to rule with some degree of permanence. This is because the Ottomans share a lot of the same geographic weaknesses with that kind of power production that the ERE did, and also because here the French kings, their major dynastic allies, might decide their interests are better served by extorting concessions from the papacy in exchange for curbstomping the Turks.

The Ottomans can no more hold parts of Italy by this point than the Empire of Justinian could hold the Ostrogothic Kingdom of Italy.
 
I dislike accepting extreme pessimism ("can't be done even though it was never seriously attempted OTL") or optimism ("can be done even though all attempts failed OTL") about empires.

People arguing that the Ottomans can't do it even though they managed campaigns at a greater distance on the grounds that the logistics are problematic is...assuming that solutions cannot be found rather than were not sought. "Obviously, there's no difficulty supplying an army in Egypt, since we all know Egypt is close by and undefended, but southern Italy would make invading China look practical." (exaggeration for illustration of why I'm being "contrary").

If that's the same as being contrary for the sake of it, we must be using two different languages.

Then again, you did associate support for the British government's policies towards the colonies with being a fascist. I'm fairly sure the only thing we agree on is that carnage isn't spelled with a K.

To me the Ottomans can conquer Naples and Sicily if everything goes well for them and they win a Lepanto-level victory over the Christian states. They will not hold them for very long and their power there would be as ephemoral as ERE power was. Justinian conquered the entire Italian peninsula but it was fairly rapidly lost and the process entrenched further the division of Italy into multiple city-states.

The ERE of Justinian relative to its rivals was if anything even stronger than the Ottomans at their height was, and his successors found maintaining that empire difficult. The Ottomans are the only state with a proper military here, and also with a proper sense of strategic. Focusing all this effort on a conquest of Italy to them is akin to the USSR devoting extreme effort to the conquest of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia or the British Empire focusing on Africa and North America at the expense of India, it's not an area of primary imperial focus for them.
 
There are primarily two reasons why Ottoman conquest of Italy (in 1480s) would've been pretty fast.

1) Venice was just recently crushed ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman–Venetian_War_(1463–1479) ). This factor has seemed to always escaped everyone's radar here somehow....

2) Ottoman resources were order of magnitude larger than Aragon's.

Now what's left is to figure out the exact size of both Ottoman and Aragonese military at the time mobilizable to the theater, especially navy, to determine whether there will be pretty much zero naval obstacle to Ottoman efforts....
 
And how strong are these castles in the days of artillery? Are they any better than any other castles taken out by Ottoman guns?

This is a query on specifics. The amount I know on Italian castles in particular could fit in a a thimble with room left over for the amount I know about the Sultan's harem and his birthmarks.

I do know that even early artillery did a pretty good job of rendering castles increasingly less dominant, and the Ottomans are known for having a good artillery train.

This is a key question. In the 1494-95 French campaign I have read that one reason for his success was that he had a new siege train, which was much more mobile and powerful than before. That he managed to take a number of fortresses very quickly, including one that had recently withstood a 7 years siege. [Although checking the Wiki entry this seems to suggest a shortage of sieges].

I do know that in 1453 the Ottomans had to build their siege cannons in situ for the final capture of Constantinople. Also that this in turn depended on renegade Hungarian gun-makers.

I have asked this question when I have seen previous threads on this issue and never received any answer. Do the Ottomans have a mobile siege train capable of doing what the French could. If so they probably can take most of S Italy, in a similar way to the French. If they don't and would have to rely on storming, starving or building guns at each location, then they are unlikely to make deep or lasting progress in Italy. [In one way the relatively small area of S Italy, coupled with the rough terrain makes conquest more difficult than the broad plains of Hungary as there are bottlenecks.

I would say that if they could do it then the shock from this could well mobilise a coalition against them as its a significant increase in the threat to the Christian states of the western Med. That is a totally different question.;)

Steve
 
They did have a effective siege train but in terms of the Battle of Vienna several mishaps lead to it being in poor shape for that campaign.
 
To me the Ottomans can conquer Naples and Sicily if everything goes well for them and they win a Lepanto-level victory over the Christian states. They will not hold them for very long and their power there would be as ephemoral as ERE power was. Justinian conquered the entire Italian peninsula but it was fairly rapidly lost and the process entrenched further the division of Italy into multiple city-states.

The ERE of Justinian relative to its rivals was if anything even stronger than the Ottomans at their height was, and his successors found maintaining that empire difficult. The Ottomans are the only state with a proper military here, and also with a proper sense of strategic. Focusing all this effort on a conquest of Italy to them is akin to the USSR devoting extreme effort to the conquest of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia or the British Empire focusing on Africa and North America at the expense of India, it's not an area of primary imperial focus for them.

Well, some level of control of Italy remained for a couple centuries - or half a millennium if we only count (part of) the southern half.

That's not entirely uninspiring here.

Not sure I follow why Italy is that unimportant to them either. Not saying you're wrong, but those seem extreme comparisons.
 
Well, some level of control of Italy remained for a couple centuries - or half a millennium if we only count (part of) the southern half.

That's not entirely uninspiring here.

Not sure I follow why Italy is that unimportant to them either. Not saying you're wrong, but those seem extreme comparisons.

Because the great reservoir of Ottoman manpower is drawn from the Balkans via the Devshirme, and the Balkans is also where the bulk of their strength is concentrated. Parts of Italy can be conquered, occupying it for extended durations is unlikely. Most of the ERE's conquests disappeared fairly rapidly following Justinian's conquest, the Ottomans would have the same issue.
 
Because the great reservoir of Ottoman manpower is drawn from the Balkans via the Devshirme, and the Balkans is also where the bulk of their strength is concentrated. Parts of Italy can be conquered, occupying it for extended durations is unlikely. Most of the ERE's conquests disappeared fairly rapidly following Justinian's conquest, the Ottomans would have the same issue.

Ah. And attention taken away from that base is ill-spent.

Not so much "Italy isn't worth conquest" as "the Balkans are that much more important".
 
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